A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of the Army
There has been much irrelevant discussion about the ability or inability of commanders in the North and South. The fact is that political instead of military ideas controlled in a very large degree the selection of commanders in the Union armies; while for three whole years the authorities in Washington could not see the necessity of unity of action in all the armies under one military leader. It required three years of costly experience to teach the government that simple lesson, taught in the military text-books! As experience finally proved, there was no lack of men capable of leading even large armies to victory; but, with few exceptions, they were not put in command until many others had been tried. Information as to military fitness was not sought from military sources. If a lawyer is wanted for the supreme bench, or an engineer to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major-generals!
Again, the policy of the government required the capture and occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies, wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous “territorial” strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the rebellion in two years instead of four.
It is true that some of the worst of these “blind guides” were men supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen would have known by what standard to judge of any one man’s fitness for high command.
It is true that no amount of military education can supply the place of military genius or create a great commander. It may possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan, or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army. But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create such an army and command its subdivisions, and this is the work to be done instantly upon the outbreak of war. The selection of commanders for the several armies, and, above all, of a general-in-chief, must of course be the most difficult; for it is not probable that any man young enough will have had any experience in such commands in this country. But even this difficulty will disappear in a very great measure if statesmen will make the study of the art and science of war, instead of far less important subjects, a part of their pastime. They will thus acquire the ability to judge, from personal acquaintance with military men and conversation with other best informed, of the relative fitness of officers for the highest commands.