Troubles With the Sioux Indians in 1890-91
It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars—starvation of the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian character had suggested a method by which the other cause of discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies. Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely, fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would, at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for general service as the same number of white men. Yet the transfer of a few hundred of the best Sioux warriors from the Sioux side to our side would much more than compensate for the loss of the same number of white troops. The result of that experiment seemed to be entirely satisfactory. At all events, there has been no great Indian war, nor any threat of one, since that experiment was begun. It has served to tide over the time during which the young men, who had from earliest childhood listened to stories of the Custer massacre and other great Indian achievements, were undergoing transformation from the life and character of savage warriors to those of civilized husbandmen, under the system of allotments in severalty. When the short warlike part of the life of one generation is past, the danger will no longer exist.
In June, 1891, at Keokuk, Iowa, I married Miss Georgia Kilbourne, daughter of Mrs. George E. Kilbourne of that city. Then a host of old soldiers of the Union army reassembled to greet their comrade.
In 1892 this country seemed to be on the verge of war with the little republic of Chile. So confident were some officials of the administration that war was inevitable, that I was asked to make an estimate of the military force which would be necessary to occupy and hold a vital point in Chilean territory until the demands of the United States were complied with. It was assumed, of course, that the navy could easily do all the rest. Pending the consideration of this subject, so disagreeable to me, I had a dream which I repeated at the time to a few intimate friends. I saw in the public street a man holding a mangy-looking dog by the neck, and beating him with a great club, while a crowd of people assembled to witness the “sport.” Some one asked the man why he was beating the poor dog. He replied: “Oh, just to make him yelp.” But the dog did not “yelp.” He bore his cruel punishment without a whine. Then he was transformed into a splendid animal, one of the noblest of his species, and the entire crowd of bystanders, with one accord, rushing in and compelled the man to desist from beating him.
CHAPTER XXVIII Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of 1894—Military Control of the Pacific Railways—United States Troops in the City of Chicago—Orders Sent to General Miles, and his Reports—The Proclamation of the President—Instructions to Govern the Troops in Dealing with a Mob—The Duties of the Military Misunderstood— Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific Railways.
In 1894 the vast development of railroad communication between the Mississippi valley and the Pacific Ocean, and the similar building of new cities and founding of industrial enterprises in the region between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, both in anticipation of the future development of the country rather then in response to any demand then existing, having been substantially completed, or suspended for an indefinite time, a large amount of capital so invested was found for the time unproductive, and a great number of laborers were left in the Pacific States without any possible employment. The great majority of these laborers were, as usual, without any accumulated means to pay their transportation to any other part of the country, and hence were left to drift as they might toward the East, subsisting by whatever means they could find during their long tramp of many hundreds of miles. Similar and other causes had produced at the same time industrial depression throughout the country, so that the unfortunate laborers drifting eastward were only an additional burden upon communities already overloaded with unemployed labor. Thus the borrowing of foreign capital to put into unprofitable investments, and the employment of great numbers of laborers in making premature developments, met with the consequences which are sure to follow disregard of natural laws. The management of the Pacific railroads did not appear to appreciate the wisdom of mitigating, so far as was in their power, the evil which had resulted from their own policy, by giving free transportation to the laborers who had been stranded on the Pacific coast. Hence all the transcontinental roads were soon blocked by lawless seizures of trains, and suffered losses far greater than they saved in transportation. Indeed, the requisite transportation of destitute laborers eastward would have cost the roads practically nothing, while their losses resulting from not providing it were very great. Every possible effort was made for a long time to deal effectively with this evil by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; but such methods proved entirely inadequate. The government was finally compelled, in consequence of the almost total interruption of interstate commerce and of the transportation of the United States mails and troops, to assume military control along the lines of all the Pacific roads, and direct the department commanders to restore and maintain, by military force, traffic and transportation over those roads.