Orders of the President
The following are in substance the orders sent on July 6 and 7, by the President’s direction, to all the department commanders in the country traversed by the Pacific railroads, and the President’s proclamation which followed two days later, under the operation of which traffic was resumed throughout all that vast region of country as rapidly as trains carrying troops could be moved. No serious opposition or resistance was offered anywhere.
“(Telegram.)
“Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894.
“Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia,
Vancouver Barracks, Washington:
“In view of the fact, as substantiated by communications received from the Department of Justice, from military official reports, and from other reliable sources, that by reason of unlawful obstructions, and combinations or assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States, and to prevent obstructions of the United States mails, and interruptions to commerce between the States, on the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and to secure to the United States the right guaranteed by section II of the act approved July 2, 1864, constituting the Northern Pacific Railroad ‘a post route and military road subject to the use of the United States for postal, military, naval, and all other government service,’ you are directed by the President to employ the military force under your command to remove obstructions to the mails, and to execute any orders of the United States courts for the protection of property in the hands of receivers appointed by such courts, and for preventing interruption of interstate commerce, and to give such protection to said railroad as will prevent any unlawful and forcible obstruction to the regular and orderly operation of said road ‘for postal, military, naval, and all other government service.’
“J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding.”
“(Telegram)
“Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894.
“Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia,
Vancouver Barracks, Washington:
“The order of the President sent you this morning by telegraph is the same in substance as one sent last night to General Merritt, the purpose being to extend military protection over the entire line of the Northern Pacific Railroad from St. Paul to Puget Sound. In the movement of the troop-trains along the line of the road in the execution of this order, the Department of Justice will furnish a sufficient force of marshals to make arrests and hold prisoners subject to the orders of the United States courts. You will please concert with General Merritt by direct correspondence the necessary exchanges of guards upon moving trains at the military posts in your department and in his, nearest to each other, so that the troops may return to their proper stations without unnecessary delay.
“J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding.”
“By the President of the United States of America.
“A Proclamation.
“Whereas, by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations, and assemblages of persons, is has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States at certain points and places within the States of North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Wyoming, Colorado, and California, and the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, and especially along the lines of such railways traversing said States and Territories as are military roads and post routes, and are engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying United States mails:
“And whereas, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, and protecting property belonging to the United States or under its protection, and of preventing obstructions of the United States mails and of commerce between the States and Territories, and of securing to the United States the right guaranteed by law to the use of such roads for the postal, military, naval, and other government service, the President has employed a part of the military forces of the United States:
“Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, do hereby command all persons engaged in, or in any way connected with, such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before three o’clock in the afternoon on the tenth day of July instant.
“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United states to he hereto affixed.
“Done at the city of Washington, this ninth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and in the independence of the United States the one hundred and nineteenth.
“Grover Cleveland.
“By the President:
“W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State.”
[( 1) See the report of Attorney-General Olney, December 1, 1894, p. 31.]
CHAPTER XXIX Lessons of the Civil War—Weakness of the Military Policy at the Outbreak of the Rebellion—A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of the Army—Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate Authorities— Territorial Strategy—General Military Education Indispensable to Good Citizenship—Organization of the National Guard—General Grant Without Military Books—Measures Necessary to the National Defense.
In my opinion, the most important of all the lessons taught by the Civil War is the necessity of using in the most effective manner the means at the disposal of the government when war breaks out. The necessity for adequate preparation is a different question, which has been much discussed, and in regard to which some progress has been made toward a satisfactory solution. Whatever the outcome may be in respect to preparation for war, certainly the government and the people ought to adopt such a policy as will lead to the best practicable use of the preparations which have actually been made.
In this respect the policy adopted by the National Government in 1861 was about as weak as possible, while that of the Confederates was comparatively strong. It is said that this weak policy was due largely to General Scott, and grew out of his distrust of volunteer troops; he having thought it necessary to have a considerable body of regular troops to give steadiness and confidence to the volunteers or militia. This is a very good theory, no doubt, providing the regulars could be provided in advance in such numbers as to produce the desired effect. But if that theory had been relied upon in 1861, the “Confederate States” would have established their independence long before the regular army could be organized and made effective. What was demanded by the necessities of the country in 1861 was the best large army that could be made in the shortest possible time, not a better small army to be made in a much longer time.
The United States government actually had in hand the means of creating in a very short time a far larger efficient army than the South could possibly have raised in the same time. This means had been provided, with great care and at great expense, through a long term of years, by the education of young men at the Military Academy, and their practical training in the small regular army in all kinds of actual service, including one foreign war and almost constant campaigns against the Indians. Nowhere in the world could have been found a better corps of officers to organize, instruct, and discipline new troops. Yet those officers were hardly employed at all in that service at first, when it was of supreme importance. Some time later, when the necessity was not so great, a few officers of the army were permitted to accept commands in the volunteers. Even then it often required great “influence” to secure such “indulgences.” Scores of young officers, qualified in every way to do such service in the first six months of the war, sought in vain for opportunities to render the valuable services for which the government had educated them, and were compelled to drag along four years in the discharge of duties several grades below their qualifications.