Sherman’s “March to the Sea”
When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he had not, as events proved, sufficient reason for assuming “Thomas’s strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field,” or even to hold Nashville against him, much less to hold “the line of the Tennessee River firmly,” which was the condition upon which Grant at first consented that Sherman might make “the trip to the sea-coast.”( 1)
Thomas’s concurrence in Sherman’s opinion, as shown in his despatch of November 12, simply shows that they were both in the same error; for A. J. Smith’s troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman’s plan. The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman’s six corps, without the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to say that the hazards of that retreat from Pulaski and of the defense at Franklin were far greater than any portion of Sherman’s army had ever before encountered, and far greater than any army ever ought to meet except in case of necessity—hazards which, at that stage of the war, with our vastly superior armies in the field, it would have been inexcusable voluntarily to incur. If it is asked why such hazard was taken, the answer has heretofore been given. By it alone could the time be gained which was necessary for Thomas’s reinforcements to reach Nashville. The time gained was barely sufficient; one day less might have been fatal.
The question that at once arises is, Why have taken even a chance of error in a matter of so vital moment—an error that might have led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood’s strength in infantry, and less than half in effective cavalry. A few days’ delay on Sherman’s part in commencing his march would have disclosed to him the impossibility of Smith’s arrival in time, and have enabled him to send another corps from his superabundant force to assist Thomas. Such delay of only a few days could not have been of serious consequence in respect to Sherman’s plans. The near approach of winter was the only reason why an early start was important; and that was not considered any very serious obstacle to the operations of Hood or Thomas in a more unfavorable country for winter operations.
The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy’s cavalry were then known to be far from it. Sherman could have kept his army supplied, and ready to start any day he pleased. Why not have waited to see whether Thomas could get together troops enough to cope with Hood, and then, when sufficient preparation had been assured to fight the enemy, and only then, start off on a march where there was no considerable enemy to fight?
In the estimate of time, Sherman had no right to disregard even Thomas’s well-known “slowness of thought and action,” but was bound to take that into account.
I have never yet been able to see the wisdom of taking any hazard of defeat in Tennessee when we had ample force at command to secure victory there, with enough remaining to march wherever its commander pleased through the South, except where Hood’s or Lee’s army might be. By this I mean to say that three, or even two, of Sherman’s corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well as four, and thus have left Thomas force enough to make the defeat of Hood sure beyond contingency; or that Sherman should have delayed his march to the sea until Thomas had concentrated troops enough to defeat Hood.