Sherman’s Purpose in Marching to the Sea
But there was one objection—absolutely overruling, apparently, in Sherman’s mind—to any further attempt by Sherman himself, with the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary military object of his campaign—the destruction or capture of Hood’s army. To have done so would have conceded a temporary triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman’s mind.( 1) Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant’s cordial concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As “master of the situation,” he could afford to go on and substantially execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,—the change of base,—treating almost with contempt the enemy’s bold design to thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary operations of a military campaign,—those directly against the opposing army,—the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with a powerful army, directly against Lee’s army in Virginia, was the surest and probably the shortest possible way to end the war. Hence Sherman’s broad view of the entire national military situation, including the moral aspect of it, which was then of very great importance, gave rise to that grand conception of far-reaching strategy which must ever stamp its author as a master of that great art.
Sherman having thus come to the conclusion that he personally must abandon the attempt to “catch Hood,” as he called it, his “busy brain” did not fail to perceive every possible alternative plan of operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely opened up two other alternatives, one of which was before not possible, and the other only partly so. The one was a movement upon Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the capture of Lee’s army, and the other was to destroy the military resources of the Southern Atlantic States. The first was too grand, and perhaps might seem too visionary, to be talked about at first, nor was any mention of it at that time necessary. Besides, events might possibly render the march to Richmond unnecessary or impracticable; or, possibly, Sherman might be compelled for some reason to make his new base at Pensacola or Mobile, though he was determined to make it at Savannah, if possible; and hence it was necessary to have, in reserve as it were, a sufficient logical reason for the preliminary operation, if that finally had to stand alone.
Again, that part of the original plan which contemplated the capture of Savannah in advance could not be carried out. Grant could not spare the troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward by the upland route instead of through the swamps of South Carolina. But, as it was, Sherman was, as he thought, compelled to go to Savannah first, capture that place himself, and make that the base for his northward march. Hence there was no need to say anything to anybody about what further was to be done until after Savannah was in Sherman’s possession, and the time had arrived for him to consult Grant about the future. Yet in Sherman’s remarkable letter to Grant, dated November 6, 1864,( 2) written after it was too late to have any influence upon Grant’s approval of Sherman’s march, he disclosed to Grant the ulterior object he had in view. In discussing the reasons for selecting the route to Savannah rather than either of the others, he said: “Incidentally I might destroy the enemy’s depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforce our armies in Virginia.”