Change of Plan Before the Battle of Nashville
Of the general details of the battle of Nashville I do not propose to speak, but simply to notice a few of its most important points. The plan of battle, as published, placed my command—the Twenty-third Corps—in the left center of our line, where only a feint was to be made. The Fourth Corps was to carry a salient advanced line, while the main attack was to be made on the enemy’s extreme left by A. J. Smith’s corps and the cavalry. After the order was prepared I went to General Thomas with a map of the position showing the exact length of the several parts of the enemy’s line, and explained to him that the force he had assigned to our left wing was at least 10,000 men more than could be used to any advantage unless for a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith’s force was not large enough for the real attack, considering the extent of the ground occupied by the enemy on that flank. Hence I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining on the left of Wood. To this suggestion General Thomas readily acceded, and orally authorized me to carry it into effect, but made no change in his written order. The result of this change of plan was that the close of the first day’s engagement found the Twenty-third Corps on the extreme right of our infantry line, in the most advanced position captured from the enemy. Yet General Thomas, in his official report, made no mention of this change of plan, but said “the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, [was] strictly adhered to.”( 1) The “alterations” were certainly “few”. A change from 10,000 to 20,000 infantry in the main attacking force may not properly be described as many “alterations,” but it looks like one very large one—sufficient, one would suppose, to determine the difference between failure and success.
The plan of battle issued December 14 had been matured and made known to the principal subordinate commanders several days before, when General Thomas intended to attack, but was prevented by the storm. Hence there had been ample time for critical consideration and discussion of the details of that plan, the result of which was the modification made at the conference in the afternoon or evening of December 14, which modification was not embodied in the written order, but was orally directed to be carried out. If General Thomas had caused that clerical work to be done in the evening of December 14, his published orders and his battle of December 15 would have been in complete harmony. There would not, so far as I know, have been even a “few alterations.” In this connection, the difference between the “Special Field Order No. 342” of December 14, as recorded in General Thomas’s order-book, and the copy embodied in his official report, as explained in a foot-note in the War Records, is not unimportant.( 2) In the order-book he says: “Major-General Schofield will mass the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter’s left flank against an attack by the enemy”; but in his report the words “will move with” are substituted for “will mass.” The latter, in military parlance, meant placing my corps in reserve, with a view to “co-operate with General Wood,” etc., whenever such co-operation might be necessary; while the words used in Thomas’s final report meant active co-operation with General Wood from the beginning of the engagement. In the body of his report General Thomas spoke of the position of the Twenty-third Corps as “in reserve,” from which position it was ordered to the right to join A. J. Smith’s troops in the attack. Hence it would seem that a position “in reserve” was what General Thomas had in mind both when he prepared his order of battle and when he wrote his report, and that the change to the words “will move with” was simply a clerical error.