XVIII
XIX
To follow up the pursuit [See Plan XIX] of the fragments of the two Russian corps, general Skrzynecki designated the division of cavalry (A) under general Lubinski, with a battery of light artillery. This detachment set out during the night, sending reconnoissances to the right and left, to see that the enemy did not prepare ambuscades. The army followed this advanced guard, which soon overtook the enemy (B), who was still in great disorder. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, and vehicles, were mingled together, pressing their retreat. At each step, our cavalry took up prisoners. Upon some positions the enemy attempted to make a stand, but every such attempt was thwarted, and he was carried along before our troops. This was the case in the position of Minsk and of Jendrzeiow, where two regiments of Russian cavalry were routed by the second regiment of chasseurs. It was the same case in the forest of Kaluszyn, where our artillery approached the Russian rear-guard, and poured upon them a fire of grape, which scattered death among their ranks. The Russians, being no longer in a state to make any stand whatever, fell into a panic, and commenced a general flight. They were pursued by general Lubinski as far as Kaluszyn, where night closed upon the scene of destruction.
This day cost the enemy nearly as much as the preceding. Besides their loss in dead and wounded, 3,000 prisoners fell into our hands, with three standards, four pieces of cannon, and a hundred vehicles of baggage, ammunition, &c.,—in fact, the whole baggage of the corps. But the most agreeable success of our army, on that day, was the taking possession of the hospitals of Minsk and Jendrzeiow, in which as many as two hundred of our comrades were lying wounded. To witness the joy of those brave sufferers was recompense enough for all our fatigues. The impetuosity of our attack was such, that the enemy had not time to burn the magazines of Milosna, Minsk, and Kaluszyn, which fell into our hands. To make a recapitulation of the loss of the enemy on those two days—it was as follows:—Two of their generals, Lewandowski and Szuszerin, taken prisoners, with as many as sixty officers, of different grades, 15,000 soldiers in killed, wounded and prisoners; 26 pieces of cannon, seven standards, 1,500 horses, a great quantity of different kinds of arms and implements, and as many as 100 vehicles of various kinds.
The disasters of these two Russian corps were the cause of the abandonment of the plan which had been adopted by marshal Diebitsch, of passing the Vistula between Pulawy and Maceiowice, opposite Kozienice, with the greater part of his army; and to execute which he had left his position on the latter days of March, and had reached the environs of Ryk. [See Plan XVI.] The fear of losing those two corps, together with the guard, had led him to return in the direction of the town of Kock, to afford them succor.
After these days, so fortunate for us, in which the Russian forces were again driven from before the walls of Warsaw, the position of their army was as follows. Their right wing, formed of the remains of the corps of Giesmar and Rosen, was at Boimie; detachments being also placed in the environs of Wengrow. The main body, under Diebitsch, was at Kock. His advanced posts extended to Wodynie, Seroczyn, and Zelechow. The Russian guard, which, as we have said, had formed the plan of joining their main body, and had left Ostrolenka by the road through Wengrow, was obliged, in consequence of the successes of our army, to abandon that plan, and to retire again to the environs of Ostrolenka, where they now were posted. In the palatinate of Lublin was the Russian corps under general Witt.
The position of our army was as follows. Our left wing was opposite Boimie. It sent out its reconnoissances along the river Kostrzyn, as far as Grombkow, Zimna-woda, and even beyond. The head-quarters of the general in chief were with the main body, at Latowicz. Our right wing was at Siennica. Its reconnoissances were sent out as far as Zelechow, at which place was a detached corps, under the command of general Pac. In this manner, the marshy rivers, Kostrzyn and Swider, covered our front. [Refer to Plan VI.] General Uminski, with his detached corps, was at Rozany, in the palatinate of Plock, opposed to the Russian guard. In the environs of the fortress of Zamosc in the palatinate of Lublin, opposed to the Russian corps of general Witt, was the corps of general Dwernicki. Besides this, a small corps was placed in the environs of the town of Granica, upon the left bank of the Vistula, under the command of general Sierawski.
While the main forces were acting with such success, the two detached corps, under generals Uminski and Dwernicki, had also fought gloriously, and gained important advantages. The corps of general Dwernicki spread terror in its vicinity, and the Russians were compelled to send a new corps against him, under the command of general Kreutz; so that the combined Russian forces opposed to him amounted to 20,000 men. Greatly superior as this force was, they did not dare to attack general Dwernicki, who, reinforced every day by volunteers coming from Galicia and Volhynia, soon found himself at the head of 4500 men, and 20 pieces of cannon. This corps, in concert with the garrison of Zamosc, was sufficient to hold in check all the operations of the enemy in that quarter.
On the 25th of March, general Dwernicki sent a reconnoissance as far as the environs of Uscilug, at which place a new Russian corps, coming from Turkey, was expected to arrive. This reconnoissance was composed of two battalions of infantry, one company of Galician volunteers, three squadrons of cavalry, and four pieces of cannon. The commander of this force was the brave colonel Russyian. The detachment arrived at the above place, and received intelligence of the approach of an advanced guard of the corps of general Rudiger, composed of two regiments or six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cossacks, and eight pieces of cannon. Colonel Russyian did not stay for the approach of this guard. He took possession of the different batteaux which were prepared for, and were waiting the arrival of the Russian force at the distance of a league from the town. Passing the river Bug, with his corps, in these boats, he suddenly attacked the Russian advanced guard with such success, that he took two thousand prisoners, and six pieces of cannon, and several hundred horses. With these trophies he returned and joined the corps, to their astonishment, for they had received but a single report from him, and had no expectation of such results. The rumor of the continual successes of this corps of general Dwernicki, spread along the borders of the Dnieper, reached the distant regions of our brethren in the Ukraine, and awakened in them an ardent desire to unite themselves to our cause.
For the continued and glorious advantages of this corps, which commenced its operations with 3,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and three pieces of cannon, and had nearly destroyed two Russian corps, those of Kreutz and Wirtemberg, taking 10,000 prisoners, and thirty pieces of cannon, the national government promoted its brave commander to the rank of full general of cavalry, and honored him with the surname of the famous Czarnecki, the ancient polish chief.50
The general in chief communicated to general Dwernicki his promotion, with the sincere thanks of the national government; and at the same time sent him instructions and advice in regard to the operations which he was then to follow. The corps of general Dwernicki was to manœuvre in such a manner as to menace continually the left wing of the Russian grand army. Keeping this object in view, he was not, unless with the expectation of some very extraordinary advantages, to remove himself very far from the fortress of Zamosc. This place was to serve as a point d’appui in every case of sudden danger. About this point he was to manœuvre, and from thence he was to push himself, as circumstances might allow, into the environs of Lublin and Wlodawa, to trouble incessantly the above mentioned wing, and even the rear of the Russian grand army. In this instruction of keeping himself near the fortress of Zamosc, and in the palatinate of Lublin generally, another advantage was contemplated: viz. that he might receive daily accessions of volunteers from Volhynia and Podolia. Our brethren, in those provinces, would hasten to join themselves to his victorious eagles, (of which disposition, indeed, he received continual evidence,) and, in this manner his corps would be gradually increased by such aid from those provinces, without attracting the attention of the enemy. As the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, from their geographical character, having no large forests, were not in a state to carry on a partizan warfare, as was quite practicable in Lithuania and Samogitia, and also as the Russians had several corps upon the frontiers of Turkey, which, by being concentrated in that open country, might be dangerous to our small forces, general Skrzynecki was of the opinion that general Dwernicki, by keeping near the frontiers of the above mentioned provinces, should rather act by a moral influence upon their inhabitants, than hazard certain advantages by entering them. The river Wieprz was to be the leaning point of his left wing, and the river Bug of his right. Between those two rivers, in a woody and marshy region, he would find many strong natural positions. Of such he would take advantage, and endeavor to strengthen them by different fortifications. General Dwernicki, in receiving these instructions, was also invested with full powers, by the national government, to institute a provisional administration over the above provinces, (in case that circumstances should lead him to establish a footing there,) similar to that of the kingdom in general, and to bring them into a state to act with effect in concert with the rest of the kingdom.
Footnotes
49 The horses taken on that day, and at the battle of Wawr, were employed to mount the entire new regiment of the Lancers of Augustow.
50 General Dwernicki, who received, among other titles, that also of the ‘Provider of cannon,’ used his cavalry so constantly in the charge upon artillery, that if the artillery of the enemy began its fire, and the charge was not ordered, our cavalry were always disappointed. This was the case at the battle of Kurow, on the 2d of March. As the enemy in that battle had placed his artillery in a commanding position, and as general Dwernicki was awaiting the arrival of detachments under colonel Lagowski, in the direction of Belzge, he was not disposed then to give the order for a charge, but preferred to amuse the enemy by various manœuvres of his cavalry. Passing down the front of his lancers, he observed that they wore a look of dissatisfaction. On noticing this, he was astonished, and demanded an explanation. ‘What does this mean, my dear comrades?’ said he; ‘you are sad at a moment when, after so many victories, you ought to be joyful.’ The lancers replied—‘Dear general, it is an hour since the enemy’s artillery commenced their fire, and you do not allow us to charge upon them.’ The general, smiling, answered, ‘Make yourselves content; you shall soon have that satisfaction;’—and in a short time, as the reader will remember, general Dwernicki, seeing the detachment of colonel Lagowski approaching, gave the order for an attack upon the enemy’s artillery, and in a moment they were driven from their position, sabred, and ten pieces of their cannon taken. The Russians, to whom the name of Dwernicki was a terror, would speak of him in the following manner: ‘What can we make of such a general? He performs no manœuvres, and never permits our artillery to fire. His generalship appears to lie only in taking possession at once of our cannon!’