VI
The centre (B), which was commanded by generals Skrzynecki and Krukowiecki, was to retire upon the road which leads from Stanislawow (9) to Okuniew (11). Upon this winding road, which traverses thick forests, the means of defence was easy.
The left wing (C), commanded by Szembek and Uminski, which was in the environs of Zegrz (4), received orders to gain Jablonna (16), and Zombke (15), on the same night. The great bridge over the Narew at Zegrz was to be destroyed, and a small detachment to be left at Zagroby, for the purpose of observing the enemy.
Conformably to the above orders, our entire line commenced the evacuation of its position, and an incessant fire was kept up throughout the line, during the whole day. In the morning, two squadrons of light cavalry, which were sent from Minsk to Stanislawow, met a regiment of cossacks, who were making a reconnoisance, after having traversed the forest of Jakubow. The cavalry threw themselves upon them, dispersed them, and took two hundred prisoners with their horses. Upon the position of Dembe, our cavalry threw themselves upon some Russian artillery which appeared upon our right, and were marching in a direction from Ruda. Six chests of ammunition were taken, and four pieces of cannon were spiked. At Stanislaus, the 2d regiment of hulans and the 4th of the line performed prodigies of valor, throwing themselves continually upon superior masses of the enemy. The division of general Zimirski repelled two successive attacks from a superior force of the enemy at Konik, upon the road between Dembe-Wielkie and Janowek. Twelve pieces of artillery, placed upon the elevated points of the road, poured an incessant fire of grape upon the masses which were advancing to the attack, and which were enclosed by forests on both sides, as well as impeded in their progress by the trees which had been placed across the road to obstruct them; and, although the enemy constantly renewed his attacking columns, he was not able to force our position, which indeed was not evacuated, until the movement of the general line required a corresponding withdrawal of this division.
Our left wing fought with equal advantages at Nasielsk. From this town, which was entirely in flames, the attacks of the enemy were repeatedly repulsed. Our artillery distinguished themselves by acts of daring valor. They drew their pieces into the midst of blazing streets, in order to pour a more effective fire upon the masses of the enemy, who had entered at the opposite extremities.
The first regiment of light infantry, having at their head the brave Szembek, threw themselves upon a part of the town occupied by a whole division of the enemy, and drove them out. Even in the midst of the burning town, our chasseurs fell upon and destroyed the different parties of the enemy. The enemy, on quitting the place, were exposed to continual attacks from our cavalry, under the command of general Uminski, who took on that day some hundred prisoners, and among them several officers.
Our right wing in its last position at Milosna (12), held the enemy in check before that town. General Zimirski placed his artillery upon the heights behind the town, from which the town and the adjoining plain was commanded. Every attempt of the enemy, every debouchment from the forest, cost him a severe loss. The enemy in vain took positions with his artillery to act upon us. He was not permitted to occupy Milosna until night approached.
At Okuniew, the road passes a marshy forest for more than half a mile. The enemy was imprudent enough to push his columns upon this road. General Skrzynecki awaited them at a point not far distant on the opposite side. The advanced guard of the enemy, imprudently composed of several regiments of cossack cavalry, had already passed the dyke, when the 4th regiment threw themselves in columns upon them.
These forces of the enemy were thrown into the utmost consternation. Their only escape was into the marshes on either side, where some hundreds of them were taken prisoners without resistance. The arrival of the night terminated the scene, and saved this advanced guard of the enemy from total destruction. Thus ended a sanguinary day, on which, in every part of our line, our troops were victorious, and the enemy was subjected to immense losses. Our generals had made the best choice of their positions, and had profited by them to the utmost.
The enemy’s loss on that day, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to at least 10,000 men. On our side the loss did not exceed 1,000.35
On the night of the 18th our army took the following position. [See Plan VII.] Our left wing was between Jablonna (16) and Zombki (15), and sent out its reconnoisances as far as Zagroby (4), upon the Narew (N), the bridge over which at that place they destroyed. Our centre was between Okuniew (11) and Zombki (15). Our right wing was at Wavre (17).
After two such bloody days, as the preceding had been for the Russians, we cannot sufficiently express our astonishment that marshal Diebitsch should have allowed his army no repose, but should have again pushed his attack, without any new plan, on the 19th and 20th. These operations of Diebitsch, without an assignable end, indicated a blind confidence in numbers, or the headlong fury of a man inflamed by the renown which he had acquired, and who was determined to make the event bear out as nearly as possible, whatever sacrifice it might cost, the rash boast which he is said to have made, that he would finish the war in twenty-four hours. But he sacrificed his thousands in vain.
On the 19th an action took place, not only with the grand army under the walls of Warsaw, or on the fields of Praga, but also on the left bank of the Vistula at Swierza [(7) Pl. VI], forty miles from Warsaw, where general Dwernicki beat prince Wirtemberg, who, as we have already mentioned, had passed the Vistula at Pulawa [(6) Pl. VI], and was approaching Warsaw [(1) Pl. VI].
BATTLE OF WAVRE AND BIALOLENKA. [Pl. VIII and IX.]
At the break of day, upon every point, the right wing, the centre, and the left wing, our line was attacked. We might remark in regard to the positions of the two armies on that day, that our right wing, (A) which was at Wavre, was unprotected, while on the other hand the left wing (C) of the enemy, opposite to it, was very advantageously placed on heights covered with wood, between Milosna and Wavre. Our centre (B) was better posted at Kawenzyn. It occupied this village, (which was in a commanding position,) and the declivity descending from it to the plain of Zombki. Our left wing at Bialolenka was also advantageously covered by little wooded hills, having two dykes in front leading toward them.
The Russians on that day directed their strongest attack upon our right wing, which occupied the weakest position. With the view of carrying this position, they sent against it some forty battalions of infantry and some thirty squadrons of cavalry, supported by seventy pieces of artillery. Our position was defended by a division of about ten battalions of infantry and fifteen squadrons of artillery, supported by twenty-four pieces of artillery. This enormous disproportion did not discourage our soldiers. Their energy supplied the place of numbers. The enemy commenced his attack by a warm fire of light troops and a fire from his artillery, which commanded the plain. The skilful man[oe]uvres of general Zimirski, in displaying his front, contracting it, dividing it into small parties, and withdrawing or advancing, as the direction of the enemy’s artillery required, and thus avoiding the effect of his fire, prevented the loss which it would else have occasioned. In this way several hours were occupied, when the enemy, trusting to the impression which he supposed his fire to have made, at about ten o’clock sent forward twelve or more battalions (D) to the charge. General Zimirski, anticipating this movement, withdrew, in order to lead them on to the plain between Wavre and Grokow, sending to general Skrzynecki an aid-de-camp to inform him of this manœuvre, and to engage him to send a force of cavalry to act upon the enemy’s columns in flank. General Skrzynecki, who occupied, as we have stated, the heights of Kawenzyn, was also warmly engaged with a brigade of the enemy, and had already observed this imprudent advance of the enemy in his attack, who had indeed gone beyond the line of Skrzynecki’s position. In a moment the order was given for the brigade of general Kicki to throw themselves upon the enemy’s flank; and as general Kicki approached with the ten squadrons (E) which composed his command, general Zimirski gave orders for a general charge both upon the enemy’s cavalry (F) and infantry (D). The columns of the enemy were carried away before these charges, and their attack was wholly paralyzed. This onset, which was so successfully made, forced the enemy (H) to incline his position back from Kawenzyn to Milosna. That manœuvre was decisive of the enemy’s fate, and it was well understood by our generals. General Skrzynecki, by pushing forward the left of his division, cut off the right wing of the enemy from all communication with his centre, and at about mid-day our right wing and centre occupied their former position at Wavre, including the small forest of elders which was between the enemy’s left wing and centre; and, in fact, general Skrzynecki occupied a part also of the Great Forest. This state of things was to be profited by, and the right wing of the enemy, thus separated, was to be attacked before the enemy should be able to renew his attack upon Kawenzyn, and the forest of elders, and our right wing. To execute this plan, the two divisions of Krukowiecki and Szembek, composing our left wing, which was fighting at Bialolenka, [See Plan IX] received orders to push a strong attack against the enemy’s front, at the same moment that a brigade (B) of Skrzynecki’s division, supported by some pieces of cannon, operated upon the road (a) leading from Kawenzyn (b) to Zombki (k). By this manœuvre the enemy was menaced with being taken in the rear.
The left wing, as we have said, was warmly engaged with the superior force of the Russians; who, by placing some fifty pieces of cannon (f) behind the two dykes (e) above named, kept up a sweeping fire of grape upon our artillery (d) and infantry (c), which were defending the passage of the dykes. A considerable body of the enemy had already reached the hither side of the dykes, when general Uminski, with a brigade of cavalry (D), advanced to the charge, and at the same time communicated the orders to the two divisions to commence the general attack. Under a warm fire of grape, our cavalry threw themselves upon the enemy’s infantry, which had debouched over the dykes. A general charge commenced, and our cavalry penetrated the enemy’s masses. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of chasseurs distinguished themselves by their feats of bravery. The enemy was repulsed, and began to fall back and crowd upon the dykes, and at this moment their rout was effected. A brigade (B) from general Skrzynecki’s division arrived, and commenced a fire of grape upon the dykes, over which the enemy was flying in the greatest disorder. Their ranks were in the utmost confusion; they crowded with precipitation upon the dykes, exposed continually to our destructive fire. By this repulse the whole of the enemy’s right wing was broken, and they commenced a general retreat, leaving a great number of prisoners, who either had not reached the dykes or could not get from them, amounting to perhaps a thousand men, besides another thousand killed and wounded. The enemy also lost two standards, four pieces of cannon, several chests of ammunition, and many horses.