§ 80 Positive and Negative Rights
In respect of their contents, rights are of two kinds, being either positive or negative. A positive right corresponds to a positive duty, and is a right that he on whom the duty lies shall do some positive act on behalf of the person entitled. A negative right corresponds to a negative duty, and is a right that the person bound shall refrain from some act which would operate to the prejudice of the person entitled. The same distinction exists in the case of wrongs. A positive wrong or wrong of commission is the breach of a negative duty and the violation of a negative right. A negative wrong or wrong of omission is the breach of a positive duty, and the infringement of a positive right. A negative right entitles the owner of it to the maintenance of the present position of things; a positive right entitles him to an alteration of this position for his advantage. The former is merely a right not to be harmed; the latter is a right to be positively benefited. The former is a right to retain what one already has; the latter is a right to receive something more than one already has.
In the case of a negative right the interest which is its de facto basis is of such a nature that it requires for its adequate maintenance or protection nothing more than the passive acquiescence of other persons. All that is asked by the owner of the interest is to be left alone in the enjoyment of it. In the case of a positive right, on the other hand, the interest is of a less perfect and self-sufficient nature, inasmuch as the person entitled requires for the realisation and enjoyment of his right the active assistance of other persons. In the former case I stand in an immediate and direct relation to the object of my right, and claim from others nothing more than that they shall not interfere between me and it. In the latter case I stand in a mediate and indirect relation to the object, so that I can attain to it only through the active help of others. My right to the money in my pocket is an example of the first class; my right to the money in the pocket of my debtor is an instance of the second.
The distinction is one of practical importance. It is much easier, as well as much more necessary, for the law to prevent the infliction of harm than to enforce positive beneficence. Therefore while liability for hurtful acts of commission is the general rule, liability for acts of omission is the exception. Generally speaking, all men are bound to refrain from all kinds of positive harm, while only some men are bound in some ways actively to confer benefits on others. No one is entitled to do another any manner of hurt, save with special ground of justification; but no one is bound to do another any manner of good save on special grounds of obligation. Every man has a right against every man that the present position of things shall not be interfered with to his detriment; whilst it is only in particular cases and for special reasons that any man has a right against any man that the present position shall be altered for his advantage. I have a right against every one not to be pushed into the water; if I have a right at all to be pulled out, it is only on special grounds against determinate individuals.