The Giraffe, and Necessity for Concomitant Variation
Having unwittingly shown that lessened use of closely-connected and co-operative parts does not cause concomitant variation in these parts, Mr. Spencer concludes that the concomitant variation requisite for evolution can only be caused by altered degrees of use or disuse. He elaborately argues that the many co-ordinated modifications of parts necessitated by each important alteration in an animal are so complex that they cannot possibly be brought about except by the inherited effect of the use and disuse of the various parts concerned. He holds, for instance, that natural selection is inadequate to effect the numerous concomitant changes necessitated by such developments as that of the long neck of the giraffe. Darwin, however, on the contrary, holds that natural selection alone “would have sufficed for the production of this remarkable quadruped.”8 He is surprised at Mr. Spencer’s view that natural selection can do so little in modifying the higher animals. Thus one of the chief arguments with which Mr. Spencer supports his theory is so poorly founded as to be rejected by a far greater authority on such subjects. All that is needed is that natural selection should preserve the tallest giraffes through times of famine by their being able to reach otherwise inaccessible stores of foliage. The continual variability of all parts of the higher animals gives scope for innumerable changes, and Nature is not in a hurry. Mr. Spencer, however, says that “the chances against any adequate readjustments fortuitously arising must be infinity to one.” But he has also shown that altered degree of use does not cause the needed concomitant variation of co-operative parts. So the chances against a beneficial change in an animal must be, at a liberal estimate, infinity to two. Mr. Spencer, if he has proved anything, has proved that it is practically impossible that the giraffe can have acquired a long neck, or the elk its huge horns, or that any species has ever acquired any important modification.
Mr. Wallace, in his Darwinism, answers Mr. Spencer by a collection of facts showing that “variation is the rule,” that the range of variation in wild animals and plants is much greater than was supposed, and that “each part varies to a considerable extent independently” of other parts, so that “the materials constantly ready for natural selection to act upon are abundant in quantity and very varied in kind.” While co-operative parts would often be more or less correlated, so that they would tend to vary together, coincident variation is not necessary. The lengthened wing might be gained in one generation, and the strengthened muscle at a subsequent period; the bird in the meanwhile drawing upon its surplus energy, aided (as I would suggest) by the strengthening effect of increased use in the individual. Seeing that artificial selection of complicated variations has modified animals in many points either simultaneously or by slow steps, as with otter-sheep, fancy pigeons, &c. (many of the characters thus obtained being clearly independent of use and disuse), natural selection must be credited with similar powers, and Mr. Wallace concludes that Mr. Spencer’s insuperable difficulty is “wholly imaginary.”
The extract concerning a somewhat similar “class of difficulties,” which Mr. Spencer quotes from his Principles of Biology, is faulty in its reasoning,9 though legitimate in its conclusion concerning the increasing difficulty of evolution in proportion with the increasing number and complexity of faculties to be evolved. But this increasing difficulty of complex evolution is only overcome by some favourably-varying individuals and species—not by all. And as the difficulty increases we find neglect and decay of the less-needed faculties—as with domesticated animals and civilized men, who lose in one direction while they gain in another. The increasing difficulty of complex evolution by natural selection is no proof whatever of use-inheritance10 except to those who confound difficulty with impossibility.