Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic

XIII Minor German Æstheticians

Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school.

When we turn from the pages of methodical and serious thinkers such as Schleiermacher, Humboldt and Steinthal, we are filled with distaste by the books written in enormous quantities during the first half of the nineteenth century by disciples of Schelling and Hegel. We are fatigued and almost disgusted as we pass from this illuminating and scientific study to something which oscillates between vapid fancies and charlatanism; between the vanity of empty formulæ and the attempt, not always free from dishonesty, to employ them in order to amaze and overwhelm the reader or student.

Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse and others.

Why should we encumber a general History of Æsthetic (which ought, certainly, to take account of aberrations from the truth, but only in so far as they indicate the general trend of contemporary thought) with the theories of such men as Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse, Deutinger, Oersted, Zeising, Eckardt and the crowd of manipulators of manuals and systems? The only one who obtained a hearing outside his native Germany was Krause, who was imported into Spain; we are justified, therefore, in leaving them to the memory or forgetfulness of their compatriots. For Krause,1 the humanitarian, the freethinker, the theosophist, everything is organism, everything is beauty; beauty is organism, and organism is beauty: Essence, that is to say God, is one, free and entire; one, free and entire is Beauty. There is but one artist, God; but one art, the divine. The beauty of finite things is the Divinity, or rather the likeness of Divinity manifested in the finite. Beauty brings into play reason, intellect and imagination in a mode conforming to their laws, and awakens disinterested pleasure and inclination in the soul. Trahndorff,2 describing the various degrees by which the individual seeks to grasp the essence or form of the universe (the degrees of feeling, intuition, reflexion and presentiment), and noting the insufficiency of simple theoretical knowledge till supplemented by the Will, the Will which is power (Können), in its three degrees of Aspiration, Faith and Love, places the Beautiful in the highest grade, in Love: it would seem, therefore, that Beauty is Love which comprehends itself. Christian Weisse3 attempted, like Trahndorff, to reconcile the God of Christianity with the Hegelian philosophy: in his estimation the æsthetic Idea is superior to the logical, and leads to religion, to God; the idea of beauty, existing outside the sensible universe, is the reality of the concept of beauty, and, as the idea of divinity is absolute Love, so must that of Beauty be found truly in Love. The same reconciliation was attempted by the Catholic theologian Deutinger;4 beauty, for him, is born of power (Können), an activity parallel with those of the knowledge of truth and the doing of good but (differing in this from knowledge, which is receptive) realizing itself in an outward movement from within, mastering the world of matter and imprinting upon it the seal of personality. An internal ideal intuition, the Idea: an external shapable matter: the power of interpenetrating internal with external, invisible with visible, ideal with real: such is Beauty. Oersted5 (the celebrated Danish naturalist whose works were translated into German and gained him a considerable reputation in Germany) defines beauty as the objective Idea in the moment of subjective contemplation: the Idea expressed in things in so far as it reveals itself to intuition. Zeising6 turned his attention partly to exploration of the mysteries of the golden section, and partly to speculations on Beauty, which he considered as one of the three forms of the Idea; first, the Idea which expresses itself in object and subject; secondly, the Idea as intuition; and thirdly, the Absolute which appears in the world and is conceived intuitively by the spirit. Eckardt,7 intent on creating a theistic Æsthetic which should avoid the one-sided transcendence of deism on the one hand and the one-sided immanence of pantheism on the other, maintained that its principles must be sought not in the feelings of the contemplator, not in works of art, not in the idea of the beautiful, not in the concept of art, but in the creative spirit of the artist, the original fount of beauty; and since a creative artist cannot be conceived except as derived from the highest creative genius which is God, Eckardt invokes aid from a psychology of God (eine Psychologie des Weltkünstlers).

Fried. Theodor Vischer.

If quantity is as important as quality, we must devote some space to Friedrich Theodor Vischer, the bulkiest of all German æstheticians, indeed the German æsthetician par excellence: after publishing a book on The Sublime and the Comic, a contribution to the Philosophy of the Beautiful,8 in 1837, he produced four huge tomes on Æsthetic as Science of the Beautiful between 1846 and 1857,9 where, in hundreds of paragraphs and long observations and sub-observations, is massed a stupendous amount of æsthetic material, of matter foreign to Æsthetic, and of subjects taken haphazard from the whole thinkable universe. Vischer’s work is divided into three parts: a Metaphysic of the Beautiful, which investigates the concept of Beauty in itself, no matter where and how it is realized: a treatise on concrete Beauty, which inquires into the two one-sided modes of realization, Beauty of nature and Beauty of imagination, one lacking subjective, the other lacking objective, existence: lastly, a theory of the arts, which studies the synthesis in art of the two artistic moments, the physical and psychical, the objective and subjective. It is easy to sum up Vischer’s concept of æsthetic activity; it is Hegel’s concept, debased. For Vischer, Beauty belongs neither to the theoretical nor to the practical activity, but is placed in a serene sphere, superior to these antitheses; that is to say in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy;10 but, in contradistinction to Hegel, Vischer assigns the first place in this sphere to Religion, the second to Art, and the third to Philosophy. Much ingenuity was devoted in those days to moving these words about like pieces on a chess-board; it has been observed that of the six possible combinations of the three terms Art, Religion and Philosophy, four were actually adopted: by Schelling, P.R.A.; by Hegel, A.R.P.; by Weisse, P.A.R.; and by Vischer, R.A.P.[11] But Vischer himself12 states that Wirth, author of a System of Ethics,13 opted for the fifth combination, R.P.A., which leaves us but the sixth, A.P.R., unclaimed, unless (as is not improbable) some unrecognized genius seized upon it and made it the text of his system. Beauty, therefore, as the second form of the absolute Spirit, is the realization of the Idea, not as abstract concept but as union of concept and reality; and the Idea determines itself as species (Gattung), and every idea of a species, even on the lowest degree, is beautiful as being an integral part in the totality of Ideas; although the higher the degree of the idea the greater is its beauty.14 Highest of all degrees is that of human personality: “in this spiritual world the Idea attains its true significance; the name of idea is given to the great moral motive powers to which the concept of species may also be applied in the sense that they stand to their restricted spheres in the same relation in which the genus stands to its species and individuals.” At the head of all is the Idea of morality: “the world of moral and autonomous ends is destined to furnish the most important, the most worthy content of the Beautiful”; with the warning, however, that Beauty, in actualizing this world through intuition, excludes art having a moral tendency.15 So Vischer proceeds now to degrade Hegel’s Idea to the simple class-concept, now to couple it with the idea of the Good; now, in accord with the teaching of his master, to make it different from, yet superior to, intellect and morality.

Other tendencies.

From the first, the Herbartian formalism was little studied and less followed: two writers, Griepenkerl in 1827 and Bobrik in 1834, made some attempt to develop and apply the cursory notes with which Herbart contented himself.16 Schleiermacher’s lectures, even before their appearance in book form, had served as basis for a series of elegant dissertations by Erich Ritter (1840)17 (better known as a historian of philosophy); his work is of little value, for instead of dwelling on the important points of the master’s doctrine Ritter brings into prominence secondary matters relating to sociability and the æsthetic fife. A penetrating critic of German Æsthetic from Baumgarten to the post-Kantian school was Wilhelm Theodor Danzel, who lived about this time and very properly rebelled against the claim to find “thought” in works of art: “Artistic thought:” he writes; “unhappy phrase, which helped to condemn an entire epoch to the Sisyphean labour of trying to reduce art to intellectual and rational thinking! The thought of a work of art is nothing save that which is contemplated in a definite way; it is not represented, as is commonly asserted, in a work of art, it is the work of art itself. Artistic thought can never be expressed by concepts and words.”18 By his early death Danzel ended the hopes he raised by his original views on the science and history of Æsthetic.

Theory of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the Modifications of Beauty.

The post-Hegelian metaphysical Æsthetic is chiefly noteworthy for the fuller development of two theories or, to speak more accurately, of two very curious combinations of arbitrary assertion and fanciful caprice: the so-called theory of Natural Beauty, and the theory of Modifications of the Beautiful. Neither of the two had any intimate or necessary connexion with this philosophical movement, to which they are rather linked by historical or psychological causes; by the relationship between facts of pleasure and pain and the inclination towards mysticism; by the confusion arising from the really æsthetic (imaginative) quality of some representations wrongly described as observation of natural beauties; or by the scholastic and literary tradition of discussing these cases of pleasure and pain and extra-æsthetic natural beauties in books devoted to the discussion of art.[19] These metaphysicians were sometimes rather grotesque and remind one of the story told of Paisiello, that in the fury of composition he set even the stage directions of his libretto to music; bitten with the rage for construction and dialectic, they did not spare even the indexes of chaotic old books, but seized on them as suitable material for a dialectical exercise.

Development of the first theory. Herder.

Beginning with the theory of Natural Beauty, observations on beautiful natural objects are found among the inquiries of the ancient philosophers on beauty, and especially among the mystical effusions of neo-Platonists and their followers in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.20 Less frequently such questions were introduced into treatises on Poetics: Tesauro (1654) is among the first who, in his Cannochiale aristotelico, discusses not only the conceits of men, but also of God, the angels, nature and animals; and somewhat later (1707) Muratori speaks of “the beauty of matter,” of which examples are “the gods, a flower, the sun, a rivulet.”21 Observations on that which is outside art and is merely natural, are made by Crousaz, by André, and especially by those authors of the eighteenth century who wrote on Beauty and Art in an empirical and gallant style.22 It was the influence of these persons that led Kant, as we have seen, to sever the theory of beauty from that of art, specially connecting free beauty with objects of nature and those productions of man which reproduce natural beauties.23 When the adversary of Kant’s theory of Æsthetic, Herder (1800), in his sketch of an ethical system united spirit and nature, pleasure and value, feeling and intellect, he inevitably made much of natural beauty, and affirmed that everything in nature has its own beauty, the expression of its own greatest content, and that this accounts for the ascending scale of beautiful objects: beginning with. outlines, colours and tones, light and sound, and proceeding by way of flowers, water and sea, to birds, terrestrial animals, and man himself. For instance “a bird is the sum of the properties and perfections of its element, a representation of its potency, a creature of light, song and air”; amongst terrestrial animals, the ugliest are those resembling man, as the melancholy moping monkey; the most beautiful, those of perfect build, well proportioned, noble, free in action; those which express sweetness; those, in fine, which live in harmony and happiness, endowed with a perfection of their own, harmless to man.24

Schelling, Solger, Hegel.

Schelling, on the contrary, utterly, denies the concept of beauty in nature, and considers that such beauty is purely accidental and that art alone supplies the norm by which it can be discovered and judged.25 Solger also excludes natural beauty;26 so does Hegel, who distinguishes himself not by denying it but by proceeding with the utmost inconsequence to deal at length with the beautiful in nature. It is in fact not clear whether he means that really no beauty exists in nature and that man introduces it in his vision of things, or whether natural beauty really exists though inferior in degree to the beauty of art. “The beauty of art,” he says,” stands higher than that of nature; it is beauty born and reborn by the work of the spirit, and spirit alone is truth and reality; hence beauty is truly beauty only when it participates in spirit and is produced therefrom. Taken in this sense, the beauty of nature appears as a mere reflexion of the beauty appertaining to spirit, as an imperfect and incomplete mode, which substantially is contained within the spirit itself.” In confirmation, he adds that nobody has attempted a systematic exposition of natural beauties, whereas there actually is, from the point of view of the utility of natural objects, a materia medica27 But the second chapter of the first part of his Æsthetic is devoted precisely to natural Beauty on the ground that, in order to grasp the idea of artistic beauty in its entirety, three stages must be traversed: beauty in general, natural beauty (whose defects show the necessity for art), and, lastly, the Idea; “the first existence of the Idea is nature, and its first beauty is natural beauty.” This beauty, which is beauty for us and not for itself, has several phases, from that in which the concept is immersed in matter to the point of disappearing, such as physical facts and isolated mechanisms, to that higher phase in which physical facts are united in systems (e.g. the solar system); but the Idea first reaches a true and real existence in organic facts, in the living creature. And even the living creature is liable to the distinction between beautiful and ugly; for example, among animals, the sloth, trailing itself laboriously and incapable of animation or activity, displeases us by its apathetic somnolence; nor can beauty be found in amphibians or in many kinds of fish, or in crocodiles, or toads, as well as in many insects and especially in those equivocal creatures which express a transition from one i class to another, such as the ornithorhyncus, a mixture of bird and beast.28 These samples may suffice to show the general trend of Hegel’s doctrine of natural beauty; elsewhere he discusses the external beauty of abstract form, regularity, symmetry, harmony, etc., which are; precisely the concepts which the formalism of Herbart placed in the heaven of the Ideas of the Beautiful.

Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher, who praised Hegel for his attempt to exclude natural beauty from his Æsthetic, excluded it from his own not verbally but actually, by confining his attention to the artistic perfection of the internal image formed by the energy of the human spirit.29 But the so-called Feeling for Nature which came in with Romanticism, and the Cosmos and other descriptive works of Humboldt,30 directed attention increasingly to the impressions awakened by natural facts.

Alexander Humboldt.

This led to the compilation of those systematic lists of natural beauties whose impossibility had been proclaimed by Hegel, though he himself had furnished an example of them; amongst others, Bratranek published an Æsthetic of the Vegetable World.31

Vischer’s “Æsthetic Physics.”

The best-known and most widely circulated treatment of the subject was contained in this very work of Vischer’s; who following Hegel’s example devoted a section of his Æsthetic, as we have seen, to the objective existence of Beauty, i.e. to the Beauty of nature, and entitled it by the perhaps new and certainly characteristic name of Æsthetic Physics (ästhetische Physik). This Æsthetic Physics comprised the beauty of inorganic nature (light, heat, air, water, earth); organic nature, with its four vegetable types and its animals vertebrate and invertebrate; and beauty of human beings, divided into generic and historic. The generic was subdivided into sections on the beauty of general forms (age, sex, conditions, love, marriage, family); of special forms (races, peoples, culture, political life); and of individual forms (temperament and character). Historical beauty included that of ancient history (Oriental, Greek, Roman), of Mediæval or Germanic, and of modern times; because, according to Vischer, it was the duty of Æsthetic to cast a glance over universal history before summing up the different degrees of the beautiful according to the varying phases of the struggle for freedom against nature.32

The Theory of the Modifications of Beauty. From antiquity to the eighteenth century.

As regards the Modifications of Beauty, it should be remembered that the ancient manuals of Poetics, and more frequently those of Rhetoric, contained more or less scientific definitions of psychological states and facts; Aristotle attempted in his Poetics to determine the nature of a tragic action or personality, and sketched a definition of the comic; in his Rhetoric he writes at considerable length of wit;33 sections of the De oratore of Cicero and the Institutions of Quintilian34 are devoted to wit and the comic; the lofty style was the subject of a lost treatise of Cæcilius, which anticipated that attributed to Longinus, whose title was translated in modern times as De sublimitate or On the Sublime. Following the example of the ancients, this kind of medley was perpetuated by writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; whole treatises on the comic are incorporated in, for instance, the Argutezza of Matteo Pellegrini (1639) and the Cannochiale of Tesauro. La Bruyère treated of the sublime35 and Boileau by his translation gave a fresh vogue to Longinus: the following century saw Burke inquiring into the origin of our ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, and deriving the former from the instinct for sociability, the latter from that of self-preservation; he also tried to define ugliness, grace, elegance and extraordinary beauty; Home, in his celebrated Elements of Criticism, discussed grandeur, sublimity, the ridiculous, wit, dignity and grace: Mendelssohn discussed sublimity, dignity and grace in fine art, and described some of these facts as due to mixed feelings, in which he was followed by Lessing36 and others: Sulzer welcomed all these various concepts into his æsthetic encyclopædia and collected round them an elaborate bibliography. A new and curious meaning of the word humour reached the continent from England at this time. Its original meaning was simply “temperament,” and sometimes “spirit,” or “wit” (“belli umori” in Italy; in the seventeenth century there was in Rome an Academy of Umoristi). Voltaire introduced it into France and wrote in 1761, “Les Anglais ont un terme pour signifier cette plaisanterie, ce vrai comique, cette gaieté, cette urbanité, ces saillies, qui échappent à un homme sans qu’il s’en doute; et ils rendent cette idée par le mot humour...”;37 in 1767 Lessing distinguishes humour from the German Laune (caprice, whim),38 a distinction maintained by Herder in 1769 in opposition to Riedel who had confused the terms.39

Kant and the post-Kantians.

Accustomed to find all these subjects treated in the same book, philosophers at first theorized about them all without attempting to link them up together by introducing an artificial logical connexion. Kant, who had already in imitation of Burke written in 1764 a dissertation on the beautiful and the sublime, ingenuously remarked in the course of his lectures on Logic in 1771 that the beautiful and the æsthetic are not identical, because “the sublime also belongs to Æsthetic”;40 and in his Critique of Judgment, while treating of the comic in a mere digression (a magnificent piece of psychological analysis)41 places side by side with and as if on an equality with the “Analytic of Beauty,” an “Analytic of the Sublime.”42 We may note in passing that, before the publication of the third Critique, Heydenreich arrived at the same doctrine of the sublime which is contained in Kant’s book.43 Did Kant ever think of uniting the beautiful and the sublime and deducing them from a single concept? Apparently not. By his declaration that the principle of beauty must be sought outside ourselves, and that of the sublime within us, he tacitly assumes that the two objects are wholly disparate. In 1805 Ast, a follower of Schelling, declared the necessity of overcoming what he called the Kantian dualism of the beautiful and the sublime:44 others reproached Kant with having treated the comic by the psychological, not the metaphysical, method. Schiller wrote a series of dissertations on the tragic, the sentimental, the ingenuous, the sublime, the pathetic, the trivial, the low, the dignified and the graceful, and their varieties, the fascinating, the majestic, the grave, and the solemn. Another artist, Jean Paul Richter, discoursed at great length on wit and humour, described by him as the romantic comic, or the sublime reversed (umgekehrte Erhabene).45

Herbart, in virtue of his formalistic principle, asserts that all these concepts are irrelevant to Æsthetic; he attributes them to the work of art, not to pure beauty;46 Schleiermacher comes to the same conclusion, but for much better reasons, as a result of his sane conception of art. Amongst other things he observes: “It is usual to describe the beautiful and the sublime as two kinds of artistic perfection; and so accustomed have we grown to the union of these two concepts that we must make an effort to convince ourselves how very far they are from being co-ordinate or from together exhausting the concept of artistic perfection”; he regrets that even the best æstheticians should give rhetorical descriptions of them instead of demonstrating them. “The thing,” says he, “is not right and just” (hat keine Richtigkeit), and he proceeds to exclude the whole subject from his Æsthetic,47 as he had done previously in the case of natural beauty. Other philosophers, however, clung persistently to their search for a connexion between these various concepts, and called in dialectic to help them. The habit of applying dialectic to empirical concepts affected everybody at that time; even the great enemy of dialectic, Herbart, showed the cloven hoof, when in order to explain the union of different æsthetic ideas in the beautiful he appealed to the formula “they lose regularity in order to regain it.”48 Schelling asserted that the sublime is the infinite in the finite, and the beautiful the finite in the infinite, adding that the absolutely sublime includes the beautiful, and the beautiful the sublime;49 and Ast, whom we have mentioned already, spoke of a masculine, positive element, which is the sublime, and a feminine, negative element which is the graceful and pleasing: between which there is a contrast and a struggle.

Culmination of the development.

These exercises in dialectical system-building developed and increased till about the middle of the nineteenth century they assumed two distinct forms whose history must here be shortly outlined.

Double form of the theory. The overcoming of the ugly. Solger, Weisse and others.

The first form may be called the Overcoming of the Ugly. This theory conceives the comic, the sublime, the tragic, the humorous, and so forth, as so many engagements in the war between the Ugly and the Beautiful, wherein the latter was invariably victorious, and arose by means of this war to more and more lofty and complex manifestations. The second form of the theory may be described as the Passage from Abstract to Concrete; it held that Beauty cannot emerge from the abstract, cannot become this or that concrete beauty, except by particularizing itself in the comic, tragic, sublime, humorous, or some other modification. The first form was already well developed in Solgei, an adherent of the romantic theory of Irony: but historically it presupposes the æsthetic theory of the Ugly, first sketched by Friedrich Schlegel in 1797. We have already noted that Schlegel considered the characteristic or interesting, not the beautiful, to be the principle of modern art; hence the importance attached by him to the piquant, the striking (frappant), the daring, the cruel, the ugly.50 Solger found here the basis for his dialectic; amongst other things he maintains that the finite, earthly element may be dissolved and absorbed in the divine, which constitutes the tragic: or else the divine element may be entirely corrupted by the earthly, producing the comic.51 These methods of Solger were followed by Weisse (1830), and by Ruge (1837); for the former, ugliness is “the immediate existence of beauty” which is overcome in the sublime and the comic; for the latter, the effort to achieve the Idea, or the Idea searching for itself, generates the sublime; when the Idea loses instead of discovering itself, ugliness is produced; when the Idea rediscovers itself and rises out of ugliness to new life, the comic.52 A whole treatise entitled The Æsthetic of the Ugly53 was published by Rosenkranz in 1853, presenting this concept as intermediate between the beautiful and the comic, and tracing it from its first origin to that “sort of perfection” it attains in the satanic. Passing from the common (Gemeine) which is the petty, the weak, the low, and the sub-species of the low, viz. the usual, the casual, the arbitrary and the crude, Rosenkranz goes on to describe the repugnant, trisected into the awkward, the dead and empty, and the horrible: thus he proceeds from tripartition to tripartition, dividing the horrible into the absurd, the nauseating and the wicked: the wicked into criminal, spectral and diabolical: the diabolical into demoniac, magical and satanic. He opposes the childish notion that ugliness acts as a foil to beauty in art, and justifies its introduction by the necessity for art to represent the entire appearance of the Idea; on the other hand he admits that the ugly is not on the same level as the beautiful, for, if the beautiful can stand by itself alone, the other cannot do so and must always be reflected by and in the beautiful.54

Passage from abstract to concrete: Vischer.

The second form prevailed with Vischer. The following extract will serve as an illustration of his manner: “The Idea arouses itself from the tranquil unity in which it was fused with the appearance and pushes onward, affirming, in face of its own finitude, its infinity”; this rebellion and transcendence is the sublime. “But Beauty demands full satisfaction for this disruption of its harmony: the violated right of the image must be reasserted: this can be accomplished only by means of a fresh contradiction, that is to say by the negative position now taken up by the image towards the Idea by rejecting all interpenetration with it and by affirming its own separate existence as the whole”; this second moment is the comic, negation of a negation.55 The same process is further enriched and complicated by Zeising, who compares the modifications of Beauty to the refraction of colours: the three primary modifications, the sublime, the attractive and the humorous, correspond with the primary colours violet, orange and green; the three secondary, pure beauty, comic and tragic, to the colours red, yellow and blue. Each of these six modifications (exactly like the degrees of the Ugly in Rosenkranz) branches out, like fireworks, into three rays: pure beauty into the decorous, noble and pleasing: the attractive into graceful, interesting and piquant: the comic into buffoonery, the diverting and burlesque: the humorous into the quaint, capricious and melancholy: the tragic into the moving, pathetic and demoniac: the sublime into the glorious, majestic and imposing.56

The Legend of Sir Purebeauty.

All the works of this period on Æsthetic are filled in this way with the gest, chanson or romaunt of the knight Sir Purebeauty (Reinschon) and his extraordinary adventures, recounted in two conflicting versions. According to one story, Sir Purebeauty is constrained to abandon his beloved leisure by the Mephistophelean devices of the temptress Ugliness, who leads him into countless dangers from which he invariably emerges victorious; his victories and successes (his Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena) are called the Sublime, the Comic, the Humorous and so forth. The other story tells how the knight, bored by his life of loneliness, sallies forth purposely to seek adversaries and occasions for fighting; he is always vanquished, but even in his overthrow ferum victorem capit, he transforms and irradiates the enemy. Beyond this artificial mythology, this legend composed without the least imagination or literary skill, this miserably dull tale, it is vain to look for anything whatever in the much elaborated theory of German æstheticians known as the Modifications of Beauty.

Notes

1 Abriss der Ästhetik, post. 1837; Vorlesung üb. Ästh. (1828-1829), post. 1882.

2 Ästhetik, Berlin, 1827.

3 Ästhetik, Leipzig, 1830; System d. Ästh., lectures, post. Leipzig, 1872.

4 Kunstlehre, Ratisbon, 1845-1846 (Grundlinien einer positiven Philosophie, vols. iv. v.).

5 Der Geist in der Natur, 1850-1851; Neue Beitrage z. d. Geist i. d. Natur, post. 1855.

6 Ästhetische Forschungen, Frankfurt a. M. 1855.

7 Die theistische Begründung d. Ästhetik im Gegensatz z. d. pantheistichen, Jena, 1857; same author, Vorschule d. Ästh., Karlsruhe, 1864-1865.

8 Üb. d. Erhabene u. Komische, Stuttgart, 1837.

9 Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft d. Schönen, Reutlingen, Leipzig and Stuttgart, 1846-1857, 3 parts in 4 vols.

[10] Ästh. introd. §§ 2-5.

11 Hartmann, Dtsch. Ästh. s. Kant, p. 217, note.

12 Ästh. introd. § 5.

13 System der spekulativen Ethik, Heilbronn, 1841-1842.

14 Ästh. §§ 15-17.

15 Op. cit. §§ 19-24.

16 Griepenkerl, Lehrb. d. Ästh., Brunswick, 1827. Bobrik, Freie Verträge üb. Ästh., Zürich, 1834.

17 Üb. d. Principien d. Ästh., Kiel, 1840.

18 Ges. Aufs. pp. 216-221.

19 See above, pp. 87-93.

20 See above, pp. 179-180.

21 Cannochiale arist. ch. 3: Perfetta poesia, bk. I. chs. 6, 8.

22 See above, pp. 205-206, 258-261.

23 See above, pp. 275-277.

24 Kaligone, op. cit. pp. 55-90.

25 System d. transcend. Ideal, part vi. § 2.

26 Vorles. üb. Ästh. p. 4.

27 Vorles. üb. Ästh. I. pp. 4-5.

28 Vorles. üb. Ästh. I. pp. 148-180.

29 Op. cit. introd.

30 Ansichten der Natur, 1088; Kosmos, 1845-1858.

31 Ästhetik. Pflanzenwelt, Leipzig, 1853.

32 Ästh. § 341.

33 Poet. 5. 13-14; Rhet. iii. 10, 18.

34 De orat. ii. 54-71; Inst. orat. vi. 3.

35 Caractères, I.

36 Hamb. Dramat. Nos. 74-75.

37 Letter to abbé d’Olivet, August 20, 1761.

38 Hamb. Dramat. No. 93; in Werke, ed. cit. xii. pp. 170-171, note.

39 Kritische Wälder, in Werke, ed. cit. iv. pp. 182-186.

40 Schlapp, op. cit. p. 55.

41 Kr. d. Urth., Anmerkung, § 54.

42 Op. cit. bk. ii. §§ 23-29.

43 System d. Ästh. introd. p. xxxvi n.

44 System der Kunstlehre: cf. Hartmann, op. cit. p. 387.

45 Vorschule d. Ästh. chs. 6-9.

46 See above, pp. 309-310.

47 Vorles. üb. Ästh. p. 240 seqq.

48 Cf. Zimmermann, G. d. Ästh. p. 788.

49 Philos, d. Kunst, §§ 65-66.

50 Cf. Hartmann, Deutsch. Ästh. s. Kant, pp. 363-364.

51 Vorles üb. Ästh. p. 85.

52 Neue Vorschule d. Ästh. Halle, 1837.

53 K. Rosenkranz, Ästhetik des Hässlichen, Kœnigsberg, 1853.

54 Ästh. d. Hässl. pp. 36-40.

55 Ästh. §§ 83-84, 154-155.

56 Ästh. Forsch. p. 413.
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