No. 6
The needs of the army.—Difficulties were accumulating, and Napoleon was, as he admits at St. Helena, seriously alarmed. Wurmser’s force proves to be large, Piedmont is angry with the Republic and ready to rise, and Venice and Rome would willingly follow its example; the English have taken Porto-Ferrajo, and their skilful minister, Windham, is sowing the seeds of discord at Naples. Although on July 20th he has written a friend in Corsica that “all smiles on the Republic,” he writes Saliceti, another brother Corsican, very differently on August 1st. “Fortune appears to oppose us at present.... I have raised the siege of Mantua; I am at Brescia with nearly all my army. I shall take the first opportunity of fighting a battle with the enemy which will decide the fate of Italy—if I’m beaten, I shall retire on the Adda; if I win, I shall not stop in the marshes of Mantua.... Let the citadels of Milan, Tortona, Alessandria, and Pavia be provisioned.... We are all very tired; I have ridden five horses to death.” Reading between the lines of this letter to Josephine, it is evident that he thinks she will be safer with him than at Milan—Wurmser having the option of advancing viâ Brescia on Milan, and cutting off the French communications. The Marshal’s fatal mistake was in using only half his army for the purpose. This raising of the siege of Mantua (July 31st) was heart-rending work for Bonaparte, but, as Jomini shows, he had no artillery horses, and it was better to lose the siege train, consisting of guns taken from the enemy, than to jeopardise the whole army. Wurmser had begun his campaign successfully by defeating Massena, and pushing back Sauret at Salo. “The Austrians,” wrote Massena, “are drunk with brandy, and fight furiously,” while his men are famished and can only hang on by their teeth. Bonaparte calls his first war council, and thinks for a moment of retreat, but Augereau insists on fighting, which is successfully accomplished while Wurmser is basking himself among the captured artillery outside Mantua. Bonaparte had been perfectly honest in telling the Directory his difficulties, and sends his brother Louis to the Directory for that purpose on the eve of battle. He is complimented in a letter from the Directory dated August 12th—a letter probably the more genuine as they had just received a further despatch announcing a victory. On August 3rd Bonaparte won a battle at Lonato, and the next day Augereau gained great laurels at Castiglione; in later years the Emperor often incited Augereau by referring to those “fine days of Castiglione.” Between July 29th and August 12th the French army took 15,000 prisoners, 70 guns, and wounded or killed 25,000, with little more than half the forces of the Austrians. Bonaparte gives his losses at 7000, exclusive of the 15,000 sick he has in hospital; from July 31st to August 6th he never changed his boots, or lay down in a bed. Nevertheless, Jomini thinks that he showed less vigour in the execution of his plans than in the earlier part of the campaign; but, as an opinion per contra, we may note that the French grenadiers made their “little Corporal” Sergeant at Castiglione. Doubtless the proximity of his wife at the commencement (July 31st) made him more careful, and therefore less intrepid. On August 18th he wrote Kellermann with an urgent request for troops. On August 17th Colonel Graham, after hinting at the frightful excesses committed by the Austrians in their retreat, adds in a postscript—“From generals to subalterns the universal language of the army is that we must make peace, as we do not know how to make war.”46
On August 13th Bonaparte sent to the Directory his opinion of most of his generals, in order to show that he required some better ones. Some of his criticisms are interesting:—
Berthier—“Talents, activity, courage, character; he has them all.”
Augereau—“Much character, courage, firmness, activity; is accustomed to war, beloved by the soldiers, lucky in his operations.”
Massena—“Active, indefatigable, has boldness, grasp, and promptitude in making his decisions.”
Serrurier—“Fights like a soldier, takes no responsibility; determined, has not much opinion of his troops, is often ailing.”
Despinois—“Flabby, inactive, slack, has not the genius for war, is not liked by the soldiers, does not fight with his head; has nevertheless good, sound political principles: would do well to command in the interior.”
Sauret—“A good, very good soldier, not sufficiently enlightened to be a general; unlucky.”
Of eight more he has little good to say, but the Directory in acknowledging his letter of August 23rd remarks that he has forgotten several officers, and especially the Irish general Kilmaine.
About the same time Colonel Graham (Lord Lynedoch) was writing to the British Government from Trent that the Austrians, despite their defeats, were “undoubtedly brave fine troops, and an able chief would put all to rights in a little time.”47 On August 18th he adds—“When the wonderful activity, energy, and attention that prevail in the French service, from the commander-in-chief downward, are compared to the indecision, indifference, and indolence universal here, the success of their rash but skilful manœuvres is not surprising.”