V The Crimean War
Nicholas I. alienates France from England by the Egyptian question—Mehemet Ali and Palmerston’s convention against him—Nicholas I. in England—The Protectorate of the Holy Land; breach between Russia and France—Proposed partition of Turkey—War of Russia and Turkey—The Vienna Note—Intervention of France and England to save Turkey—Treaty of Paris; Russia foiled—Correspondence between Palmerston and Aberdeen as to the declaration of war—National feeling of England secures the former’s triumph—French motives in joining in the war.
Although Turkey was unable to withstand Russia alone, yet, with the help of England and France, she was able to prevent the Russian inroad, on the south.
Nicholas, ever crafty, now turned his attention to fostering the minor disputes which still existed between England and France.
Being envious of the English naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, France resumed her traditional policy of obtaining influence in Egypt, in order to be able to have a stronghold there against English power, and succeeded in making Egypt a faithful ally.
England, on the other hand, clung to the alliance with Turkey, and assisted the Sultan in quelling the rebellion of Mehemet Ali.
Thus we see there existed a difference between the two Powers, notwithstanding that Russia was a common rival of both.
Nicholas used this difference as a tool to weaken the allies against his own country.
In 1839 Mehemet Ali, with the silent approval of Russia, determined to become an independent monarch.
Thiers, a minister of Louis Phillipe, in helping Mehemet Ali, the viceroy of Egypt, had fallen into a Russian trap, although he believed and hoped that he was following the traditional policy of Napoleon the Great. This proved, however, a mistaken policy; for it was the general European feeling that if war resulted the Egyptians would be victorious, Constantinople would be in danger; the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi would come into force, the Russians would rush to help the Porte, while the Anglo-French fleets would be barred from the Dardanelles.
Lord Palmerston saw that the united action of the five Great Powers might settle the Eastern Question and destroy the influence of Russia, which seemed to be too arbitrarily strong. His idea was that a Conference should be held by the five Great Powers, and this was approved of by all.
There was no doubt that the Conference was not as unanimous as could be wished, and certainly England did not agree with France on several points.
At length Palmerston made a convention with three of the Powers for an armed interference in the Eastern Question. France was left alone. And Palmerston determined to pursue the above-mentioned policy.
Admiral Stopford captured Beyrout, and Sir Charles Napier bombarded Acre. The fall of the fortress of Acre—which was thought to be impregnable—before the English fleet, terminated the war, and Mehemet Ali became only an hereditary ruler over Egypt under the over-lord of the Porte.
The breach between England and France having become serious, Russia having obtained her desires stationed her fleet at Sebastopol, where it remained quiescent during the English bombardment of Acre.
Thus, although Lord Palmerston succeeded in crushing the French Minister’s scheme, yet he fell into the snare laid for him by Russia, viz., of bringing about a diplomatic disagreement between England and France.
But Russia did not gain by the transaction, for she in her turn lost her single-handed power over Turkey, which was given into the hands of the Five Powers.
Lord Palmerston offered the following condition to the Turkish Government. “England having, in conjunction with other Christian Powers, succeeded in restoring Syria to the Sultan, she is entitled to expect that the Sultan, in return for such assistance, should secure his Christian subjects from oppression.”56
At last the Syrian affairs were settled, but still England was always dreading a French attack both on Egypt and Syria.
In 1844 the Emperor Nicholas paid his famous visit to England. What was his object in coming to England at such a period? The only idea that I can put forward is, that he wanted to see to what extent the Anglo-French disagreement57 with regard to Syrian affairs had reached; also to widen them as much as possible in order to make it impossible to form an Anglo-French alliance against him, and thus leave him a free hand in the settlement of the Eastern Question when the fall of Turkey should take place.
Nicholas was at once informed, after his arrival, by the British Prime Minister, “that no foreign influence in Egypt would be allowed by the British Government, who desired to keep the way open to India.” He at once perceived that the English were fearful of the French historic Napoleonic plans; and he at once used this fear to his advantage.
He first proposed a partition of Turkey, knowing that the English Government would not dare to agree to it, because it would hurt the national feeling of England. Soon after the Anti-Napoleonic Revolution was over the Holy Alliance was concluded between several European Courts, and the moral feelings in the western states of Europe were to defend the weak against the strong, and to resist unjust aggression. These feelings were clearly shown during the Russian oppression of Poland (1837), and in the Independence of Greece (1821–1829).
In England these feelings had manifested themselves, and any English Government which should venture to shock them would have been certainly upset. Therefore, a proposed partition of Turkey by Russia was received by the English Government with decided disfavour.
Then the Czar proposed that the guardianship of the Holy Land should be entrusted to Russia. This was his great aim, and was his principal object.
England found herself in a dilemma. What was she to do? She had already refused the Czar’s first proposal, and she felt obliged to accept the second. “The three representatives of the Conservative party, namely, the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, met the Czar and signed a secret memorandum, promising to exert their personal influence on behalf of the Greeks as opposed to the Latin Church at Jerusalem, and so practically to forward Russian claims to the guardianship of the Holy Places, as opposed to those of France, who was to be ignored in the matter. This memorandum, to a certain extent favouring Russia’s claim to a protectorate of the Greek Church, was never placed in the Foreign Office archives, but was forwarded in succession from one English Foreign Secretary to another, until, as we shall show, poor Lord Aberdeen (Wellington and Peel being dead) was called on for his pound of flesh in 1853.”58
Thus Nicholas attained the end he had in view, and left England, well pleased with the brilliant reception he had met with. “The Greek and the Catholic Church,” Lord Palmerston had written to Canning, 1849, “are merely other names for Russian and French influence.”
France at once perceived that the Czar’s visit to England was connected with some secret arrangement to the prejudice of French interests, and felt highly indignant.
France did not lose any time, and commenced plans to overturn Russian influence in the Holy Land. Russia resented this, thinking that France would be her only enemy. The Holy Land dispute soon became general.
The Turkish compromise did not please Russia and France. “Suddenly, the French ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Lavalette, was instructed to demand that the grants59 to the Latin Church should be strictly executed in the Holy Land.”60
In 1852 Lord Aberdeen was made the British Prime Minister, and “the Emperor Nicholas heard the tidings of Lord Aberdeen’s elevation to a premiership with a delight he did not suppress.”61
Nicholas thought that now an alliance between England and France was impossible,62 and at the same time, seeing that Prussia and Austria were neutral, determined to obtain “the key of the Black Sea.”63
However, he wanted to ascertain whether England would keep her secret engagement to come to a separate understanding with him. He again proposed a partition of Turkey, on January 28, 1853, at the same time making use of the curious expression to Sir Hamilton Seymour that “a sick man is dying,” and that his (the sick man’s) property should be divided according to agreement between England and Russia. Nicholas’ idea was (a) that Servia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and the other principalities of the Danube, should become independent states under Russian protection, and (b) that he would “have no objection to offer,” to the occupation of Egypt and Candia by England “in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman Succession upon the fall of the Empire,” (c) that Constantinople should never be held by the English or French, or any other great nation, and Greece should not strengthen herself “so as to become a powerful state,” and (e) that Russia should occupy Constantinople provisionally, not “as a proprietor, of course, but as a trustee.”
“In answer to these overtures,” Kinglake says, “the Government of the Queen disclaimed all notion of aiming at the possession of either Constantinople or any other of the Sultan’s possessions, and accepted the assurances to the like effect which were given by the Czar. It combated the opinion that the extinction of the Ottoman Empire was near at hand, and deprecated the discussions based on that supposition as tending directly to produce the very result against which they were meant to provide.”64
Then the Czar sent Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople, and entrusted to him the two following missions: viz., (a) to set forth a Russian claim on the Holy Places, and (b) that all orthodox Christians, who were subjects of Turkey, should be placed under the immediate protectorate of Russia.
The above second mission was planned by Russia owing to her deep sympathy with the Sclavonic races, who had adhered to the same religion although they were still under Turkish rule. But this bond was rapidly getting weaker, and the Christian inhabitants were determined to throw off, if possible, the Mahomedan yoke.
But the second demand of Russia, to my mind, was an unjust claim, because it would have considerably affected the independence or dignity of the Sultan.65
The English Ambassador in Turkey, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a great opponent of Russia, advised the Porte to stand firm and resist to the utmost the second demand.66 He and Lord Clarendon (the English Foreign Secretary), however, tried to persuade the Porte to agree to the first demand, but the Porte, with decided firmness, declined to accept this advice.
This was followed, on May 21, 1853, by the departure of Prince Menschikoff from Constantinople, with the threat that “he had come in his great coat, but would return in his uniform.” Russia then crossed the Pruth on July 2nd, and occupied the Danubian Principalities as a preliminary to her demands. On the same day of the Russian invasion the representatives of the Great Powers assembled at Vienna. This Congress drew up what is known as the “Vienna Note.” Russia acceded to the terms contained in the Note, but the Porte refused, and offered certain amendments. The Powers after a time accepted them, and forwarded them to Russia, who, however, rejected them.67 The Conference then dissolved.
In October, 1853, the Porte declared war on Russia; and the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope sealed the Russian acquiescence to the declaration.
England and France allied themselves with Turkey against Russia, and declared war on March 28, 1854.
The siege of Sebastopol lasted for nearly a year, and its fall was followed by the Congress of Paris.68 The plenipotentiaries of France, England, Russia, Turkey, Sardinia, Austria, and at last Prussia, assembled at Paris (February, 1856), and the “Treaty of Paris” was signed, by which the following matters were settled:—
1. The Great Powers “declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation, as a question of general interest” (Art. VII.).
2. “The Black Sea is neutralized; its waters and its ports thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power” (Art. XI.), and, “The Black Sea being neutralized according to the terms of Article XI., the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of military maritime arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any military maritime arsenal” (Art. XIII.).
The docks and fortifications at Sebastopol were destroyed by the Western Powers; but it was allowed that Russia and the Porte should keep up “the number of light vessels necessary for the service of the coast” (Art. XIV.), and merchant ships of all kinds were allowed freely to enter it.
3. All control over the mouth of the Danube was taken from Russia and entrusted to the authority of the Riverain Commission (Art. XVII.). “A Commission shall be established, and shall be composed of delegates of Austria, Bavaria, the Sublime Porte, and Würtemburg (one for each of those Powers), to whom shall be added commissioners from the three Danubian Principalities, whose nomination shall have been approved by the Porte. This Commission, which shall be permanent: (1) Shall prepare regulations of navigation and river police; (2) Shall remove the impediments, of whatever nature they may be, which still prevent the application to the Danube of the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna; (3) Shall order and cause to be executed the necessary works throughout the whole course of the river; (4) Shall, after the dissolution of the European Commission, see to maintaining the mouths of the Danube and the neighbouring parts of the sea in a navigable state” (Art. XVII.).
4. A portion of Bessarabia on the left bank of the Danube was ceded by Russia in order to make the Turkish defence against Russia more easy, and more fully to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube (Art. XX.).
There is no doubt Russia was beaten by the combined alliance against her. She had entirely overreached herself and miscalculated the temper of the other Powers. She had thought that an Anglo-French alliance was impossible, and that Prussia and Austria would have remained neutral. Prussia indeed did maintain a neutrality at the commencement of the war, and the King of Prussia himself said, “I am resolved to maintain a position of complete neutrality, and to this I add with proud elevation that my people and myself are of one mind. They require absolute neutrality from me.”
Austria, however, only maintained a conditional neutrality. The Austrian Emperor, in replying to the Russian Ambassador, Count Orloff, said, “Then must Austria be equally free to act as her interest and dignity may direct,” if Russia was to cross the Danube, or seek to occupy fresh territory, or not evacuate the Principalities when the war was over.
Later on both Prussia and Austria formed a defensive alliance against Russia, and with the consent of the Porte, the Principalities were provisionally occupied by Austria.
In England Lord Aberdeen did his utmost to bring about a peace between Russia and Turkey, but it was a hopeless task. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, described the aggressive policy of Russia as follows:—
“The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified, in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia.”69 And Lord Palmerston wrote as follows to Lord Aberdeen (July 4, 1853), when the combined fleets of England and France were at Besika Bay:—“In the meantime, however, I hope you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at liberty to go into the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the protection of Turkish territory. The advantages of such a course seem to be—
“First. That it would encourage and assist the Turks in those defensive arrangements and organizations which the present crisis may give the Turkish Government facilities for making, and the benefit of which, in strengthening Turkey against attack, will continue after the crisis is over.
“Secondly. It would essentially tend to prevent any further inroad on Turkish territory in Europe or in Asia, and it is manifest that any such further inroad would much increase the difficulties of a settlement.
“Thirdly. It would act as a wholesome check upon the Emperor and his advisers, and would stimulate Austria and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian Government to reason.
“Fourthly. It would relieve England and France from the disagreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting without venturing to enter the back door as friends, while the Russians have taken forcible possession of the front hall as enemies.
“If these orders are to be given, I would suggest that it is very important that they should be given without delay, so that we may be able, when these matters are discussed this week in Parliament, to say that such orders have been sent off. Of course they would at the same time be communicated to the Russian Government.”
But the Premier did not agree with Palmerston’s views.
The combined fleets, at the request of the Sultan, passed up to Constantinople (October 7, 1853). Palmerston then made two propositions to the Cabinet:—
“First. That instructions should be sent to Constantinople that, in the event of war having been declared, the two squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and should send word to the Russian admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of things, any Russian ship of war found cruising in the Black Sea would be detained, and be given over to the Turkish Government.
“Secondly. That England and France should propose to the Sultan to conclude a convention to the effect that, whereas war has unfortunately broken out between Russia and Turkey, in consequence of differences created by unjust demands made upon Turkey by Russia, and by unwarrantable invasion of the Turkish territory by a Russian army; and whereas it is deemed by England and France to be an object of general European interest, and of special importance to them that the political independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained inviolate against Russian aggression, the two Powers engage to furnish to the Sultan such naval assistance as may be necessary in existing circumstances for the defence of his empire; and they moreover engage to permit any of their respective subjects who may be willing to do so, to enter the military or naval service of the Sultan. In return, the Sultan is to engage that he will consult with England and France as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to determine, on the conclusion of hostilities, the future relations of Russia and Turkey.”
But Lord Aberdeen in reply said:—
“I cannot say that I think the present state of the Russo-Turkish question would authorize such a proceeding on our part as that which you intend to propose.”
On November 1, 1853, Palmerston again said in concluding another letter to Lord Aberdeen:—
“It seems to me, then, that our course is plain, simple, and straight. That we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by negotiation, if possible; and that if negotiation fails, we must, by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers.”
After the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, Palmerston wrote to Aberdeen as follows:—
“Will you allow me this opportunity of repeating in writing what I have more than once said verbally, on the state of things between Russia and Turkey? It appears to me that we have two objects in view: the one to put an end to the present war between these two Powers; the other to prevent, as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so, a recurrence of similar differences, and renewed dangers to the peace of Europe.
“Now it seems to me that, unless Turkey shall be laid prostrate at the feet of Russia by the disasters of the war—an event which England and France could not without dishonour permit—no peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon his demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of former treaties upon which he has founded the pretensions which have been the cause of existing difficulties.
“To bring the Emperor to agree to this, it is necessary to exert a considerable pressure upon him; and the quarter in which that pressure can at present be most easily brought to bear is the Black Sea and the countries bordering upon it. In the Black Sea, the combined English, French, and Turkish squadrons are indisputably superior to the Russian fleet, and are able to give the law to that fleet. What I would strongly recommend, therefore, is that which I proposed some months ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian Government and the Russian admiral at Sebastopol should be informed that so long as Russian troops occupy the Principalities, or hold a position in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian ships of war can be allowed to show themselves out of port in the Black Sea.
“You will say that this would be an active hostility towards Russia; but so is the declaration already made, that no Russian ships shall be permitted to make any landing or attack on any part of the Turkish territory. The only difference between the two declarations is that the one already made is incomplete and insufficient for its purpose, and that the one which I propose would be complete and sufficient. If the Russian fleet were shut up in Sebastopol, it is probable that the Turks would be able to make in Asia an impression that would tend to facilitate the conclusion of peace.
“With regard to the conditions of peace, it seems to me that the only arrangement which could afford to Europe a fair security against future dangers arising out of the encroachments of Russia on Turkey, and the attempts of the Russian Government to interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, would be that arrangement which I have often suggested, namely, that the treaty to be concluded between Russia and Turkey should be an ordinary treaty of peace and friendship, of boundaries, commerce, and mutual protection of the subjects of the one party within the territories of the other; and that all the stipulations which might be required for the privileges of the Principalities and of Servia, and for the protection of the Christian religion and its churches and the Ottoman dominions by the Sultan and the five Powers. By such a treaty, Russia would be prevented from dealing single-handed with Turkey in regard to those matters on which she has, from time to time, endeavoured to fasten a quarrel on the Sultan.”
Lord Aberdeen’s reply was:—
“I confess I am not prepared to adopt the mode which you think most likely to restore peace.”
Lord Palmerston tendered his resignation on receiving this reply, but withdrew it ten days after when the Cabinet adopted his views.
On June 16, 1854, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Minister of War—“Our only chance of bringing Russia to terms is by offensive and not by defensive operations. We and the French ought to go to the Crimea and take Sebastopol. If this blow were accompanied by successful operations in Georgia and Circassia, we might have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.”
Thus we see that the English policy during the Crimean crisis changed from peace tactics to defensive operations, and was subsequently turned into an offensive line of action which terminated in a brilliant triumph for England.
But how was Lord Palmerston able to carry out his war policy so vigorously? The answer is a very simple one. He was backed and urged on by the nation at large, who were incensed at the insolence of Russia. Thus he was able to pursue his plans, being encouraged and supported by a people who were well able to carry out what they resolved upon.
Kinglake said he (Lord Palmerston) “was gifted with the instinct which enables a man to read the heart of a nation.”
His judgment was rightly pronounced, for Palmerston saw the feelings of his national constituents and steered his course well and skilfully.70
What, then, was the national feeling of England at that time?
“In the present instance,” said the Prince Consort, “their (the English) feeling is something of this sort: The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, and the oppressor of Poland.” From these royal remarks, I do not think I shall be far wrong in saying that the growing tendency of the English people towards liberalism since the Reform Bill of 1832, and the teaching of William Wilberforce, had led them to consider Russia not only as a national enemy but as a general opponent of the rights of humanity and civilization. No wonder that a war became a necessity after this public manifestation.
At the end of the last chapter I stated that England had rapidly increased, in wealth and prosperity since the Repeal of the Corn Laws. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, stated that such was the vigour and elasticity of the English trade, that even after the disadvantage of a bad harvest, and under the pressure of war, the imports from day to day, and almost from hour to hour, were increasing, and that the very last papers laid on the table showed within the last three months of the year that there was an increase of £250,000 in the national exports.71 This, then, was one of the reasons which enabled England to carry on this war so successfully.
Let us turn our attention for a short time to France, which at this period was undergoing considerable internal agitation. Republicanism was now abolished and Monarchy reigned in its stead in the hands of Napoleon III. (1852). There seemed every prospect of the French Monarchy being firmly re-established.
The French Emperor was very desirous of starting a European War for the purpose of securing his seat on the throne, and also for the aggrandizement of his country abroad.72 The interests of his country, both religious and political, were opposed to those of Russia with regard to the Holy Places, while both England and France had a common interest in keeping the Ottoman Empire from Russia. This latter interest acted as a means of union between the two Powers, both of whom were ready at any moment to attack Russia, and the publication of the Czar’s memorable conversation with Sir H. Seymour still further cemented that union.
The result we have already seen. Russia was humiliated.