VIII Remarks Upon the Treaty of Berlin
The position of affairs—The Salisbury-Schouvaloft Memorandum and its disastrous effect on the negotiations at Berlin—Russia’s gain—England and Austria the guardians of Turkey—Austria’s vigorous and straightforward Balkan policy—Thwarted in Servia but triumphant in Bulgaria—Relations of Greece to Austria—Solution of the Crete question—Neutrality of Belgium threatened—Importance of Constantinople to Russia; the Anglo-Turkish Convention—England’s feeble policy in Asia Minor—The question of Egypt—A new route to India by railway from the Mediterranean to Persian Gulf—England’s relation to Constantinople.
Let us now review and make a few remarks on the Treaty of Berlin.
Firstly, the whole treaty seems to me to be virtually a repetition86 and revision of the conditions of the European concert in the Eastern question.
Prince Bismarck’s opinion was that the Treaty of San Stefano meant to alter “the state of things as fixed by former European Conventions,” consequently the Berlin Congress followed for “the free discussion of the Cabinets’ signatories of the treaties of 1856 and 1871.”
The Treaties of Paris and London being still in force, and owing to the rise of a new nationality and the redistribution of territory, these treaties were altered and amended by the Congress.
Before we criticize the Treaty of Berlin we ought to bear two things in our mind. (1) At the Conference of Paris, 1856, England, France, and Turkey were victorious, while Russia was conquered. (2) At the Berlin Congress, 1878, Russia was victorious over Turkey, while England and France were neutral.
In both meetings it was asserted and claimed that the Powers collectively had the right of settling the Eastern Question as against Russia’s single-handed interference, England leading the van with fair words but selfish interests.
On Russia concluding the San Stefano Treaty with Turkey, England said that, according to the conditions of the Treaty of Paris, the Great Powers of Europe “engaged each on its own part to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire,” and consequently Turkish affairs produced a general interest throughout Europe.
Russia had committed a serious breach of “the law of nations” by a treaty single-handed with Turkey. When the European Congress at Berlin was consented to by Russia, England said that the Treaty of San Stefano was not valid without the consent of the signatory Powers of the Treaties of Paris and London. She also demanded from Russia that, “in the Congress itself, each Power should have full liberty of assent and free action.” These demands seemed perfectly reasonable. However, England, before the Berlin meeting, contracted a secret agreement with Russia, in which the modifications asked for by England in the Treaty of San Stefano were specified. This agreement did not leave out the bringing in of other changes by mutual consent, but, if these failed, tended to be a mutual engagement by the ambassadors of Russia and Great Britain as to their general behaviour and conduct at the Congress. This secret agreement between the two Powers practically blocked the full liberty of the other Powers and the full amount of good they might otherwise have done. England had been one of the first to attack Russia for committing a breach of the Treaties of Paris and London; yet she overlooked the fact that she herself had morally broken the same treaties by her secret negotiation with Russia, the other Powers not being at the time cognizant of the fact.
Once more Russia, by the Black Sea Conference, had gained full freedom on the Black Sea, now she had regained the part of Bessarabia which she had lost during the Crimean War, the principal object of which was to drive Russia from the banks of the Danube. The above-mentioned territory was ceded to Russia through the influence of Lord Salisbury, who had secretly promised Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador, that he would support the Russian demand with regard to that land.
By the Berlin Treaty England and Austria were invested with a special responsibility for protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression—England in Asia Minor, and Austria in the Balkans.
If Russia attacked through Asia Minor the English interests would be imperilled; and by the disappearance of the Balkan States, then Austria would be open to Russian immediate attacks—a consummation which would be little desired by that Power.
This responsibility has undoubtedly from that time engrossed the attention of Austria and Hungary. She has had to encounter several difficulties. Bessarabia was no longer a Turkish province, and had been ceded to Russia by the Salisbury-Schouvaloff memorandum. Also there, was no possibility of the Balkan States being confederated owing to the different races, language, and feelings of the nationality.
In September, 1879, Bismarck visited Vienna and concluded an Austro-German defensive alliance against the alliance of France and Russia. Bismarck, however, described the German policy in the following terse manner: “Fight by all means, if you feel yourself strong enough to beat Russia single-handed. France and Germany will see all fair, and you can hardly expect anybody effectually to help you.”
Notwithstanding these rather unfavourable circumstances, and her financial difficulties as well, still the policy of Austria is at the present time carried on straightforwardly and vigorously, and the duty with which she charged herself at the Berlin Treaty is ably done, and is well backed up by the five million Magyars who inhabit Hungary and the adjoining provinces. This nation had been cruelly put under Austria by Russia (1848–49), and consequently their hatred against Russia was deeply rooted.
At present, therefore, Russia’s schemes with regard to Constantinople have been frustrated, and Austria holds the lead in the Balkan Peninsula race.
Austria was asked to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to secure peace and order there. She did so, and, notwithstanding an armed resistance, entered and fulfilled her promise. She is now strengthening her hold on these states by stationary garrisons of soldiers in different parts, and also Jesuits, who exercise a moral influence over the people. The affairs of Servia have also deeply occupied the attention of the Austrian Government. She captured King Milan, and used him as a tool for her own purposes. Russia, however, desired to get hold of Servia through the ex-queen.
Intrigues at the Servian Court were numerous, and at last the miserable divorce of the king and queen leaked out. The present young king ascended the throne. This was a blow to the Austrian influence.
Bulgaria had been declared an independent country by the Berlin Treaty. On this state the question of supremacy between Russia and Austria in the Balkans hangs to a great degree. In 1855 Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were united into a single state. This revolution occasioned very great displeasure in Russia, and under her influence Prince Alexander was kidnapped and compelled to abdicate, and Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was elected as the ruling prince.
Although of German extraction, he is an Austrian by allegiance, and a Roman Catholic. He was originally an officer in the Hungarian army. There seems to me no doubt that his election was illegal, because, in the first place, by the Berlin Treaty the ruling prince must belong to the Greek Church.
Prince Ferdinand was quite ready to submit his claim for decision to the Great Powers, and abide by the result. All the Powers except England and Austria declared that he had no claim to the crown, but the two had their own way, and he ascended the Bulgarian throne—another repulse and blow to Russian influence. Prince Alexander meanwhile was given a post in the Austro-Hungarian army. Only recently, to show the friendly spirit that exists between Austria and Bulgaria, a loan has been concluded and advanced by the former to the latter.
Undoubtedly Austria committed a slight mistake in her policy with regard to Greece. She had arrogantly displayed her fleet and strength at Salonika, which no doubt was a source of irritation to Greece. Her best policy would have been kindness and consideration, not forcible means, for the prosperity of Austria was to a certain extent dependent on her treatment of neighbouring countries, and, together with the Great Powers she was to a certain extent dependent upon Greece’s action. The latter, therefore, was a necessary bulwark against Russian encroachments, and was thus of primary importance to England, France, and Italy. If, therefore, the Turks were driven from Europe, Greece would occupy the place of Turkey with regard to Russia, and would be the only obstacle to Russian Mediterranean advance. “I would never permit,” said the Czar Nicholas, “such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state.” Truly Greece might well be called the Belgium of the Mediterranean!
By the Berlin Treaty the Porte was advised to cede Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. This was done, and as the Greeks were noted for being good traders and sailors, great progress and improvement was made in their newly acquired territory.
It is difficult to see the reason why the Berlin Congress did not advise the Porte to cede Crete to Greece. If the island was left alone it would be harmless, and exercise no influence on the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean.
However, an occupation of Crete by a European Power would to a great extent change the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, destroy European tranquillity and peace, the Levant would be in the hands of the Cretan occupiers. Again, its position would completely command the Ægean Sea, and if properly fortified might be rendered almost impregnable. Its natural wealth, population, and general productiveness afford ample resources both in times of war and peace; in fact, it might be very well termed the Second Gate to the Black Sea.
Therefore it seems to me the best policy to let this important island remain in a neutral state by an agreement between the Great Powers, and the sooner it is agreed to the better it would be for the peace of Europe generally.
In my opinion it would have been better to have placed it under Grecian rule for the following reasons:—
(1) Because Greece herself was a neutral nation. (2) They were a commercial people, and peaceful, which would have a beneficial effect upon the island. (3) More than half of the Cretan population are of Grecian extraction.
There is no doubt that if any one87 of the Great Powers had proposed the cession of Crete to Greece it would have met with the general approbation of the Congress. This would not have met with Turkish opposition, particularly as England had before the Berlin Congress mentioned it in the Anglo-Turkish agreement; and to show that Turkey did not attach much importance to Crete, it is related in Turkish history that it was offered to Mehemet Ali as a reward for his help in the Greek insurrection; besides, the national force of Turkey was not large enough to utilize the strong natural position of the island.
Austria,88 unless she had been influenced by her national vanity, would have agreed to such a proposal owing to the great value as a national defence that she received from the Balkan States. Again, Germany, France, and Italy could find no reasonable argument for opposing this plan.
The policy of England with regard to a neutral state has always been to strengthen its national power, and that to such a degree as to properly maintain its fixed neutrality.
In 1815 England ceded the Java Islands to the Dutch on the formation of the Netherlands at the Congress of Vienna. Why did she do this? For this reason: because by doing this the new States would be rendered neutral in case of a French or German invasion, and by this cession of Java the Dutch national power was increased in every way, and their power of maintaining a strict neutrality rendered stronger.
Another instance may strengthen my statement. Corfu, an important military and naval post, was put under English protection at the Vienna Congress, 1815. Lord Palmerston at one time saw that it would be impolitic to hand over Corfu to Austria, and declared that the islands ought never to be abandoned by England.
However, when the new kingdom of Greece was formed England cordially agreed to hand over Corfu and several other islands to Greece, on the condition that the Greeks should choose a king subject to the approval of England. The fortifications of Corfu were demolished, and the neutrality of the islands was declared by the Great Powers.
These circumstances, then, tend to show us that England was distinctly favourable89 to the cession of Crete to Greece, and they were considerably strengthened by the fact that Greece was an ally of England, and the commercial relations between the two were very free.
There is no doubt that the marriage of the Crown Prince of Greece with a German Princess (1889) has morally strengthened the position and power of Greece. However, Greece still needs material strength for the maintenance of a strict neutrality.
Turning to another country, we find that it is a matter of considerable doubt whether Belgium can maintain a firm neutrality in case of a Franco-German war. At the time of Lord Palmerston she might perhaps have been able to do so, but the recent discoveries in the world of science, and their application to military purposes, and the immense increase of the French and German armies, have changed the military world, and the neutrality of Belgium is a doubtful point. In 1887 an important discussion on this question took place, which resulted in the fortification of Namur and Liege. This was followed by the fortification of the Meuse, but it is said that the Belgians have not enough troops to garrison these newly-made defences. It has been publicly admitted in Belgium that their national force is not sufficient to defend a violation of neutrality against France and Germany, therefore Belgium must regard the first violator of her neutrality as her national enemy, and will be obliged to ally herself with a nation which is an enemy of the state which has violated neutrality. This is not the Belgium which Lord Palmerston meant it to be.
Another important fact is that since the Franco-German war German attention has been turned to the North Sea, and a new naval harbour and arsenal have been built at Wihelmshafen. Two other large harbours in the North Sea have also been improved lately, viz., Hamburg and Bremen. Kiel, the finest port on the Baltic, has been confiscated, and is now connected with the North Sea by a canal, through which ships of large tonnage may one day pass. Numerous ironclads and fleets of large merchant and emigrant steam vessels have been constructed which, in case of war, can be armed and turned into transports. Her land forces have been well organized and augmented, and military tactics scientifically developed. From these threatening facts it is certain that in the event of a Franco-German war both Holland and Belgium would occupy most dangerous positions. Having these events staring them in the face, only one expedient could present itself to the two states, viz., union. This would enable them to show a powerful front to the rival Powers, and would enable them both to maintain a united fixed neutrality, thus showing Lord Palmerston’s mistaken policy of the separation of the two states to be a weak one with regard to the present state of affairs, though perhaps it may have served its purpose at that time.
All these arguments go to prove that a cession of Crete to Greece would be beneficial to both European and Grecian interests.
Constantinople was hardly mentioned in the Berlin Treaty, although it is said that Lord Beaconsfield had suggested to General Ignatieff a Russian occupation of the Bosphorus with an English one of Mitylene. Ignatieff said, however, that “Mitylene was too near, as it was only two hours’ steam from the north of the Dardanelles.” Lord Beaconsfield did not, therefore, press the discussion. The importance of Constantinople can be explained in a few words.
By possession of the Straits Russia would be able to make the Black Sea a second Caspian, whose coasts are left undefended, and it would become a great Russian arsenal, for ten or fifteen thousand troops would be sufficient to shut out an English fleet from the Straits, and by this means quite two hundred thousand Russian troops could be withdrawn from the Black Sea and turned to the Balkans, Asia Minor, or Central Asia.
The Anglo-Turkish Convention
Notwithstanding the fact that Austria has fulfilled her contract in preventing Russian aggression through the Balkans, yet Russia could find a way through Asia Minor, although her progress through Asia was stopped by England at the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
By this treaty, however, England committed a still more grave and serious breach of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 than by this Berlin Treaty. Yet although England and Russia had made a secret agreement beforehand, still the Berlin Treaty was discussed and drawn up by the Congress. Therefore England was only morally to blame. But the Anglo-Turkish Convention was concluded between the two countries themselves, and was never submitted for the consideration of the Great Powers. Lord Beaconsfield sought to screen England by declaring that Russia had concluded the San Stefano Treaty with Turkey without the knowledge and consent of the Powers, and Russia herself, therefore, had broken the principles of the 1856 and 1871 Treaties. Yet this did not conceal the fact that England herself had not acted up to her tenets in the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
The Porte ceded Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, together with its port, to Russia. England occupied Cyprus, and engaged to defend Asiatic Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Assyria, Arabia, and Armenia, against Russian invasion.
Has England performed her contract in Asiatic Turkey as Austria has done in the Balkans? We will see. Cyprus is left almost in the same condition as it was before our English occupation, and nothing has been done by England for the defence of Asiatic Turkey, while only a few hundred soldiers guard against a Russian invasion in Asia Minor. Surely this cannot be a sufficient number of men to withstand a Russian army. What, then, has become of the Anglo-Turkish Convention? Russia has taken advantage of this, and is doing her utmost to bring about war in that quarter.
By the Berlin Treaty the Russian Emperor declared that it was his intention to constitute Batoum a free port essentially commercial. Lord Salisbury interpreted this remark that the port of Batoum was to be only a commercial port. The Russian Emperor has, however, changed his intention, and Batoum is essentially a fortress, and is connected with Poti by a railway through Kutais.
Why cannot, therefore, Russia have an idea of breaking the Berlin Treaty with equal freedom as England did with regard to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 by concluding the Anglo-Turkish Convention single-handed? It seems to me that Russia has a great opportunity of advancing to Erzeroum, and from there proceeding to Alexandretta; and from there to Constantinople. At any rate she has ample opportunities of reaching the Persian Gulf by piercing the northern frontiers and western part of Persia, and thus completing the far-seeing policies of Peter the Great, Nicholas, and Alexander.
How can England withstand this? When Cyprus was placed under English administration both France and Italy were opposed to this, France especially so, because she had a special interest with regard to Syria. However, she concluded a secret agreement with England, that the latter would consent to a French Protectorate over Tunis, which was done in 1881, a protectorate which is now extending to Tripoli. Many regard this action of France as an indirect third offer of Egypt to England, the first having been made by Nicholas I., and the second by Louis Philippe.
Whatever the French occupation of Tunis might be, England occupied Egypt in 1885, thus fulfilling Lord Palmerston’s prophecy of a quarter of a century before, when he said that “if a practicable waterway were created between the Gulf of Pelusium and the Red Sea England would be compelled sooner or later to annex Egypt, and that he opposed M. de Lessep’s scheme because he considered it undesirable that England should annex territory in that part of the world.”90
The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, and Lord Palmerston’s prophecy was fulfilled. In 1875 the English Government purchased the Khedive’s shares (£4,000,000) in the Suez Canal, and this was followed by the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet in 1885. The chief aim of the English occupation of Egypt was “to possess the inns on the north road.”91
It will be impossible to avoid the conflict of English and French interests as long as there is only one route through the Suez Canal to India, and an Anglo-French alliance on the subject seems to be far distant, particularly as England has three-fourths of the traffic through the canal.
It is also a matter of great importance that England should keep Egypt orderly and peaceful. Lord Salisbury, in an excellent speech on Lord Mayor’s Day, 1889, said:
“We (English) have undertaken to sustain Egypt until she is competent to sustain herself against every enemy, foreign or domestic. We cannot see that that time has yet arrived. It may arrive quicker or later. Other Powers may help us by concurring in measures which will improve the position and increase the prosperity of Egypt, or they may defer that day by taking an opposite course. But whether the day comes sooner or later, our policy remains unaltered, and we will pursue our task to the end.”
We can easily get at the pith of Lord Salisbury’s speech. If France again became a co-partner of England in establishing peace and order in Egypt, then England would be quite willing to restore the dual control with regard to Egypt, and Lord Salisbury in 1878 had declared that England did not desire to annex Egypt.
The dual control of France and England with regard to Egypt might possibly settle affairs there temporarily, or neutralize that country on the same lines as Belgium; but still this is not a sufficient guarantee against an Anglo-French dispute on the Egyptian question.
The French Government of the present day is not noted for stability, always changing, never agreeing, and ready for foreign quarrels, and although now they are supporting the English Government in Egypt, it is not safe to depend upon them, for the feeling of rivalry is sure to arise, and great caution has to be exercised in order to prevent complications arising. No matter what happens, England must have free communication with India, and as long as there is only one road, ruptures will be inevitable, and there can be no firm alliance as in the case of the Crimean War.
It seems to me to be a favourable time to suggest to Turkey the construction of a railway from Constantinople or some other port on the Mediterranean to Bussorah on the Persian Gulf: why should not England undertake the construction herself? This route would certainly possess four great advantages:
(1) It would be a shorter route to India.
(2) It would be a valuable means of quick transportation of either Turkish or English troops for the defence of Asia Minor.
(3) It would avoid a clashing of English and French interests in Egypt to a certain extent, and a dual control would thereby be strengthened, and would produce two more results, viz:—
(a) A firmer alliance between England and France.
(b) England would be able to reduce her troops in Egypt, and devote them to the defence of Asia Minor, and by this means be more able to withstand Russian attacks in that quarter and in Persia.
(4) Lastly, Turkey would be strengthened financially owing to the prosperity of her commerce, and productions in Asia Minor, which is the usual effect of such a communication.
By this means England can fulfil her public duty to Turkey, which she had undertaken to do by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and can maintain her national honour pledged when Lord Beaconsfield and Count Andrassy discussed the defence of Turkey from Russian invasion in Asia and Europe.
It is difficult to see why this railway scheme was not brought forward at the Anglo-Turkish Convention, because it appears to me to be of primary importance for the defence of both Asia Minor and India; and also how it escaped the mind of so clever a statesman as Lord Beaconsfield.
It has, however, been informally discussed both at political meetings and by pamphlet only recently: the financial difficulties seemed quite surmountable, but political opinions are decidedly at variance on the subject. But it is my opinion that England would be perfectly right in compelling Turkey to carry out this scheme, and if she was not able to execute it, then England could perform it herself, and she would be only fulfilling one of the duties which she has undertaken to perform with the Sultan at the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
The following articles strangely enough appeared in one of the English daily papers92:—
“The tradition, adhered to even by Lord Beaconsfield, of remaining allied with Turkey at all hazards, is no longer advocated even by Conservative occupants of the Foreign Office. Since the occupation by England of Cyprus, and still more of Egypt, Constantinople has lost much of its importance to England. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea would, in the event of war, pass through the Dardanelles, with or without the Sultan’s consent, and advance into the Mediterranean. The rule of the Sultan at Constantinople, therefore, no longer affords a guarantee against a Russian attack of the English possessions in the Mediterranean. Russia already possesses a road to India viâ Merv, and the possession of Constantinople could afford her no resistance in this direction.”
“England, on the other hand, in the event of Russia’s impeding the conveyance of English troops through the Suez Canal, has at her disposal another way to India, one which leads exclusively through British dominions—the new Canadian railway. One no longer thinks of defending India at Constantinople, but in Afghanistan and on the Anglo-Afghan frontier. England has as much interest as the other Powers in preventing Russia from advancing towards Constantinople, but this is no longer held to be a vital interest that would have to be protected even by force of arms.”
This is certainly a serious mistake in policy if backed up by the English Government, even more so than that of the Duke of Wellington, 1827–1830.
If Constantinople were once occupied by Russia, it is certain that Turkey would be a thing of the past, the Russian fleet on the Black Sea would at once sail into the Mediterranean and attack the English supremacy there. The Russian occupation would enable them to withdraw quite 200,000 troops from the Black Sea coasts which could be used for an attack on the Balkans, Armenia, or Central Asia; Cyprus would be lost to England, and Asia Minor to Turkey; Russia would have a largely increased power in the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf would be no longer open to English ships.
If the Franco-Russian alliance of to-day remained firm, and war was to be declared, then England would only have two long routes to India: (a) round the Cape of Good Hope, (b) the new Canadian railway. Lord Charles Beresford said, “With the Cape well fortified and held by a military force, England might laugh at the world.” But the Cape would be unsafe, owing to France having now firm hold of the Indian Ocean “Malta,” viz., Madagascar.
Notwithstanding that the new Canadian route passes exclusively through British dominions, yet it cannot be called a direct route, for it is certainly a seven days longer journey than the Gibraltar route to Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, could send an immense number of troops in seven or ten days from Moscow to the Afghan frontiers, and in about another extra day from St. Petersburg, or the Caucasian Peninsula.
This would be all in favour of Russia gaining the first military move—a matter of extreme importance in the present advanced stage of military tactics.
This question may also be viewed from two other points:—
First, Cobden93 and Bright were once under the idea that if Russia occupied Constantinople, she would change into a peaceful and civilized nation, and that England would be materially benefited commercially. This was merely an imaginary dream, for there is no doubt in my mind that a Russian occupation of the Turkish capital is a preliminary to shutting out English trade from the Black Sea by heavy protective duties. Second, England has engaged herself, together with the other European Powers, to respect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire by the Treaties of Paris, London, and Berlin, and still more emphatically by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. If, therefore, she followed the policy of leaving Constantinople to its fate, and simply defended her interests on the Afghan frontiers, she would at once be branded with disgrace, and stigmatized as a breaker of the 1856, 1871, and 1878 Treaties, and a backslider from the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
At the present time, however, an indirect change of policy may be observed. Early in March, 1889, the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) introduced and passed the Naval Defences Bill, authorizing an expenditure of £21,500,000 on the Navy by constructing eight first and two second-class battle-ships, nine first-class and thirty-three smaller cruisers, and eighteen torpedo gunboats. This surely implies that England is determined to prevent Russian encroachments both at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean.
Reviewing the above, the following things seem plainly revealed, viz., that Russia has in the majority of cases assumed an offensive policy while England has maintained a defensive one with regard to Eastern Europe.
Pitt started a splendid scheme of resistance against Russia; Canning worked upon it, and developed the European Concert scheme with regard to Turkey; Palmerston improved, expanded, and eventually completed a perfectly harmonious unison; while Beaconsfield composed and worked variations upon the original strain of the Concert. Surely the example of such noble and great statesmen is worthy of veneration both in the present and the future.