Chap. IV
Of the National Debt and Sinking Fund.— Advantages and Disadvantages of both.— Errors committed in calculating their Effects.—Causes of Error. — Mode proposed for preventing future Increase.
In no circumstance does the British empire differ so widely from all nations recorded in history, or from any now in existence, as with regard to the national debt.
Not only the invention of contracting debt to carry on war is but of recent origin, but no nation has ever carried it to near the extent that it has arrived at in England. The Italian states, in which this mode was first practised, never had the means of carrying it very far. In Spain, France, and Holland, national debt met with obstacles that arrested its progress long before it arrived at the pitch to which it has now come in this country.
The interest of the debt is above thrice the free revenue of the country, in time of peace, as that revenue was, previous to hostilities in 1793.
Whenever any operation is begun, the result of which is not known, owing to its being new, but which is in itself of great importance; the anxiety it occasions must be great, and, generally, the alarm is more than proportioned to the danger. If ever this truth was exemplified in any thing, it has been with regard to the national debt of England, which has been a continual object of terror since its first creation; not a public terror, merely amongst the ignorant, but the most profound and enlightened statesmen. Calculators, and writers on political economy, have served to augment the uneasiness by their predictions of a fatal termination.
While the debt has been augmenting with great rapidity, the wealth and resources of the nation have, at least, augmented equally fast, and the matter of fact has given the lie to all the forebodings of those who [end of page #234] occasioned the alarm. This very extraordinary circumstance merits an investigation.
It unfortunately happens, that, where people are deeply interested in a subject, they form their opinion before they begin to examine and investigate, and consequently the mind commences with a bias, and acts under its influence, the consequence of which is, that the conclusion is not so accurate as it otherwise would be. Not that, in calculating with figures, the disposition of the mind can make an unit of difference, the question being once fairly stated; but the previous impression on the mind tends to prevent the fair statement of the question.
That an uninterrupted practice of borrowing must end in an inability to pay is a self-evident axiom. It is not a matter that admits of dispute; but to fix the point where the inability will commence is a problem to resolve of a very difficult nature; it is indeed a problem, the re-solution =sic= of which depends upon some circumstances that cannot be ascertained. There are, it is true, certain fixed principles; but there are some points also that depend on events entirely unconnected with the debt, and, in themselves, uncertain. Two great considerations, that operate powerfully, have been omitted by most writers on this subject. The first, is the increased energy of human exertion, under an increased operation of necessity; the second, is the effect that the depreciation of money has, on lessening the apparent burthen occasioned by the interest of the debt. That these two causes, which have not been taken into account, have rendered the calculations erroneous, there is not a doubt; and how far they may still continue to operate is, at this time, as uncertain as ever; but they ought not to be considered as of operation beyond a certain unknown point, else the practice of contracting debt would be capable of infinite extension, which is impossible.
But the augmentation of the debt itself is not the only circumstance that excites attention, as intimately connected with the fate of this nation.
The increasing wealth and prosperity of the nation, under the heavy load of taxes, of which the debt is the principal occasion, is as much a matter of surprize as the ultimate result is an object of anxiety.
So long, however, as the nation is not actually born =sic= down by the [end of page #235] weight of taxes, its wealth must increase; and, what is considered as a very strange phenomenon, is only the natural and necessary consequence of increased taxation.
When men inhabit and cultivate land of their own, they are under no necessity of creating any greater value than they consume; but, when they pay RENT and TAXES, they are laid under a necessity of producing enough to supply their own wants, and to pay the rent and taxes to which they are subject. The same is the case with regard to manufacturers in every line of business, for though they do not, perhaps, consume any part of what they produce, (what comes to the same thing is that,) they are obliged to produce as much as will exchange, or sell, for all they want to consume, over and above paying their rent and taxes.
Without rent and taxes there are only three things that excite the exertion of man:— Necessity, arising from natural wants; a love of pleasure; or, a love of accumulation.
When a man labours no more than for his mere natural necessities, he is a poor man, in the usual acceptation =sic= of the word, that is, he has no wealth; 188 and a nation, peopled with such men, would justly be called a poor nation. When a man labours for nothing more than what he expends on pleasure, or to gratify his taste and passions, it is still the same, he consumes what he creates, and there is an end of the matter; and, whether he creates much or little, as his consumption is regulated by it, no difference is made to society; but, when rent and taxes constitute a part of the price of every commodity, the consumption of every man, whether he pays any taxes directly or not, himself, is attended with an increase to the revenues of those who receive the rent and taxes, and obliges him to create more than he consumes.
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It arises from this, that the aggregate wealth of a people increases with rent and taxes; for, where there are neither, the desire of accumulation is the only thing that increases wealth. 189
It is for this reason, that, by obliging a man to create more than he himself consumes, taxation increases the wealth of a nation; so that the flourishing state of England is a very natural effect of heavy taxation. The misery and poverty of those people who have little or nothing to pay, is equally natural, though it does not astonish one quite so much.
As there is nothing in the world without a bound, and a limit, it is clear, that, in laying it down as a principle, that rent and taxes occasion wealth instead of poverty, it is only to be understood, to a certain extent; that is to say, to the length to which the nature of things will admit of the exertion of man augmenting his industry, but not a step farther.
To ascertain this point would be to solve a most curious problem; observing, that the solution would, in every case, depend on a great variety of particular circumstances.
Something like a general investigation, however, is possible. It will not be accurate, nor is that wanted, but it may lay the foundation for understanding the matter better at a future period.
In London, rent and taxes are heavier than in any other part of the kingdom, and in Scotland they are less than in any other; yet, the working people, from all parts of the kingdom, come to London, and from the poorest places, in the greatest numbers. Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, are the poor countries, lightly taxed, and from them
Thus, for example, the Americans are increasing in wealth, from necessity, because their country is becoming better, by being cultivated, in order to produce what is necessary. They cannot have what they want, in the way they wish, without increasing or bettering the property of which they have taken possession.
If they had no more rent and taxes than they have, and if this were not the case, they would remain a poor people. Thus, the inhabitants of Syria, of Egypt, of Arabia Felix, formerly the finest countries in the world, having a property that does not better in their possession, and having scarcely either rent or taxes to pay, remain, from generation to generation, creating little, and consuming what they create.
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people come, perpetually, to pay heavy taxes in London. Yes, but it will be said, in answer, these are poor countries. They are, however, richer than England was in the days of Queen Elizabeth; and, if the nature of things could have admitted of people changing centuries, as they change countries, the people of the seventeenth century, with light taxes, would have emigrated to the nineteenth century, with all its heavy taxes, just as those Irish and Scotch come to London.
This proves that, even in London, the excess of taxes is not yet such as to create a retrograde effect, and it proves it in a very striking manner. Though there may, at first sight, appear something ludicrous in the idea of emigrating from the seventeenth to the nineteenth, from the reign of Queen Elizabeth to that of his present majesty, it is a perfectly fair comparison, and will hold good, examine it as much as one will. The common expression, (and a very significant one it is,) that one part of the country is a century behind another, or twenty years, or fifty years, is exactly the same idea, expressed in other words, for it is a comparison between the changes which a lapse of time makes in one case, and a removal of place in the other. The present times are then better to live in than those of Elizabeth, as London is better than any distant part of the country.
That the ability of the nation to sustain a given burthen, for a certain number of years, is no proof of a permanent ability to support it, must be admitted, even if the same annual resources were to continue; but, that permanent ability becomes much less certain, when we consider that the annual resources are perpetually varying, that, therefore, they have so many uncertain quantities, that it is impossible to resolve the problem.
As to the effect, with respect to the increasing the burthens of the people, that has been treated under the general head of taxation. Whether the money goes to pay for a ship of war, a regiment of soldiers, or the interest of loans, makes no difference to him who pays the tax; and, indeed, makes little to the general system of national economy, as, in every case, what is paid to the state is employed on unproductive labourers or idle people. That is to say, it is consumed, and never appears again.
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National debt, then, so far as it increases the taxes of a country, is like any other national expenditure; and, in maintaining unproductive and idle people, it is also the same; but it has, in another point of view, a different effect, and that effect is an advantageous one.
In every nation, the greatest part of the capital is employed, or, as it is called, sunk. Land, houses, machines, merchandize, &c. are the principal employments of capital. As those are transferred from one to another, or as the use or produce of them is paid for, by one to another, money is wanted occasionally; and, if there were no other employments, money must either be lying idle in some persons =sic= hands, till an employment could be found for it, or the possessor of it must begin some enterprise, and sink it himself.
But, when money is thus employed, it is no longer in the power of the proprietor; and, though money may be borrowed on such sort of security, it is slowly, and with difficulty. The expense, the inconveniency =sic=, and time necessary, prevent the lenders of money from lending any for occasional purposes on such sort of security; but when a nation borrows, and the stock is divisible and transferable at will, money can always be realized when it is wanted for any purpose that affords a greater advantage than the stock affords. 190
Without this had been one of the effects of national debt, how could the facility of borrowing have increased, 191 as it has done? or how could merchants and individuals raise the sums they now do? 192
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It must be allowed that one hundred millions, or at least a much smaller sum than our debts amount to now, would have produced this effect, and might answer every purpose of this sort, but there is still a consideration arising from the fluctuations in a stock, when it is small, and also from the number of persons possessed of it. People buy in and sell out with total indifference when the quantity is great, and the fluctuations small; but, the moment the funds are agitated, whether in rising or falling, money becomes scarce for those who want it for other purposes.
That the number of persons ready to buy and sell must be proportioned, in some degree, to the quantity of stock, is of itself so evident, that it would be useless to enlarge upon it; but it must be granted that the national debt has long ago passed the sum that was necessary to produce this advantage.
We find, then, that the evils attending the increase of debt are greatly counteracted by the debt itself, and that, to a certain amount, it is productive of a very considerable advantage to a trading nation. As those who calculated its ill effects, and foretold the ruin it would bring upon the state, did not take into account those circumstances, the result of their enquiries was necessarily wrong, in point of time, though the effect of which they spoke is perfectly certain to take place, if the debt continues to increase. Their reasoning may be compared to that of an astronomer, who observed the position of a planet, but, in his calculations, made no allowance for the refraction of the atmosphere, who would therefore err as to the place of the star, but not as to its existence.
Let us now consider the natural consequence, supposing that future increase is prevented by means of the sinking fund established for that purpose. As to the probability of this, it depends on so many circumstances that are concealed in the womb of time, that it would be madness to give any other than a hypothetical solution of the question.
If the war continues, and expenses increase nearly as they have hitherto done, great as is the operation of a sinking fund, it will not have time to counteract the evil. If the war stops soon, it will dim- [end of page #240] inish the debt with a most prodigious rapidity, 193 if it continues; the question, whether taxes can be found to pay the interest or not? can only be answered as a matter of opinion, which is, in a case of this sort, equivalent to no answer at all.
With respect to the supposed case of the debt augmenting, the observations that apply to that have been made already; they now only remain to be made with respect to the debt being paid off.
It has been observed already, in the chapter on Taxation, that the case of taxes being taken off to a great amount would be a new one of sudden and hurtful operation. Wages of labour would be diminished, as well as the burthens on those who live on settled income; it would therefore render people of fixed income more affluent, without giving ease to those who want it; in short, as the augmentation of taxes falls most on people with fixed incomes, so the advantages of this would principally be felt by them; and, as the baneful operation carries a sort of counteracting antidote with it, so, likewise, this beneficial operation would be attended with some drawback and inconveniency =sic=.
The diminution of taxes, though the ultimate is not, however, the immediate consequence of the operation of the sinking fund, the efficacy of which depends on the taxes being kept up to their full extent for a considerable time. =sic= The first effect of the fund is, that a large sum, annually expended, as revenue drawn from the subject, is reimbursed to the stockholders, and becomes capital.
This would immediately raise the funds, and thereby would counteract the sinking fund itself in a very material degree. Money would become abundant for all the purposes of trade, and it would be difficult
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to find employment for it; and, if the progress continued, part of it would most undoubtedly be sent to other countries, and so be the means of impoverishing this.
If, then, we could suppose fifty years of peace, and that the national debt could be paid off, (as it might be in that time,) the situation of productive labourers would be worse; of unproductive, better; and, finally, capital would leave the country, which would be deprived of that transferable stock, the beneficial effects of which have been mentioned.
The necessity that creates industry would be diminished, so that nothing could tend more effectually to bring on the decline of the nation than if all the debt were to be paid off; an operation which, though possible in calculation, never certainly would take place; the evils attending it would be so manifest, so clear, and so palpably felt before that was accomplished.
To let the national debt continue to increase is, then, certain ruin, at some period unknown, but perhaps not very distant; to pay it off would be equally dangerous: what then are we to do?
We must try to raise the resources necessary for war within the year, by which means we may avoid augmenting the debt. That is not, however, to be done while the present heavy interest remains, and that cannot be got rid of, according to any method yet publicly known, without bankruptcy, breaking faith with creditors, or paying off the debt; a resource in itself dangerous, and one that, after all, would bring relief at a very distant day.
Since the debt has been contracted, let it be kept up; but let a mode be taken of reducing the interest, without breaking faith with the creditors of the state, so that we may never be obliged to borrow any more.
At present, the sum that goes annually for interest, and for the sinking fund, (that is for paying off capital,) amounts to twenty-four millions, and the expenses of a year of war do not exceed that sum. Twelve millions of this may be found by war-taxes, and twelve millions diminution of the interest would just leave a residue sufficient to pay for a constant state of war; and, if peace came, the war-taxes would be taken off. The enemies of England would then not be able to make notches [end of page #242] in a stick, and say, “When we come to such a notch England will be ruined.”
If this could be done it would be a solid and permanent system of revenue, arising out of an unsolid and transitory one.
Any thing like want of faith with the creditors would, however, not only be disgraceful and dishonourable, but would reduce such numbers to beggary, and ruin credit so completely, that the nation would be lost for ever; and, certainly, if we are to be ruined, there is no balancing between ruin with honour and ruin with disgrace.
There is a mode that would be fair and practicable, and the present is the most favourable moment for executing it; indeed, it is perhaps the only one when it has been practicable or would be just. By practicability and justice, two words very well understood, we mean, in this instance, that it is a moment when those who would have to pay the difference would be willing to do it, would see their interest in doing it, and would feel that they ought to do it.
We mean not to propose any of those imaginary means, by which debts will be paid off without burthens laid on. We have no talent for schemes, where all is produced from nothing, and no faith in their practicability.
The late and present wars, which have occasioned one-half of the debt, and for which our exertions are to be continued, were undertaken for the preservation of property; for, though the French system is so completely bad that even the beggars in England would be losers by adopting it, yet, it will be allowed, that the evil to people of property would be much greater than to those who have no property. Let us look to Flanders, Holland, and other countries, and say no if we can.
It was on this idea that an income-tax, afterwards termed a property-tax, was laid on, by which the rich are made to pay, and the poor are exempted. The justice and expediency of this was universally admitted: there might be some difference of opinion as to modes and rates, but there was none as to the general principle.
We would, then, propose to RAISE LOANS, at a low rate of interest to reimburse the present creditors, ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROPERTY-TAX EXISTS, in the following manner:
There are, by Mr. Pitt’s calculation, (and his may be taken [end of page #243] in order to prevent caviling) 2,400,000,000 L. of capital in the kingdom. Let us then create a two and a half per cent. stock, into which every person possessed of property should be compelled to purchase at par, in proportion to their capital, so as to redeem fifty millions every year, thereby creating fifty millions of new debt at two and a half per cent. and reimbursing an equal sum bearing an interest of five per cent.
A loan of two per cent. per annum, on each man’s capital would do this, and would never be an object for the safety of the whole, particularly as it would only last for ten years. As he would have interest at two and a half per cent. he would, in reality, only lose half, that is, one per cent. a year during twelve years; so that a man, with 10,000 L. would only have given 100 L. a year for twelve years.
At the end of ten years, the interest of the national debt would be reduced to one-half its present amount, which, together with the war-taxes, would be sufficient to prevent the necessity of creating more debt. This, however, is not all, a more prompt effect and advantage may be expected. It is more than probable, that the moment our enemy found that the nation, could, without any great exertion, put its finances on a permanent footing, the present contest would finish. It is now only continued, in hopes of ruining our finances, and it is on the accumulation of the debt that the expectation of that is alone founded.
We observed, in the beginning of this Chapter, that most people are biased by hope or fear, in examining a question of great importance; and that, therefore, they do not state it quite fairly, without being sensible of their error. In the case of the gloomy calculators of this country, fear and anxiety operated in causing a misstatement; but, with regard to our enemies, hope is the cause of their magnifying the effect of our national debt, and, it must be allowed, that hope had seldom ever a more easy business to perform. The general conclusion is certain, and all the question that remains, is with respect to time.
The only mode of putting an end to this hope of our enemy, and to the war, at once, will be by shewing that enemy that it is quite out of his power to augment our debt, but untill =sic= a method shall be adopted by [end of page #244] us, that is PRACTICABLE AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD, that will not be believed by our enemy.
The rapidity of the operation of a sinking fund is easily calculated, but not so easily credited, particularly by people not inclined to do so, and who would not themselves have the constancy and self-denial to leave it time to operate. Besides, by this operation, we shall not get free of debt till the taxes are raised far above their present amount. Our enemies may be pardoned for believing it impracticable, particularly as many of our friends are of the same opinion.
France, which has always been the rival of this country, and hates it now more than ever, (envy being now an ingredient of its hatred,) knows well that it is fallen and degraded, that it has less wealth and happiness than England; but then it considers, that, however bad its finances may be, they are getting no worse; that to continue the war for twenty years will bring no more ruin on the nation, while half the term would probably ruin us. Till we show the fallacy of this calculation, we cannot expect a durable peace. Our ruin is become an object, not only of ambition, but of necessity, as it were, to France; and nothing but despair of being able to accomplish their object will make them abandon the attempt.
We must be permitted here to ask a few questions:
Is not the time favourable for the plan here proposed?
Would it not be fair in its operation?
Would it not bring relief effectually and speedily?
Would it not reduce our burthens, without breaking faith with the creditors of the state?
Would it not reduce the interest, without setting too much capital afloat, that might leave the country?
Could our enemies then calculate on the national debt destroying England?
The affairs of nations, it has been observed, become so complicated, and the details so multiplied, that those who have the management of them are scarcely equal to the business of the day; and they have no leisure to inquire into the best modes of keeping off evil when it is yet distant; of this we have had ample experience.
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Allowing all the credit possible to the sinking fund, (and a great deal is due,) still during war its operation is a sort of paradox; it does not obtain relief: it is liable to be questioned; but we are come to a point, where the stability of our finances ought to be put out of doubt, and beyond all question. The mode of settling our affairs ought not only to be such as in the end may succeed, but its efficacy and practicability ought to be such as our enemies can understand and give credit to. Without this, we shall have no end to the contest.
With respect to what our enemies will give credit to, a good deal depends on their own natural disposition. A fickle and arbitrary people, who are continually breaking their faith, can have little belief in the constancy of a sinking fund, but they will be perfectly well inclined to believe, that men of property may be compelled, and will even be glad to pay one per cent. a year, for ten years, to ensure the safety of that property. Supposing then that the sinking fund were the better plan of the two in reality, it would not be so in the present circumstances, because it would not obtain credit, and the other will.
As to the rest, deprive the French of their hopes of ruining our finances, and they will make peace on reasonable terms, whenever we please; their object for continuing the war will then be at an end; and, if they do continue it, we can go on as long as they can, without any addition to our burthens.
Whatever the cause of a war may be, the hope of success is the only possible motive for persisting in it. The French have been led into two errors; first, by the comparison of this country to Carthage, and of their own to Rome, (an absurd comparison that does not hold,) and, in the second place, by looking on our ruin, from the increase of our debt, as certain. We ought to undeceive them, and then they will have less inclination to persist in war. No pains has hitherto been taken to set them right; nor, indeed, with respect to the national debt, can it ever be done by the present method, till they see the effect; for though the progress of a sinking fund in peace is easily understood, in time of war there is much appearance of deception; it looks like slight =sic= of hand more than a real and solid transaction.
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Notes
188 Some philosophers call a man rich, who wants little, and has that little; they are quite right, in their way, but that does not apply here. Perhaps, according to their definition, the Lazzaroni of Naples are richer than the merchants of London; and, a man who is contented in a parish work-house, is, beyond dispute, rich; to say that such a man is wealthy would be absurd, because wealth, with writers on political economy, implies being possessed of real tangible property.
189 Accumulation is sometimes not a passion, but arises from necessity; by accumulation, is meant the increasing the value of the stock you possess, whether it consists of land, cattle, money, or merchandize.
190 In 1793, 5,000,000 L. was lent to merchants on exchequer-bills. The property, on which the money was secured, was really merchandize, but the lenders would have nothing to do with the goods; government stepped in, and took the goods as a security, creating a stock transferrable, that represented the same goods, and, as if by magic, the money was found in a moment. I know of no operation so fit for elucidating the advantage of national debt as this.
191 Borrowing on life rents is bad, for this reason; where there is no employment of this sort, all money is constantly employed in some sort of trade or enterprise that will produce profit, but cannot be realised. Example, Paris, &c.
192 When money was wanted, in Queen Anne’s time, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Mr. Montague,) attended by the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs, went about, from shop to shop, to borrow it, much in the way that is occasionally practised by the beadles for a public charity!! Yet England’s credit was good, it owed little, the war was popular, and the country rich.
193 A sort of ridicule has been thrown on the operation of compound interest, because its effects are so amazing as not to be capable of being realized; but, on this subject, two things are to be said,— first of all, it has never been to the operation during the first hundred years that either incredulity or ridicule have applied, and the sinking fund was never meant to continue to operate so long. Secondly, though there are many drawbacks on the employment of large sums laid out at interest, that diminish, and would at last destroy, the result of the calculation in accumulating; it is not so in paying off debt, where the effect calculated is produced with the greatest certainty.
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