Chap. III
Of increased Taxation, as an Interior Cause of Decline.— Its different Effects on Industry, according to the Degree to which it is carried.— Its Effects on the People and on Government.
There has been no instance of a government becoming more economical, or less expensive, as it became older, even when the nation itself was not increasing in wealth; but, in every nation that has increased in wealth, the expenditure, on the part of government, has augmented in a very rapid manner.
Amongst the interior causes of the decline of nations, and the overthrow of governments, the increase of taxes has always been very prominent. It is in the levying of taxes that the sovereign and the subject act as if they were of opposite interests, or rather as if they were enemies to each other.
In every case almost, where the subjects have rebelled against their sovereign, or where they have abandoned their country to its enemies, the discontents have been occasioned by taxes that were either too heavy, imprudently laid on, or rigorously levied.
Sometimes the manner of laying on the tax has given the offence; sometimes its nature, and sometimes its amount. The revolution in England, in Charles the first’s time, began about the manner of levying a tax. The revolution of the American colonies began in the same way; and it is generally at the manner that nations enjoying a certain degree of freedom make objection. The excise had very nearly proved fatal to the government of this country, as the stamp duties did to that of France, and as the general amount and enormity of taxes did to the Western Empire. 87
Perhaps the chief motive for submitting to the difficulties, the oppressions, and the burthens, which people submit to under republican forms of government arises in deception. They seem to be paying taxes to themselves, and for themselves, when, in reality, they are not doing so any more than under a monarchy, where the taxes, in proportion to the service done, are generally less than in a republic.88
This was the case in Holland and Venice. In England, the first great increase of taxes took place under the long Parliament and Commonwealth.
The only administration carried on by delegated authority, that is from necessity obliged to be executed with unabaiting rigour, is the department of finance. Money is a thing of such a nature, that strict rules are absolutely necessary in its administration. There is here a great distinction between money and other property, or money’s worth. A menial servant, of whose honesty there is no proof, and even when it may be dubious, is habitually trusted with the care of property to a considerable amount, and the account rendered is seldom very rigorous; but, in the case of trusting with money, every precaution is first taken, as to being trust-worthy. Security is generally demanded, and neither friendship, confidence, nor the highest respectability, will supply the place of a strict account, which, when not rendered, leaves an indelible stain. There are many causes for this, but they are so generally understood, or, at least, so generally felt, that it is not necessary to examine them; the consequences are in some cases, however, not so evident. One of the most important is, that the accuracy with [end of page #103] which those appointed to collect taxes are obliged to render their accounts, compels them to a strictness in doing their duty that appears frequently rigorous to an extreme degree, and scarcely consistent with justice or humanity.
A king is considered as an unrelenting creditor, and he certainly appears in that character; but it should be considered why he is obliged to be so; for, as a master, he is generally the most indulgent in his dominions.
No duty or service is exacted with less rigour than that belonging to a civil department under government, when it is not connected with accountability in money; none so rigorous where money is concerned. How is this to be accounted for, unless it is by shewing that the nature of the situation admits of giving way to the feelings of humanity in one case, and not in the other? A few examples will illustrate this point, which is very important, very well known, but not well understood.
A clerk in a public office wants, either for health or private business, or, perhaps, only for amusement, to absent himself from duty; if his conduct merits any indulgence, and if his request is any way reasonable, it is immediately granted, though his salary during his absence may amount to a considerable sum; but he receives the gift under the form of time, not of money. If the same clerk is in arrear for taxes to one-twentieth part of the amount, if he does not pay, his furniture will be seized, and that perhaps by order of the same superior from whom he obtained the leave of absence from his duty. 89
The consequences would be fatal if the case were reversed. Supposing that leave of absence had been refused, and that a remission of taxes had been granted, the man who remitted the tax would be liable to suspicion, which he could never do away; the receipt of the revenue would never be secure, and the clerk, who had demanded a fair indulgence, would be disgusted and provoked at the refusal.
We cannot, however, alter the nature of things. Taxes cannot be remitted, in any case, without discretional authority, and that it would
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be ruinous to the revenue to give, we must, therefore, never expect that the augmentation of taxes will take place without an increase of discontent, or, at least, an augmented indifference towards government.
Perhaps nothing evinces more the general feeling, (even of the respectable part of society,) with regard to the revenues of the state, than the disposition to profit by evading the payment of duties imposed upon articles of consumption.
The most respectable of the nobility or gentry will conceal a contraband article, or one on which there is a heavy duty, on their return from abroad: and what is more, if detected, they are more ashamed, on account of their want of address, than on account of the crime; for such it is, whatever custom may have taught us to think.
A man who is rigorously treated, by what is commonly called a lawful creditor, whom he would never attempt to defraud must naturally feel doubly incensed, when still more rigorously treated by one whom he would think it very little harm, and no disgrace, to defraud. It is then very clear, that, the common habits of thinking on the subject of debts due to the king, is such as does not favour taxation, or incline people to submit willingly to rigorous modes of recovery.
All taxes raise the prices of the articles taxed, but those are most felt and most obnoxious which fall on personal property, or on persons themselves.
All taxes, then, when they pass a certain point, have a tendency to send away persons, and property, and trade, from a country, which, if they do, its decline is inevitable. The extent, however, of that effect must depend on a great variety of circumstances, such as the comparative situation of other nations, their distance, the difficulty of removing, &c.
If America were as near to England as France is, the industrious class would emigrate in multitudes; and, if in France, property and persons were as safe and free as in England, part of both would go there; but, as matters are, to the former it is impossible to remove, and, to the latter, the risk surpasses the advantage.
An increase of taxation tends to raise the wages of labour, and, where it does so in due proportion, the labourer pays almost nothing; he still for all that seems to pay, and he has the same disagreeable feeling [end of page #105] as if he did pay. No feeling is more disagreeable than that of being obliged, after earning money that can ill be spared, to pay it away to a surly tax-gatherer, who treats a man and his family with insolence, while he receives the money that should purchase them bread. Besides this, though the prices of many articles keep pace with the wages of labour, yet many others do not. Thus, in a country where wages are rapidly altering, though some are bettered by it, penury is entailed on others, who have not the means of raising their prices.
If heavy taxes are levied on a few articles of consumption, then they become inefficient, and if they are divided amongst a great many, they become troublesome, so that either way they are attended with inconvenience and difficulty.
In every country, where taxation has been carried to a great height, it has, at last, become necessary to bear heavily upon personal property. Such taxes are always attended with disagreeable feelings, and peculiar inconveniency. The tax always comes in the form of a debt, and whether convenient to be paid or not, it admits at best but of little delay. 90
In England the nature of the government, the disposition of the people, and the same sort of genius that made them succeed in commercial intercourse and regulation, led them to adopt the least objectionable modes of taxation.
The customs were the first great branch of revenue at the time of the revolution. The excise, land-tax, and stamps, rose next, none of which can be objected to; for the person who pays the tax to government only advances the money, and is reimbursed by the consumer, who, again on his part, when he really pays the tax (for good and all) does it under the form of an advance in price. Thus, then, the tax is disguised to him that really pays it, and it is optional, inasmuch as he
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may avoid the tax, by not consuming the article. He never can be sued for the tax, and he pays it by degrees, as he can spare the money. 91
Some time before the taxation which the American war rendered necessary, it was thought that the customs and excise could not be carried much farther. Ministers did not chuse =sic= to venture on an additional tax on land, and, consequently, stamps were augmented and extended, as were also duties on windows. A variety of new taxes on particular articles of consumption were resorted to. Those sort of taxes harassed and tormented individuals more than they filled the treasury, yet still, when, after an interval of a few years of peace, new burthens became necessary, in 1793, the same plan was pursued, till it was found ineffectual, being too troublesome and tedious, besides being unequal to the increase of expenditure.
It was necessity that suggested a plan, which is the simplest and easiest of any, so long as it succeeds and is productive. =sic= To increase the excise and customs by an additional five or ten per cent. on the articles that were supposed able to bear it. This has been done again and again with those two branches of revenue, and with the stamps likewise.
But the necessities of the state still outrun the means, and the assessed taxes, the worst and most obnoxious of all, were augmented in the same way; but even those were not productive. The inducement to privation was too great, and the restraints laid on expenditure, suggested the adoption of a tax on income; that is, on the means a man has to pay, which carries in its very name a description of its nature.
We have mentioned the influence that necessity has on industry. One of the effects of taxes, as well as of rent, is to prolong the operation of necessity, or to increase it. A man who has neither rent nor taxes to pay, as is the case in some savage nations, only labours to supply his wants. Whatever proportion rent and taxes bear to the wants of
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a people their industry will be increased in the same proportion, unless their forces are exceeded, and then the operation is indeed very different.
It follows, from this, that both rent and taxes, to a certain degree, increase the wealth of a people, by augmenting their industry. As rent is not compulsive, it never can in general be carried beyond the point that augmented industry will bear; but taxes are not either regulated by the industry of the individual, or of the community; they may therefore be carried too far, and when they are, the people become degraded, disheartened, their independent spirit is lost and broken, and industry, in place of increasing, as it did in the first stages of taxation, flies away.
The government, in this case, generally becomes more severe, and certainly more obnoxious. The broken spirit of the people makes submission a matter of course, so that there is no effectual resistance made to its power. Incapacity to pay comes at last, and defeats the end; but, between incapacity and resistance, the difference is very wide.
As calculators have been predicting the moment of a total stoppage to the increase of revenue for nearly half a century; as ministers, themselves, have never ventured to lay on a new burthen, except when forced to it by necessity. 92 As taxes have been laid on at random, in a manner similar to that in which the streets and houses of old cities were built, without regularity or design, and as the effects predicted have not taken place, it is fair to conclude, that the subject is not well understood. If it were, the evil would be in the way to be obviated; but still the conclusion would be the same, that increased taxation tends to bring on discontent, and to drive men and capital from a country. The degree of tendency, and the rapidity of its operations, are a question; but respecting the tendency itself there can be no question.
Two things more are to be observed, relative to the effects of taxation, as tending towards decline. The first is, that the taxes are levied by and expended on men, who, having income only for their lives,
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generally leave families in distress. Those who lose their parents when young are often left destitute, and those who are farther advanced are frequently ruined by being educated and accustomed to a rank in life that they are not able to support. This is a very great evil, and is renewed as it were every generation. As the revenues of a country increase, this evil increases also: for, except what goes to the proprietors of money in the stocks, all the public revenue, very nearly, goes to people whose income perishes with themselves. To begin with those who collect the taxes, custom-house officers, excise men, collectors, and clerks of every rank and demonination =sic=, there is not one in ten who does not die in indigence; and if he leaves a family, he leaves it in distress.
It is no doubt the lot of the great bulk of mankind, that is to say, the labouring part of the community in every country, to leave children unprovided for; but then they are left in a rank of society that does not prevent their going to work or to service, which is not the case with the vast number left by those who enjoy, during life, a genteel and easy existence under government.
The education of such persons is either neglected entirely, or ill fitted for the line of life into which they are to go. If the sum-total of human vice and misery was to be divided into shares, and if it were calculated how much fell to each person, there is not a doubt but at least a double portion would fall to the lot of those unfortunate persons who are left by parents enjoying offices for life; who are generally obliged to expend their income as they earn it. As, according to the natural chance of things, a number of such persons must leave young families, the seeds of misery are continually sowing a-fresh, to the great detriment of society. This evil depends in a great degree upon the habits and nature of the people, which augment or diminish it; and, in commercial nations, the evil is far the greatest. Where commerce does not flourish, persons belonging to the revenue-department are seldom highly paid, and they by no means consider themselves as a class of persons distinguished above the general run, or obliged to live more expensively; but, in a manufacturing country, to live without working, implies a degree of gentility that is extremely ruinous to those who enjoy that fatal and flimsy pre-eminence. [end of page #109]
A manufacturer, who is getting a thousand pounds a year, will, perhaps, not assume so much importance as a man in office who does not get one hundred pounds; and the former, as well as his family, knowing that they are beholden to industry for what they have, do not think themselves above following it. 93
Unfortunately, it also happens, that, in all sorts of occupation where trust is reposed and punctuality required, more than in ordinary business, it is rather late in life before those employed rise to situations of considerable emolument. When they are old, their families are generally young; thus it is, that the persons who are the most unfit to marry late in life are generally those who do so. This order of things cannot easily be changed. In the rate of payments governments are regulated by the service done, and by the dependence that can be placed on the person employed, who, on the other hand, follows the natural propensities of human nature. When young, and on a small allowance, a revenue-officer remains single; but when it is necessary to become serious, attentive, and confidential, and when he finds he has the means, he betakes himself to a domestic life, which is the most natural to men arrived at a certain time of life, and the best fitted for those who are to be depended upon for the correctness of their conduct. It is impossible to prevent this natural state of things; and if let go uncorrected, if not counteracted, the consequences are very pernicious. It is to this, in a great measure, the augmentation of vice and mendicity =sic= is to be attributed in nations, as they become wealthy and great.
Perhaps more depends upon the manner of taxation than the amount; at least it certainly is so in all countries where the amount is not very high. In America, for example, the amount is of no importance; the manner might be of very pernicious consequence. In France, before the revolution, the taxes were more oppressive, from the manner of levying them than from their amount. The same thing might be said
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of almost every country in Europe, England and Holland excepted. At present, the case is greatly altered, in many countries, by the increase: yet, still, one of the principal evils arises from the manner of levying the taxes; the restraints imposed by them, the inconveniency, the vexation, and, finally, the misery and ruin they, in many cases, occasion.
Of all the examples, where taxation contributed most to the fall of a country, Rome is the greatest. The luxury of the imperial court, and the expenses of a licentious and disorderly army, added to the ignorance of the subject, rendered the taxes every way burthensome. From the fall of Rome, to the time of Louis XIV. the splendour of courts, and their expenses, were objects of no great importance. We are but lately arrived at a new aera in taxation; for, though taxation has been the occasion of much discontent at all times, it was carried to no considerable length, in any country in Europe, except in Spain and Holland, till within this last century.
Indeed, when we consider the great noise that has often been made about raising an inconsiderable sum, it is impossible not to be astonished at the reluctance with which people pay taxes, when they feel that they are paying them, and are not accustomed to the feeling.
Taxation is, then, to the feelings of men, disagreeable; to their manners hurtful; they are also, in their operation, to a certain degree, inimical to liberty. The ultimate consequence of this is, that persons and property have both of them a tendency to quit a country where taxes are high, and to go to one, where, with the same means, there may be more enjoyment.
Taxes may be called a rent paid for living in a country, and operate exactly like the rent of houses or land, or rent for any thing else; that is, they make the tenant remove to a cheaper place, unless he finds advantages where he is to counterbalance the expense.
Unfortunately, the persons who have the greatest disposition to quit a country that is heavily taxed are those, who, having a certain income, which they cannot increase, wish to enjoy it with some degree of economy. They are, likewise, the persons who can remove with the greatest [end of page #111] facility. Thus, people whose income is in money are always the first to quit a country that is become too dear to live in with comfort.
Many circumstances may favour or counteract this tendency, such as the difficulty of finding an agreeable place to retire to, where the money will be secure, or the interest regularly paid; but, an inquiry into that will come more properly when we examine the external causes of decline.
Though the increase of taxes, by augmenting the expense of living, and of the necessaries of life, is little felt by the labouring class, their wages rising in proportion; yet a most disastrous effect is produced on the fine arts, and on all productions of which the price does not bear a proportional rise.
Where taxes are high, and luxury great, there must be some persons who have a great deal of ostentation, even if they have little taste. A picture or a jewel of great value will, very certainly, find a purchaser, but that will only serve as a motive for bringing the fine painting from another country, where the necessaries of life are cheaper, and where men enjoy that careless ease which is incompatible with a high state of taxation.
When Rome became luxurious, to the highest pitch, there were neither poets, painters, nor historians, bred within its walls; buffoons and fiddlers could get more money than philosophers, and they had more saleable talents. Had Virgil not found an Augustus, had he lived three centuries later, he must either have written ballads and lampoons, or have starved; otherwise he must have quitted Italy.
When Rome was full of luxury, and commanded the world and its wealth, there was not an artist in it capable of executing the statues of its victorious generals. 94
Some Greek island, barren and bare, would breed artists capable of making ornaments for imperial Rome.
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It is an easy matter, in a rich country, to pay for a fine piece of art, but a difficult matter to find a price for the bringing up a fine artist. 95
The fine arts have not, indeed, any intimate or immediate connection with the wealth or strength of a nation. The balance of trade has never been greatly increased by the exportation of great masterpieces of art, nor have nations been subdued by the powers of oratory; but the knowledge and the arts, by which wealth and greatness are obtained, follow in the train of the finer performances of human genius.
Where money becomes the universal agent, where it is impossible to enjoy ease or comfort for a single day without it, it becomes an object of adoration, as it were. To despise gold, which purchases all things, is reckoned a greater crime than to despise him to whose bounty we are indebted for all things; consequently, ambition, without which there never is excellence, is, at an early period of life, bent towards the gaining a fortune. A man, indeed, must either be of a singularly odd and obstinate disposition, or very indifferent about the opinion of others, and even about the good things of this world, (as they are termed,) to persevere in obtaining perfection in science or art, while without bread, when he might, with a tenth part of the care and study, live in affluence, and get money from day to day. There are few such obstinate fools; and without them, in a wealthy country, there can be found few men profound in science, or excelling in any of the arts.
The augmentation of taxes, by rendering the produce of industry dearer than in other countries, tends to cut off a nation of that de-
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scription, from the markets in poorer countries. If all other countries are poorer; and the taxes lower; it has a tendency to shut it out from all the markets in the world.
An operation, that, at the same time that it renders people less happy, less contented, and more indifferent to the fate of their country, and at the same time tends to shut them out from foreign markets, is certainly very hurtful to any country, but particularly so to one, the greatness of which is founded on manufactures and commerce.
It would be useless to enlarge on so self-evident a consequence; yet, even in this case, we shall find something of that mixture of good, along with the bad, which is to be found in all human things.
As exertion originates in necessity or want, which it removes, taxation has the effect of prolonging the operation of necessity, after it would otherwise have ceased, and of rendering its pressure greater than it otherwise would be; the consequence of this is a greater and larger continued exertion on the part of those who have to pay the taxes. Human exertion, either in the way of invention or of industry, is like a spring that is pressed upon, and gains strength according to the pressure, until a certain point, when it gives way entirely.
Those investigators, who have calculated the effect of such and such a degree of taxation, of national debt, &c. have all erred, in not making any, or a sufficient, allowance for the action of this elastic power. Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith, certainly, both of them, men of profound research, have erred completely in this. The former, in calculating the ultimatum of exertion, at a point which we have long since passed; and, the latter, in reasoning on the taxation at the time he wrote, as if nearly the utmost degree, though it has since trebled, and the difficulty in paying seems to be diminished; at least it appears not to have augmented.
To fix the point at which this can stop is not, indeed, very easy; particularly, as the value of gold and silver, which are the measures of other values, do themselves vary. Thus, for example, a working man can, with his day’s wages, purchase as much bread and beer as he could have done with it forty years ago. Though the national debt [end of page #114] is five times as great as it was then, at the present price of bread, it would not take twice the number of loaves to pay it that it would have required at that time.
The depreciation of money, then, as well as the continuation and augmented pressure of necessity, counteract, to a certain degree, and for a certain time, the natural tendency of taxes; but that counteraction, though operating in all cases, in its degree and duration, must depend upon particular circumstances; and though, perhaps, it cannot be, with much accuracy, ascertained in any case, it is impossible to attempt resolving the question in a general way; we shall, therefore, return to the subject, when we apply the general principles to the particular situation of England.
One conclusion, however, is, that as taxes, carried to a great extent, are very dangerous, though not so if only carried to a certain point; as that point cannot be ascertained, it ought to be a general rule to lay on as few taxes as possible; and the giving as little trouble and derangement to the contributor as may be, is also another point, with respect to which there cannot be two different opinions. [end of page #115]
Notes
87 The system of taxation was ill understood amongst the Romans, and its execution, under a military government, is always severe. The Romans were so tormented, at last, that they lost all regard for their country. Taxes seem to be the price we pay for the con- [end of page #102] stitution we live under, and as they increase, the value of the purchase lessens. The difference between value paid, and value received, constitutes the advantage or loss of every bargain.
88 America is an exception, but then there is no similarity between the United States and any other country in the world. Their existence, as an independent country, is only of twenty-five years standing; they have had no wars during that time, and the revolutionary war cost little in actual money. The comparison between the states and other nations will not hold, but, if we compare the expense of their government now, and when under the British, it will be found they pay near thirty times as much; and, even allowing their population to have risen one-half, they still pay proportionately twenty times as much. Their revenue now amounts to 16,000,000 of dollars. The public expense, in 1795, when they revolted, was about 350,000 dollars.
89 Accountability in money may be compared to military discipline, when on duty. No allowances are to be made for negligence or deviation from rule. Of this we have lately had a most striking and memorable example.
90 It will be seen, in a future part of this work, that the farmers have lost nothing, but rather got by the high prices of grain in this country, and it is so probably in all others. Those who sell necessaries raise the price; those who make or sell superfluities have no such resource, and therefore pay in the severest manner.
91 The land-tax is not precisely the same, but very nearly. It operates as a tax on the produce of land, that is on commodities for the use of man, the same as those articles subject to duties of customs or excise. The landholder just feels as the brewer, distiller, or importer of foreign goods, he gets the tax reimbursed by the farmer, and the farmer is reimbursed by the consumer.
92 Mr. Pitt seems an exception to this; but the establishment of a sinking fund, at the end of the war, was as necessary for his administration as any of the loans, during the war, were for Lord North; and both measures required new taxes.
93 This is a very important part of the consideration; but, as education and it are connected, and that comes into the Fourth Book =sic - there is none=, the whole consideration is left till then; not only the national prosperity is injured, but the feelings of humanity are hurt, and the sum of human misery increased by this consequence.
94 They were obliged to cut the heads off from ancient statues, as their artists were only sufficiently expert to carve the drapery of the body.
95 This is liable to some exceptions. Natural genius may make a man excel; but, even then, it is ten to one if he is not compelled to labour in order to get bread, in place of trying to obtain fame. It was thus the great Dr. Johnson, with a genius that might have procured him immortal fame, drudged, during life, on weekly or daily labours, which will soon be forgotten. Even his dictionary, wonderful as it is for a single man, is not worthy of the English nation, and Johnson’s name is little known beyond the limits of his own country. His genius was great, but his labours were little. His mind was in fetters; it was Sampson grinding at the mill to amuse the Philistines; not Sampson slaying lions, and putting to flight armies.
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