III
Following the circuit court’s ruling the Clarendon case was immediately appealed to the United States Supreme Court. By the time the highest tribunal considered the case, the six months period allowed by the circuit court for school officials to furnish bona fide equality for Negroes had elapsed. Consequently, on January 26, 1952, the case was remanded to the circuit court which was directed to take whatever action it deemed appropriate in view of its findings. In the meanwhile Judge Waring had retired and had been replaced on the court by Judge Armisted M. Dobie of Virginia. At the rehearing counsel for the school officials reported on the steps taken by the county and on other plans contemplated under the statewide school equalization program. These plans, when completed, would provide equality in all areas for white and Negro schools, claimed school authorities. Though equality admittedly as yet had not been attained, such would be forthcoming within a “reasonable” time. Accepting these arguments at face value, the circuit court ruled unanimously that “the defendants have complied with the decree of the court to equalize facilities as soon as humanly possible and no good could be accomplished for anyone” by ordering an end to segregation.65 The NAACP again immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.
Arguments before the Supreme Court took place in December, 1952, in conjunction with four similar cases. Clarendon County was represented by John W. Davis, noted constitutional lawyer and Democratic presidential candidate in 1924. Davis, a twentieth century “Northern man with Southern principles,” based his case mainly on grounds of constitutionalism and states rights. “What is the great national policy underlying this whole question?” he asked. “Is it not that the very strength and fiber of our federal system is local self-government in those matters for which local action is competent?”66 Again the appellees stressed three main points. They maintained that the state was proceeding to remove “all inequalities between its white and colored schools,” as had been found by the lower court. Further, school authorities argued that the legality of school segregation had been exercised and recognized so continuously that the question was “no longer open for debate.” As for the testimony of “sundry academic persons” offered in opposition to segregation, such “opinions” presented questions of legislative policy only and formed no sufficient basis for any conclusions on the subject, least of all for a judicial finding.67
Thurgood Marshall, chief counsel for appellants, presented the same arguments he had used in the lower courts.
Unable to arrive at a decision on the basis of arguments advanced at the first hearing, the Supreme Court in June, 1953, asked for further pleadings on five questions. These involved essentially two points: (1) In the light of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, was school segregation per se violative of that amendment? (2) Assuming that segregation was unconstitutional, would it necessarily follow that schools should be integrated “forthwith” or could the Court in the exercise of its equity powers remit the cases to lower courts and permit a “gradual adjustment” to integration?
Answers to these questions were prepared under the supervision of T. C. Callison, South Carolina’s Attorney General. The state maintained that the “overwhelming preponderance of the evidence” demonstrated that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as forbidding racial segregation. In reply to the second query, the state held that on the assumption stated, the Court could permit gradual integration to be carried out within broad policy limitations by the lower federal courts. However, in this connection, the state argued that even assuming that the courts could declare segregated schools unconstitutional, it was not within the judicial power to determine what, if any, non-segregated system should be substituted in their place.68
IV
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion, a milestone in the American Negro’s struggle for human dignity and freedom.69 After reviewing the background of the various cases under consideration, the Court declared that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it applied to school segregation, was “inconclusive.” Furthermore, said the Chief Justice, the school segregation issue had never been definitely settled by the Supreme Court. Recent decisions concerning inequality on graduate and professional levels of schooling had not faced the basic issue—the legal status of segregation per se. Consequently the Court would attempt conclusively to settle the problem.
In premising its decision, the Court turned not to “tangible factors” but to the overall “effect of segregation on education.” On this basis it asked: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?” The reply was direct: “We believe that it does.” Accepting the testimony presented in the lower court by the social scientists, the Court found that segregation of Negro children “from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race” generated feelings of inferiority concerning their status in the community that might affect “their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” In the light of such a condition the Court concluded that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”
The cases were not immediately disposed of since no implementing decree was included in this ruling. Recognizing the revolutionary nature of the transition being ordered, the Court, departing from established legal tradition, restored the cases to the docket and asked all affected states, the NAACP and the United States Attorney General to appear as friends of the Court and present further argument on how best to implement the decision. The state of South Carolina refused to come before the Court in this capacity. Attorney General Callison thought that such an appearance might indicate that the state was bringing itself “within the jurisdiction of the Court in this particular case.”70 The state, as such, would do nothing that might make the Court’s decision specifically applicable to all school districts. Clarendon officials, however, did file a brief with the Court. They urged that the case be remanded to the lower federal court to permit school authorities “the opportunity of presenting their problems fully to that tribunal and of appealing to its equitable discretion in connection with their further handling of its affairs.”71 Attorney Figg asked the Court to give the Clarendon authorities time to allow for “community acceptance.” But privately the less suave Attorney Rogers maintained that there was going to be no integration in South Carolina.
The Supreme Court’s implementing decree was not issued until May 31, 1955, a little over a year after its momentous decision.72 It recognized the existence of “varied local school problems.” Consequently federal district courts were given the responsibility within their local areas for supervising the compliance with the Court’s original decision. While giving attention to local conditions, the district courts were to require school officials to make “a prompt and reasonable start toward compliance” with the original ruling. Delays in beginning integration were justifiable only when “necessary in the public interest” and “consistent with good faith compliance.” In proceeding “with all deliberate speed,” school officials were to be allowed consideration for such factors as “physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts... and a revision of local laws and regulations” requiring segregation. This decision was applicable in the strict sense only to those school districts immediately involved in the litigation. No allowance was made for applying its provisions to other school districts. Segregation therefore would be erased only when action voluntarily was taken by school authorities or when directed by federal courts following petition by aggrieved groups upon failure of local officials to follow the spirit of the decision.
On July 15, 1955, the Federal Circuit Court, composed of Judges Parker, Timmerman and Dobie, met in Columbia and disposed of the Clarendon case in conformity with the Supreme Court ruling. In an unanimous decision the three judges restrained Summerton school officials “from refusing on account of race to admit to any school under their supervision any child qualified to enter such school, from and after such time as they may have made the necessary arrangements for admission of children to such schools on a non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.”73
There the case rested in the spring of 1958. The school officials have not yet “made the necessary arrangements” to end segregation, and Negro parents, fearing among other things that the public schools will be closed if precipitate action is taken, have not pushed the matter further.