Appendix C — I
ADDRESS TO THE ARMY: June 14, 1815.
Corresp. Vol. 28, p. 324.
22052.—À L’ARMÉE.
Avesnes, 14 juin 1815.
Soldats, c’est aujourd’hui l’anniversaire de Marengo et de Friedland, qui décidèrent deux fois du destin de l’Europe. Alors, comme après Austerlitz, comme après Wagram, nous fûmes trop généreux; nous crûmes aux protestations et aux serments des princes que nous laissâmes sur le trône! Aujourd’hui, cependant, coalisés contre nous, ils en veulent à l’indépendance et aux droits les plus sacrés de la France. Ils ont commencé la plus injuste des agressions. Marchons donc à leur rencontre: eux et nous ne sommes-nous plus les mêmes hommes?
Soldats, à Iena, contre ces mêmes Prussiens aujourd’hui si arrogants, vous étiez un contre trois; à Montmirail, un contre six.
Que ceux d’entre vous qui ont été prisonniers des Anglais vous fassent le récit de leurs pontons et des maux affreux qu’ils ont soufferts!
Les Saxons, les Belges, les Hanovriens, les soldats de la Confédération du Rhin, gémissent d’être obligés de prêter leurs bras à la cause des princes ennemis de la justice et des droits de tous les peuples. Ils savent que cette coalition est insatiable. Après avoir dévoré douze millions de Polonais, douze millions d’Italiens, un million de Saxons, six millions de Belges, elle devra dévorer les états de deuxième ordre de l’Allemagne.
Les insensés! Un moment de prospérité les aveugle. L’oppression et l’humiliation du peuple français sont hors de leur pouvoir. S’ils entrent en France, ils y trouveront leur tombeau.
Soldats, nous avons des marches forcées à faire, des batailles à livrer, des périls à courir; mais, avec de la constance, la victoire sera à nous: les droits, l’honneur et le bonheur de la patrie seront reconquis.
Pour tout Français qui a du cœur, le moment est arrivé de vaincre ou de périr!
NAPOLÉON.
D’après la copie. Dépôt de la guerre.
II
ORDER OF MOVEMENT: June 14, 1815.
Corresp. vol. 28, p. 325.
22053—ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT.
Beaumont, 14 juin 1815.
Demain 15, à deux heures et demie du matin, la division de cavalerie légère du général Vandamme montera à cheval et se portera sur la route de Charleroi. Elle enverra des partis dans toutes les directions pour éclairer le pays et enlever les postes ennemis; mais chacun de ces partis sera au moins de 50 hommes. Avant de mettre en marche la division, le général Vandamme s’assurera qu’elle est pourvue de cartouches.
A la même heure, le lieutenant général Pajol réunira le 1er corps de cavalerie et suivra le mouvement de la division du général Domon, qui sera sous les ordres du général Pajol. Les divisions du 1er corps de cavalerie ne fourniront point de détachements; ils seront pris dans la 3e division. Le général Domon laissera sa batterie d’artillerie pour marcher après le 1er bataillon du 3e corps d’infanterie; le lieutenant général Vandamme lui donnera des ordres en conséquence.
Le lieutenant général Vandamme fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin; à trois heures, il mettra en marche son corps d’armée et le dirigera sur Charleroi. La totalité de ses bagages et embarras seront parqués en arrière, et ne se mettront en marche qu’après que le 6e corps et la Garde impériale auront passé. Ils seront sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les réunira à ceux du 6e corps, de la Garde impériale et du grand quartier général, et leur donnera des ordres de mouvement.
Chaque division du 3e corps d’armée aura avec elle sa batterie et ces ambulances; toute autre voiture qui serait dans les rangs sera brûlée.
M. le comte de Lobau fera battre la diane à trois heures et demie, et il mettra en marche le 6e corps d’armée à quatre heures pour suivre le mouvement du général Vandamme et l’appuyer. Il fera observer, pour les troupes, l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, le même ordre de marche qui est prescrit au 3e corps.
Les bagages du 6e corps seront réunis à ceux du 3e, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, ainsi qu’il est dit.
La jeune Garde battra la diane à quatre heures et demie, et se mettra en marche à cinq heures; elle suivra le mouvement du 6e corps sur la route de Charleroi.
Les chasseurs à pied de la Garde battront la diane à quatre heures, et se mettront en marche à cinq heures et demie pour suivre le mouvement de la jeune Garde.
Les grenadiers à pied de la Garde battront la diane à cinq heures et demie, et partiront à six heures pour suivre le mouvement des chasseurs à pied.
Le même ordre de marche pour l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, prescrit pour le 3e corps d’infanterie, sera observé dans la Garde impériale.
Les bagages de la Garde seront réunis à ceux des 3e et 6e corps d’armée, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les fera mettre en mouvement.
M. le maréchal Grouchy fera monter à cheval, à cinq heures et demie du matin, celui des trois autres corps de cavalerie qui sera le plus près de la route, et il lui fera suivre le mouvement sur Charleroi; les deux autres corps partiront successivement à une heure d’intervalle l’un de l’autre. Mais M. le maréchal Grouchy aura soin de faire marcher la cavalerie sur les chemins latéraux de la route principale que la colonne d’infanterie suivra, afin d’éviter l’encombrement et aussi pour que sa cavalerie observe un meilleur ordre.
Il prescrira que la totalité des bagages restent en arrière, parqués et réunis, jusqu’ au moment où le vaguemestre général leur donnera l’ordre d’avancer.
M. le comte Reille fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin, et il mettra en marche le 2e corps à trois heures; il le dirigera sur Marchienne-au-Pont, où il fera en sorte d’être rendu avant neuf heures du matin. Il fera garder tous les ponts de la Sambre, afin que personne ne passe; les postes qu’il laissera seront successivement relevés par le 1er corps; mais il doit tâcher de prévenir l’ennemi à ces ponts pour qu’ils ne soient pas détruits, surtout celui de Marchienne, par lequel il sera probablement dans le cas de déboucher, et qu’il faudrait faire aussitôt réparer s’il avait été endommagé.
A Thuin et à Marchienne, ainsi que dans tous les villages sur sa route, M. le comte Reille interrogera les habitants, afin d’avoir des nouvelles des positions et forces des armées ennemies. Il fera aussi prendre les lettres dans les bureaux de poste et les dépouillera pour faire aussitôt parvenir à l’Empereur les renseignements qu’il aura obtenus.
M. le comte d’Erlon mettra en marche le 1er corps à trois heures du matin, et le dirigera aussi sur Charleroi, en suivant le mouvement du 2e corps, duquel il gagnera la gauche le plus tôt possible, pour le soutenir et l’appuyer au besoin. Il tiendra une brigade de cavalerie en arrière, pour se couvrir et pour maintenir par de petits détachements ses communications avec Maubeuge. Il enverra des partis en avant de cette place, dans les directions de Mons et de Binche, jusqu’ à la frontière, pour avoir des nouvelles des ennemis et en rendre compte aussitôt; ces partis auront soin de ne pas se compromettre et de ne pas dépasser la frontière.
M. le comte d’Erlon fera occuper Thuin par une division; et, si le pont de cette ville était détruit, il le ferait aussitôt réparer, en même temps qu’il fera tracer et exécuter immédiatement une tête de pont sur la rive gauche. La division qui sera à Thuin gardera aussi le pont de l’abbaye d’Aulne, où M. le comte d’Erlon fera également construire une tête de pont sur la rive gauche.
Le même ordre de marche prescrit au 3e corps pour l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, sera observé aux 2 e et 1er corps, qui feront réunir et marcher leurs bagages à la gauche du 1er corps sous les ordres du vaguemestre le plus ancien.
Le 4e corps (armée de la Moselle) a reçu ordre de prendre aujourd’hui position en avant de Philippeville. Si son mouvement est opéré et si les divisions qui composent ce corps d’armée sont réunies, M. le lieutenant général Gérard les mettra en marche demain à trois heures du matin, et les dirigera sur Charleroi. Il aura soin de se tenir à hauteur du 3e corps, avec lequel il communiquera, afin d’arriver à peu près en même temps devant Charleroi; mais le général Gérard fera éclairer sa droite et tous les débouchés qui vont sur Namur. Il marchera serré en ordre de bataille, et fera laisser à Philippeville tous ses bagages et embarras, afin que son corps d’armée, se trouvant plus léger, se trouve à même de manœuvrer.
Le général Gérard donnera ordre à la 14e division de cavalerie, qui a dû aussi arriver aujourd’hui à Philippeville, de suivre le mouvement de son corps d’armée sur Charleroi, où cette division joindra le 4e corps de cavalerie.
Les lieutenants généraux Reille, Vandamme, Gérard et Pajol se mettront en communication par de fréquents partis, et ils régleront leur marche de manière à arriver en masse et ensemble devant Charleroi. Ils mettront, autant que possible, à l’avant-garde des officiers qui parlent flamand, pour interroger les habitants et en prendre des renseignements; mais ces officiers s’annonceront comme commandant des partis, sans dire que l’armée est en arrière.
Les lieutenants généraux Reille, Vandamme et Gérard feront marcher tous les sapeurs de leurs corps d’armée (ayant avec eux des moyens pour réparer les ponts) après le premier régiment d’infanterie légère, et ils donneront ordre aux officiers du génie de faire réparer les mauvais passages, ouvrir des communications latérales et placer des ponts sur les courants d’eau où l’infanterie devrait se mouiller pour les franchir.
Les marins, les sapeurs de la Garde et les sapeurs de la réserve marcheront après le premier régiment du 3e corps. Les lieutenants généraux Rogniat et Haxo seront à leur tête; ils n’emmèneront avec eux que deux ou trois voitures; le surplus du parc du génie marchera à la gauche du 3e corps. Si on rencontre l’ennemi, ces troupes ne seront point engagées, mais les généraux Rogniat et Haxo les emploieront aux travaux de passages de rivière, de têtes de pont, de réparation de chemins et d’ouverture de communications etc.
La cavalerie de la Garde suivra le mouvement sur Charleroi et partira à huit heures.
L’Empereur sera à l’avant-garde, sur la route de Charleroi. MM. les lieutenants généraux auront soin d’envoyer à Sa Majesté de fréquents rapports sur leurs mouvements et les renseignements qu’ils auront recueillis. Ils sont prévenus que l’intention de Sa Majesté est d’avoir passé la Sambre avant midi, et de porter l’armée à la rive gauche de cette rivière.
L’équipage de ponts sera divisé en deux sections; la première section se subdivisera en trois parties, chacune de 5 pontons et 5 bateaux d’avant-garde, pour jeter trois ponts sur la Sambre. Il y aura à chacune de ces subdivisions une compagnie de pontonniers.
La première section marchera à la suite du parc du génie après le 3e corps.
La deuxième section restera avec le parc de réserve d’artillerie à la colonne des bagages; elle aura avec elle la 4e compagnie de pontonniers.
Les équipages de l’Empereur et les bagages du grand quartier général seront réunis et se mettront en marche à dix heures. Aussitôt qu’il seront passés, le vaguemestre général fera partir les équipages de la Garde impériale, du 3e corps et du 6e corps; en même temps, il enverra ordre à la colonne d’équipages de la réserve de cavalerie de se mettre en marche et de suivre la direction que la cavalerie aura prise.
Les ambulances de l’armée suivront le quartier général et marcheront en tête des bagages; mais, dans aucun cas, ces bagages, ainsi que les parcs de réserve de l’artillerie et la seconde section de l’équipage de ponts, ne s’approcheront à plus de trois lieues de l’armée, à moins d’ordres du major général, et ils ne passeront la Sambre aussi que par ordre.
Le vaguemestre général formera des divisions de ces bagages, et il y mettra des officiers pour les commander, afin de pouvoir en détacher ce qui sera ensuite appelé au quartier général ou pour le service des officiers.
L’intendant général fera réunir à cette colonne d’équipages la totalité des bagages et transports de l’administration, auxquels il sera assigné un rang dans la colonne.
Les voitures qui seront en retard prendront la gauche, et ne pourront sortir du rang qui leur sera donné que par ordre du vaguemestre général.
L’Empereur ordonne que toutes les voitures d’équipages qui seront trouvées dans les colonnes d’infanterie, de cavalerie ou d’artillerie, soient brûlées, ainsi que les voitures de la colonne des équipages qui quitteront leur rang et intervertiront l’ordre de marche sans la permission expresse du vaguemestre général.
A cet effet, il sera mis un détachement de 50 gendarmes à la disposition du vaguemestre général, qui est responsable, ainsi que tous les officiers de la gendarmerie et les gendarmes, de l’exécution de ces dispositions, desquelles le succès de la campagne peut dépendre.
Par ordre le l’Empereur:
Le maréchal de l’Empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
D’après l’original. Dépôt de la guerre.
III
Doc. Inéd., p. 22.
15 Juin.
A M. LE COMTE REILLE.
Commandant le 2e Corps d’Armée.
Monsieur le comte Reille, l’empereur m’ordonne de vous écrire de passer la Sambre, si vous n’avez pas de forces devant vous, et de vous former sur plusieurs lignes, à une ou deux lieues en avant, de manière à être à cheval sur la grande route de Bruxelles, en vous éclairant fortement dans la direction de Fleurus. M. le comte d’Erlon passera à Marchiennes et se formera en bataille sur la route de Mons à Charleroi, où il sera à portée de vous soutenir au besoin.
Si vous êtes encore à Marchiennes lorsque le présent ordre vous parviendra, et que le mouvement par Charleroi ne pût avoir lieu, vous l’opéreriez toujours par Marchiennes, mais toujours pour remplir les dispositions ci-dessus.
L’empereur se rend devant Charleroi. Rendez compte immédiatement à Sa Majesté de vos opérations et de ce qui se passe devant vous.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
Au bivouac de Jumignon, le
15 juin, 1815, à 8 heures et
demie du matin.
IV
Doc. Inéd., p. 24.
A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON.
Bivouac de Jumignon, 15 juin,
10 heures du matin.
Monsieur le Comte, l’empereur m’ordonne de vous écrire que M. le comte Reille reçoit ordre de passer la Sambre à Charleroi, et de se former sur plusieurs lignes à une ou deux lieues en avant, à cheval sur la grande route de Bruxelles.
L’intention de Sa Majesté est aussi que vous passiez la Sambre à Marchiennes, ou à Ham, pour vous porter sur la grande route de Mons à Charleroi, où vous vous formerez sur plusieurs lignes, et prendrez des positions qui vous rapprocheront de M. le comte Reille, liant vos communications et envoyant des partis des toutes les directions: Mons, Nivelles, etc. Ce mouvement aurait également lieu si M. le comte Reille était obligé d’effectuer son passage par Marchiennes. Rendez-moi compte de suite de vos opérations et de ce qui se passe devant vous; l’empereur sera devant Charleroi.
V
ORDER TO THE COUNT D’ERLON: 3 P.M., June 15, 1815.
Doc. Inéd., p. 25.
A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON.
(EXTRAIT DU REGISTRE DU MAJOR GÉNÉRAL.)
En avant de Charleroi, à 3 heures du soir,
15 juin 1815.
Monsieur le comte d’Erlon, l’empereur ordonne à M. le comte Reille de marcher sur Gosselies, et d’y attaquer un corps ennemi qui paraissait s’y arrêter. L’intention de l’empereur est que vous marchiez aussi sur Gosselies, pour appuyer le comte Reille et le seconder dans ses opérations. Cependant, vous devrez toujours faire garder Marchiennes, et vous enverrez une brigade sur les routes de Mons, lui recommandant de se garder très militairement.
VI — Subsequent Order to the Count D’Erlon: June 15, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 25.
A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON,
COMMANDANT LE 1ER CORPS.
Charleroi, le 15 juin 1815.
Monsieur le Comte, l’intention de l’empereur est que vous ralliez votre corps sur la rive gauche de la Sambre, pour joindre le 2e corps à Gosselies, d’après les ordres que vous donnera à ce sujet M. le maréchal prince de la Moskowa.
Ainsi, vous rappellerez les troupes que vous avez laissées à Thuin, Sobre et environs; vous devrez cependant avoir toujours de nombreux partis sur votre gauche pour éclairer la route de Mons.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
VII — Order to General Noguès: 3 A.M., June 16, 1815
“Napoléon à Waterloo,” p. 144.
Ordre de mouvement adressé par l’adjudant commandant, chef d’état-major de la 3e division du 1er corps, au général Noguès, commandant la 1er brigade de cette division.
Quartier général à Marchienne-au-Pont:
16 juin (trois heures du matin).
D’après l’intention du général en chef, le lieutenant général me charge de vous inviter à faire partir de suite votre brigade pour être rendue à six heures du matin, et plus tôt s’il était possible, à Gosselies.
L’adjudant commandant,
chef d’état-major:
Ch. d’Arsonval.
P.S.
La 2e brigade reste ici jusqu’à l’arrivée de la première division, pour se rendre ensemble à la même destination.
This indicates that at 3 A.M. of the 16th, while the 4th division (Durutte’s) was in bivouac beyond Jumet (Doc. Inéd., Durutte’s statement, p. 71, where he gives Gosselies, where the Second Corps was, by mistake for Jumet), the 2d Division (Donzelot’s) must also have crossed the river, the 3d division (Marcognet’s) was at Marchienne, and the 1st (Allix’) had not yet reached the Sambre.
VIII — Bulletin of the Army: June 15, 1815: Evening
Corresp. vol. 28, p. 331.
22056.—BULLETIN DE L’ARMÉE.
Charleroi, 15 juin 1815, au soir.
Le 14, l’armée était placée de la manière suivante:
Le quartier impérial à Beaumont.
Le 1er corps, commandé par le général d’Erlon, était à Solre, sur la Sambre.
Le 2e corps, commandé par le général Reille, était à Ham-sur-Heure.
Le 3e corps, commandé par le général Vandamme, était sur la droite de Beaumont.
Le 4e corps, commandé par le général Gérard, arrivait à Philippeville.
Le 15, à trois heures du matin, le général Reille attaqua l’ennemi et se porta sur Marchienne-au-Pont. Il eut différents engagements dans lesquels sa cavalerie chargea un bataillon prussien et fit 300 prisonniers.
A une heure du matin, l’Empereur était à Jamioulx-sur-Heure.
La division de cavalerie légère du général Domon sabra deux bataillons prussiens et fit 400 prisonniers.
Le général Pajol entra à Charleroi à midi. Les sapeurs et les marins de la Garde étaient à l’avant-garde pour réparer les ponts; ils pénétrèrent les premiers en tirailleurs dans la ville. Le général Clary, avec le 1er de hussards, se porta sur Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles, et le général Pajol sur Gilly, sur la route de Namur.
A trois heures après midi, le général Vandamme déboucha avec son corps sur Gilly.
Le maréchal Grouchy arriva avec la cavalerie du général Exelmans.
L’ennemi occupait la gauche de la position de Fleurus. A cinq heures après midi, l’Empereur ordonna l’attaque. La position fut tournée et enlevée. Les quatre escadrons de service de la Garde, commandés par le général Letort, aide-de-camp de l’Empereur, enfoncèrent trois carrés; les 26e, 27e et 28e régiments prussiens furent mis en déroute. Nos escadrons sabrèrent 400 ou 500 hommes et firent 1,500 prisonniers.
Pendant ce temps, le général Reille passait la Sambre à Marchienne-au-Pont, pour se porter sur Gosselies avec les divisions du prince Jérôme et du général Bachelu, attaquait l’ennemi, lui faisait 250 prisonniers et le poursuivait sur la route de Bruxelles.
Nous devînmes ainsi maîtres de toute la position de Fleurus.
A huit heures du soir, l’Empereur rentra à son quartier général à Charleroi.
Cette journée coûte à l’ennemi cinq pièces de canon et 2,000 hommes, dont 1,000 prisonniers. Notre perte est de 10 hommes tués et de 80 blessés, la plupart des escadrons de service, qui ont fait les charges, et des trois escadrons de 20e de dragons, qui ont aussi chargé un carré avec la plus grande intrépidité. Notre perte, légère quant au nombre, a été sensible à l’Empereur, par la blessure grave qu’a reçue le général Letort, son aide-de-camp, en chargeant à la tête des escadrons de service. Cet officier est de la plus grande distinction. Il a été frappé d’une balle au bas-ventre, et le chirurgien fait craindre que sa blessure ne soit mortelle.
Nous avons trouvé à Charleroi quelques magasins. La joie des Belges ne saurait se décrire. Il y a des villages qui, à la vue de leurs libérateurs, ont formé des danses, et partout c’est un élan qui part du cœur.
Dans le rapport de l’état-major général, on insérera les noms des officiers et soldats qui se sont distingués.
L’Empereur a donné le commandement de la gauche au prince de la Moskova, qui a eu le soir son quartier général aux Quatre-Chemins, sur la route de Bruxelles.
Le due de Trévise, à qui l’Empereur avait donné le commandement de la jeune Garde, est resté à Beaumont, malade d’une sciatique qui l’a forcé de se mettre au lit.
Le 4e corps, commandé par le général Gérard, arrive ce soir à Châtelet. Le général Gérard a rendu compte que le lieutenant général Bourmont, le colonel Clouet et le chef d’escadron Villoutreys ont passé à l’ennemi. Un lieutenant du 11e de chasseurs a également passé à l’ennemi. Le major général a ordonné que ces déserteurs fussent sur-le-champ jugés conformément aux lois.
Rien ne peut peindre le bon esprit el l’ardeur de l’armée. Elle regarde comme un événement heureux la désertion de ce petit nombre de traîtres, qui se démasquent ainsi.
Extrait du Moniteur du 18 juin 1815.
IX — Wellington’s First Memorandum of Orders: June 15, 1815
Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 472.
MEMORANDUM
For the Deputy Quarter Master General.
Movements of the Army.
Bruxelles, 15 June, 1815.
General Dörnberg’s brigade of cavalry, and the Cumberland Hussars, to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that town.
The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2d hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys.
The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.
The third division to collect this night at Braine le Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.
The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Audenarde.
The 5th division, the 81st regiment, and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Bruxelles at a moment’s notice.
The Duke of Brunswick’s corps to collect this night on the high road between Bruxelles and Vilvorde.
The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.
The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow morning to move towards Bruxelles, and to halt on the high road between Alost and Assche for further orders.
The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3d division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as collected.
This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy’s attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.
Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries and the Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at daylight.
The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight.
Wellington.
X — Wellington’s Letter to the Duc de Feltre: 10 P.M., June 15, 1815
Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473.
To the Duc de Feltre.
à Bruxelles, ce 15 juin, 1815.
à 10 heures du soir.
Monsieur Le Duc:
Je reçois les nouvelles que l’ennemi attaqua les postes Prussiens ce matin à Thuin sur la Sambre, et il paraissait menacer Charleroi. Je n’ai rien reçu depuis neuf heures du matin de Charleroi. * * * *
Wellington.
XI — Wellington’s “After Orders”: 10 P.M., June 15, 1815
Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474.
MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY.
After Orders, 10 o’clock p.m.
Bruxelles, 15th June, 1815.
The 3d division of infantry to continue its movement from Braine le Comte upon Nivelles.
The 1st division to move from Enghien upon Braine le Comte.
The 2d and 4th divisions of infantry to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.
The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.
The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible.
Wellington.
XII — Extract From Wellington’s Report of the Operations: June 19, 1815
Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 478.
TO EARL BATHURST.
Waterloo, 19th June, 1815.
My Lord,
Buonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre, at daylight in the morning.
I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march, and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy’s movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.
The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that day; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus; and Marshal Prince Blücher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, holding the villages in front of his position of St. Amand and Ligny.
The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards Bruxelles; and, on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasne, and forced it back to the farmhouse, on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras.
The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, and, in the morning early, regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal Blücher’s position.
In the meantime, I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras; and the 5th division, under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, arrived at about half-past two in the day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.
At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blücher with his whole force, excepting the 1st and 2d corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, with which he attacked our post at Les Quatre Bras.
I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy’s flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.
I have the honor to be, &c.
Wellington.
Earl Bathurst.
XIII — Wellington’s Conversation With the Duke of Richmond: June 16, 1815
Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, London; Bentley. 1870. vol. 2, p. 445.
CAPTAIN BOWLES838 TO LORD FITZHARRIS.
ORIGINAL MEMORANDUM BY THE WRITER.
At the Duchess of Richmond’s ball at Brussels the Prince of Orange, who commanded the 1st division of the army, came back suddenly, just as the Duke of Wellington had taken his place at the supper table, and whispered some minutes to his Grace, who only said he had no fresh orders to give, and recommended the Prince to go back to his quarters and go to bed.
The Duke of Wellington remained nearly twenty minutes after this, and then said to the Duke of Richmond, “I think it is time for me to go to bed likewise;” and then, whilst wishing him good-night, whispered to ask him if he had a good map in his house. The Duke of Richmond said he had, and took him into his dressing-room, which opened into the supper-room. The Duke of Wellington shut the door and said, “Napoleon has humbugged me (by G—), he has gained twenty-four hours’ march on me.” The Duke of Richmond said, “What do you intend doing?”
The Duke of Wellington replied, “I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras; but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him here” (at the same time passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo). He then said adieu and left the house by another way out. He went to his quarters, slept six hours and breakfasted, and rode at speed to Quatre Bras, where he met Hardinge and went with him to Blücher, who took him over the position at Ligny. The Duke of Wellington suggested many alterations, but Blücher would not consent to move a man.
The conversation in the Duke of Richmond’s dressing-room was repeated to me, two minutes after it occurred, by the Duke of Richmond, who was to have had the command of the reserve, if formed, and to whom I was to have been aide-de-camp. He marked the Duke of Wellington’s thumb-nail with his pencil on the map, and we often looked at it together some months afterwards.
XIV — Wellington’s Orders to Lord Hill: June 16, 1815
Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474.
INSTRUCTIONS
For the Movement of the Army on the 16th.839
Signed by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey, Deputy Quarter Master General.
To General Lord Hill, G. C. B.
16th June, 1815.
The Duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division of infantry upon Braine le Comte immediately. The cavalry has been ordered likewise on Braine le Comte. His Grace is going to Waterloo.
To General Lord Hill, G. C. B.
16th June, 1815.
Your Lordship is requested to order Prince Frederick of Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving 500 men, as before directed, in Audenarde.
XV — Extract From Wellington’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo.”
SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES, &c., of the Duke of Wellington:
vol. x, pp. 523 et seq.
But what follows will show that, notwithstanding the extension of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, such was the celerity of communication with all parts of it, that in point of fact840 his orders reached all parts of the army in six hours after he had issued them; and that he was in line in person with a sufficient force to resist and keep in check the enemy’s corps which first attacked the Prussian corps under General Zieten at daylight on the 15th of June; having received the intelligence of that attack only at three o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th, he was at Quatre Bras before the same hour on the morning of the 16th,841 with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army.
It was certainly true that he had known for some days of the augmentation of the enemy’s force on the frontier, and even of the arrival of Buonaparte at the army; but he did not deem it expedient to make any movement, excepting for the assembly of the troops at their several alarm posts, till he should hear of the decided movement of the enemy.
The first account received by the Duke of Wellington was from the Prince of Orange, who had come in from the out-posts of the army of the Netherlands to dine with the Duke at three o’clock in the afternoon. He reported that the enemy had attacked the Prussians at Thuin; that they had taken possession of, but had afterwards abandoned, Binch; that they had not yet touched the positions of the army of the Netherlands. While the Prince was with the Duke, the staff officer employed by Prince Blücher at the Duke’s headquarters, General Müffling, came to the Duke to inform him that he had just received intelligence of the movement of the French army and their attack upon the Prussian troops at Thuin.
It appears by the statement of the historian842 that the posts of the Prussian corps of General Zieten were attacked at Thuin at four o’clock on the morning of the 15th; and that General Zieten himself, with a part of his corps, retreated and was at Charleroi at about ten o’clock on that day; yet the report thereof was not received at Bruxelles till three o’clock in the afternoon. The Prussian cavalry of the corps of Zieten was at Gosselies and Fleurus on the evening and night of the 15th.
Orders were forthwith sent for the march of the whole army to its left.
The whole moved on that evening and in the night, each division and portion separately, but unmolested; the whole protected on the march by the defensive works constructed at the different points referred to, and by their garrisons.
The reserve, which had been encamped in the neighborhood and cantoned in the town and in the neighborhood of Bruxelles, were ordered to assemble in and in the neighborhood of the park at Bruxelles, which they did on that evening; and they marched in the morning of the 16th upon Quatre Bras, towards which post the march of all the troops consisting of the left and centre of the army, and of the cavalry in particular, was directed.
The Duke went in person at daylight in the morning of the 16th to Quatre Bras, where he found some Netherland troops, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which had been engaged with the enemy, but lightly; and he went on from thence to the Prussian army,843 which was in sight, formed on the heights behind Ligny and St. Amand. He there communicated personally with Marshal Prince Blücher and the headquarters of the Prussian army.
In the meantime the reserve of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras. The historian asserts that the Duke of Wellington had ordered these troops to halt at the point at which they quitted the Forêt de Soignies. He can have no proof of this fact,844 of which there is no evidence;845 and in point of fact the two armies were united about mid-day of the 16th of June, on the left of the position of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. These troops, forming the reserve, and having arrived from Bruxelles, were now joined by those of the 1st division of infantry,846 and the cavalry; and notwithstanding the criticism of the Prussian historian on the positions occupied by the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and on the march of the troops to join with the Prussian army, it is a fact, appearing upon the face of the History, that the Allied British and Netherland army was in line at Quatre Bras, not only twenty-four hours sooner than one whole corps of the Prussian army under General Bülow, the absence of which is attributed by the historian to an accidental mistake, but likewise before the whole of the corps under General Zieten, which had been the first attacked on the 15th, had taken its position in the line of the army assembled on the heights behind Ligny, and having their left at Sombref.
It was perfectly true that the Duke of Wellington did not at first give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and the Meuse.
The enemy had destroyed the roads leading through those valleys, and he considered that Buonaparte might have made his attack upon the Allied armies in the Netherlands and in the provinces on the left of the Rhine by other lines with more advantage. But it is obvious that, when the attack was made, he was not unprepared to assist in resisting it: and, in point of fact, did, on the afternoon and in the evening of the 16th June, repulse the attack of Marshal Ney upon his position at Quatre Bras, which had been commenced by the aid of another corps d’armée under General Reille. These were the troops which had attacked on the 15th, at daylight, the Prussian corps under General Zieten, which corps the Allied troops, under the Duke of Wellington, relieved in resistance to the enemy.
XVI — Wellington’s Letter to Blücher: 10.30 A.M., June 16, 1815
Ollech, opposite p. 124.
Sur les hauteurs derrière
Frasne le 16me Juin 1815
à 10 heures et demi.
Mon cher Prince:
Mon armée est situé comme il suit:
Le Corps d’Armée du Prince d’Orange a une division ici et à Quatre Bras; et le reste à Nivelles.
La Reserve est en marche de Waterloo sur Genappe; ou elle arrivera à Midi.
La Cavalerie Anglaise sera à la même heure à Nivelles.
Le Corps de Lord Hill est à Braine le Comte.
Je ne vois pas beaucoup de l’ennemi en avant de nous; et j’attends les nouvelles de votre Altesse, et l’arrivée des troupes pour décider mes opérations pour la journée.
Rien n’a paru du côté de Binch, ni sur notre droite.
Votre très obéissant serviteur
Wellington.
XVII — Soult’s First Order to Ney: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 26.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.
Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.
Monsieur le maréchal, l’empereur vient d’ordonner à M. le comte de Valmy, commandant le 3e corps de cavalerie, de le réunir et de le diriger sur Gosselies, où il sera à votre disposition.
L’intention de Sa Majesté est qui la cavalerie de la garde, qui a été portée sur la route de Bruxelles, reste en arrière et rejoigne le restant de la garde impériale; mais, pour qu’elle ne fasse pas de mouvement rétrograde, vous pourrez, après l’avoir fait remplacer sur la ligne, la laisser un peu en arrière, où il lui sera envoyé des ordres dans le mouvement de la journée—M. le lieutenant général Lefebvre Desnoëttes enverra, à cet effet, un officier pour prendre des ordres.
Veuillez m’instruire si le 1er corps a opéré son mouvement, et quelle est, ce matin, la position exacte des 1er et 2e corps d’armée, et des deux divisions de cavalerie qui y sont attachées, en me faisant connaître ce qu’il y a d’ennemis devant vous, et ce qu’on a appris.
Le major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
XVIII — The Emperor’s Letter to Ney: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 32.: Corresp. vol. 28, p. 334.
AU MARÉCHAL NEY.
Mon cousin, je vous envoie mon aide de camp, le général Flahaut, qui vous porte la présente lettre. Le major général a dû vous donner des ordres; mais vous recevrez les miens plus tôt, parce que mes officiers vont plus vite que les siens. Vous recevrez l’ordre de mouvement du jour, mais je veux vous en écrire en détail parce que c’est de la plus haute importance. Je porte le maréchal Grouchy avec les 3e et 4e corps d’infanterie sur Sombref. Je porte ma garde à Fleurus et j’y serai de ma personne avant midi. J’y attaquerai l’ennemi si je le recontre, et j’éclairerai la route jusqu’ à Gem bloux. Là, d’après ce qui se passera, je prendrai mon parti, peut-être à trois heures après midi, peut-être ce soir. Mon intention est que, immédiatement après que j’aurai pris mon parti, vous soyez prêt à marcher sur Bruxelles. Je vous appuierai avec la Garde, qui sera à Fleurus ou à Sombref, et je désirerais arriver à Bruxelles demain matin. Vous vous mettriez en marche ce soir même, si je prends mon parti d’assez bonne heure pour que vous puissiez en être informé de jour et faire ce soir 3 ou 4 lieues et être demain à 7 heures du matin à Bruxelles. Vous pouvez donc disposer vos troupes de la manière suivante. Première division à deux lieues en avant des Quatre-Chemins, s’il n’y a pas d’inconvénient. Six divisions d’infanterie autour des Quatre-Chemins et une division à Marbais, afin que je puisse l’attirer à moi à Sombref, si j’en avais besoin. Elle ne retarderait d’ailleurs pas votre marche. Le corps du comte de Valmy, qui a 3,000 cuirassiers d’élite, à l’intersection du chemin des Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, afin que je puisse l’attirer à moi, si j’en avais besoin; aussitôt que mon parti sera pris, vous lui enverrez l’ordre de venir vous rejoindre. Je désirerais avoir avec moi la division de la Garde que commande le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, et je vous envoie les deux divisions du corps du comte de Valmy pour la remplacer. Mais, dans mon projet actuel, je préfère placer le comte de Valmy de manière à le rappeler si j’en avais besoin, et ne point faire faire de fausses marches au général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, puisqu’il est probable que je me déciderai ce soir à marcher sur Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, couvrez la division Lefebvre par les deux divisions de cavalerie d’Erlon et de Reille, afin de ménager la Garde; s’il y avait quelque échauffourée avec les Anglais, il est préférable que ce soit sur le ligne que sur la garde. J’ai adopté comme principe général pendant cette campagne, de diviser mon armée en deux ailes et une réserve. Votre aile sera composée des quatre divisions du 1er corps, des quatre divisions du 2e corps, de deux divisions de cavalerie légère, et de deux divisions du corps du Comte de Valmy. Cela ne doit pas être loin de 45 à 50 mille hommes.
Le maréchal Grouchy aura à peu près la même force, et commandera d’aile droite. La Garde formera la réserve, et je me porterai sur l’une ou l’autre aile, selon les circonstances. Le major général donne les ordres les plus précis pour qu’il n’y ait aucune difficulté sur l’obéissance à vos ordres lorsque vous serez détaché; les commandants de corps devant prendre mes ordres directement quand je me trouve présent. Selon les circonstances, j’affaiblirai l’une ou l’autre aile en augmentant ma réserve. Vous sentez assez l’importance attachée a la prise de Bruxelles. Cela pourra d’ailleurs donner lieu a des incidents, car un mouvement aussi prompt et aussi brusque isolera l’armée anglaise de Mons, Ostende, etc. Je désire que vos dispositions soient bien faites pour qu’au premier ordre, vos huit divisions puissent marcher rapidement et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles.
Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.
N.
XIX — Count Reille’s Letter to Ney: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 37.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL Prince de la Moskowa.
Gosselies, le 16 juin 1815,
10 heures et quart du matin.
Monsieur le Maréchal,
J’ai l’honneur d’informer Votre Excellence du rapport que me fait faire verbalement le général Girard par un de ses officiers.
L’ennemi continue à occuper Fleurus par de la cavalerie légère qui a des vedettes en avant; l’on aperçoit deux masses ennemis venant par la route de Namur et dont la tête est à la hauteur de Saint-Amand; elles se sont formées peu à peu, et out gagné quelque terrain à mesure qu’il leur arrivait du monde: on n’a pu guère juger de leur force à cause de l’éloignement; cependant ce général pense que chacune pouvait d’être de six bataillons en colonne par bataillon. On apercevait des mouvements de troupes derrière.
M. le lieutenant général Flahaut m’a fait part des ordres qu’il portait à Votre Excellence; j’en ai prévenu M. le comte d’Erlon, afin qu’il puisse suivre mon mouvement. J’aurais commencé le mien sur Frasnes aussitôt que les divisions auraient été sous les armes; mais d’après le rapport du général Girard, je tiendrai les troupes prêtes à marcher en attendant les ordres de Votre Excellence, et comme ils pourront me parvenir très vite, il n’y aura que très peu de temps de perdu.
J’ai envoyé à l’empereur l’officier qui m’a fait le rapport du général Girard.
Je renouvelle à Votre Excellence les assurances de mon respectueux dévouement.
Le général en chef du 2e corps.
Comte Reille.
XX — Ney’s Orders to Reille and D’Erlon: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 38.
A M. LE COMTE REILLE,
Commandant le 2E Corps d’Armée.
Ordre de Mouvement.
Frasnes, le 16 juin 1815.
Conformément aux instructions de l’empereur, le 2e corps se mettra en marche de suite pour aller prendre position, la cinquième division847 en arrière de Gennapes, sur les hauteurs qui dominent cette ville, la gauche appuyée à la grande route. Un bataillon ou deux couvriront tous les débouchés en avant sur la route de Bruxelles. Le parc de réserve et les équipages de cette division resteront avec la seconde ligne.
La neuvième division848 suivra les mouvements de la cinquième, et viendra prendre position en seconde ligne sur les hauteurs à droite et à gauche du village de Banterlet849.
Les sixième et septième divisions850 à l’embranchement de Quatre-Bras, où sera votre quartier général. Les trois premières divisions du comte d’Erlon viendront prendre position à Frasnes; la division de droite s’établira à Marbais avec la deuxième division de cavalerie légère du général Piré; la première couvrira votre marche, et vous éclairera sur Bruxelles et sur vos deux flancs. Mon quartier à Frasnes.
Pour le Maréchal prince de la Moskowa,
Le Colonel, premier aide de camp,
Heymès.
Deux divisions du comte de Valmy, s’établiront à Frasnes et à Liberchies.
Les Divisions de la garde des généraux Lefebvre Desnoëttes et Colbert resteront dans leur position actuelle de Frasnes.
XXI — Soult’s Formal Order to Ney to Carry Quatre Bras: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 27.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.
Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.
Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur ordonne que vous mettiez en marche les 2e et 1er corps d’armée, ainsi que le 3e corps de cavalerie, qui a été mis à votre disposition, pour les diriger sur l’intersection des chemins dits les Trois-Bras (route de Bruxelles), où vous leur ferez prendre position, et vous porterez en même temps des reconnaissances, aussi avant que possible, sur la route de Bruxelles et sur Nivelles, d’où probablement l’ennemi s’est retiré.
S. M. désire que, s’il n’y a pas d’inconvénient, vous établissiez une division avec de la cavalerie à Genappe, et elle ordonne que vous portiez une autre division du côté de Marbais, pour couvrir l’espace entre Sombref et les Trois-Bras. Vous placerez, près de ces divisions, la division de cavalerie de la garde impériale, commandée par le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, ainsi que le 1er régiment de hussards, qui a été détaché hier vers Gosselies.
Le corps qui sera à Marbais aura aussi pour objet d’appuyer les mouvements de M. le maréchal Grouchy sur Sombref, et de vous soutenir à la position des Trois-Bras, si cela devenait nécessaire. Vous recommanderez au général, qui sera à Marbais, de bien s’éclairer sur toutes les directions, particulièrement sur celles de Gembloux et de Wavre.
Si cependant la division du général Lefebvre Desnoëttes était trop engagée sur la route de Bruxelles, vous la laisseriez et vous la remplaceriez au corps qui sera à Marbais par le 3e corps de cavalerie aux ordres de M. le comte de Valmy, et par le 1er régiment de hussards.
J’ai l’honneur de vous prévenir que l’empereur va se porter sur Sombref, où, d’après les ordres de Sa Majesté, M. le maréchal Grouchy doit se diriger avec les 3e et 4e corps d’infanterie, et les 1er, 2e et 4e corps de cavalerie. M. le maréchal Grouchy fera occuper Gembloux.
Je vous prie de me mettre de suite à même de rendre compte à l’empereur de vos dispositions pour exécuter l’ordre que je vous envoie, ainsi que de tout ce que vous aurez appris sur l’ennemi.
Sa Majesté me charge de vous recommander de prescrire aux généraux commandant les corps d’armée de faire réunir leur monde et rentrer les hommes isolés, de maintenir l’ordre le plus parfait dans la troupe, et de rallier toutes les voitures d’artillerie et les ambulances qu’ils auraient pu laisser en arrière.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
XXII — Soult’s Second Order to Ney to Carry Quatre Bras: June 16, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 31.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
Prince de la Moskowa.
Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.
Monsieur le Maréchal,
Un officier de lanciers vient de dire à l’empereur que l’ennemi présentait des masses du côté des Quatre-Bras. Réunissez les corps des comtes Reille et d’Erlon, et celui du comte de Valmy, qui se met à l’instant en route pour vous rejoindre; avec ces forces, vous devrez battre et détruire tous les corps ennemis qui peuvent se présenter. Blücher était hier à Namur, et il n’est pas vraisemblable qu’il ait porté des troupes vers les Quatre-Bras; ainsi, vous n’avez affaire qu’à ce qui vient de Bruxelles.
Le maréchal Grouchy va faire le mouvement sur Sombref, que je vous ai annoncé, et l’empereur va se rendre à Fleurus; c’est là où vous adresserez vos nouveaux rapports à Sa Majesté.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
XXIII — Flahaut’s Letter to the Duke of Elchingen
Doc. Inéd., p. 63.
A M. LE DUC D’ELCHINGEN.
Paris, 24 novembre 1829.
Je voudrais, mon cher Duc, pouvoir répondre d’une manière plus précise à vos questions; mais, n’ayant pas pris de notes, il m’est impossible, après un intervalle de quinze années, de me rappeler les détails que vous tenez à savoir.
C’est moi qui ai porté, le 16, à monsieur votre père, l’ordre de marcher aux Quatre-Bras et de s’emparer de cette position. L’empereur me l’a dicté le matin de bonne heure, autant qu’il m’en souvienne, entre huit et neuf heures.
Quant à celle à laquelle je l’ai remis à M. le maréchal Ney, il me serait impossible de le dire, n’y ayant pas attaché d’importance dans le moment.
Après le lui avoir remis, j’ai pris les devants et ai été rejoindre le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, qui commandait l’avant-garde. L’infanterie s’est fait longtemps attendre, mais dès que monsieur votre père nous a rejoints, et avant qu’elle fût arrivée, il a fait attaquer les troupes anglaises. Voilà tout ce dont je puis me souvenir; je regrette que ce ne soit pas plus circonstancié, puisque vous tenez à avoir des détails plus précis.
Croyez, mon cher Duc, à la sincérité de l’amitié que je vous ai vouée.
Comte Ch. FLAHAUT.
XXIV — Napoleon’s Letter to Grouchy: June 16, 1815
Corresp. vol., 28, p. 336.
22059.—AU MARÉCHAL COMTE GROUCHY
Commandant l’aile droite de l’armée du Nord.
Charleroi, 16 juin 1815.
Mon Cousin, je vous envoie Labédoyère, mon aide de camp, pour vous porter la présente lettre. Le major général a dû vous faire connaître mes intentions; mais, comme il a des officiers mal montés, mon aide de camp arrivera peut-être avant.
Mon intention est que, comme commandant l’aile droite, vous preniez le commandement du 3e corps que commande le général Vandamme, du 4e corps que commande le général Gérard, des corps de cavalerie que commandent les généraux Pajol, Milhaud et Exelmans; ce qui ne doit pas faire loin de 50,000 hommes. Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe. Faites partir en conséquence, de suite, les corps des généraux Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans et Vandamme, et, sans vous arrêter, continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe. Le 4e corps, qui est à Châtelet, reçoit directement, l’ordre de se rendre à Sombreffe sans passer par Fleurus. Cette observation est importante, parce que je porte mon quartier général à Fleurus et qu’il faut éviter les encombrements. Envoyez de suite un officier au général Gérard pour lui faire connaître votre mouvement, et qu’il exécute le sien de suite.
Mon intention est que tous les généraux prennent directement vos ordres; ils ne prendront les miens que lorsque je serai présent. Je serai entre dix et onze heures à Fleurus; je me rendrai à Sombreffe, laissant ma Garde, infanterie et cavalerie, à Fleurus; je ne la conduirais à Sombreffe qu’en cas qu’elle fût nécessaire. Si l’ennemi est à Sombreffe, je veux l’attaquer; je veux même l’attaquer à Gembloux et m’emparer aussi de cette position, mon intention étant, après avoir connu ces deux positions, de partir cette nuit, et d’opérer avec mon aile gauche, que commande le maréchal Ney, sur les Anglais. Ne perdez donc point un moment, parce que plus vite je prendrai mon parti, mieux cela vaudra pour la suite de mes opérations. Je suppose que vous êtes à Fleurus. Communiquez constamment avec le général Gérard, afin qu’il puisse vous aider pour attaquer Sombreffe, s’il était nécessaire.
La division Girard est à portée de Fleurus; n’en disposez point à moins de nécessité absolue, parce qu’elle doit marcher toute la nuit. Laissez aussi ma jeune Garde et toute son artillerie à Fleurus.
Le comte de Valmy, avec ses deux divisions de cuirassiers marche sur la route de Bruxelles; il se lie avec le maréchal Ney, pour contribuer à l’opération de ce soir, à l’aile gauche.
Comme je vous l’ai dit, je serai de dix a onze heures à Fleurus. Envoyez-moi des rapports sur tout ce que vous apprendrez. Veillez à ce que la route de Fleurus soit libre. Toutes les données que j’ai sont que les Prussiennes ne peuvent point nous opposer plus de 40,000 hommes.
NAPOLÉON.
D’après la copie. Dépôt de la guerre.
XXV — The 2 P.M. — June 16th — Order to Ney
Doc. Inéd., p. 40.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
Prince de la Moskowa.
En avant de Fleurus,
le 16 juin à 2 heures.
Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur me charge de vous prévenir que l’ennemi a réuni un corps de troupes entre Sombref et Bry, et qu’à deux heures et demie M. le maréchal Grouchy, avec les troisième et quatrième corps, l’attaquera; l’intention de Sa Majesté est que vous attaquiez aussi ce qui est devant vous, et qu’après l’avoir vigoureusement poussé, vous rabattiez sur nous pour concourir à envelopper le corps dont je viens de vous parler.
Si ce corps était enfoncé auparavant, alors Sa Majesté ferait manœuvrer dans votre direction pour hâter également vos opérations.
Instruisez de suite l’empereur de vos dispositions et de ce qui se passe sur votre front.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
Au dos de cet ordre est écrit:
A M. le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa,
A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles.
Et au crayon: Wagnée
Bois de Lombuc.
Un duplicata de cet ordre porte
A M. le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa,
A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles.
Wagnée.
Ransart.
XXVI — The 3.15 P.M. — June 16th — Order to Ney
Doc. Inéd., p. 42.
Monsieur le Maréchal, je vous ai écrit, il y a une heure, que l’empereur ferait attaquer l’ennemi à deux heures et demie dans la position qu’il a prise entre le village de Saint-Amand et de Bry: en ce moment l’engagement est très prononcé; Sa Majesté me charge de vous dire que vous devez manœuvrer sur-le-champ de manière à envelopper la droite de l’ennemi et tomber à bras raccourcis sur ses derrières; cette armée est perdue si vous agissez vigoureusement; le sort de la France est entre vos mains. Ainsi n’hésitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que l’empereur vous ordonne, et dirigez vous sur les hauteurs de Bry et de Saint-Amand, pour concourir à une victoire peut-être décisive. L’ennemi est pris en flagrant délit au moment où il cherche à se réunir aux Anglais.
Le major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815, à 3 heures un quart.
XXVII — Soult’s Letter to Ney: June 17, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 45.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
Prince de la Moskowa.
Flerus, le 15 [17] juin 1815.
Monsieur le Maréchal, le général Flahaut, qui arrive à l’instant, fait connaître que vous êtes dans l’incertitude sur les résultats de la journée d’hier. Je crois cependant vous avoir prévenu de la victoire que l’empereur a remportée. L’armée prussienne a été mise en déroute, le général Pajol est à sa poursuite sur les routes de Namur et de Liége. Nous avons déjà plusieurs milliers de prisonniers et 30 piéces de canon. Nos troupes se sont bien conduites: une charge de six bataillons de la garde, des escadrons de service et la division de cavalerie du général Delort a percé la ligne ennemie, porté le plus grand désordre dans ses rangs et enlevé la position.
L’empereur se rend au moulin de Bry où passe la grande route qui conduit de Namur aux Quatre-Bras; il n’est donc pas possible que l’armée anglaise puisse agir devant vous; si cela était, l’empereur marcherait directement sur elle par la route des Quatre-Bras, tandis que vous l’attaqueriez de front avec vos divisions qui, à présent, doivent être réunies, et cette armée serait dans un instant détruit. Ainsi, instruisez Sa Majesté de la position exacte des divisions, et de tout ce qui se passe devant vous.
L’empereur a vu avec peine que vous n’ayez pas réuni hier les divisions; elles out agi isolément; ainsi, vous avez éprouvé des pertes.
Si les corps des comtes d’Erlon et Reille avaient été ensemble, il ne réchappait pas un Anglais du corps qui venait vous attaquer. Si le comte d’Erlon avait exécuté le mouvement sur St. Amand que l’empereur a ordonné, l’armée prussienne était totalement détruite, et nous aurions fait peut-être 30,000 prisonniers.
Les corps des généraux Gérard, Vandamme et la garde impériale ont toujours été réunis; l’on s’expose à des revers lorsque des détachements sont compromis.
L’empereur espère et désire que vos sept divisions d’infanterie et la cavalerie soient bien réunies et formées, et qu’ensemble elles n’occupent pas une lieue de terrain, pour les avoir bien dans votre main et les employer au besoin.
L’intention de Sa Majesté est que vous preniez position aux Quatre-Bras ainsi que l’ordre vous en a été donné; mais si, par impossible, cela ne peut avoir lieu, rendez-en compte sur-le-champ avec détail, et l’empereur s’y portera ainsi que je vous l’ai dit; si, au contraire, il n’y a qu’une arrière-garde, attaquez-la, et prenez position.
La journée d’aujourd’hui est nécessaire pour terminer cette opération, et pour compléter les munitions, rallier les militaires isolés et faire rentrer les détachements. Donnez des ordres en consequence, et assurez-vous que tous les blessés sont pansés et transportés sur les derrières: l’on s’est plaint que les ambulances n’avaient pas fait leur devoir.
La fameux partisan Lutzow, qui a été pris, disait que l’armée prussienne était perdue, et que Blücher avait exposé une seconde fois la monarchie prussienne.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de DALMATIE.
XXVIII — Soult’s Order to Ney: 12 M., June 17, 1815
Doc. Inéd., p. 44.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL
Prince de la Moskowa.
851 4e corps d’armée [sic], à Gosselies.
En avant de Ligny, le 17 à midi.
Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur vient de faire prendre position, en avant de Marbais, à un corps d’infanterie et à la garde impériale; S. M. me charge de vous dire que son intention est que vous attaquiez les ennemis aux Quatre-Bras, pour les chasser de leur position, et que le corps qui est à Marbais secondera vos opérations; S. M. va se rendre à Marbais, et elle attend vos rapports avec impatience.
Le maréchal d’empire, major général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
XXIX — Captain Bowles’ Story of Wellington at Quatre Bras: June 17, 1815
Captain Bowles in Lord Malmesbury’s Letters, vol. 2, p. 447.
“On the morning of the 17th, my company being nearly in front of the farmhouse at Quatre-Bras, soon after daybreak the Duke of Wellington came to me, and, being personally known to him, he remained in conversation for an hour or more, during which time he repeatedly said he was surprised to have heard nothing of Blücher. At length a staff-officer arrived, his horse covered with foam, and whispered to the Duke, who without the least change of countenance gave him some orders and dismissed him. He then turned round to me and said, ‘Old Blücher has had a d——d good licking and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can’t help it; as they are gone back, we must go too.’
He made all the arrangements for retiring without moving from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did not occupy him five minutes.”
XXX — Grouchy’s Report to Napoleon From Sart-à-Walhain: 11 A.M., June 18, 1815
Grouchy Mém. vol. 4, p. 71.
Sart-à-Walhain le 18 juin, onze heures du matin.
Sire:
Je ne perds pas un moment à vous transmettre les renseignements que je recueille ici; je les regarde comme positifs, et afin que Votre Majesté les reçoive le plus promptement possible, je les lui expédie par le major La Fresnaye, son ancien page; il est bien monté et bon écuyer.
Les 1er, 2e et 3e corps de Blücher marchent dans la direction de Bruxelles. Deux de ces corps out passé à Sart-à-Walhain, ou à peu de distance, sur la droite; ils ont défilé en trois colonnes, marchant à peu près de même hauteur. Leur passage a duré six heures sans interruption. Ce qui a défilé en vue de Sart-à-Walhain peut-être évalué à trente mille hommes au moins, et avait un matériel de cinquante à soixante bouches à feu.
Un corps venant de Liége a effectué sa jonction avec ceux qui out combattu à Fleurus. (Ci-joint une réquisition qui le prouve.) Quelques-uns des Prussiens que j’ai devant moi se dirigent vers la plaine de la Chyse, située près de la route de Louvain, et à deux lieues et demie de cette ville.
Il semblerait que ce serait à dessein de s’y masser ou de combattre les troupes qui les y poursuivraient, ou enfin de se réunir à Wellington, projet annoncé par leurs officiers, qui, avec leur jactance ordinaire, prétendent n’avoir quitté le champ de bataille, le 16, qu’afin d’opérer leur réunion avec l’armée anglaise sur Bruxelles.
Ce soir, je vais être massé à Wavres, et me trouver ainsi entre Wellington, que je présume en retraite devant Votre Majesté, et l’armée prussienne.
J’ai besoin d’instructions ultérieures sur ce que Votre Majesté ordonne que je fasse. Le pays entre Wavres et la plaine de la Chyse est difficile, coupé, et marécageux.
Par la route de Wivorde, j’arriverai facilement à Bruxelles avant tout ce qui sera arreté à la Chyse, si tant il y a que les Prussiens y fassent une halte.
Daignez, Sire, me transmettre vos ordres; je puis les recevoir avant de commencer mon mouvement de demain.
La plupart des renseignements que renferme cette lettre me sont fournis par la propriétaire de la maison où je me suis arreté pour écrire à Votre Majesté; cet officier a servi dans l’armée française, est décoré, et parait entièrement dévoué à nos intérêts. Je les joins à ces lignes.
XXXI — General Order of Preparation for the Battle of Waterloo: June 18, 1815
Doc. Inéd. p. 52.
A M. LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.
L’empereur ordonne que l’armée soit disposée à attaquer l’ennemi à 9 heures du matin; MM. les commandants des corps d’armée rallieront leurs troupes, feront mettre les armes en état, et permettront que les soldats fassent la soupe; ils feront aussi manger les soldats; afin qu’à 9 heures précises chacun soit prêt et puisse être en bataille avec son artillerie et ambulances, à la position de bataille que l’empereur a indiquée par son ordre d’hier soir.
MM. les lieutenants-generaux, commandant les corps d’armée d’infanterie et de cavalerie, enverront sur-le-champ des officiers au major-général pour faire connaître leur position et porter des ordres.
Au quartier-général imperial,
le 18 juin 1815.
Le maréchal d’empire, major-général,
Duc de Dalmatie.
XXXII — Order for the Attack to Begin at 1 P.M., June 18, 1815
Doc. Inéd. p. 53.
Une fois que toute l’armée sera rangée en bataille, à peu près à 1 heure après midi, au moment où l’empereur en donnera l’ordre au Maréchal Ney, l’attaque commencera pour s’emparer du village de Mont St. Jean où est l’intersection des routes. A cet effet, les batteries de 12 du 2me corps et celle du 6me se réuniront à celle du 1er corps. Ces 24 bouches à feu tireront sur les troupes du Mont St. Jean, et le comte d’Erlon commencera l’attaque, en portant en avant sa division de gauche et la soutenant, suivant les circonstances, par les divisions du 1er corps.
Le 2e corps s’avancera à mesure pour garder la hauteur du comte d’Erlon.
Les compagnies de sapeurs du 1er corps seront prêtes pour se barricader sur-le-champ à Mont St. Jean.
Au crayon et de l’écriture du Maréchal Ney.
Ajouté par M. le Maréchal Ney.
Le comte d’Erlon comprendra que c’est par la gauche que l’attaque commencera, au lieu de la droite.
Communiquer cette nouvelle disposition au général en chef Reille.
AU DOS.
Ordres dictés par l’empereur, sur le champ de bataille du Mont St. Jean, le 18, vers onze heures du matin, et écrits par le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, major général. Paris, le 21 juin 1815. Le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa Pair de France,
Ney.
XXXIII — The 10 A.M. — June 18th — Order to Grouchy
Grouchy Mémoires, vol. 4, p. 79.
En avant de la ferme de Caillou, le 18 juin, 1815,
à dix heures du matin.
Monsieur le maréchal, l’Empereur a reçu votre dernier rapport, daté de Gembloux.
Vous ne parlez à Sa Majesté que de deux colonnes prussiennes qui ont passé à Sauvenière et à Sart-à-Walhain. Cependant des rapports disent qu’une troisième colonne, qui était assez forte, a passé par Géry et Gentines, se dirigeant sur Wavres.
L’Empereur me charge de vous prévenir qu’en ce moment Sa Majesté va faire attaquer l’armée anglaise, qui a pris position à Waterloo, près de la forêt de Soignes. Ainsi, Sa Majesté désire que vous dirigiez vos mouvements sur Wavres, afin de vous rapprocher de nous, vous mettre en rapport d’opérations et lier les communications, poussant devant vous les corps de l’armée prussienne qui ont pris cette direction et qui auraient pu s’arrêter à Wavres, où vous devez arriver le plus tôt possible.
Vous ferez suivre les colonnes ennemies, qui out pris sur votre droite, par quelques corps légers, afin d’observer leurs mouvements et ramasser leurs traînards. Instruisez-moi immédiatement de vos dispositions et de votre marche, ainsi que des nouvelles que vous avez sur les ennemis, et ne négligez pas de lier vos communications avec nous. L’Empereur désire avoir très-souvent de vos nouvelles.
Le maréchal duc de DALMATIE.
For translation, see ante p. 265.
XXXIV — The 1 P.M. — June 18th — Order to Grouchy
La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 270.
Du champ de bataille de Waterloo, le 18 juin,
à une heure après midi.
Monsieur le Maréchal,
Vous avez écrit, ce matin à deux heures, à l’Empereur, que vous marcheriez sur Sart-lez-Walhain; donc votre projet était de vous porter à Corbais ou à Wavre. Ce mouvement est conforme aux dispositions de Sa Majesté, qui vous out été communiquées. Cependant, l’Empereur m’ordonne de vous dire que vous devez toujours manœuvrer dans notre direction. C’est à vous de voir le point où nous sommes pour vous régler en conséquence et pour lier nos communications, ainsi que pour être toujours en mesure de tomber sur les troupes ennemies qui chercheraient à inquiéter notre droite et de les écraser.
Dans ce moment, la bataille est engagée sur la ligne de Waterloo; le centre ennemi est à Mont-Saint-Jean; ainsi manœuvrez pour joindre notre droite.
P. S. Une lettre qui vient d’être interceptée porte que le général Bülow doit attaquer notre flanc. Nous croyons apercevoir ce corps sur les hauteurs de Saint-Lambert; ainsi, ne perdez pas un instant pour vous rapprocher de nous et nous joindre, et pour écraser Bülow, que vous prendrez en flagrant délit.
Le maréchal duc de DALMATIE.
For translation, see ante, p. 270.
Footnotes
1 Where these works are cited in this book they are cited by the word which is printed in capitals; as ALISON, BATTY, BAUDUS.
2 Our citations are from this (original) edition.
3 Unless otherwise stated, our quotations are from this edition.
4 Our citations are from this translation.
5 See Clausewitz, chaps. 8, 14.
6 Gourgaud, pp. 42, 43.
7 Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 195, 197, 198.
8 Ante, pp. 4 et seq.
9 Ellesmere, pp. 161, 162. See Maurice, pp. 333 et seq.; Jan. 1891.
10 In the edition of 1850, this passage (as we suppose it to be) is found in vol. xiii, p. 625, and reads somewhat differently, but the idea is precisely the same.
11 Thiers; vol. xx, book lx, p. 23, says: “He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians * * * would leave between their respective forces a space, not very strongly guarded, and he thought that, by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point, he might become master of the position.”
12 The italics are our own.
13 In the edition of 1862, this passage is found in Chap. 22 on pages 46 and 47.
14 Hooper, p. 58. See also, by the same author, Wellington, p. 207. To the same effect, see Clinton, p. 378. Cf. Rogniat, Considérations, p. 339, who was the first to announce this theory.
15 Quinet, p. 75.
16 Réponse, &c., pp. 261, 262.
17 Jomini, p. 122, 123; also, pp. 213, 225, 226.
18 La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 41, 42; also, pp. 73 et seq.
19 Charras, vol. I, pp. 115, 116. See also Quinet, p. 101,—“Pour empêcher la réunion (of the English and Prussian armies) il était indispensable de fermer à la fois les deux passages (Sombreffe and Quatre Bras).”
20 Siborne (vol. I, p. 47) is perfectly clear on this point.
21 Corresp.: vol. 31, p. 471.
22 Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 14.
23 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 69, 70: Histoire de la Garde Imperiale: Saint Hilaire, p. 654.
24 Ib., pp. 653, 654.
25 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249.
26 Cf. Gourgaud, pp. 67, 68.
27 Charras, vol. 1, p. 70.
28 Ney’s letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, p. 385.
29 Davout, p. 540.
30 Foy’s History of the War in the Peninsula; vol. 1, pp. 110-112: Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule; pp. 161-164.
31 Thiers, vol. xx, book lx, p. 37, n.: Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 44, n. 2; id. in Le Mal de G., p. 18, n. 2.
32 Soult told Sir W. Napier: “The Emperor seemed at times to be changed; there were moments when his genius and activity seemed as powerful and fresh as ever; at other moments he seemed apathetic. For example, he fought the battle of Waterloo without having himself examined the enemy’s position. He trusted to General Haxo’s report. In former days he would have examined and re-examined it in person.” Life of Sir W. F. W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505.
33 As do Chesney, p. 67, and Hooper, pp. 62, 161.
34 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 65-68.
35 Charras, vol. 1, p. 196, n., says that Jerome’s command was purely nominal, and that Guilleminot, his chief-of-staff, really commanded this division.
36 Bourmont deserted to the enemy early on the 15th June, and was succeeded by Hulot.
37 We here follow many historians in calling Morand’s command the Middle Guard, “la moyenne Garde.”
38 Charras’ summing up of the cavalry and artillery varies from ours, and would seem to be 500 less than the number before given by him.
39 Thiers, vol. xx, book lx, p. 37, n.
40 Chesney, p. 72, n.
41 Charras, vol. 2, p. 203, n. H.
42 Gardner; Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo; pp. 31-37; p. 220, n. 138.
43 Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armée pendant l’année 1812. Paris, 1825. Book 4, chaps. 2 and 6.
44 Fifty Years of my Life: by the Earl of Albemarle, p. 98. Cf. Thiers, vol. XX, p. 37, note.
45 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 270, 271. This, as will be seen later on, was the third reconnoissance since midnight.
46 Cf. Fraser, Words on Wellington, p. 250. The Caillou house was set on fire by the Prussians, but the principal rooms were spared, and the house was afterwards carefully restored.
47 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 81, 82. See vol. 2, p. 202, note G, where it is shown that the number of men in the artillery given by Wagner is much too small.
48 The view of the Prussian army presented here is that of Charras (vol. 1, p. 89); but Delbrück, the biographer of Gneisenau, states that many of the troops were inexperienced, and some were half-hearted in the cause. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Cf. Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303.
49 For instance, at the battle of Waterloo, troops of the 1st Corps, that of the Prince of Orange, were stationed on both ends of the line.
50 These figures are taken from Siborne.
51 This brigade was composed of one regiment of Nassau, in three battalions, and one regiment of Orange-Nassau and numbered 4,300 men.
52 Including 4,300 Nassauers.
53 Müffling, Passages; pp. 204, 223.
54 Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 358, 509,—letters to Lt. Gen. Stewart, May 8, and to Earl Bathurst, June 25, 1815.
55 Müffling, Passages; pp. 213, 214.
56 See, for instances, Müffling, Passages; pp. 15-18, 83, 304, 311: See also Stanhope, p. 110, for the “great discussion” the night after the battle of Ligny, when “Blücher and Grolmann carried the day for remaining in communication with the English army” against Gneisenau. See post, p. 230.
57 Ellesmere, page 299.
58 Ante, p. 4.
59 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 324, No. 22,052: App. C, I; post, p. 362.
60 Ib., vol. 28, p.322, No. 22,050.
61 Ib., vol. 28, p. 323, No. 22,051.
62 Ib., vol. 28, p. 325, No. 22,053: App. C, II; post, p. 363.
63 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 62.
64 Charras, vol. I, pp. 101,117: La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 57, n. Cf. Stanhope, pp. 65, 248.
65 Maurice, p. 547: Sept. 1890.
66 For a valuable discussion of Zieten’s conduct, see Col. F. Maurice’s Article on Waterloo in the United Service Magazine for October, 1890.
67 Corresp. vol. 28, p. 330, No. 22,055: Baron Fain to Prince Joseph.
68 But see Grouchy: Observations, pp. 60 et seq.
69 Charras, vol. 1, p. 111.
70 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 99, 100.
71 Doc. Inéd., III, p. 22; App. C, III; post, p. 366.
72 Ib., V, p. 25; App. C, V; post, p. 367. See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 58.
73 Doc. Inéd., p. 56: Statement of General Reille.
74 Charras, vol. 1, p. 123.
75 Doc. Inéd., p. 4, statement of Colonel Heymès. The hour given by Heymès, seven o’clock, is much too late. We can fix the time of this conversation from a statement of Marshal Grouchy’s. That officer (Observations, p. 61) tells us that on going to Charleroi to take his orders from the Emperor just before the attack on Gilly, he found him giving instructions to Ney. The attack on Gilly was ordered, as we have seen above, at five o’clock, so that Ney must have joined the Emperor some time before five, and probably reached Reille about half or three-quarters of an hour later. Cf. Van Loben Sels, p. 140.
76 Report of Prince Bernard, given in full in Van Loben Sels, p. 134, n. Heymès’ statement is all wrong as to the hours. He says Ney met the Emperor at seven, put himself at the head of the 2d Corps at eight, and occupied Frasnes at ten. Doc. Inéd., p. 4.
77 Doc. Inéd., pp. 4, 5. Col. Heymès’ Statement.
78 See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 53, where d’Erlon’s order to his troops to break camp at 4 A.M., instead of at 3 A.M., as had been directed, is given in full, and severely commented on.
79 Charras, vol. 1, p. 98. Cf the 10 A.M. order to d’Erlon: Doc. Inéd., IV, p. 24; App. C., iv; post, p. 367. This directed d’Erlon to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes or Ham, and take up a position close to that of Reille.
80 Ib., p. 98, n.
81 Charras, vol. 2, pp. 207, 208.
82 Durutte’s statement, Doc. Inéd., p. 71, that this Corps camped at night beyond Gosselies, is wholly unsupported. Durutte probably meant Jumet, not Gosselies. The divisions of Foy and Jerome, of the 2d Corps, occupied Gosselies.
83 Doc. Inéd., V., p. 25; App. C, v; post, p. 367.
84 At six or seven o’clock, Charras thinks. Charras, vol. 2, p. 224.
85 Doc. Inéd., VI., p. 25; App. C, vi; post, p. 368.
86 In some unaccountable way Chesney (Waterloo, pp. 118, 119) has overlooked these orders that Napoleon gave to d’Erlon to close up on Reille at Gosselies. The Documents Inédits are not among the authorities given in the List which follows his Table of Contents, although they are referred to on page 119, and this may account for this regrettable oversight. His blame of Napoleon, which is very severe, is, therefore, entirely undeserved.
87 Charras, vol. 1, p. 110.
88 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 91; Siborne, vol. 1, p. 82; Quinet, p. 90; Hooper, p. 76: The author of “Napoléon à Waterloo” alone states (p. 34) that a part of the 1st Corps had not crossed at night. See also p. 60.
89 Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 144; App. C, vii; post, p. 368.
90 Charras, vol. 1, p. 98.
91 Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199: Gourgaud, p. 47.
92 Corresp. vol. 31; p. 202.
93 Corresp. vol. 28; p. 330, No. 22,055.
94 United Service Magazine: Sept., 1890: pp. 541 et seq.
95 Doc. Inéd., p. 71. Statement of General Durutte. As we have before remarked, this officer probably mistook Jumet for Gosselies. See ante, p. 50, note 25.
96 “An error was committed by suffering it [the 1st Corps] to remain, during the night of the 15th, echeloned between Marchienne and Jumet.” Gourg. p. 66.
97 Ante, pp. 12, 13.
98 Jomini, p. 125. Jomini says (p. 123) that “Napoleon gave Grouchy a verbal order to push as far as Sombreffe that very evening, if possible”; but no evidence of such an order is cited. See Jomini’s letter to the Duc d’Elchingen, pp. 225, 226. Cf. La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 69. That Napoleon nowhere blames Grouchy for not having pushed on to Sombreffe on the 15th,—taken in connection with his censure of Ney for not having seized Quatre Bras that evening,—is pretty good evidence that he neither ordered nor expected Grouchy to reach Sombreffe.
99 Charras, vol. 1, p. 116: cf. vol. 2, p. 225, Note K.
100 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249.
101 Evidently a misprint for “three”; the word “seven” having obviously been carelessly repeated.
102 Rogniat: Consid., p. 339: cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471.
103 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471.
104 Rogniat claims that there is a serious inconsistency between this statement, as to the occupation of Fleurus by the advance guard, and that in the Memoirs, where it is said that the Emperor intended to place his headquarters there. This seems rather hypercritical. Charras (vol. 2, p. 221) says “It stands to reason that if he had had his headquarters in that city [Fleurus], he would have occupied Sombreffe.” But this is surely going too far. Headquarters might well have been in Fleurus, while the Prussians held the heights of Brye and Sombreffe, and even the villages of Ligny and St. Amand; and this actually was the case the next day,—the 16th. Fleurus, half way between Charleroi and Sombreffe, was a very natural place for the Emperor to aim at as his resting place for the night of the 15th.
105 Clausewitz, ch. 30, p. 60. But see Rogniat, Réponse, p. 262.
106 The italics are our own.
107 pp. 264, 265.
108 It is not easy to see what is meant here. It is certain that, without having occupied Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon did fight the Prussians separately on the 16th. That Ligny was not a more decisive victory was due to special causes.
109 Vol. 1, p. 115, note. Quinet, p. 102, does not follow Charras here.
110 Jomini, pp. 123, 125.
111 La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 73 et seq. takes the same view.
112Vaudoncourt, vol. 3, 2d part, pp. 134, 135, states the Emperor’s plan with admirable clearness. But on pp. 165, 166, he slides into the theory of Jomini.
113 Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 22, p. 46. “It was certainly to be assumed that both generals would remain in communication with each other.”
114 “Bonaparte hoped, if he met Blücher’s main body, to destroy it by a quick attack, before Wellington could arrive.” Ib., ch. 22, p. 46.
115 But see La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 75, 76.
116 Jomini, pp. 125, 215.
117 Charras, vol. 1, p. 124. Cf. Quinet, p. 102.
118 Ante, pp. 51, 52. Gourg. p. 66.
119 Gourgaud, p. 47.
120 Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199.
121 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 333: “L’Empereur a donné le commandement de la gauche au prince de la Moskowa, qui a eu le soir son quartier général aux Quatre Chemins, sur la route de Bruxelles.” This Bulletin was printed in the “Moniteur” of the 18th. App. C, viii; post, pp. 369, 370. It is to be found in Jones, pp. 378, 379.
122 Marshal Grouchy, in 1818, only three years after the battle, in the first edition of the pamphlet which he published in Philadelphia, entitled “Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiée par le Général Gourgaud,” in defending himself for having, on the 18th of June, as he claims, strictly obeyed his orders, instead of marching to the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, says (p. 32):—
“Besides, this way of looking at the matter was fortified in my eyes by the disapproval which Napoleon had shown in my presence of the conduct of Marshal Ney. I had heard him blame him for having suspended the movement of his troops on the 15th at the sound of the cannonade between Gilly and Fleurus, for having halted Reille’s Corps between Gosselies and Frasnes, and for having sent a division towards Fleurus, where the fighting was going on, in place of keeping himself to the execution, pure and simple, of his orders, which prescribed to him to march on Quatre Bras. (The italics are ours.)
And again, when speaking of his own refusal to entertain the suggestion that he should march to the sound of the cannon, he says (p. 61):—
“Could I, moreover, so soon forget that Napoleon had censured Marshal Ney for having halted at the sound of the cannon which were being fired near Fleurus, for having sent troops in that direction, and for having permitted himself to depart from the literal execution of his orders?”
Grouchy must be referring here to the scene at the Emperor’s headquarters on the night of the 15th and 16th (see post, p. 116).
In the edition published in Philadelphia in 1819, and in the reproduction of the pamphlet from this edition in Paris in the same year, Grouchy omits the statement that he heard the emperor blame Ney, and rests his argument on the censure on Ney’s conduct contained in the Gourgaud Narrative. One may not unreasonably conjecture that, after publishing the edition of 1818, he was informed that Ney’s family denied that Ney had received on the 15th any order to go to Quatre Bras, and that Grouchy was unwilling to give evidence in this controversy against this contention of the friends of the Marshal.
Captain Pringle, R. E., in an Appendix to Scott’s Napoleon (Paris edition, 1828, p. 833, n.), is the only author who cites the above-quoted statements of Marshal Grouchy.
123 Gourgaud, p. 48, n.
124 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 200.
125 Cf. Jomini, p. 214, to whom the hesitation of Ney to occupy Quatre Bras seems justifiable, “unless the order to rush headlong on Quatre Bras had been expressed in a formal manner.”
126 In his letter to the Duke of Otranto (Jones, 386), Ney says: “The Emperor [on the 15th] ordered me immediately to put myself at the head of the 1st and 2d Corps, &c., &c. With these troops * * * I pursued the enemy, and forced him to evacuate Gosselies, Frasnes, Millet, Heppignies. There they took up a position for the night. * * *
“On the 16th I received orders to attack the English in their position at Quatre Bras.”
It will be observed that Ney omits to state what directions, if any, the Emperor gave him on the 15th. He confines himself to enumerating the troops placed under his orders and to stating what he accomplished with them. The remark that he was ordered on the 16th to attack Quatre Bras throws no light on the question we are examining, viz.:—what orders were given to him on the 15th.
127 Thiers, vol. xx, p. 31, n.
128 Letter from the Duke of Elchingen to General Jomini, 16 October, 1841, published in the “Spectateur Militaire,” Dec. 15, 1841, as cited in Charras, vol. 1, p. 119, n. Cf. Heymès’ Statement, Doc. Inéd., p. 4.
129 Doc. Inéd., p. 30.
130 See post, p. 69, n. 38.
131 Doc. Inéd., p. 4.
132 We cannot find any allusion to the evidence furnished by this bulletin in any of the authorities, except in the “Waterloo” of La Tour d’Auvergne (p. 75), in Mr. William O’Connor Morris’s “Campaign of 1815” (Great Commanders of Modern Times, p. 327, note), and in the work entitled “Napoléon à Waterloo,” p. 24, n., where the proper weight is given to the matter. Hence the elaborate discussions of Charras and Chesney, failing as they do, to meet this important piece of evidence, do not greatly assist in arriving at a decision. The bulletin is not alluded to in the Duke of Elchingen’s notes to the despatches collected in his “Documents Inédits.”
The probability is that the existence of this Bulletin escaped Chesney’s attention. Charras, however, cites the Bulletin (vol. 1, pp. 113, 114, notes). The fact that “Napoléon à Waterloo” was a reply to the work of Charras, and that the “Waterloo” of La Tour d’Auvergne was a reply to Chesney, accounts for our not finding the subject discussed by Chesney and Charras. It is, however, difficult to understand why Charras in his elaborate work should have overlooked the inference to be drawn from the statement in the bulletin.
133 Cf. Charras, vol. 1, p. 120.
134 Clausewitz, ch. 15, ch. 16. Sib., vol. 1, p. 39.
135 Chesney, p. 71: Siborne, vol. 1, p. 54.
136 Clausewitz, ch. 23, p. 48: Chesney, p. 71.
137 Charras, vol. 1, p. 127, states this to be the fact, but cites no authority.
138 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 345. Clausewitz, ch. 11, p. 28, probably refers to this meeting, though he locates it at St. Trond. Cf. Chesney, p. 77.
139 Passages, p. 231.
140 Ib. p. 232.
141 The italics are ours.
142 As does Chesney, for instance (p. 77), who says that the English and Prussian chiefs agreed to assemble their armies respectively at the points given in the above citation from Müffling. Maurice also (pp. 145, 146, May, 1890) makes the same statement. Both these writers evidently rest on the statement of Müffling, cited above, which does not seem to us to sustain them. They are, however, careful to confine the agreement to the measures to be taken in case the French advanced by way of Charleroi. Cf. La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 107.
Siborne (vol. 1, pp. 39 and 40) says that Blücher and Wellington had agreed in the above-mentioned event to concentrate respectively at Sombreffe and Quatre Bras, but he gives no authority for the statement. Jomini (p. 122) says substantially the same thing. Charras (vol. 1, p. 84) makes the same statement, also without citing any authority for it. Very possibly he took it from Siborne. Cf. Chesney, p. 93.
143 Cf. Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 521: Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo. App. C, xv; post, pp. 374, 375, 376.
144 “Naturally, then, Prince Blücher * * * would expect to be supported by Wellington, so far as the existing situation would make this support possible to the Duke.” Ollech, p. 124.
145 Clausewitz, ch. 20; Chesney, pp. 82, 101; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 70, 71, n. Charras, vol. 1, p. 128, n.; Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 360 et seq.; Ollech, pp. 90 et seq. Cf. Maurice, p. 259: June, 1890; also, p. 546: Sept., 1890.
146 Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 521; Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo; App. C, XV; post, pp. 374, 375, 376; Ellesmere, p. 171.
147 Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 530. App. C, XV; post, pp. 374, 375, 376.
148 Maurice, pp. 148, 149: May, 1890.
149 Chesney, p. 76.
150 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 33.
151 See this information collated in Maurice, pp. 147, 148: May, 1890. He is also inclined to think that Napoleon ordered the temporary occupation of Binche, with the intention of creating the belief that a part, at least, of the French army was moving on Mons.
152 Ollech, p. 115.
153 Ib., pp. 114, 115. Maurice, p. 540: Sept., 1890.
154 Steinmetz sent this message to Van Merlen at 8 A.M. Van Loben Sels, p. 125, note. Chesney, p. 94, note.
155 Charras, who says, vol. 1, p. 130, that Wellington received at nine o’clock in the morning a despatch from Zieten, announcing that his advance posts had been attacked, is clearly in error. Hooper, p. 83, points out that the expression on which Charras bases his conclusion really means that 9 A.M. was the date of the latest intelligence from Charleroi.
Siborne, vol. 1, p. 164, n., severely criticises the arrangements of the Prince of Orange for the transmission of intelligence.
156 Müffling, Passages, p. 228.
157 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 472. App. C, ix; post, p. 370. We rely mainly on the “Memorandum for the Deputy Quartermaster General,” from which he drafted the orders. In some cases we know that the orders actually sent varied somewhat from the terms of the Memorandum; this was no doubt true in all cases; but the differences were not material. See Van Loben Sels, p. 177, note (1).
158 0llech (p. 116) says Cooke’s division was not mentioned in these orders. He is in error; it is Clinton’s division that is not mentioned. Cooke’s was ordered to collect at Ath, not Clinton’s, as Ollech has it.
159 Müffling, Passages, p. 229.
160 Chesney, p. 83, n. Müffling, p. 229. Maurice, p. 69: April, 1890. Charras, vol. 1, p. 132, n., says between eight and half-past nine.
161 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473; App. C, ix; post, p. 370.
162 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 365, note.
163 Müffling, Passages, p. 229.
164 At 10 o’clock, however, it was not known at Brussels that Charleroi had been taken. In a letter to the Duc de Feltre, dated 10 P.M., the Duke says that the enemy “appears to menace” Charleroi. Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473; App. C, x; post, p. 371.
165 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474; App. C, xi; post, p. 371.
166 Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 478, et seq. App. C, xii; post, p. 372.
167 It is remarkable that this distinct and unequivocal statement, made in an official report the day after the battle, should have received so slight attention. It is hardly, if at all, alluded to either by those who believe that Wellington did order his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras, or by those who do not believe this. There is no mention of it in Siborne, Chesney, Hooper, Kennedy, Maurice, O’Connor Morris.
168 “Passages, p. 230. Cf. Maurice, p. 261: June, 1890.
169 Siborne (vol. I, pp. 79, 80) says this information arrived about 10 P.M. Charras (vol. 1, p. 134) says it was “towards eleven o’clock.”
170 Cf. Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, vol. 2, p. 445 (London, Bentley, 1870,), where a similar statement is said to have been made by Wellington to the Duke of Richmond just before the former left the ballroom. See App. C, xiii; post, p. 373.
171 Müffling’s letter to Gneisenau, dated 7 P.M. but no doubt sent off about midnight (Passages, pp. 229, 230) says that “as soon as the moon rises, the reserves will march; and, in case the enemy should not attack Nivelles, the Duke will be in the region of Nivelles with his whole force in the morning in order to support your Highness.” Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 365, note. The letter does not mention Quatre Bras. Delbrück, in his Life of Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 367, says that “Müffling also reported about midnight to the Prussian commander-in-chief that the allied army would be concentrated in twelve hours, and that at ten o’clock on the following morning 20,000 men would be at Quatre Bras, and the cavalry corps would be at Nivelles.” But he cites neither Müffling nor any other authority for this amazing statement. Müffling tells us himself that in his judgment the cavalry could not reach Quatre Bras before nightfall,—hence they could reach Nivelles only two or three hours before nightfall. Müffling, Passages, p. 235.
172 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474. Cf. Maurice, p. 144: May, 1890. Van Loben Sels, p. 181. Ellesmere, pp. 173, 174.
173 The Deputy Quarter Master General, or chief-of-staff.
174 He was killed at Waterloo.
175 The orders themselves, however, would be received at the headquarters of the different corps or divisions, and might, possibly, be even now in existence.
176 Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474; App. C, xiv; post, p. 374.
177 “Previously to starting from Brussels for” Quatre Bras,—says Siborne, vol. I, p. 88.
178 Maurice, p. 344: July, 1890. This is Colonel Maurice’s conclusion. So, Ollech, p. 118.
179 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 88, says: “With the early dawn of the 16th of June, the whole of the Duke of Wellington’s forces were in movement towards Nivelles and Quatre Bras.” And then he gives the substance of the orders to Hill. It is not easy to follow Siborne’s train of thought here.
180 Gomm, p. 352; Waterloo Letters, p. 23. Gomm says the march was resumed at 1 P.M.
181 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, note.
182 Maurice, p. 344: July, 1890. It is curious that the contradiction between these facts and the Duke’s statement in his Report should not have been commented on.
183 Wellington’s letter to Blücher: Ollech, p. 125; Maurice, p. 257: June 1890; post, p. 106: App. C, xvi; post, pp. 376, 377.
184 Von Ollech, p. 125. Maurice, p. 257: June, 1890; post, p. 106; App. C, xvi; post, pp. 376, 377.
185 Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 496.
186 Disposition of the British Army at 7 o’clock A.M., 16th June.
| 1st division | Braine le Comte | marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. | |||
| 2d „ | „ | marching to Nivelles. | |||
| 3d „ | Nivelles | „ to Quatre Bras. | |||
| 4th „ | Audenarde | „ to Braine le Comte. | |||
| 5th „ | beyond Waterloo | „ to Genappe. | |||
| 6th „ | Assche | „ to Genappe and Quatre Bras. | |||
| 5th Hanoverian brigade | Hal | „ to Genappe and Quatre Bras. | |||
| 4th „ | beyond Waterloo | „ to Genappe and Quatre Bras. | |||
| 2d division | army of the | at Nivelles and Quatre Bras. | |||
| 3d „ | Low Countries | ||||
| 1st division | „ | Sotteghem | marching to Enghien. | ||
| Indian brigade | |||||
| Major-General Dörnberg’s brigade and Cumberland Hussars | beyond Waterloo | „ to Genappe and Quatre Bras. | |||
| Remainder of the cavalry | Braine le Comte | „ to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. | |||
| Duke of Brunswick’s Corps, | beyond Waterloo | „ to Genappe. | |||
| Nassau | „ | „ to Genappe. | |||
The above disposition written out for the information of the commander of the Forces by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey. The centre column of names indicates the places at which the troops had arrived or were moving on. The column on the right of the paper indicates the places the troops were ordered to proceed to at 7 o’clock A.M., 16th June, previous to any attack on the British.
(Signed) DeLacy Evans.
By the phrase—“the places at which the troops had arrived or were moving on”—the writer means, in all probability, the places to which the troops were, in his judgment, nearest, at 7 A.M.
187 Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 4, 19.
188 Maurice (June, 1890, p. 261) adopts a different construction of the statement; he thinks it means that the orders to march to the various points named were issued at seven o’clock A.M. But why should it have been thought necessary to give to the Commander of the Forces information of the hour of issuing the orders? What he would want to know would be where the various divisions probably were at a given hour, and to what points they were marching.
189 Major Oldfield states that the Duke rode out to Quatre Bras unattended by his Quartermaster-General, De Lancey, or by the other heads of departments. Oldfield, MSS.
190 Lady Jane Dalrymple Hamilton, in her most interesting Journal, now in the possession of her granddaughter, Lady Manvers, says: “We found him [the Duke] there [at the ball] on our arrival at 10 o’clock. * * * We remained till past two, and, when I left, the Duke was still there.”
191 App. C, xiii; post, p. 373.
192 Ante, p. 82.
193 The italics are ours. But see post, p. 374, n. 2.
194 Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 523; App. C, XV; post, pp. 374, 375, 376.
195 Chesney, p. 83, n.; p. 101; p. 131.
196 Ib., p. 101; p. 131.
197 Siborne, vol. 1., p. 40.
198 Ib., p. 102, note.
199 By a despatch sent to the Prince of Orange at Brussels from Braine-le-Comte at 10 P.M. Van Loben Sels, p. 176, note.
200 Gleig’s Life of the Duke of Wellington, p. 308.
201 Scott’s Life of Napoleon, p. 833. Paris; Galignani; 1828.
202 Maurice, pp. 344 et seq. (July, 1890.) Contra, Charras, vol. 1, pp. 132, et seq.
203 Ante, p. 80, n. 36.
204 Chesney, p. 101.
205 Kennedy, pp. 168-170. See, also, Clausewitz, chaps. 11, 15, 17. Charras, vol. 1, p. 80. Corresp., vol. 31, p. 254.
206 Kennedy, p. 171.
207 Charras, vol. 1 p. 80.
208 This is also the opinion of Clausewitz; ch. 18.
209 Charras, vol. 1, p. 83. Clausewitz, ch. 18, says “nearer Nivelles,” i.e., nearer than Namur is.
210 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 253.
211 Ib., p. 254.
212 Ib., p. 253.
213 Ib., p. 254. The words in brackets are in the edition of 1820, known as the “Mémoires,” but are not in the “Correspondance.” The “Mémoires” also substitute “the 17th” for “the evening of the 16th.”
214 Corresp. vol. 31, p. 255.
215 Kennedy, p. 172.
216 Corresp., pp. 195,197. Kennedy, p. 172.
217 Van Loben Sels, p. 130.
218 Ib., pp. 131, 132. Chesney, p. 100.
219 Van Loben Sels, p. 128, note.
220 Ib., pp. 133, 134, note.
221 Van Loben Sels, p. 175.
222 Ib., p. 176.
223 Ib., p. 176, note.
224 Ib., p. 178, n. It would seem that the sending to Perponcher the order to return to Nivelles was a mere form.
225 Ib., p. 183.
226 Ib., p. 185.
227 Maurice, p. 345: July, 1890.
228 Ante, pp. 94 et seq.
229 Chesney, p. 102; Hooper, p. 84.
230 Müffling (Passages, p. 230) says about 5. Mudford puts it at 7. Gardner, p. 58, at 8. Sir A. Frazer (Letters of Colonel Sir A. S. Frazer, London, 1859, p. 536), writes at 6 A.M., that he has “just learned that the Duke moves in half an hour.” The Duke had 22 miles to ride to arrive at Quatre Bras, and he got there about 10 A.M. His letter to Blücher is dated 10.30 A.M. Oldfield (MSS.) puts the time of the Duke’s departure as before that of Sir George Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Smyth, who “drove out in a calêche of the latter” “between seven and eight o’clock,” and soon after the departure of the Brunswick troops, which was “at an early hour.”
231 Oldfield, MSS.
232 Von Ollech, p. 125. Maurice, June, 1890, p. 257. App. C, xvi; post, pp. 376, 377.
233 Charras, vol. 1, p. 192, note, refers to it to show that Wellington was opposite Frasnes at 10.30 A.M., but he makes no other reference to it.
234 Müffling, Passages, p. 236. Ollech, p. 126.
235 Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 369, 370.
236 At the same time, it must be said that Delbrück was quite naturally led to adopt this suggestion. It is only on the supposition that the “Disposition” is an authentic document and that the Duke followed it blindly, but honestly, in his letter to Marshal Blücher, that we can find a satisfactory answer to Delbrück’s suggestion.
237 Grenadier Guards, vol. 3, p. 15.
238 Leeke, vol. 1, pp. 10, 11.
239 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 90.
240 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, note. Gomm, pp. 353, 354. Waterloo Letters, pp. 23, 24. Gomm says Picton’s division left Brussels at 5 A.M., marched to Waterloo (a distance of about eleven miles), and halted there two hours; and then at 1 P.M. resumed its march for Quatre Bras, where it arrived at 3.30 P.M. Siborne (vol. 1, p. 102) says that Picton arrived at a quarter before 3 P.M., having left Waterloo about noon. As the distance is about thirteen miles, the later hour of arrival given by Gomm is probably correct.
241 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 103, n.
242 Van Loben Sels, p. 232.
243 Historical Record of the Life Guards, p. 193: 2d Ed. London; Longmans: 1840. Bullock’s Journal; English Historical Magazine, July, 1888, p. 549.
244 Life Guards, p. 194. Bullock, p. 549, says eight o’clock.
245 It ought to be remembered, however, that the “Disposition” was in all probability drawn up in a great hurry. Wellington had put off the decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras so late that both the giving of the necessary orders and the preparation of this “Disposition” must have been done in the greatest haste.
246 Cf. Siborne, vol. 1, p. 166, note.
247 Ante, p. 54.
248 Doc. Inéd., Heymès’ Rel. p. 6. See ante, p. 65, n. 28.
249 Ib., pp. 6, 7.
250 Doc. Inéd., Reille, Not. Hist., p. 57.
251 From the context, he would seem to mean before 7 A.M.
252 Girard’s division was with the main army under Napoleon.
253 Cf. La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 189. Muquardt, pp. 145, 146.
254 Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57.
255 Ante, p. 51.
256 Ante, p. 50, n. 25.
257 Doc. Inéd., Heymès, pp. 7, 8.
258 Ib., p. 8.
259 Ib., pp. 5, 7. Ante, p. 49.
260 Ib., Reille, p. 57.
261 Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; post, p. 377.
262 Ante, p. 49.
263 Doc. Inéd., Heymès. V, VI, p. 25; App. C, v, vi; post, pp. 367, 368.
264 Ib., Reille, p. 57.
265 Ib., p. 57.
266 Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57.
267 Reille in his “Notice Historique” says 11 A.M. But his despatch to Ney, in which he says that he read the Flahaut order, is dated 10.15 A.M. Doc. Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; post, p. 379.
268 Ib., X, pp. 32 et seq. App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378.
269 Ib., p. 30: at least this was the opinion of Marshal Ney’s son.
270 Ib., Reille, p. 57.
271 Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38. App. C, xix; post, p. 379. He does not mention in his “Notice Historique” that he delayed executing Ney’s order.
272 The delay thus occasioned is estimated by Charras (vol. 2, p. 238) at an hour and a quarter. It was really an hour and three-quarters, as Reille ought to have started at ten.
273 Ante, p. 19.
274 Doc. Inéd., Reille, XII, p. 38; App. C, xx; post, pp. 379, 380.
275 Charras, vol. 1, p. 189. Cf. vol. 2, p. 238.
276 Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; post, p. 377.
277 Ante, p. 120.
278 Doc. Inéd., VIII, p. 27; App. C, xxi; post, pp. 380, 381.
279 That of the Count of Valmy, Kellermann.
280 Doc. Inéd., X, pp. 32 et seq.; App. C, xvii; post, pp. 377, 378.
281 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 204, 205.
282 Doc. Inéd., IX, p. x31; App. C, xxii; post, p. 381.
283 Charras (vol. 1, p. 190) says that this order differed from Soult’s previous orders in authorizing Ney to employ the cavalry of the Count of Valmy. But both Soult’s orders direct this in express terms.
284 Doc. Inéd., XII, pp. 38, 39; App. C, xx; post, pp. 379, 380.
285 Jones, p. 386. Charras, vol. 1, p. 215.
286 Ante, p. 51.
287 Ante, p. 52.
288 Ante, pp. 67, 68.
289 For an explanation of Chesney’s (pp. 118, 119) severe strictures, see ante, p. 51, n. 29.
290 Doc. Inéd., Heymès, p. 6.
291 Cf. La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92.
292 Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378.
293 Ante, p. 121, note 23.
294 Ante, p. 121, note 21.
295 Doc. Inéd., XXI, p. 63; App. C, xxiii; post, p. 382.
296 Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; post, p. 379.
297 Ante, pp. 5, 13, 14.
298 Ollech, p. 123.
299 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334. Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378.
300 Flahaut, says Reille, passed through Gosselies about 10 A.M. Doc. Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; post, p. 379.
301 This seems to imply that the Emperor did not propose to carry the Guard to Gembloux.
302 See ante, p. 123.
303 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; post, pp. 382, 383.
304 Ollech, pp. 112, 113: D’Auvergne, pp. 103, 104: Charras, vol. 1, pp. 143, 144.
305 “Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe.”
306 It is, however, given in Du Casse’s Vandamme, vol. 2, p. 562.
307 Jomini, pp. 129, 130.
308 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 138, 145, 182.
309 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 85.
310 The Duke of Wellington, however, thought the inactivity of Napoleon on the morning of the 16th was necessitated by the long marches of the past few days. Ellesmere, pp. 296, 297. So, Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53.
311 Ante, pp. 132, 139.
312 Chesney, pp. 138, 139: See also, Clinton, p. 380.
313 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334: Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378.
314 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; post, pp. 382, 383.
315 Jomini, p. 112.
316 Ante, p. 70.
317 Ollech, p. 120.
318 Pirch II. commanded a brigade in the 1st Corps.
319 Ollech, p. 122.
320 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 373.
321 Ollech, p. 125.
322 Müffling: Passages, 230, 231, 237.
323 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 150, 151, and note. Damitz, p. 92. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375. Charras states in the note cited above that Clausewitz “says that it was the promise of help from Wellington that decided Blücher to receive battle,”—but we have not been able to find the passage. He also says that Siborne substantially follows Damitz in this matter; but we can not find that Siborne represents Wellington as making any such promise. In his official report of the battle Blücher does not claim that such a promise was given. Jones, pp. 320, 321.
324 Müffling: Passages, pp. 233-237.
325 Ollech, p. 127, note.
326 Ib., p. 127.
327 Ollech (p. 142) quotes Gneisenau as writing on the 17th: “We received from the Duke of Wellington the written promise that if the enemy should attack us, he would attack them in the rear.” There is no such promise in Wellington’s letter to Blücher.
328 La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 109, entirely disbelieves this assertion.
329 Gneisenau, p. 372.
330 Müffling: Passages, p. 234.
331 Blücher’s Report leaves the question open. Jones, pp. 320, 321.
332 Damitz, p. 85.
333 Damitz, p. 87.
334 Ib., p. 92.
335 Ollech, pp. 123, 124.
336 Ib., p. 127.
337 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375.
338 Ante, p. 70.
339 Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n.
340 Ib., p. 155, n.
341 Charras, vol. 1, p. 145.
342 Ib., p. 150.
343 For a further discussion of this subject see the Notes to this chapter.
344 “A movement that would certainly have obtained an immense victory.” Jomini, p. 223.
345 Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n. The division of Hulot and the cavalry of Maurin were stationed opposite the bend in the enemy’s line, beyond Ligny. Ib., p. 161.
346 Ib., p. 155, n.
347 Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n.
348 Ib., p. 155, n.
349 Ib., p. 155, n.
350 Ib., p. 155, n. This is exclusive of the 6th Corps, which was in reserve. It numbered 10,465 men, with 32 guns.
351 Doc. Inéd., XIII, p. 40; App. C, xxv; post, pp. 383, 384.
352 The battle of Ligny has often been described. Charras, La Tour d’Auvergne, Thiers, on the French side, Clausewitz and Ollech on the German side, give excellent descriptions. Siborne’s account is also very clear and good. It is unnecessary to repeat the details here.
353 Sir Henry Hardinge, speaking to the Duke of Wellington, said: “When you had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much disapproved of it, and said to me, ‘if they fight here they will be damnably mauled.’” * * * The Duke added: “They were dotted in this way—all their bodies along the slope of a hill, so that no cannon ball missed its effect upon them.” Stanhope, p. 109. Cf. Hooper, p. 96.
354 Doc. Inéd., XIV, p. 42; App. C, xxvi; post, p. 384.
355 The Duke of Elchingen—Doc. Inéd., p. 41—estimates the distance at nearly five leagues, that is, 12-1/2 miles, and allows two hours for the time occupied. Charras, vol. 1, page 204, n., makes the distance six leagues (15 miles) and estimates the time at three hours.
356 Charras, vol. 1, p. 166.
357 Ib., p. 164.
358 Sometimes classed as part of the Old Guard, as in Charras, vol. 1, p. 67 and La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 48, and sometimes as “the Middle Guard” (la Garde moyenne). See “Napoléon à Waterloo,” p, 315, n. 1; p. 325.
359 We shall consider in another place how d’Erlon’s Corps came to be there. Shortly after it was seen by Vandamme it retired to Frasnes.
360 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 135: Jomini, pp. 138, 139.
361 There was no delay, as suggested by Siborne, vol. 1, p. 218. From where the Guard had been stationed to the northerly end of the village of Ligny, where it was put in, was at least two miles and a half. Only a small part of this distance had been traversed before the news from Vandamme caused a halt.
362 Charras, vol. 1, p. 175, n. 2: letter from Soult to Joseph Bonaparte.
363 Charras, vol. 1, p. 179, where he discusses the Prussian authorities. Cf. Muquardt, p. 139, n.
364 Cf. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Müffling: Passages, pp. 204, 205, 223. Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303.
365 Charras, vol. 1, p. 180.
366 Ib., pp. 177, 178.
367 Ib., p. 179.
368 Charras, vol. 1, p. 178.
369 Charras (vol. 1, p. 184) thinks it was not later than 6.30 P.M. when the 6th Corps reached Fleurus.
370 Charras (vol. 1, pp. 184, 185) severely criticises this decision.
371 Unless he erred in arresting the attack of the Guard on the appearance of the strange corps. See post, p. 174, note 8.
372 Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53.
373 Cf. Charras, vol. 1, pp. 182, 183.
374 Clausewitz, ch. 34.
375 Cons. sur l’Art de la Guerre, p. 339, cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472.
376 Davout, p. 545.
377 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472.
378 Clausewitz (ch. 34, pp. 81 et seq.) points out that Ney’s coöperation could not have formed an essential part of Napoleon’s plan of battle, for Napoleon “could not know whether Ney would be able to spare him a single man.”
379 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 206.
380 Davout, p. 545.
381 Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 83.
382 It is not quite clear in which direction this column was to advance.
383 Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. Maurice thinks that the beaten troops must have crossed the turnpike, even if they were intending to retreat towards the Rhine.
384 Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 66.
385 Ante, p. 133.
386 Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 65.
387 Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; post, p. 381.
388 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 170, 171, 183, 184.
389 Jomini, p. 138.
390 Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 84.
391 Clausewitz, ch. 32, pp. 73 et seq.
392 This includes the 6th Corps.
393 Charras makes the Prussian army about 87,000 strong.
394 Unless we include the IIId Corps among the Prussian reserves, the French superiority in reserves was very large; and Blücher, as Clausewitz goes on to state, did not have the IIId Corps at his disposal.
395 Davout, p. 547.
396 Cf. Jomini, p. 221.
397 Jomini, p. 226, defends Reille’s course. We shall discuss this question in the Notes to this chapter.
398 Cf. Jomini, pp. 221, 226.
399 La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92, 145; Muquardt, pp. 145, 146, 149, n. Charras, though discussing Ney’s conduct at considerable length (vol. 2, pp. 236 et seq.), does not touch upon this part of it.
400 Kellermann, Charras says, vol. 1, p. 188, had at 10.30 A.M. passed Gosselies. His two divisions were, therefore, long before 2 P.M., at Frasnes, and Liberchies.
401 “Vers 3 heures.” Reille’s statement, Doc. Inéd, p. 59.
402 Or that of Guilleminot, as Charras prefers to call it. Charras, vol. 1, pp. 195, 196, n.
403 Gomm, p. 353; Waterloo Letters, p. 23.
404 Siborne, vol. 1, p 108.
405 We shall not attempt a tactical account of the battle. It is well described by Siborne and Charras, and there is much of value in other writers. But it is not worth while at this late day to go into detail.
406 Doc. Inéd., p. 71, Durutte’s statement.
407 Drouet, p. 95.
408 Ib., p. 95; Doc. Inéd, p. 65; d’Erlon’s statement.
409 As it would seem from the map. But the distance is a matter of conjecture only.
410 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 207.
411 But see “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 132 et seq.
412 So, Hooper, pp. 136, 137.
413 Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; post, p. 381.
414 Charras, vol. 1, p. 206.
415 Ib., p. 204, n.
416 Ib., p. 206.
417 Ib., p. 206. Charras says that Roussel’s division remained where it was. He is probably correct. But see Siborne, vol. 1, p. 136, and Hooper, p. 127.
418 Siborne is in error in supposing that there were two charges. Only one brigade was put in, the cuirassiers, and this was towards the end of the action.
419 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 153. Charras, vol. 1, p. 210, rates Wellington’s force as high as 37,000 men.
420 Even Hooper admits (p. 137) that the “timely presence” of these troops would have “placed Wellington in an extremity of peril.” Cf. Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 162, 163.
421 The Duke of Wellington did not get back from Brye, where he had gone to confer with Marshal Blücher, until half-past two o’clock.
422 Jomini, however, says (p. 227) that all that could have been expected of Ney even in this case would have been to maintain his position. But he says this in a letter to Marshal Ney’s son, and his statement cannot be taken seriously. The events of the day demonstrated that one corps would have been amply sufficient to hold the place, had it been once occupied by the French.
423 Cf. Chesney, p. 137.
424 Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378.
425 Ib., VIII, p. 27; App. C, xxi; post, pp. 380, 381.
426 Ib., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; post, p. 381. This refers to the prior order in distinct terms.
427 Charras, vol. 1, p. 205.
428 Ib., p. 206.
429 Hooper, p. 127.
430 Even in regard to this division, Soult’s order plainly implies that Ney might make use of it. Doc. Inéd., VIII, p. 28; App. C, xxi.; post, pp. 380,381.
431 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 209.
432 Doc. Inéd., XVII, p. 46; App. C, xxvii; post, pp. 384, 385.
433 Life of General Sir W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505.
434 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 146, n.
435 Jomini, pp. 219, 221.
436 Ib., p. 226.
437 Charras, vol. 2, pp. 242 et seq.
438 Vol. 1, pp. 210 et seq. Paris: 1841.
439 This is exactly what was enjoined on Ney by the 3.15 P.M. order. It is to be noted that, while the 2 P.M. order expressly directed Ney to attack the English, and only after having vigorously pushed them, to turn back and operate against the Prussians, the 3.15 P.M. order directed him to manœuvre at once,—that is, without waiting until he should have driven the English,—so as to surround the Prussian right wing. This is precisely what Baudus says the Emperor and Soult desired him so strongly to urge upon Marshal Ney.
440 See note 16, on page 194.
441 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 206-208.
442 Heymès, Ney’s aide-de-camp, says (Doc. Inéd., pp. 9, 10) that it was just when Kellermann’s cuirassiers had been routed that Colonel Laurent arrived and told Marshal Ney that he had ordered d’Erlon to turn off the main road in the direction of St. Amand. Baudus came up a little later, evidently, as he met the cuirassiers some distance from the field of battle. But as Baudus saw nothing of the troops of the 1st Corps, we think Heymès must be mistaken, as to Laurent’s having just turned off the head of the column to the right. If so, Baudus must have passed at least half the corps on the road.
443 According to Gourgaud, p. 57, Colonel Forbin-Janson carried this order.
444 Charras, vol. 1, p. 206.
445 Doc. Inéd., p. 42.
446 Ib., pp. 9, 10.
447 Baudus, vol. 1, p. 212.
448 See his despatch to Ney, of the 17th, cited above; p. 191.
449 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 255.
450 Jomini, p. 148.
451 See Ney’s letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, 386.
452 See Charras’ very apposite remarks on this: vol. 1, p. 234.
453 Doc. Inéd., XVII, pp. 45, 47; App. C, xxvii.; post, pp. 384, 385.
454 See ante, p. 191.
455 Charras, vol. 1, p. 235, n.
456 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 214. See also, pp. 208 and 233.
457 One division of the 6th Corps, that of Teste, was detached, and added to Grouchy’s command.
458 Doc. Inéd., XVI, p. 44; App. C, xxviii; post, pp. 385, 386.
459 Maurice, p. 350; July, 1890: citing Clausewitz, ch. 33, p. 76. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386.
460 Maurice, pp. 350, 354: July, 1890.
461 But see Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. He thinks that the troops of the two beaten corps must at first have retreated northward,—that is, across the turnpike, in the direction of Wavre.
462 This mistake could not have been made, as Ollech points out (p. 172) if the battle had been decided before nightfall.
463 As a matter of fact, these troops were not a part of a column in retreat for Namur; but, of course, this could not be known at once. See Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 286, 287. Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 92.
464 Jomini states (p. 150, n.) that General Monthion reconnoitred in the direction of Tilly and Mont St. Guibert in pursuance of orders given him by the Emperor on the morning of the 17th. Siborne, vol. 1, p. 317, states that Domon’s cavalry division of the 3d Corps, which had been temporarily attached to the main column, reconnoitred the country between the Brussels road and the Dyle. This must have been, however, in the afternoon of the 17th.
465 Grouchy, Obs., p. 12 et seq.
466 Fragments Hist., Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy; pp. 4, 5. Grouchy Mem., vol. 4, p. 44.
467 Grouchy, Obs. p. 13.
468 Ollech, p. 171. Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 51.
469 This subject will be treated of in Appendix B; post, p. 355.
470 Charras, vol. 1, p. 240.
471 Berton, pp. 47, 48. Berton supposed it to be the corps of Bülow, but it was really that of Thielemann. Ollech, p. 157.
472 Pascallet, p. 79. Charras, vol. 1, p. 241. Appendix B; post, p. 358.
473 This division belonged to the 6th Corps.
474 Namur lay nearly south-east and Maestricht nearly north-east from Sombreffe.
475 The italics are ours.
476 The original is “et,” but this is plainly an error, very possibly caused by the fact that the letter was dictated.
477 The italics are ours.
478 There are other readings varying in unimportant points from the above.
479 Whether it was wise under these circumstances for Napoleon to detach such a large force as that which he intrusted to Grouchy, is a question which will be discussed in the notes to Chapter XV.
480 Charras, vol. 1, p. 242.
481 Ib., vol. 1, p. 238.
482 Gérard: Dernières Obs., p. 15; Charras, vol. 1, p. 244; Siborne, vol. 1, p. 297. Of the mutilations in the text affecting the significance of this letter, contained in the Grouchy Memoirs, notice will be taken in Appendix B, post, p. 359, where a full copy of it will be given.
483 The italics are ours.
484 Charras, vol. 1, p. 249.
485 Ib., pp. 236, 237.
486 Charras, vol. 1, p. 250.
487 Cf. Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 181.
488 Charras, vol. 1, p. 250.
489 Gourgaud, pp. 77, 78; Corresp., vol. 31, p. 214.
490 Ante, p. 47.
491 Le Maréchal Drouet, p. 96.
492 Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 185, 186.
493 Cf. Gourgaud, pp. 78, 79. Cf. Mercer’s Diary, vol. 1, p. 269.
494 Charras, vol. 1, p. 233.
495 Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 95.
496 Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 93.
497 The Memoirs are exceedingly unsatisfactory in regard to this part of the campaign. Napoleon evidently had no exact recollection of the order which he dictated to Bertrand. He was only sure that he gave Grouchy an intimation that he might need him. See App. A; post, p. 351.
498 Very possibly Grouchy did tell “the simple truth” in his account of the interview between himself and the Emperor. The trouble with Grouchy was, that he did not tell “the whole truth.” He denied having received any written order.
499 Clausewitz, ch. 48, p. 130.
500 Chesney, p. 152.
501 Maurice, pp. 73, 74: April, 1890.
502 These are the verbal orders.
503 The italics are our own.
504 Hamley, Op. of War, p. 190. He also cites the verbal orders.
505 Ib., pp. 196-198.
506 Hamley contends that the injunction to Grouchy—which, by the way, is contained in both the written and the verbal orders,—to communicate with Napoleon by the Namur-Quatre Bras turnpike, is not consistent with a movement towards Wavre. But why should not this arrangement have been prescribed for the sake of greater safety? If the Prussians were moving towards Wavre and the Dyle, their cavalry might be expected to make all communication across the country very hazardous for couriers or staff-officers. And, as a matter of fact, it was by the Brussels turnpike to Quatre Bras, thence by the Namur turnpike to Sombreffe, and thence via Gembloux to Grouchy’s position in front of Wavre, that Napoleon sent Grouchy the two orders on the day of the battle. Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 277, 278.
507 Hooper, p. 153.
508 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 241, 242.
509 Assuming, that is, that it was wise in Napoleon to detach Grouchy with his two corps from the main army after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English. See the Notes to Chapter XV; post, pp. 273 et seq.
510 Maurice, p. 348: July, 1890.
511 Ib., p. 353.
512 Ib., pp. 350-355.
513 Ante, p. 159.
514 Ollech, p. 157.
515 He could not at this time communicate with Thielemann and Bülow.
516 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 385; Ollech, p. 156.
517 Ollech, p. 157. Maurice (pp. 354, 355: July, 1890) points out that this serves, as far as it goes, to show that Napoleon might have known of the retreat of Zieten and Pirch I. to Wavre without changing his opinion that the whole Prussian army was intending to fall back to the eastward.
518 Damitz, p. 143.
519 This is Ollech’s opinion (p. 156): “Thus had Gneisenau broken all bridges behind him, given up all communication with the Rhine, that he might once again offer the hand to the English for a common blow which should forever overthrow the French forces.” But this is surely going too far. Communication with the Rhine could be maintained as well by way of Maestricht as by way of Liége.
520 Ante, pp. 151, 204. Cf. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386
521 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386.
522 Ollech, p. 156; Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 385.
523 Müffling: Passages, p. 212.
524 Ante, p. 106.
525 Ante, p. 144.
526 He was exactly seventy-two years and six months old on the day of the battle of Ligny.
527 Ollech, p. 157.
528 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 241, n.
529 Stanhope, p. 110.
530 Maurice, p. 355: July, 1890. Colonel Maurice is inclined to believe that the above incident “must have taken place in Wavre, after the receipt of Wellington’s offer to remain and fight at Waterloo, if Blücher would join him with one or two corps.” This is certainly very possible. The incident reported in Stanhope’s work, however, is stated to have occurred the night after the battle, which, as we know from the Prussian historians, Blücher spent at Mellery. Ollech, p. 157. Very possibly there may have been a second discussion at Wavre on the 17th.
531 Ollech, pp. 166 et seq.
532 Ollech, p. 166. These troops were afterwards replaced by two battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and two batteries, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ledebur. See post, p. 260; Ollech, p. 168; Siborne, vol. 1, p. 285.
533 Ollech, p. 168.
534 Ib., p. 169.
535 Waterloo Letters: Vivian, p. 153.
536 Ollech, p. 179.
537 Müffling: Passages, pp. 238, 239.
538 For a capital story connected with this incident, see the “Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury,” vol. 2, p. 447. London, 1870. App. C, xxix; post, p. 386. See also Waterloo Letters, pp. 154, 167.
539 Müffling Passages, p. 241; Ollech, p. 180.
540 Ollech, p. 187.
541 It arrived about 5 P.M. See ante, p. 232.
542 Contra: Siborne, vol. 1, p. 279. This subject will be considered in the Notes to this chapter.
543 Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 393.
544 In point of fact Wellington supposed that only the 3d Corps had been detached for the pursuit of the Prussians. See his Official Report, Jones, p. 307.
545 See post, p. 243.
546 Maurice, pp. 534 et seq.: Sept., 1890.
547 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 251, following Damitz, p. 212.
548 Lieutenant Massow.
549 Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 278, 279, following Damitz, p. 213.
550 Ollech, p. 187; Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 393, 394.
551 Ib., p. 180.
552 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 278.
553 Maurice, pp. 533-538: Sept., 1890; and pp. 330 et seq., January, 1891.
554 Vol. 2, p. 313. The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. 3d ed., 2 vols. John Murray: 1835. See also the same work, p. 594; London: William Tegg: 1867.
555 Ellesmere, p. 157; Quarterly Review, vol. 70, p. 464.
556 A Memoir of Charles Mayne Young, Tragedian: With extracts from his son’s journal. By Julian Charles Young, M. A., Rector of Ilmington. London and New York: Macmillan & Co.: 1871; pp. 158 et seq.
557 Maurice, p. 337: January, 1891.
558 Mere improbability, however, is not a sufficient reason for rejecting a story supported by credible evidence. It is always impossible to place one’s self precisely in the position of those of whom the story is told. And some, at any rate, of the improbable features may be mere accretions on the original story.
559 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 258.
560 Clausewitz, ch. 39, pp. 99, 100.
561 Mém. du Duc de Raguse, vol. 7, pp. 124, 125.
562 Soult’s despatch to Grouchy: June 18th, 10 A.M.
563 Even if the Emperor had been asleep when Grouchy’s aide arrived, or had been at the front, where he was between one and two o’clock in the morning, to see if the English army was still in position, a competent chief-of-staff should, of his own motion, have sent back at once to Grouchy the information possessed at headquarters.
564 Especially when, according to Marshal Marmont, the subordinate was a man like Grouchy: Mém., vol. 4, p. 125. See, also, Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 226, n.
565 Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 et seq.; Gérard: Dern. Obs. p. 44.
566 Cf. La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 232, 233, 245.
567 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 70, 87, 131, n.
568 Gardner, pp. 160, 161. The italics are our own.
569 Ib., pp. 161, 162.
570 Maurice, p. 550: Sept. 1890., The italics are our own. It is possible that Colonel Maurice may have had in mind the language of Soult’s order dated 10 A.M., in which Grouchy’s movement on Wavre is approved. But this did not reach Grouchy till 4 P.M., as we have just stated. See, also, Kennedy, p. 159.
571 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 315, n. 1. The hour of starting is given in the Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 56) as “before four o’clock.” But this is a gross and manifest error. Cf. Charras, vol. 2, p. 33, where the hour is given as 6 A.M.
572 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 1; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4. p. 55.
573 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 2; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 57.
574 This despatch is not in existence, but its receipt was acknowledged and the above statement in it was referred to in Soult’s despatch to Grouchy, dated 1 P.M., June 18th. From Grouchy’s statement that he was going to Sart-à-Walhain, Soult drew the inference that he was going to Corbaix or to Wavre.
575 Gérard: Dern. Obs., pp. 13, 14; Letter of General Exelmans.
576 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 62, 63.
577 There is in the Grouchy Mémoires, vol. 4, pp. 65, 66, what purports to be a copy of a despatch to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 3 A.M. But its authenticity is more than doubtful. Cf. La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 318, n. It begins with the statement that all Grouchy’s reports and information confirm the idea that the Prussians are retiring on Brussels, to concentrate there, or to deliver battle after being united to the English.
578 Charras, vol. 2, pp. 33, 55. Charras seems to us to be in error in supposing that Grouchy’s uncertainty still existed on the morning of the 18th. He has, perhaps, overlooked the statement in Grouchy’s order to Pajol, dated at daybreak, quoted in the text.
579 Gérard: Dernières Obs., p. 24; Letter of General Exelmans.
580 Ib., p. 25; Letter of General Berthezène.
581 Gérard: Quelques Doc., p. 12.
582 We shall examine the English authorities in the Notes to this chapter. See post, p. 280.
583 Jomini, pp. 175 et seq.
584 10.30 A.M., according to Charras, vol. 2, p. 62.
585 Clausewitz, ch. 50, p. 146.
586 Charras, vol. 2, pp. 57, 58.
587 We reserve for the Notes to this chapter the consideration of the various opinions on the consequences of this movement, had it been made.
588 See Siborne’s excellent remarks on this subject,—vol. 1, pp. 318 et seq.
589 Declaration of M. Leguest, in the Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 141, 142. The staff-officer, by name Pont-Bellanger, must have left Moustier several hours before Marbot’s officer, Captain Eloy, got there. See Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407.
590 See the Notes to this chapter.
591 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 72. This despatch is given in full in Appendix C, xxx; post, pp. 386, 387.
592 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 75.
593 Le Mal. de Grouchy, p. 15, n. 2: p. 59; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 75.
594 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 328. Cf. Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 295.
595 The one of these bridges which was nearest Wavre, that at Limale, was passed at six o’clock by Valin’s cavalry, without experiencing any serious resistance. Siborne, vol. 2, p. 286. Berton, pp. 66, 67. Marbot’s cavalry-picket occupied the bridge of Moustier all the afternoon. Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407. Cf. Charras, vol. 2, p. 69.
596 Ollech, pp. 208, 209.
597 Berthezène, in Gérard, Dem. Obs., p. 25.
598 Berton, p. 66, n.
599 Charras, vol. 2, p. 44.
600 Berthezène, in Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 25.
601 Charras’ discussion of this movement will be considered in the Notes to this chapter: post, p. 284, n. 6.
602 Charras, vol. 2, p. 69, n.
603 The paved chaussée which now runs straight from Gembloux to Wavre was not built in 1815. Nor was the chaussée from Sombreffe to Gembloux.
604 Ante, p. 258.
605 The Prussian brigade corresponded then to the French or English division.
606 Sometimes called the Wood of Frischermont.
607 Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 127, 128.
608 See Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock P.M., 18th June.
609 Ollech, p. 187.
610 Clausewitz, ch. 42, p. 107.
611 Maurice, p. 549: Sept., 1890.
612 Charras, vol. 2, p. 43.
613 Ib., p. 45. Cf. Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock P.M., June 18th.
614 Ib., p. 43.
615 Ollech, p. 188.
616 Ib., p. 189; Maurice, p. 537: Sept., 1890.
617 Ollech, p. 190.
618 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 79; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 283, 284; App. C, xxxiii; post, p. 388.
619 Ante, p. 212; also App. B, post, p. 358.
620 This must have been the Ist and IId Corps.
621 The original has “corps”; but army-corps are not meant. The same word is used below,—“quelques corps légers.”
622 Ante p. 212; App. B, post, p. 358.
623 Gérard (Dern. Obs. p. 19) remarks:—“If one analyzes separately the text of these two despatches, * * * one perceives that the Emperor has spoken of the direction of Wavre only because he finds it indicated in the reports of the commander of the right wing. The principal object of both of them was to insist upon movements which would bring the troops of the right wing near the main body.” Gérard is here referring to the order sent to Grouchy at 1 P.M. (post, p. 270), as well as to that dated 10 A.M.
624 Chesney, p. 206; Kennedy, p. 162; Gardner, p. 161, n.; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 78, 80, 87.
625 Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 et seq. This letter is chiefly made up from his report, which is to be found in “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 344 et seq. The editors of Marbot’s Memoirs say (vol. 3, p. 408) that the steps they have taken to find the report at the War Office have been unsuccessful.
626 Sometimes called the Wood of Paris.
627 He commanded the picket at Moustier.
628 This was Marbot’s own conviction; vol. 3, p. 408.
629 La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 270, 271; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 286, 287; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 400, 401; Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 279, 280; App. C, xxxiv; post, p. 389.
630 The Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 82) give this as 3 o’clock.
631 The text given in the Grouchy Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 82, replaces this “or” by an “and.” This is not followed in any other work.
632 The text of the Grouchy Memoirs inserts here the following:—“and to seek to come near to our army, in order that you may join us before any body of troops can put itself between us. I do not indicate to you the direction you should take.”
633 The original is “engagée.” “This letter,” says Marshal Grouchy (Fragm. Hist., Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy; p. 14), “was in a hand writing so difficult to decipher that I read it, as did also my chief-of-staff, and my senior aide-de-camp, ‘gagnée.’” The chief-of-staff, General Le Sénécal, says that the Marshal closely questioned the officer who was the bearer of the despatch, but he was so intoxicated that they could not get anything from him. Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 132, 133. Cf. Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 20, n.
634 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 87.
635 See the Bertrand order, ante, p. 210.
636 This statement is true only of the army which the Duke had in line of battle at Waterloo. There were besides some 18,000 men, stationed at Hal and Tubize, of whom he did not avail himself.
637 “Napoleon would not have lost his line of communication with France had Blücher immediately reoccupied the position of Ligny upon Napoleon’s leaving it; for his advance upon Wellington necessarily opened to him both the Mons and Lille great lines to France.” Kennedy, pp. 154, 155.
638 Kennedy, p. 157.
639 Ante, p. 274, n. 3.
640 Kennedy, p. 160; Chesney, pp. 206, 207.
641 Marshal Soult, according to Baudus (vol. 1, pp. 222, 223), was opposed to detaching Grouchy with the large body of troops assigned to him. He said to one of his aides that it was a great fault to detach so considerable a force from the army which was going to march against the Anglo-Belgian troops; that in the condition in which the defeat of the evening before had put the Prussian army, a feeble force, with the cavalry of General Exelmans, would suffice to follow and observe it in its retreat. We concur in Marshal Soult’s conclusion, but not with his reasons. It was not because the Prussian army was so weak, but because it was still so formidable, that Napoleon should have kept all his army together.
642 See the admirable observations of Siborne (vol. 1, pp. 318 et seq.); and of Van Loben Sels, pp. 319 et seq. With many writers, to blame Napoleon is to exonerate Grouchy; with others, again, to blame Grouchy is to exonerate Napoleon.
643 Cf. Kennedy, pp. 160, 161; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. On the other hand see Van Loben Sels, pp. 323, 324.
644 Operations of War, p. 196 et seq.
645 Hamley, p. 196.
646 Frag. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 44.
647 Jomini, p. 176.
648 Charras, vol. 2, pp. 62, 63. Hooper’s view [pp. 342 et seq.] is substantially that of Charras. He also seems to think that unless Grouchy could succeed in defeating the Prussian troops opposed to him, his intervention would be useless. It seems to us, on the other hand, that all that it was needful for Grouchy to do was to engage, and so to detain, the corps of Bülow and Pirch I.; and by marching from the Dyle upon their line of march from Wavre to St. Lambert, he was, it seems to us, certain to accomplish this. This view is well presented by Quinet, pp. 301-304.
649 Charras, vol. 2, p. 42.
650 Ante, p. 232.
651 Siborne (vol. 1, p. 320) thinks that Grouchy could have successfully crossed the Dyle even if he had not started from Gembloux earlier than he did.
652 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 311; Charras, vol. 2, pp. 72, 73.
653 Charras, vol. 2, p. 43; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 311, 312. Kennedy (p. 163) seems to suppose that Pirch I. and Zieten followed Bülow without any interval.
654 Ante, p. 259.
655 Van Loben Sels (pp. 322, 323, 340) is very positive as to this.
656 Charras, vol. 2, p. 376; also, p. 44.
657 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 313. He strictly follows Damitz, p. 247.
658 Ollech, pp. 208, 209.
659 Called by him Lautelle. It is sometimes called the wood of Lauzel, as it adjoins a farm of that name.
660 Berton, p. 55.
661 Berton, pp. 55, 59.
662 Grouchy, Obs., p. 16.
663 Quelques Doc., p. 7. He means Walhain and Sart-à-Walhain.
664 Ib., 12. By “Walin,” he means Walhain.
665 Quelques Doc., pp. 17, 18. By “Sarra-Walin,” he means Sart-à-Walhain.
666 Ib., p. 19. His letter was dated September 30, 1819.
667 Ib., p. 24. See also Gérard’s “Lettre à MM. Germain-Sarrut et B. Saint Edme,” pp. 10, 11; and his “Dernières Observations,” pp. 8, 29.
668 Fragm. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry and Barthélemy, p. 9.
669 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 75.
670 The writer has abundant proof of the above statements. He has also visited the house. M. Wenseleers, who is referred to in the Preface, obtained for him this information in 1888 and 1889.
671 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 219; Charras, vol. 1, p. 263.
672 Drouet, pp. 96, 97; Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, p. 24.
673 Ante, pp. 268 et seq.
674 The question of the alleged orders sent to Grouchy during this night will be treated of in Appendix A; post, p. 353.
675 Van Loben Sels, p. 319.
676 Ante, p. 265.
677 Charras, vol. 1, p. 265.
678 Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, 24.
679 Van Loben Sels, p. 270.
680 Baudus, vol. 1, p. 225.
681 Doc. Inéd., XVIII, p. 52; App. C, xxxi; post, p. 387.
682 Thiers, vol. xx, p. 157, n.
683 Charras, vol. 1, p. 270.
684 Charras, vol. 1, p. 274.
685 Ib., p. 275.
686 Kennedy, p. 131.
687 Wellington’s Official Report: Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 481.
688 Oldfield MSS.; Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 380. A copy of this sketch is inserted opposite page 565 of C. D. Yonge’s “Life of Wellington”; London: Chapman and Hall; 1860. See, also, p. 616 of the same work.
689 Curiously enough they were very nearly lost in the action; the officer who had them in his keeping, Lieutenant Waters, being unhorsed in the melée.
690 Probably the information brought by Lieutenant Massow; ante, p. 233.
691 Oldfield MSS.
692 Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461; App. xxx. Charras, vol. 1, p. 269, n. 2, raises the total to 70,187 men of all arms, of whom 13,432 were cavalry. He gives the number of guns as 159.
693 Ante, p. 35, n. 3.
694 Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461: App. xxx.
695 Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the 6th British division, was not in the action.
696 Kennedy, p. 61; Waterloo Letters, pp. 30, 31, Sir W. Gomm.
697 Waterloo Letters, pp. 403, 404.
698 Kennedy, p. 65.
699 Oldfield MSS.
700 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 461: App. xxxi. Charras (vol. 1. p. 238, n.) gives the total as 72,447 men and 240 guns.
701 Doc. Inéd., XIX, pp. 53, 54; App. C, xxxii; post, p. 388.
702 We shall not attempt to give a complete tactical description of the battle of Waterloo. The narratives of Siborne, Charras, Hooper, La Tour d’Auvergne, and others give all the facts. With the exception of two or three points, their accounts do not differ materially.
703 The following extract from a letter by Baron Müffling written on June 24, 1815, is directly in point here:—
“Before we arrived there I said to the Duke, ‘If only there were an apparently weak point in the right flank of your position, so that Bonaparte might assail it right furiously, and neglect his own right wing to such an extent that he should fail to discover the march of the Prussians!’
“And see! when we arrived there, there lay the advanced post of Hougomont, upon which he (B.) indeed fell.” Militär Wochenblatt, Nov. 14, 1891.
704 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 266; Charras, vol. 1, p. 281.
705 Charras, vol. 2, p. 18.
706 Charras, vol. 1, p. 288, and note 2.
707 Charras, vol. 1, p. 288; La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 274. D’Erlon in his autobiography throws no light on the matter; Drouet, p. 97.
708 Nowhere better, perhaps, than in Erckmann-Chatrian’s “Waterloo.”
709 Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 5, 6.
710 Ante, p. 270.
711 Charras, vol. 2, p. 18. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff says that more than 2,000 men were killed in endeavoring to get possession of La Haye Sainte. Doc. Inéd., p. 17. This, however, must be an excessive estimate.
712 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303; vol. 2, p. 18; Hooper, p. 213, n.; O’Connor Morris, p. 352. Other authorities put the capture of La Haye Sainte two hours later. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff places the hour between 6 and 7 P.M. Doc. Inéd., pp. 18, 19.
713 Kennedy, pp. 114-116. Kennedy’s account of this part of the battle, as indeed of all parts of it, is most valuable; but we think he is in error in supposing that La Haye Sainte had not fallen before these cavalry attacks were made.
714 Kennedy, pp. 127 et seq.; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 et seq.
715 Mercer, vol. 1, p. 325; Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 154, 155. Mercer in his Diary seems to think these enfilading batteries were Prussian; but see his letter and plan in the Waterloo Letters, pp. 214 et seq. Cf. Waterloo Letters, p. 330.
716 Van Loben Sels, p. 333.
717 Charras, vol. 1, p. 318.
718 Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 et seq.; Van Loben Sels, p. 295. Cf. Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 382: Waterloo Letters, p. 339, where the hour is fixed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson Kelly at “about half-past six.”
719 Kennedy, p. 127.
720 Halkett’s brigade was on the main line, nearly half of a mile west of the pike.
721 Kempt’s brigade was on the east side of the Brussels pike; its right rested on it.
722 It is almost exactly a mile and a half from the point of intersection of the Brussels turnpike with the Wavre road to the church in Planchenoit.
723 See Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 313, 318.
724 The principal question as to this is in regard to the corps of Reille, a part of which, certainly, might have been more usefully employed in sustaining the cavalry attacks than in fighting in the wood of Hougomont, or on the Nivelles road on the west side of Hougomont. See Heymès’ statement in Doc. Inéd., pp. 17, 18.
725 Charras, vol. 1, p. 316.
726 Ib., p. 317.
727 Ib., p. 321, n.; correcting the statement on p. 318, which speaks of only one battalion of grenadiers being on the road to the Maison du Roi.
728 Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
729 Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285. Damitz gives a complete roster of the Guard, and, in fact, of the whole army, at the end of his first volume. He also gives the numbers of the regiments and battalions detached in and around Planchenoit.
730 Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285, states that owing to the losses suffered at Ligny these eight battalions had been consolidated into six. Batty (pp. 106, 107) also says that the 4th regiment of grenadiers consisted of but one battalion, and that the same was true of the 4th regiment of chasseurs.
731 At least this was the fact on the 16th of June, prior to the battle of Ligny. See the Roster at the end of Damitz’ first volume. All these officers, except Henrion, are mentioned by Charras (vol. 1, p. 322) as participating in this charge. Cf. Gore, p. 59. This work is an explanation, in 1817, of Craän’s Map of the Field.
732 Ney: Letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, p. 387. But Drouot (Jones, p. 227) and Napoleon (Corresp., vol. 31, p. 238) say four battalions only, and the latter adds “of the Middle Guard.” It is not unlikely that the other battalions had previously been brought up to the neighborhood of La Haye Sainte.
733 Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
734 This is implied in Damitz’ statement, vol. 1, p. 286, as well as from Charras’ statement that the horse-batteries were on the left flank of the column. It is distinctly so stated in Van Loben Sels, p. 295.
735 We call the whole mass, consisting of columns of battalions,—division (or two company) front,—arranged in échelon,—a column, merely for convenience’ sake. It may be remarked that the French infantry were formed in three ranks.
736 Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 257; Contra, Siborne, vol. 2, p. 166.
737 St. Hilaire: Hist. de la Garde, p. 634.
738 Charras, vol. 1, p. 67.
739 Captain Powell, in Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.
740 This is an error. “La Moyenne Garde” consisted solely of the chasseurs of the Guard; the grenadiers constituted the Old Guard, strictly so called. It is not uncommon to find the grenadiers and chasseurs spoken of as constituting the Old Guard; this is Charras’ usage. But it is an error to speak of the grenadiers of the Middle Guard. The grenadiers whom he saw were the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment,—ante, p. 317. See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315, n. 1; pp. 321, 325, 327, n. 1. Contra, Gore, p. 75.
741 The 1st brigade of guards, about 1,800 strong,—Siborne, vol. 1, p. 460. App. xxx. They were formed in four ranks.
742 Relation Belge, pp. 74 et seq.
743 Waterloo Letters, pp. 244, 245.
744 Charras, vol. 1, pp. 325, 326.
745 See Waterloo Letters, pp. 320, 321; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 170, 171, n.; See, also, Waterloo Letters, pp. 330, 331, 339, 340.
746 Waterloo Letters, p. 245; Maitland’s narrative.
747 Waterloo Letters; Colborne’s narrative, pp. 284, 285; Gawler’s narrative, p. 293.
748 Charras, vol. 1, p. 327, n.
749 Charras, vol. 1, p. 331.
750 Doc. Inéd., p. 62; Reille’s Statement.
751 Hist. de l’Ex-Garde, pp. 538, 539.
752 Charras, vol. 1, p. 334.
753 Ante, pp. 261, 283.
754 Ante, pp. 294, 295.
755 Cf. Wellington’s Report (Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 484; App. C, xii; post, pp. 372, 373). where he says that he attributes the successful result of the day to the assistance he received from the Prussians.
756 Ante, pp. 303, 304.
757 Corresp., vol. 28, p. 343; Jones, p. 384.
758 Jones, p. 387.
759 Ib., p. 227.
760 Sidney’s Life of Lord Hill, p. 309.
761 Jones (Artillery Operations), p. 177; Sharpin in the “Waterloo Letters,” pp. 228 et seq.; Gore, pp. 58 et seq. See, also, Captain Batty’s account (pp. 106 et seq.,) in his “Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815”: London, 1820. He was an ensign in the 1st regiment of foot-guards in Maitland’s brigade. He speaks, it is true, of the chasseurs of the Guard “forming another attack”; but he says that it was when Maitland was advancing, that he perceived the chasseurs “so far advanced as to menace the right flank of the brigade,”—which is substantially the view maintained in the text. Cf. Siborne, vol. 2, p. 170, where the same statement is made. Yet Siborne (vol. 2, p. 174) says that “between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a distance during their advance of from ten to twelve minutes’ march.” How such an interval was possible, when the contest of the Guard with Maitland’s brigade was of such extremely short duration, is not apparent. See Maitland’s statement in “Waterloo Letters”, pp. 244, 245; also statements of Powell and Dirom; pp. 255, 257, 258.
762 Gawler, p. 15.
763 Ib. pp. 31, 32.
764 Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84.
765 Lord Seaton, then Sir John Colborne, who commanded the 52d, admits that he did not himself see, and could not have seen, any movement of the guards. He simply claims that the Imperial Guard halted when his skirmishers opened fire on their flank. Leeke, vol. 1, p. 101.
766 Ib., pp. 43, 44, 84.
767 Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84. See also his letter to the Editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, August 17, 1867.
768 Waterloo Letters, p. 229. Cf. a statement of an officer in the same battery,—Jones, p. 177,—probably Sharpin.
769 Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.
770 Waterloo Letters, p. 257.
771 Ib., p. 293; Cf. Colborne’s Letter, p. 285.
772 Leeke, vol. 1, p. 104; Letter of Colonel Brotherton.
773 Ib., p. 101.
774 Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
775 Wellington brought up about this time to the right centre of his line Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division, besides other troops.
776 Wellington about this time brought over the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to the threatened centre of his line, as well as the remnants of Somerset’s and Ponsonby’s brigades.
777 On Marshal Ney’s state of mind at this time, see Gourgaud, pp. 48, n.; 111, 112; Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 249, 250; Muquardt, p. 149, n.; Life of Sir W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505,—where Soult gives his opinion on Ney’s conduct; Berton, p. 41, where Ney’s extraordinary letter to Fouché (Jones, pp. 385 et seq.) is examined.
778 Chesney, p. 217; Hamley, p. 198.
779 Kennedy, p. 174.
780 Müffling; Passages, p. 249.
781 Müffling; Passages, p. 250.
782 Chapter I, and Notes: Notes to Chapter IV.
783 Ante, pp. 64 et seq.
784 Ante, pp. 131, 132, 139.
785 Chapter VIII., and Notes.
786 Ante, pp. 184-186.
787 Ante, p. 181.
788 Ante, pp. 164 et seq.
789 Ante, p. 205.
790 Ante, pp. 197 et seq.
791 Ante, p. 209.
792 Chapter XV., note 1.
793 Ante, p. 211; pp. 249 et seq.
794 Ante, p. 255; pp. 286 et seq.
795 Ante, pp. 268 et seq.
796 Ante, pp. 311 et seq.; p. 330.
797 Ante, pp. 314, 330.
798 Ante, pp. 337, 338.
799 Ante, pp. 316 et seq.; pp. 331 et seq.
800 Ante, pp. 281 et seq.
801 Ante, pp. 259 et seq.
802 Ante, p. 328.
803 Ante, pp. 70 et seq.; p. 91.
804 Ante, pp. 87 et seq.
805 Ante, p. 94.
806 Ante, p. 89.
807 Chap. X.
808 Ante, p. 234.
809 Ante, pp. 238 et seq.
810 Chesney, p. 207; Kennedy, pp. 163, 164.
811 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 251.
812 The italics are ours.
813 Charras, vol. 1, p. 104, n. 1.
814 Doc. Inéd., XIII., p. 40; XIV., p. 24; App. C, xxv., xxvi; post, pp 383, 384.
815 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 204.
816 Corresp., vol. 31, p. 216; see, also, p. 212.
817 Thiers, vol. xx, p. 95, n.
818 Observations, Phila. ed. 1818, p. 13. In the Philadelphia edition of 1819, p. 12, and in the Paris edition, 1819, p. 13, the statement is made somewhat stronger by the insertion of the words “word for word.”
819 Obs., Phila. ed., 1818, pp. 26, 27; ed. 1819, pp. 24, 25; Paris ed., pp. 30, 31.
820 Doutes sur l’authenticité des Mémoires Historiques attribués à Napoléon. Par le Cte de Grouchy. Philadelphie; Avril, 1820.
821 Fragments Historiques: Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5, note.
822 Jomini, p. 149. Jomini’s Preface is dated in 1838.
823 Pascallet, p. 79.
824 Cf. Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 199, n.
825 Le Mal de Grouchy en 1815, pp. 26-28.
826 Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 50, 51.
827 Gérard: Dem. Obs., p. 15.
828 Charras, vol. 1, p. 244.
829 Siborne, vol. 1, p. 297.
830 La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 230.
831 Chesney, p. 153.
832 Quinet, p. 430.
833 Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 219.
834 Grouchy Mém., p. 58; see, also, p. 263, where the writer says that he has the original under his eyes. See, also, the same thing in the “Mal de Grouchy en 1815,” p. 37; and also p. 194, where Thiers is sharply taken to task for following the generally received version.
835 The capitals are ours.
836 Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 48, p. 131; ch. 50, p. 146.
837 Charras, vol. 2, p. 53.
838 Captain George Bowles (Guards).
839 The original instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey were lost with that officer’s papers. These memorandums of movements have been collected from the different officers to whom they were addressed.
840 The italics are ours.
841 The text cited is from the Supplementary Despatches; but it seems to us quite possible that the reading of this passage given in the Appendix to C. D. Yonge’s “Life of Wellington,”—London; Chapman & Hall, 1860,—is the correct one. It there reads as follows:—
“He was at Quatre Bras before twenty-four hours on the 16th,”—that is by 3 P.M., on the 16th,—which was the fact. There are other points where these versions differ, but this is the most important one. See ante, p. 90.
842 Clausewitz.
843 About 1 o’clock, at the Windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and Brie: so Hardinge told me.—J. G.
844 Cf. Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, n.; Gomm, p. 352; Waterloo Letters; Gomm, p. 23.
845 The italics are ours.
846 The 1st division did not arrive on the field until after 6 P.M. (ante, pp. 183, 184), and the cavalry, not at all.
847 That of Bachelu.
848 That of Foy.
849 A village on the Brussels turnpike half a mile north of Quatre Bras.
850 Those of Jerome and Girard. This shows that Ney expected that Girard’s division would be returned to him.
851 This mention of the 4th Corps, Gérard’s, must be an error.