Contents
Preface
Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day 12
Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras 19
But it was a better army than either that of Wellington or of Blücher 25
Napoleon more or less a sufferer; but on the whole possessed of good health and strength 30, 31
His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout confirm the view above given of his plan of campaign 45
The general order of movement issued on the evening of the 14th of June 45, 46
Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and 16th 48
At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 51
He expected Blücher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wellington 53
2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 et seq.
A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61
The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon 60
B. The question as regards the non-occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63
(1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61
(2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62
3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63
4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64
The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th 65
The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th
That no mention is made in the written orders of the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69
The nature of the understanding between them 70 et seq.
There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details 72
Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75
And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P.M. of the 15th 77
But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78
And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After Orders” which direct a general movement towards the east 79
The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 80
They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83
This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton’s division at Waterloo 83
It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M. of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. 182
But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher and the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition 85
Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 88
But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton 88
His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89
2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington and Blücher in the event of a French invasion 91
3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness in deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras 92
A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffe he could run no great risk in concentrating at Quatre Bras
If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny 95
C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition 95, 96
6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98
Because this decision of Wellington’s was based on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100
The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6 A.M. of the 16th 102
But the fact that they knew of the concentration of the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe fully justifies their course 103, 104
Comparison of the statements in the Letter with those in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey 107-108
Delbrück’s theory, that the Duke deliberately misrepresented the situation of his army, entirely unsupported 109, 110
2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he would have stayed at Quatre Bras,—quære 114
3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in the matter of the transmission of intelligence from the front 114-115
But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille, with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to remain in Gosselies 117
And to have filled their places at Gosselies with the divisions of the 1st Corps 118
He does nothing to bring up the 1st Corps till late in the forenoon 119
Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gosselies, with instructions to march to the front at once on receipt of orders from army headquarters
About 9 A.M. Reille receives word from Girard that the Prussians are massing at Fleurus 121
And at 10 A.M. he reads the Emperor’s letter to Ney, brought by Flahaut 121
The 1st and 2d Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry are all put at Ney’s disposal 123
3. The light his conduct on the 16th throws on his failure to seize Quatre Bras the day before 127
5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier order to seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX 128
Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130
The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney’s report of the state of his command had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M.
The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left 131, 132
Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal Blücher 134, 135
But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre Bras 137
1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the 16th not deserved 139
2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night 140
4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution on the part of Napoleon 140
5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies—Chesney and Clinton 141
CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY: BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT 143
Blücher’s decision to fight was arrived at before he heard from or saw Wellington 146
And was unwilling to change his decision when he found he could not count upon Bülow’s arrival 150
It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it had disposed of the Prussians for a time 161, 162
5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, considering that he could not absolutely rely on Ney’s coöperation 169
6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remain and take part in the battle 170
He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come upon the field for this purpose 170
He points out that Napoleon was more economical in the use of his troops than Blücher 171
8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the progress of the battle on the appearance of the strange corps (d’Erlon’s),—Quære 174-175
9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made use of the 6th Corps 175
He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as he was ordered to do 177
He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions of Bachelu, Foy and Piré 178
Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St. Amand 180
This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division had passed through Frasnes 181
It was probably the staff-officer who carried the 2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from the turnpike 182
If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is probable that Wellington would have been badly beaten 184, 185
If Ney had concentrated his whole command between 12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would probably have been evacuated 185, 186
In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist Napoleon 186
1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry 189
But his principal censure on Ney for not having got his command together and used it as a whole, is fully borne out 191
It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in any event, and therefore cannot be accepted 193
Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon recover from the defeat of Ligny 198
Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming that part of Wellington’s army which was at Quatre Bras 199
Of which the principal was that he had on the day before employed so large a part of his army in holding the Namur road
Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians 206
The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictates to Bertrand an order to Grouchy 209
He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to separate from the English or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of another battle
And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington 212, 213
1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz’s opinion 217
2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre 218
3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—e. g., on Clausewitz 218
4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light 219
7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur 223
8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities, when so much was at stake 224, 225
2. The story of the Duke’s ride to Wavre on the evening of the 17th 238-242
3. Napoleon’s criticism on the course of Wellington and Blücher after the battle of Ligny 243
Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him 247
Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his orders for the next day to move on Sart-à-Walhain at 6 and 8 A.M. 250
He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of M. Hollert, a notary 255
His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelled by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 264
This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur 273
But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that Blücher might have undertaken to join Wellington 274
In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move 275
Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct warning 276
It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army 277
But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off Blücher 278
It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his march 281
Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M. 283
6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’s effecting a crossing after he had arrived at La Baraque 284
His statements as to the Prussian force in the vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported 285
7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart-à-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 286
He was, however, at Walhain, at the Chateau Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the Notary of Nil St. Vincent 287, 288
Early in the morning he again goes to the front to see if the English are there 290
He does not seem to have drawn the very natural inference that Wellington was expecting Blücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act upon it
The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted 303, 304
Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge of the resistance to the Prussians 308
French batteries placed to the south of La Haye Sainte enfilade the English line west of the turnpike 310
The battle against the English not actively carried on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks 312
But the English line at this period becomes from various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description of it 312
What Napoleon might have accomplished against the English had he not been fighting the Prussians at this time 313
Wellington has made every effort to restore his line; its condition to the west of the pike 314
Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack to be made by the Imperial Guard 315
The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317
They are formed in columns of battalions and march in échelon, the right in advance 317
Premature attack of a body of French horse on the left of the Guard 317
The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses
Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337
5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339
6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance of Grouchy’s force marching from the Dyle 339
7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption of Zieten’s Corps 340
Appendix A
He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the orders which he gave 352
Appendix B
Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published in Philadelphia that he received on the 17th any written order 355
He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand order was among the major-general’s papers 356
Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 10 P.M., June 17, given in full 359
Appendix C
(At End of This Volume.)
The Theatre of War
A Partial List of Works Relating to the Campaign1
ALISON:
History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, LL. D. New Edition with Portraits. Vols. XIII and XIV. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, MDCCCL.
BATTY:
An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre-Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. By Captain Batty, of the First or Grenadier Guards. 2d Edition, Considerably Enlarged. London, 1820.
BAUDUS:
Études sur Napoléon. Par le lieutenant-colonel de Baudus, ancien aide-de-camp des Maréchaux Bessières et Soult. 2 Vols. Paris: Debécourt: 1841.
BERTON:
Précis, historique, militaire et critique, des batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo. Avec une Carte. Par le Maréchal-de-Camp Berton. Paris: Delaunay. 1818.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CAMPAIGN:
Prepared, with critical estimates, in October, 1875, by Justin Winsor, now Librarian of Harvard College, in Bulletin No. 35 of the Public Library of the City of Boston, of which Mr. Winsor was then Librarian. It includes a notice of Maps and Plans.
Colonel Chesney gives a list of works cited by himself just after the Table of Contents in his Waterloo Lectures.
Colonel Maurice in his book entitled “War,”—London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1891,—gives in the Appendix, pp. 128 et seq., a list of books relating to the campaign of Waterloo,—with comments and estimates.
BROWNE:
Wellington: or Public and Private Life of Arthur, first Duke of Wellington. By G. Lathom Browne. London, W. H. Allen & Co. 1888.
BULLOCK’S DIARY:
CAMPAGNE DE LA BELGIQUE:
Contenant
1. L’Ode sur la Bataille de Waterloo ou de Mont St. Jean:
2. Relation Belge sur la Bataille de Waterloo, et de la part qu’y a prise la troisième division militaire du Royaume des Pays Bas:
3. Relation Française, par un témoin oculaire:
5. Relation Anglaise, traduite sur le texte, publiée à Londres en Septembre dernier.
Bruxelles, 1816. (With a portrait of the Prince of Orange, and maps.)
CHARRAS:
Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Waterloo: Par le Lt-Colonel Charras. 5me Édition, revue et augmentée. Avec un Atlas nouveau. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. (No date.)
CHESNEY:
Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815. By Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E., late Professor of Military Art and History in the Staff College. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.
CHURCHILL’S LETTER:
Letter to his father written by Major Chatham Horace Churchill, of the 1st Foot Guards, Aide to General Lord Hill. (Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 2, 14, 92, and Appendix.) The letter was first printed in the Life of Sir William Napier, pp. 175 et seq. It was reprinted, with some omissions and some additions, in an English magazine called Atalanta, in November, 1887, where it erroneously said to have been “hitherto unpublished.” The writer’s name is not given. Mr. Dalton, the compiler of the Waterloo Roll Call, states in the Appendix (p. 235) that a copy of the letter is in his possession. It would be well worth while to republish it textually with notes.
CLAUSEWITZ:
Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz.
CLINTON:
The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington’s Campaigns in France and Belgium. With original maps and plans. By H. R. Clinton. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1878.
CORRESPONDANCE de Napoléon 1er, publiée par ordre de l’Empereur Napoléon III.
Tome XXVIII.
COTTON:
A Voice from Waterloo: a history of the battle, &c. By Sergeant-major Edward Cotton, late 7th Hussars.
CRAAN, W. B.:
DAMITZ:
Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Par le major de Damitz, officier prussien, d’après les documents du Général Grolman, Quartier-Maître-Général de l’armée prussienne en 1815.
D’AUVERGNE:
See La Tour d’Auvergne.
DAVOUT:
Histoire de la Vie Militaire, Politique, et Administrative du Maréchal Davout, Duc de Auerstaedt, Prince d’Eckmühl. D’après les documents officiels. Par L. J. Gabriel de Chenier. Paris: Gosse, Marchal & Cie: 1866.
DOCUMENTS INÉDITS:
DRAME DE WATERLOO:
Le Drame de Waterloo: Grande Restitution Historique. Avec un plan. 3me edition. Paris: Au Bureau de la Revue Spiritualiste. 1868.
DROUET:
Le Maréchal Drouet, Comte d’Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire, écrite par lui-même et dediée à ses amis. Publiée par sa famille. Avec portrait. Paris: Gustave Barba: Libraire Éditeur. 34 Rue Mazarine. 1844.
ELLESMERE:
Essays on History, Biography, Geography, Engineering, &c. Contributed to the Quarterly Review: By the late Earl of Ellesmere. London: John Murray. 1858.
FRAGMENTS HISTORIQUES:
See Grouchy.
FRASER: Letters written during the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns. By Sir A. S. Fraser. London: 1859.
FRASER:
Words on Wellington—the Duke-Waterloo—the Ball. By Sir Wm. Fraser, Baronet. London. John C. Nimmo: 1889.
GARDNER:
Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. A narrative of the campaign in Belgium in 1815. By Dorsey Gardner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1882.
GAWLER:
The Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo. By an Eyewitness. Dublin. Richard Milliken & Son: 104 Grafton Street. 1833.
GÉRARD:
1. Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, propres à éclairer la question portée devant le public par M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: Novembre, 1829. (With a Map.)
2. Dernières Observations sur les Opérations de l’aile droite de l’Armée Française à la Bataille de Waterloo, en réponse à M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: 1830. (With a Map.)
3. Lettre à MM. Germain Sarrut et B. Saint Edme, Rédacteurs de la Biographie des Hommes du Jour. Paris: 12 Mars, 1840.
GIRAUD:
The Campaigns of Paris in 1814 and 1815, etc. Translated from the French of P. F. F. J. Giraud by Edmund Boyce. 2d Edition, enlarged. London. 1816.
GNEISENAU:
Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau. Vierter Band. 1814, 1815. Von Hans Delbrück. Fortfetzung des Gleichnamigen Werkes von G. H. Pertz. Berlin. 1880.
GOMM:
Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G. C. B. From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815. Edited by Francis Culling Carr-Gomm. London: John Murray. 1881.
GORE:
An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo; intended to elucidate the topographical plan executed by W. B. Craän, J. U. D. Translated from the French, with explanatory notes, by Captain Arthur Gore, 30th Regiment of Foot. With Plates. London. Printed for Samuel Leigh. 1817.
Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze: ou Relation des Opérations Miliaires qui ont eu lieu en France et en Belgique, pendant les Cent Jours. Écrite à Sainte Hélène. Par le Général Gourgaud. Paris: 1818.
GOURGAUD (translation):
GRENADIER GUARDS:
The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards. By Lieut. Gen. Sir F. W. Hamilton, K. C. B. In three volumes. London: John Murray. 1874.
GROUCHY:
1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiée par le Général Gourgaud, et Réfutation de quelques unes des Assertions d’autres écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo. Par le Maréchal de Grouchy. Philadelphie. 1818.
3. The same title except that the author’s name is given as “le Comte de Grouchy.” Reprinted, with many omissions and changes, from the Philadelphia edition of 1819. Paris: Chez Chaumerot Jeune, Libraire, Palais Royal. 1819.3
4. Doutes sur l’Authenticité des Mémoires historiques attribués à Napoléon et première réfutation de quelques unes des assertions qu’ils renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy: Philadelphie: Avril, 1820.
5. Fragments Historiques relatifs à la Campagne de 1815 et à la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le Général Grouchy.
Lettre à Messieurs Méry et Barthélemy.
De l’influence que peuvent avoir sur l’opinion les documents publiés par M. le Comte Gérard.
7. Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815. Par le Général de Division Sénateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris. E. Dentu. 1864.
8. Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy. Par le Marquis de Grouchy, officier de l’état-major. vol. 4. Paris: E. Dentu. 1874.
GURWOOD:
The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Compiled from official and authentic documents, by Lieut.-Colonel Gurwood. Vol. XII. London: John Murray: 1838.
HAMLEY:
The Operations of War explained and illustrated. By Edward Bruce Hamley, Colonel in the Army, etc. Second Edition. William Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1869.
HILL:
The Life of Lord Hill, G. C. B. By the Rev. Edwin Sidney, A.M. Second edition. London: John Murray: 1845.
HISTOIRE DE L’EX-GARDE:
HOOPER:
Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of 1815. By George Hooper: author of “The Italian Campaigns of General Bonaparte.” With Map and Plans. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1862.
IMPERIAL GUARD:
See Histoire de l’Ex-Garde.
See St. Hilaire.
JOMINI (original):
Précis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815, pour servir de supplement et de rectification à la Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon racontée par lui-même. Par le Général J. Paris: 1839.
The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo. Translated from the French of General Baron de Jomini, by Capt. S. V. Benét, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. Second Edition. New York: D. Van Nostrand: 1862.
JONES:
The Battle of Waterloo, with those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, described by eye-witnesses, and by the series of official accounts published by authority. To which are added Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Wellington, F. M. Prince Blücher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., etc. Illustrated by Maps, Plans, and Views of the Field, and Thirty-four Etchings from Drawings. By George Jones, Esq., R. A. Eleventh Edition, enlarged and corrected. London: L. Booth: Duke Street. 1852.
KENNEDY:
Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By the late General Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, K. C. B., acting at the time of the battle on the Quarter-Master-General’s Staff of the Third Division of the Army. London: John Murray: 1865.
LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE:
Waterloo: Étude de la Campagne de 1815. Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Édouard de La Tour d’Auvergne. Avec Cartes et Plans. Paris: Henri Plon: 1870.
LEEKE:
The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (the 52d Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. By the Reverend William Leeke, M. A. 2 vols. London: Hatchard & Co. 1866.
LOBEN SELS:
See Van Loben Sels.
LOCKHART:
The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. Third edition. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1835.
See Grouchy.
MAURICE: ARTICLES ON WATERLOO:
By Col. J. F. Maurice, R. A. From the United Service Magazine. Vol. 123. In the years 1890 and 1891.
MÉMOIRES (original):
Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la bataille de Mont St. Jean. Paris: 1820.
MEMOIRS (translation):
Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815. Translated from the original Manuscript by B. E. O’Meara. London: Printed for Sir Richard Phillips & Co. 1820.
MERCER:
Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. Kept throughout the Campaign of 1815. By the late General Cavalié Mercer, commanding the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery. In 2 vols. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London. 1870.
MORRIS, O’CONNOR:
See O’Connor Morris.
MUDFORD:
An Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 1815 under his Grace the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Prince Blücher. By William Mudford. Illustrated. London. 1817.
MÜFFLING: PASSAGES:
Passages from my Life; together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814. By Baron von Müffling. Edited with notes by Col. Philip Yorke, F. R. S. Second Edition, revised. London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street. 1853.
Part II., beginning with page 197, contains an account of the Waterloo Campaign.
MÜFFLING: SKETCH:
A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo, to which are added the Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal Prince Blücher, and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo. By General Müffling. With Craän’s Map of the Field. Sixth Edition. Waterloo. H. Gérard, Publisher. 1870.
MUQUARDT:
Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Bruxelles. Libraire Militaire C. Muquardt: Merzbach and Falk, Éditeurs. 1887.
NAPIER:
Life of General Sir William Napier, K. C. B., Author of the “History of the Peninsular War.” Edited by H. O. Bruce, M. P. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1864.
NAPOLEON:
See Correspondance.
„ Mémoires.
„ Memoirs.
NAPOLÉON À WATERLOO:
Souvenirs Militaires. Napoléon à Waterloo, ou Précis rectifié de la Campagne de 1815. Avec des Documents nouveaux et des Piéces inédites. Par un ancien officier de la Garde Impériale, qui est resté près de Napoléon pendant toute la campagne. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1866.
NIEMAN’S DIARY:
The Journal of Henri Nieman of the 6th Prussian Black Hussars. From the English Historical Magazine for July, 1888.
O’CONNOR MORRIS:
Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815. By William O’Connor Morris. London: W. H. Allen & Co.: 1891.
OLDFIELD:
Letters on the Battle of Waterloo. MSS. By John Oldfield, Captain and Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers.
OLLECH:
Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen. Von Ollech, General der Infanterie. Berlin: 1876.
O’MEARA:
See Memoirs.
PAJOL:
Pajol, Général en Chef. Par le général de division Comte Pajol—son fils ainé. 3 vols. Paris. Firmin Didot Frères. 1874.
PASCALLET:
Notice Biographique sur M. le Maréchal Marquis de Grouchy, Pair de France, avec des Éclaircissements et des Détails historiques sur la Campagne de 1815 dans le midi de France, et sur la Bataille de Waterloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur and Rédacteur en chef de la Revue Générale, Biographique, Politique and Littéraire. 2e Edition. Paris. 1842.
QUINET:
RELATION BELGE:
See Campagne de la Belgique.
ROGNIAT:
Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoléon sur l’ouvrage intitulé “Considérations sur l’Art de la Guerre.” Paris. 1823.
SIBORNE:
History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. Containing minute Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo. By Capt. W. Siborne; Secretary and Adjutant of the Royal Military Asylum Constructor of the “Waterloo Model.” 2d Edition. 2 vols. London T. & W. Boone: 1844. With an Atlas of Maps and Plans.
STANHOPE:
Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831-1851. By Philip Henry, 5th Earl Stanhope. New York, Longmans, Greene & Co. 1886.
ST. HILAIRE:
Histoire, anecdotique, politique et militaire, de la Garde Impériale. Par Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire. Paris: Eugène Penaud. 1847.
SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES:
The Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. Edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K. G. Volume X. London: John Murray. 1863.
THIERS:
History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon. By M. A. Thiers. Vol. XX. London: Willis and Sotheran. 1861.
TREUENFELD:
Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance. Von v. Treuenfeld, Premier-Lieutenant im 2 Hessischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 82. Mit 11 Karten. Hanover, 1880. Helwing’sche Verlags-Buchhandlung: Schlägerstrasse 20.
VANDAMME:
Le Général Vandamme et sa Correspondance. Par A. Du Casse. 2 Vols. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1870.
VAN LOBEN SELS:
Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Par le major d’artillerie E. Van Löben Sels, aide-de-camp de S. A. R. le Prince Frédéric des Pays-Bas. Avec Plans. Traduit du Hollandais. La Haye: Chez les Heritiers Doorman: 1849.
VAUDONCOURT:
Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France. Par le Général Guillaume de Vaudoncourt. Tome Quatrième. Paris. 1826.
VAULABELLE:
WATERLOO LETTERS:
Waterloo Letters. A selection from original and hitherto unpublished letters bearing on the operations of the 16th, 17th and 18th June, 1815, by officers who served in the campaign. Edited, with explanatory notes, by Major General H. T. Siborne, late Colonel R. E. Illustrated with numerous Maps and Plans. London: Cassell & Co. Limited. 1891.
WATERLOO ROLL CALL:
The Waterloo Roll Call. By Charles Dalton, F. R. G. S. London. Wm. Clowes & Sons, Limited. 13 Charing Cross, S. W. 1890.
WELLINGTON:
See Gurwood, and, also, Supplementary Despatches.