The Art of Warfare
“The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art.”
—MARSHAL FOCH.
The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the alluring trap that Warfare is “merely a matter of common sense”; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the Subaltern Officer.
KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.—With regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare may be consulted. “The cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed” (General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). “Although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate” (Marshal Foch). “This war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances—and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor transport—have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working” (Marshal Haig).
The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. “The mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground” (General Sir E. B. Hamley). “A lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one’s flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash—it must present itself to the mind as perfectly obvious” (Marshal French). The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. “Generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect. It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand war. No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. In order to do even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well.... The right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed principles.... Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all” (Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon’s own maxim: “The only way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains.”
THE “COMMON-SENSE” FALLACY.—The fallacy that warfare is “merely a matter of common sense” has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865, when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have possessed “common sense” in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals’ plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this well-intentioned “common sense” would have been even more disastrous. “Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army” (Henderson, “Stonewall Jackson”).
In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack Lee’s Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.
THE “HIGHER RANKS” FALLACY.—The same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks. “Every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles” (“The Science of War”). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in “The Operations of War Explained,” points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader “knows his job,” and in every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements of Jackson’s forces in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 were almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of Jackson’s commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of Stonewall’s couriers approached him. “I was always expecting him to order me to assault the North Pole! But, if he had ordered, we should have done it!”
THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.—It is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature. But “the quick, the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise” (“The Science of War”). Theory, applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of Wellington, of Foch, and of many of the most famous generals of history. “A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon’s warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy’s communications his first objective; and if Wellington’s tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack.... The same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon or an army corps” (“The Science of War”).