Chapter IV — The Struggle Renewed Against the Crown
Parliament Under the Tudors
The English Parliament throughout the sixteenth century was but a servile instrument of the Crown. The great barons were dead. Henry VIII. put to death Sir Thomas More and all who questioned the royal absolutism. Elizabeth, equally despotic, had by good fortune the services of the first generation of professional statesmen that England produced. These statesmen—Burleigh, Sir Nicholas Bacon, Sir Walter Mildmay, Sir Thomas Smith, and Sir Francis Walsingham—all died in office. Burleigh was minister for forty years, Bacon and Mildmay for more than twenty, and Smith and Walsingham for eighteen years.48
Parliament was not only intimidated by Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, its membership was recruited by nominees of the Crown.49 And then it is also to be borne in mind that both Henry and Elizabeth made a point of getting Parliament to do their will. They governed through Parliament, and ruled triumphantly, for it is only in the later years of Elizabeth that any discontent is heard. The Stuarts, far less tyrannical, came to grief just because they never understood the importance of Parliament in the eyes of Englishmen in the middle ranks, and attempted to rule while ignoring the House of Commons.
Elizabeth scolded her Parliaments, and more than once called the Speaker of the House of Commons to account. The business of Tudor Parliaments was to decree the proposals of the Crown. “Liberty of speech was granted in respect of the aye or no, but not that everybody should speak what he listed.” Bacon declared, “the Queen hath both enlarging and restraining power; she may set at liberty things restrained by statute and may restrain things which be at liberty.”
Yet Elizabeth raised no objection to the theory that Parliament was the sovereign power, for her authority controlled Parliament; and so we have Sir Thomas Smith writing in 1589 that “the most high and absolute power of the realm of England consisteth in the Parliament.”
In his “Ecclesiastical Polity,” Book I. (1592-3), Hooker argues that “Laws human, of what kind soever are available by consent,” and that “laws they are not which public approbation hath not made so”; deciding explicitly that sovereignty rests ultimately in the people.