San Francisco Relief Survey

II | Methods of Distribution

1. Sources of Contributions

The complicated story of organization seems comparatively unimportant when one’s mind is full of questions as to what was to be distributed, and how many human beings were in need of immediate relief. That there was general, quick recognition of the need is shown by the quantities of supplies hurried to San Francisco. Five thousand cars were reported April 28 to be on the road. General C. A. Devol, who had charge of receiving and unloading all supplies, states, however:[41] “The stores that arrived for the relief of San Francisco up to July 20 amounted to 1,702 carloads and five steamship loads, a total of approximately 50,000 tons. At the height of the operations about 150 carloads were delivered into the city daily, in addition to stores arriving by steamers.” The chairman of the Finance Committee reported to Mr. Taft, president of the American National Red Cross, on November 28, 1906, that the estimate of total receipts in kind was 1,850 carloads of food supplies, and 150 carloads of bedding, tenting, clothing, and so forth.

[41] Devol, Major (now General) C. A.: The Army in the San Francisco Disaster. Journal United States Infantry Association, Vol. VI, No. 1. pp. 59-87 (July, 1907). Further quotation from this article will be found in Appendix I, p. 381, of this volume.

During the first two weeks after the disaster the Southern Pacific Railroad brought 1,099 carloads of relief supplies into the city. Under orders of its president, right of way was given to trains carrying these cargoes, and express time schedules were used for the sake of speed. These receipts were not all direct donations, as the contents of a number of carloads had been purchased by the Finance Committee and by the army from an appropriation of $2,500,000 made by Congress[42] to be distributed under the direction of the officers of the Pacific Division. There were also many donations that were sent to agencies other than the Citizens’ Committee, the Red Cross, and the army. These cannot be included in any estimate as there was no complete record of the amounts.

[42] See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910.

Transportation Routes about San Francisco

Larger map (200 kB)

It was found to be difficult to protect the mass of the rations in the railroad yards and in transit to the warehouse against seizure by ordinary thieves and by those who felt justified in disregarding the usual rights of property. Goods were stolen, in quantities that could not be reckoned, by those who expected to realize a profit as well as by those who considered that they had the right to seize what they felt was destined to meet their need. Some of these confiscated boxes were addressed not to the relief authorities but to specified persons and groups of persons in San Francisco or at other points about the bay. A further incentive to confiscate lay in the action of the police who, as was generally known, acting on the orders of the chief of police, had broken open about 100 grocery and provision stores that were doomed to be destroyed by fire. The police, after making a rough estimate of the value of the stock, distributed freely to the destitute.

When the cars reached San Francisco, along with the bulk of the shipments which were addressed either to the quartermaster of the army, who was designated to have charge of all supplies sent to the American National Red Cross, or to the Citizens’ Committee, were boxes addressed to the mayor, to the churches, to other organizations of all kinds, and to individuals. It would have interfered seriously with the work of relief if an effort had been made to find the persons to whom special boxes were directed. The American National Red Cross through its representative, in whose care many boxes with specific directions were sent, did all that was possible to carry out the intent of the donors, but it could not in every instance find the intended recipient. Many inquiries were received as to barrels and boxes which had not reached their destination, but the cost of tracing these and the cost of making special deliveries under the then existing conditions were often greater than the value of the packages themselves.

An illustration of the difficulty of delivering special packages is the story of eight cases of bread pans which were addressed to the “Relief Committee” and were quickly distributed among the refugees. When the manufacturing company that shipped the cases learned on inquiry of the bakers for whose use they were intended that they had not received them, it threatened to file a claim for loss. The trouble, however, lay in the fact that a letter of instruction addressed to the mayor got effectually separated from the boxes.

No complete record of cash contributions can be made. Some of the committees throughout the country expended part of their funds to purchase supplies to be forwarded to San Francisco or to relieve refugees at home, or failed to collect all the money reported to have been contributed. The money reported as subscribed in the state of California is far from representing the actual value of relief contributed. Being so near the scene of disaster the California communities wisely contributed supplies in large quantities for immediate use and also cared for large numbers of refugees who came to them. The official reports of contributions cannot therefore give credit to all communities for all the relief furnished by each, nor can they show the amounts contributed by the smaller cities when these forwarded their contributions through the larger city committees. Nor can a record of contributions sent to the American Red Cross be found in the published list of contributors to the committee in San Francisco.

TABLE 1.—CASH RECEIPTS OF THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF RELIEF AND RED CROSS FUNDS, AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE CORPORATION,[43] TO JUNE 1, 1909

Cash donations, including San Francisco subscriptions and Red Cross remittances		$8,921,452.86
Interest on deposits (in part at 3 per cent and in part at 2 per cent)		97,254.80
Exchange		1,140.65
Receipts from sales of commodities donated in whole or in part:
Sales of surplus flour	$216,717.15
Sales of foodstuffs	41,498.07
Sales of tents	14,826.55
Total		273,041.77
Total receipts from donations		$9,292,890.08
Receipts from sales of commodities purchased, loans repaid, instalments, etc.		380,167.86
Total cash receipts		$9,673,057.94

[43] The San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds, a Corporation. See Part I, p. 25 ff.

The total cash donations, $8,921,452.86, given in Table 1, do not include the $2,500,000 appropriated by Congress, which was disbursed in the first two months for food, clothing, bedding, shelter, etc., nor an estimate of the numerous independent funds which were probably expended within the first month, nor of the enormous quantity of supplies donated by the people of the country. These supplied the first needs of the destitute and enabled the Committee to save its cash for later and more permanent forms of relief.

TABLE 2.—CASH CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE RELIEF OF SAN FRANCISCO, TO JUNE 1, 1909, RECEIVED BY THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF RELIEF AND RED CROSS FUNDS, AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE CORPORATION, AND BY AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Country of origin	Received by Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross Funds and the Corporation	Received by the American National Red Cross	Total
San Francisco	$413,090.83	..	$413,090.83
About 2500 cities and towns of the United States	5,261,898.35	$2,967,079.90	8,228,978.25
Austria (Sec’t’y Amer. Embassy at Vienna)	..	50.00	50.00
Australia	385.96	..	385.96
Belgium	50.00	..	50.00
Canada	145,097.15	315.50	145,412.65
Cape Colony (Americans)	..	464.00	464.00
Ceylon	..	32.33	32.33
China	40,000.00	..	40,000.00
Cuba	5.00	729.30	734.30
England	6,522.58	48.30	6,570.88
France (Amer. Chamber of Commerce, Paris, $20,850)	20,850.00	385.08	21,235.08
Germany	50.00	..	50.00
Japan	98,960.10	146,000.00	244,960.10
Mexico	14,286.44	193.87	14,480.31
Russia	51.45	147.57	199.02
Scotland	..	50.40	50.40
United States of Colombia (Americans)	200.00	..	200.00
Total	$6,001,447.86	$3,115,496.25	$9,116,944.11

The donations mentioned in Table 2 do not include $100,000 given to the University of California Hospital by the Massachusetts Association for the Relief of California.

It appears from the figures of the two preceding tables that while on June 1, 1909, money to the amount of $9,116,944.11 had been contributed for the relief of San Francisco, $8,921,452.86 had been received by the Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross Funds and by the Corporation. This difference between the amount donated and the amount received by the local organizations to which the work of relief had been entrusted is explained by the fact that not all the money contributed through the American National Red Cross had been paid over to the Finance Committee or to the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds by June 1, 1909. The disposition made of the money contributed through the American National Red Cross is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3.—DISPOSITION OF CASH CONTRIBUTED FOR THE RELIEF OF SAN FRANCISCO THROUGH THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, TO JUNE 1, 1909[44]

Total donations made through the American National Red Cross		$3,115,496.25
Remitted to San Francisco to June 1, 1909	$2,920,005.00
Administration expenses, purchase of relief supplies, and transportation of refugees	47,073.35
Sent to Italy (for Messina earthquake sufferers, 1909)	50,000.00
Total disbursements to June 1, 1909		3,017,078.35
Balance available from donations, June 1, 1909		$98,417.90

[44] For detailed account of receipts and disbursements see Sixth Annual Report, American National Red Cross, 1910, pp. 60-152.

The statement shows that of the $3,115,496.25 donated through the American National Red Cross up to June 1, 1909, $2,920,005.00 had been remitted to San Francisco. The balance received but not remitted was therefore $195,491.25,[45] of which $97,073.35 was disbursed directly by the Red Cross. It will be seen that this balance equals the difference between the total amount donated for the relief of San Francisco and the amount of the cash donations received to June 1, 1909.

[45] Subsequent to June 1, 1909, the sum of $100,545.65 was forwarded to San Francisco, this sum comprising the $98,417.90 above mentioned, together with a portion of the accrued interest and a delayed contribution.

2. Distribution of Food

Food was of course the first necessity, and out of the need to supply it grew the whole machinery of relief. Before the noon of Thursday, April 19, the Citizens’ Committee had appointed a sub-committee on relief of the hungry, with Rabbi Voorsanger as chairman, to furnish food for the entire population, which for a time fell into a series of long bread lines. In these lines rich and poor, Italian, German, Swedish, Chinese, and native fared alike. The only question was one of need. From the mayor and the military officers down to the humblest families in the Potrero, there was a good-humored acquiescence in the hardships of the situation, and an optimism that was inspiring. Supplies in sufficient quantities were rushed to the city, and the danger of suffering from lack of food was averted.

The sub-committee began the distribution of food April 20. It at once called on the army to furnish an officer, two companies of infantry, and a troop of cavalry to guard rather than to distribute what supplies had become available. It took steps to get flour from points around the bay and studied the situation as to the bakeries, some of the largest of which had been burned or damaged. Repairs were being made to some of those damaged, and a daily output of 50,000 loaves of bread was shortly to be expected.

The ruling was made that after the committee on relief of the hungry had received the quantity of bread it needed, the bakers might sell the remainder at not more than 10 cents a loaf, in quantities of not more than five loaves to one person. The committee was furthermore authorized by the Citizens’ Committee to levy on all supplies wherever found. The following notes show the general trend of the work during the first week.

All classes joined the bread line

Soldiers gave aid and protection

Relieving the Hungry

On Friday, April 20, while the fire was still spreading, the general distribution was begun. About 25 wagons were impressed which were used in the distribution of the provisions seized by order of the committee. Refugees were standing in line at the Golden Gate Park Lodge; the Young Men’s Hebrew Association, Page and Stanyan Streets; St. Mary’s Cathedral, Van Ness Avenue and O’Farrell Street; at Jefferson and Columbia Squares, and at the corners of Fifth and Mission Streets and 24th and Douglas Streets, where food stations had already been established by the citizens. The committee made use of these for its own distribution, choosing the Young Men’s Hebrew Association as its base for general distribution.

The bakeries that day furnished 35,000 loaves of bread. The chief difficulty lay in transporting to the city the supplies that were available—5,000 tons of flour at Vallejo and many carloads of donated goods at Oakland.

On Saturday, April 21, the day the fire was brought under control, the city was reported to be divided into districts. Five bakeries were in operation and a committee from Fresno appeared before the Citizens’ Committee to announce that it had brought six carloads of supplies. Committees from some nearby communities put themselves under the direction of the Citizens’ Committee, but the general efficiency of the distribution was lowered by the fact that still other out of town committees undertook to make independent distributions.

On Sunday, April 22, arrangements had been made to have bread baked in the towns of the Santa Clara Valley. It was found necessary to carry into effect the committee ruling to prevent alleged exorbitant retail charges for bread.

On Monday, April 23, there was an abundance of supplies for present use and an over-supply of milk.

On Tuesday, April 24, there was a shortage of sugar and coffee. Sixty food stations had been established. No stores were found on investigation to be charging exorbitant prices for food, but some of the refugees were trying to get more than their share of food. Confusion was still being caused by the work of the independent relief committees.

When two days later the committee on relief of the hungry made its final report to the Finance Committee there had been established 128 stations and sub-stations, a warehouse in the Moulder School, Page and Gough Streets, and a branch warehouse at Spear and Howard Streets. It had had printed a card for the use of the applicant at the food station and had determined that rations, except in cases of emergency, should be issued to each person at intervals of three days. Every card carried a statement of the amount of food required by a person for a day, as follows:

Fresh beef, 1¹⁄₄ lbs. or bacon or ham, ³⁄₄ lb.

Salt fish, ³⁄₄ lb. [Probably as a substitute for meat and not in addition to it.]

Fresh or canned vegetables, 1 lb.

Flour, 18 oz., or bread, 22 oz.

Rice, ¹⁄₈ lb. or beans, ¹⁄₄ lb.

Sugar, ¹⁄₁₀ lb.

Coffee, ¹⁄₁₀ lb.

Special diet,—eggs, butter, milk, fruit,—was also issued.

This ration was more liberal than that adopted by the army.[46]

[46] See Appendix I, p. 379 ff. This General Orders No. 18, is an important document to be read in connection with any facts given about the army methods.

During the trial week the distribution of food was made to the refugees either from the stations or at the various camps or shelters. Though a fixed ration was agreed on there could be no certainty of delivery, as the quantity and variety of the food supply was indeterminate. The committee in making its report could give only an approximate estimate of the goods it had seized. It anticipated that claims would be made against it as well as against the United States army, the state militia, the police department, and the various volunteer organizations which had without authorization seized goods.

It arranged to pay the bakeries at a rate of 5 cents a loaf for the 255,630 loaves of bread which had been supplied by them to the committee, part of the payment to be made in flour, and to pay the Milk Dealers’ Association at a rate of not more than 20 cents a gallon for milk supplied by it. The committee had employed between three and four hundred men and as many trucks to transport supplies, but it did not know the extent of its obligation for the use of the latter.

During the first week after the disaster there was a growing inclination to turn to the army for the direction of the relief work. Though the army in common with every other body of persons had suffered serious losses, its efficiency as an organization could not be impaired even though the extent of the aid it could immediately give were lessened.

To the military reservations which lay outside the burned district refugees immediately fled in numbers, and on April 19, the day the committee on relief of the hungry began its work, Major Krauthoff issued from a depot established by him in the Presidio such food as could be spared from the Presidio itself and from Forts Mason and Miley. The great army warehouses, which had stored $2,000,000 worth of supplies, were burned, but along with the committee on relief of the hungry the army began to confiscate supplies for use on the reservations. It also purchased from the posts in the Departments of California and the Columbia 900,000 rations, the first shipment of which arrived on April 21. On that same day a steamer from Stockton put in at Fort Mason with donations of provisions and blankets. These were immediately distributed among 20,000 refugees.

The committee on relief of the hungry had not been given full authority nor had its powers been defined. It had no machinery adequate for the handling of a great bulk of supplies, and it was hindered by the crossing of efforts on the part of unauthorized agencies.

The Finance Committee, as has been said in Chapter I, was the committee of power, and might have assumed responsibility for perfecting an adequate relief organization, but as it realized that its efforts could not be as quickly effective as those of the army, it, as well as the mayor, called on the army to assume control of the relief work. General Greely consented and on April 29 took charge of the food issues and gradually put the work under the direction of 64 officers and 500 enlisted men.

Major C. A. Devol, depot quartermaster, who took over the tremendous task of unloading cars and boats and transporting supplies to and from warehouses,[47] quickly introduced order and economy into the work. Major C. R. Krauthoff, in charge of the commissary department, was also able soon to reduce to an efficient routine his work of receiving donated supplies, of purchasing, selling, and storing supplies, and of issuing properly balanced rations.

[47] See Appendix I, p. 383 ff. See also Part I, pp. 8 and 30.

In the report made in July, 1906, to the War Department, Colonel Febiger, who from April 29 had charge of the organization of relief stations, and later became chief of the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations, which had been established by the army to facilitate the relief work, said that on taking charge he had found, after a most thorough investigation, no instance of extreme suffering from lack of food or shelter, but many instances of repeating, so that the number of rations issued was in excess of the needs of the population. With no accepted general organization bringing about the co-ordinating of relief, there was of necessity an exaggerated estimate of the needy.

General Greely, who during his Arctic explorations had learned what extreme suffering from hunger and cold meant, had the city canvassed on May 13 in order to find any case of destitution which might have been overlooked. All of his inspectors, with 30 officers in addition to the officers directly connected with the relief work, were ordered to make a special effort to learn of persons in absolute need of food and decent clothing or of bed and shelter. The result was that but two such cases were reported.

During the early days orders were issued forbidding all householders to light fires in their houses. Cooking, in consequence, was done in the street over open fires or on rusty stoves which belched smoke out of short sections of pipe. In those days only candles were permitted for light and they had to be extinguished at 8 p.m.

Relief Stations and Registration

As stated in Chapter I,[48] the northern part of the city was, for purposes of policing, put under military control the third day after the disaster. Later, for purposes of relief, the city was divided into seven sections, whose boundaries were made coterminous with those of the army districts. On May 8, each section was supplied by the army with an officer who made regular reports to the headquarters of the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations, and with a physician who was responsible for sanitation and for diet prescriptions. Nine depots and sub-depots were open for storage of food supplies.

[48] See Part I, pp. 11-12.

Preparing meals in the street

A row of street kitchens

Fires in Houses were Prohibited

To give some idea of the character and origin of the relief stations a table of the relief stations of Civil Section VI is given:

TABLE 4.—CHARACTER OF LOCATION, ORIGIN, AND DATES OF OPENING AND CLOSING OF RELIEF STATIONS OF CIVIL SECTION VI

Station number	Character of location	Opened by	Date opened		Date closed
600	Planing Mill	Citizens of neighborhood	April 19		June 12	[49]
601	Saloon	Committee, Citizens of neighborhood	24		May 21
602	Church	Pastor of same	26	[49]	July 1
606	Butcher shop	Citizens of neighborhood	24		June 1	[49]
609	Police station	Committee, Citizens of neighborhood	25	[49]	(Unknown)
610	Shack	Mission Relief Committee	20		(Unknown)
611	City Park	Committee of citizens	22	[49]	June 2
613	(Unknown)	Committee, Citizens of neighborhood	22	[49]	May 15
616	Bakery	Citizens of neighborhood	23		June 23
618	Schoolhouse	Citizens of neighborhood	22	[49]	June 16
619	Barn	Volunteers	21	[49]	June 23
620	Hot Meal Kitchen	Los Angeles Relief Committee	(Unknown)		(Unknown)
622	Tent	U. S. Army	April 25	[49]	June 23
623	Maennerbund Hall	Local Order of Eagles	20	[49]	May 14
624	Public square	Citizens of neighborhood	20	[49]	June 14
626	Shack	Citizens of neighborhood	27	[49]	May 21	[49]
627	(Unknown)	Committee, Citizens of neighborhood	22		June 9
628	Hall	Committee, Citizens of neighborhood	20		June 9
629	Residence	Citizens	25	[49]	May 13
630	Schoolhouse	Physician and other citizens	22	[49]	May 31	[49]
631	(Unknown)	(Unknown)	(Unknown)		May 1
632	(Unknown)	(Unknown)	(Unknown)		June 16
634	(Unknown)	Citizens	April 23		May 12
635	(Unknown)	(Unknown)	(Unknown)		(Unknown)
636	Residence	Society of Native Daughters	April 26	[49]	May 26	[49]
637	(Unknown)	(Unknown)	(Unknown)		May 13
641	Cellar	Ancient Order of Hibernians	April 24	[49]	June 23	[49]
642	Residence	Two physicians	22	[49]	(Unknown)
643	City and County Hospital Grounds	U. S. Army	25	[49]	(Unknown)
645	Saloon	Ancient Order of Hibernians	25		June 20	[49]
646	Schoolhouse	Citizens of neighborhood	23		June 15
647	School	A physician	20		May 1	[49]

[49] Approximate.

There is no information to show that any one of these sub-stations had been established by the committee on relief of the hungry. As may be borne in mind, the number of stations in use on April 26 was reported by the committee on relief of the hungry to be 128; three days later, on taking charge, the army reported 177; early in May the number dropped, as is shown by Table 5, to 112.

TABLE 5.—RELIEF STATIONS IN THE SEVEN CIVIL SECTIONS ON MAY 3 AND ON JUNE 3, 1906

CIVIL SECTION		Food stations on May 3	Food stations on June 3	Hot meal kitchens on June 3
Num- ber	Headquarters
I	Presidio entrance	19	..	4
II	Oak St. near Stanyan	8	3	3
III	3055 Van Ness Ave.	5	4	3
IV	Hamilton School, Geary and Scott Sts.	35	10	4
V	Buena Vista School, 18th and York Sts.	9	3	4
VI	24th St. and Potrero Ave.	21	5	2
VII	25th and Guerrero Sts.	15	8	..
Total		112	33	20

Dr. Devine as representative of the American National Red Cross had appointed a civil chairman to be responsible for the receiving and investigation of applications. After May 1, the responsibility for the distribution of supplies was divided at each section between the military officer and the civil chairman. The civil chairman determined who should receive relief and the military officer made the necessary requisition on the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations.

The records of relief distribution are incomplete and there is no means of determining accurately from week to week the number of persons who received food, clothing, and other supplies, medical care and shelter. The most complete records[50] are furnished by the official camps. Colonel Febiger in his July report, already quoted, says that “313,145 persons were on May 2 estimated to be receiving rations, though this number should probably be reduced to 300,000 to make allowance for repeaters.” General Greely made estimate that the number of cases of fraudulent repeating was not more than 3 per cent of the whole.

[50] For report sheet forms see Appendix II, pp. 430 and 431.

TABLE 6.—DAILY ISSUES OF RATIONS FROM APRIL 19 TO MAY 12, 1906

Date		Number of persons (estimated)	Date		Number of persons (actual)
1906			1906
April	19	100,000	May	1	313,117
	20	150,000		2	313,117
	21	200,000		3	279,631
	22	225,000		4	230,207
	23	250,000		5	264,570
	24	270,000		6	262,027
	25	290,000		7	233,989
	26	306,000		8	223,915
	27	310,000		9	222,313
	28	315,000		10	204,637
	29	315,000		11	186,960
	30	315,000		12	147,232
Daily average		253,833	Daily average		240,143

Care has been taken to verify the estimate of the issues, which has called for some reduction of the totals as given in earlier reports. This accounts for the slight discrepancy between Colonel Febiger’s figure for May 2 and that given in the table.

The reason for the large increase in numbers in the bread line in the days immediately after the disaster is that householders had by then exhausted their private stock and could not make purchases, as most of the goods in retail stores had been confiscated; nor could food be prepared in private houses until chimneys had on inspection been found safe. From a week to two or three months, according to the location and the activity of the inspection, the fire prohibition held. In towns across the bay people with money in bank had difficulty in securing food because the banks were temporarily closed and the retail stores could not determine when they would be able to replenish their stock.

As the number in the bread line in the early part of May represented two-thirds of the population of a city that had been raised to a high degree of prosperity by the industry and thrift of its citizens, there would have been rapid decrease in the number of applicants for rations even had there been no concerted plan to reduce numbers. Pressure was brought from without, however, which, as is shown in the following paragraph, did accelerate the citizens’ return as a body to the normal means of making provision for creature needs.

In order that the smaller traders might be encouraged to resume business and the funds be reserved in a great measure to give permanent relief, the representatives of the army and the American National Red Cross co-operated during late April and early May in a strenuous effort to lessen the number supplied with rations. The attractiveness of the free food issues was diminished by reducing the ration items to meat, bread, and vegetables for all applicants in sound health except such as were living in the camps under military control. The number of the stations was rapidly reduced, as shown by Table 5. After the middle of May, except in cases of invalidism, rations were issued but three times a week, and an offer was made of a final issue of a month’s rations to any one who would accept that in place of the regular allowances. These measures served to concentrate in the permanent camps those refugees who were to continue as charges on the relief administration. The work of concentration was hindered, however, by the numerous private relief stations throughout the city which could be persuaded only gradually to send their patrons to the public relief stations. An Associated Charities worker who knew well the people in one large section of the city went through the tents with a soldier and demanded the return of extra bacon, canned goods, and potatoes, which had been laid in by thrifty refugees who had made use of both public and private food stations.

The Red Cross began within the first week of the disaster a general registration of the refugees. As substantially every one in the city was at that time dependent on the relief stations for food, the natural way of getting access to the refugees was through the distribution of rations. Carl C. Plehn, professor of finance in the University of California, whose experience as director of the census of the Philippine Islands suggested special fitness for the work, undertook to prepare a plan, organize the force, and superintend the work of a registration bureau. The force consisted of some 200 volunteers from among the public school teachers, an intelligent and capable, even though inexperienced, group of enumerators. Their regular employment stopped on April 18, but their salaries were paid to the end of the school year. Though the service given was very unequal and largely unsatisfactory, if judged by the standard of a census bureau or a charity organization society, it is doubtful whether at the time so high an average of efficiency could have been obtained in any other way.

On April 27 Professor Plehn submitted a tentative plan for the registration. By May 7 the cards[51] and instructions had been printed, a force of 175 persons was in the field, and the work was well under way. Ten days later 20,000 cards had been filled out and the canvass was practically completed as far as it could then be carried.

[51] See Appendix II, pp. 425 and 426.

After excluding duplicates as far as they could be detected, the 19,438 cards, which represented the same number of families or household parties, distributed the 84,703 persons included among the seven sections as follows:

TABLE 7.—FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS REGISTERED IN THE SEVEN CIVIL SECTIONS, MAY, 1906

Section	FAMILIES OR PARTIES REGISTERED		INDIVIDUALS REGISTERED
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
I	2,590	13.3	10,206	12.1
II	813	4.2	3,076	3.6
III	3,097	15.9	12,473	14.7
IV	2,577	13.3	10,737	12.7
V	2,220	11.4	8,384	9.9
VI	2,876	14.8	14,896	17.6
VII	5,265	27.1	24,931	29.4
Total	19,438	100.0	84,703	100.0

The 84,703 individuals were 28,319 men, 32,650 women, 22,795 children, and 939 persons who were entered under the heading, “Aged, etc.”[52]

[52] This classification was adopted for the purpose of determining the number of rations required by the family, and for that reason the dividing line between children and adults was placed at twelve years, the allowance for a child under twelve being placed at half the standard ration. “Men” and “Women” meant respectively the number of males and females twelve years of age and over, who were not aged and infirm. The heading, “Aged, etc.” (see card, Appendix II, p. 425), was an unfortunate one for statistical purposes, especially as on some of the cards it was printed “Ages, etc.” It was intended to be used, as the instructions to the enumerator clearly stated, for recording the “number of persons so old, sick, or crippled, as to be presumably unable to support themselves by labor.” This information would have had much practical value, but the cards show plainly that the ambiguity of the heading on the card was not corrected in the enumerators’ minds (as such ambiguity can rarely be corrected) by the careful explanation in the instructions. In many cases, when an entry was made under it, it was the ages of the children; in other cases it was apparently the number of adults in the party who were not immediate members of the family. The figures which have been tabulated are only of significance as recording so many additional adults. They do not indicate the proportion of aged and infirm, or the amount of physical disability among the refugees.

The information recorded on the registration cards varies in completeness and value on account of the great diversity in carefulness and capability among the persons who collected it. Many of the cards were filled out intelligently and conscientiously; many are wholly unsatisfactory. Taken together, however, they give a rough picture of that quarter or third, whichever it may have been, of the city’s population which was still, in the middle of May, dependent on the general distribution of food for its daily supplies; and they reflect to some extent the dislocations that were brought about by the disaster, in residence, occupation, and circumstances.

It was not the primary object of the registration to furnish material for a description of the refugees, but to establish a uniform system of food distribution which should prevent waste by cutting out repeaters, apportioning the number of rations to the size of the family, and cutting off persons as they reached a position where they no longer needed to be dependent. Other purposes were also in mind. At the beginning, in fact, the efforts seem to have been made to provide a record of the persons who received relief, for historical purposes and for aid in determining their future needs. It was also hoped that the registration could be made of practical value to the state labor commissioner, in the free employment bureau[53] which had been opened. In part for this last reason, information was asked about former occupation and former employer, union membership, and present employment.

[53] A free employment bureau at Hearst School in charge of State Labor Commissioner Stafford closed its office May 29, 1906, after four weeks’ work, during which time employment was found for over 1,100 men and 93 women. See 12th Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1905-06. For brief mention of the work of the employment bureau see Charities and the Commons, June 2, 1906, p. 304.

The bread line, Mission District

Relief station, Mission District

Distribution of Relief Supplies

The registration was made at the relief stations, the cards being filled out when applicants came for rations. If the applicant did not live within the boundaries of the section served by the station to which he had come he was referred to the proper station. When the applicant had been registered he was given a food card[54] bearing a serial number, good for ten days, which stated conspicuously, so that the attendants could see, even before he reached the counter, the number of rations to which his family was entitled, and showed uncanceled the dates on which the card would be honored. The food card number was entered on the registration card, which was kept at the relief station. Each time rations were drawn the date for which they were drawn was canceled on the card. After the registration had been completed at any station no rations were issued except on presentation of a food card.

[54] A reproduction of the card is shown in Appendix II, p. 427.

By this system abuses were controlled: no one could draw supplies from two or more stations, nor two or three times on the same day from the same station, nor for more persons than he represented; able-bodied men, for whom by this time there was abundant opportunity of employment, could be cut off; and at the expiration of the ten-day period the merits of the case could be reviewed before granting a renewal of the food card.

It was through its success in establishing a uniform and workable system of food distribution that the first registration was most valuable. It did not prove to be of much service in aiding applicants to find employment, in giving a record of the entire work of relief, or in furnishing a basis for the rehabilitation work. That it failed in realizing all that was hoped from it in these directions was due partly to changes in the labor situation, which soon made efforts to supply employment superfluous; partly to some ambiguity and lack of definiteness in the headings on the card, and the omission of some essential items; but chiefly to the many omissions on the part of the enumerators, the lack of uniformity in their interpretation of the headings on the card, and the large amount of carelessness they exhibited in recording the information that was secured. The inexperience of the enumerators in investigation, the immense difficulty of supervising them adequately when the automobile and the wagon were the only means of transportation between the far-scattered stations, and the necessity for getting the whole work done as speedily as possible, so that there was no time for correcting mistakes or training investigators, are the simple explanations of these defects.

If all the circumstances are taken into consideration—the number of persons affected by the disaster, the extent of the territory to be covered, the difficulty of getting about, the confusion which still existed among the many elements of the relief organization, and the inexperience in relief work of those who made the registration, both university professors and public school teachers—the results obtained were surprisingly satisfactory. The registration would have justified itself if it had done nothing more than systematize the food distribution and contribute toward the reduction of the bread lines. This it undoubtedly did.

An indication of the effectiveness of the first registration, as may be seen in Table 11,[55] is the sudden drop in the number of persons who received rations after May 12, a decrease of 21 per cent on that day against an average daily decrease for the five preceding days of slightly over 7 per cent. The marked drop of May 16 is, however, in part due to the stimulation to self-help caused by putting into effect the order that rations should be issued only three times a week. The general use of the food card was an important factor in bringing about the reduction; another, the rapid increase in the number of persons gaining self-support. One special use to which the so-called first registration was put was to determine who should receive special diet. The diet included meat, fresh milk, butter and eggs, vegetables, and fruit, and was prepared for the sick, the aged, and for mothers with infants. The method of its distribution varied in the different sections and from time to time, but the policy was to subject its distribution to more direct control from the central office than the ordinary rations. Issues of special diet were not finally discontinued until October 1, a few days before the closing of the last kitchen.

[55] See Part I, p. 53.

A second general registration[56] was made in June by the American National Red Cross staff of workers with the aid of the camp commanders. General Greely appreciated the need of having a more complete case record of the individuals who were making use of the camps, in order that a restriction of numbers might be judiciously and expeditiously made. The relief workers outside the camps, also, realized clearly the need of a more adequate registration as a basis for intelligent rehabilitation work.

[56] See Part II, p. 115. For registration card, see Appendix II, pp. 428 and 429.

Hot Meal Kitchens

The Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations, acting on the advice of the Finance Committee, opened its first kitchen in Lobos Square about the middle of May to serve hot meals both to refugees and to persons able to pay for their food. From immediately after the disaster kitchens had been established by voluntary relief committees as the best means of feeding the people living in or near the camps. One such committee, that of Los Angeles, sent equipment to furnish five kitchens, with a representative, Mr. Desmond, of the Desmond Construction Company, to put them in operation. They were intended freely to furnish food and they gave timely aid in the early days.

When the Bureau opened its own community kitchens,[57] the experiment was made as a distinctive part of the effort to reduce the long bread lines. The kitchens were intended to test the needs of those applying for free food, because the number of those willing to accept relief in food was expected to suffer diminution when a common eating room was offered. They were also to give a convenient eating place to persons able to pay but not able to provide their own food, with the privilege of sitting at separate tables and of ordering a better quality of food than that furnished at the free tables. They were also to serve to the aged and infirm better food than had been supplied to them before. The kitchen system was intended to be economical and sanitary. Sanitary inspection could be made more thorough when in each encampment there should be one general kitchen rather than scattered individual kitchens for the preparing of free rations. Insistence on the first article of the new experiment—the common eating room—made Section VII, in the part of the city known as the Mission, unwilling to open a kitchen. It successfully opposed the step because it was one that the Mission workers felt would degrade the people and tend to destroy the privacy of family life.

[57] For partial list of kitchens and dates of closing, see Sixth Annual Report of the American National Red Cross, 1910, p. 43.

It must be borne in mind that the kitchen system was introduced after the bread line had been reduced to less than one-half its greatest length, and that it threw into conspicuous relief those who were without power to re-establish themselves or unwilling to try to do so.

The hot meal kitchens caused no sudden drop in the amount of food distributed. On May 12 when, as has been already commented upon, there was a marked decrease in the number of persons receiving rations, there were but five kitchens in operation; but the new method did effectively help to weed out those who no longer needed free rations. Colonel Febiger wrote late in June that “by the operation of these hot food camps thousands of dollars were saved for future relief; probably 95 per cent of the 15,000 persons now being supported by food relief were absolutely in need of it, those not in need either having withdrawn or having been forced out.”

The kitchens were at first run exclusively by the Desmond Construction Company under contract with the Bureau of Consolidated Relief Stations; that company, which had already made its experiment, having been the only one willing to undertake what was considered by the contractors to be an undesirable job. When by June 21 the number of kitchens had been gradually increased to 27, two other contractors were operating under the Bureau.

The Bureau and the Red Cross provided police protection, furnished sites for the kitchens, and supplied fuel and water. Each contractor provided his own buildings or tents, equipment, and service. The contractor agreed to furnish a wholesome meal, and to submit his daily menu to the relief officials for approval.

An open air dining room

In Golden Gate Park

Hot Meal Kitchens

The following is a typical daily menu:

Breakfast

Hot Hash, or Hot Mush and Milk
Bread or Hot Biscuit
Coffee, and Sugar

Dinner

Hot Soup, or Roast Beef or Hash
One Vegetable, Bread
Coffee, and Sugar

Supper

Soup, or Irish Stew
Bread or Hot Biscuits
Tea, and Sugar

Meals were supplied to any person who was ready to pay cash or who possessed a meal ticket. The meal tickets were issued daily by the Red Cross and were redeemed by it by payment made to the contractor in cash or in kind from the relief supplies. The original plan was to serve ten-cent free meals with provision for granting an extra five-cent purchase to such persons as might be considered in need of extra food.

Certain kitchens within the Presidio reservation are not reported on later than July 11, when they were furnishing about 1,200 meals a day. One thousand meals a day would probably be a liberal estimate for the remainder of the time, thirty days, that these Presidio kitchens were to remain open, but such an estimate is not included in Table 8.

TABLE 8.—MEALS SERVED BY HOT MEAL KITCHENS, FROM MAY TO OCTOBER, 1906, INCLUSIVE

Month	MEALS SERVED			Amounts disbursed from Relief and Red Cross Funds in payment for meals
	Free	Paid
May	87,160	(Unknown)		(Unknown)
June	402,522	1,027	(all in 3 days)	$46,610.55
July	486,182	3,786	(all in 11 days)	75,756.30
August	377,776	4,608		61,379.75
September	109,448	684		17,746.80
October	11,875	..		2,953.14
Total	1,474,963	(Unknown)		(Unknown)

From the data on hand we can estimate the proportion of ten-cent meals at 12.1 per cent and fifteen-cent meals at 87.9 per cent.

The first report of meals paid for is for June 28. Those who patronized these restaurants paid from 10 to 20 cents for their meals, the average price being 15 cents. The extent to which this opportunity was utilized is shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9.—FREE AND PAID MEALS SERVED BY HOT MEAL KITCHENS ON SPECIFIED DATES IN 1906

Date	Free meals served	PAID MEALS SERVED
		Number	Per cent of free meals
June 28	16,666	617	3.7
July 1	14,087	423	3.0
August 1	15,202	191	1.3
September 1	7,484	82	1.1

The last paid meal was served on September 19, 1906. The last kitchen closed was that at Speedway Camp, where the final meal was served October 10, 1906.

Frequent complaints were made that the kitchens supplied food which lacked in quality and variety, was poorly cooked, and served on fly-infested tables in unsanitary rooms. In some instances the complaints were justified, but the army inspections were thorough, and the contractors on the whole lived up to the contracts. Some of the complaints were made not by those who were using the kitchens but by those who were critical of the kitchen system itself.

It is not possible to estimate the total value of the food distributed. For food and its distribution the Relief and Red Cross Funds expended $1,226,567.16. The army report gives $259,811.20 as expended for subsistence stores, but this is not a complete statement of the disbursements made by it from the appropriation from Congress. These sums do not include an estimate of the value of donations in kind that were used as such and not sold. General Greely in his report stated that in the food donations distributed by the army there were about 2,000,000 complete rations, which had to be increased by substitutions and by purchase to supply the 3,873,745 rations distributed by the army during May and June. Two commodities that had been donated in excess of need were flour and potatoes.

TABLE 10.—EXPENDITURES OF SAN FRANCISCO RELIEF AND RED CROSS FUNDS FOR PURCHASE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, TO MAY 29, 1909

Purchases of food
Groceries	$560,205.77
Meat	182,798.74
Bread	84,436.10
Milk, fresh	33,032.64
Fruits and Vegetables	25,029.01
Flour	21,848.14
Miscellaneous	8,029.43
Total		$915,379.83
Distribution of food
Stoves, hardware, kitchen utensils, dishes, fuel, etc.	$30,540.72
Labor of all kinds	39,968.72
Drayage, etc.	14,787.10
Total		85,296.54
Hot Meal Kitchens		204,446.54
Bureau of Special Relief		21,444.25
Grand total		$1,226,567.16

TABLE 11.—PERSONS TO WHOM RATIONS WERE ISSUED IN MAY AND JUNE, 1906

Date		Number of persons
1906
May	1	313,117
	2	313,117
	3	279,631
	4	230,207
	5	264,570
	6	262,027
	7	233,989
	8	223,915
	9	222,313
	10	204,637
	11	186,960
	12	147,232
	13	139,405
	14	126,970
	16	97,886
	18	91,812
	22	73,163
	24	62,239
	26	39,432
	29	54,883
	31	44,289
June	2	42,374
	5	39,084
	7	35,237
	9	34,268
	12	29,621
	14	22,753
	16	22,295
	19	16,608
	21	16,246
	23	15,451
	26	15,340
	28	15,339
	30	15,353

Among the persons who received rations, as indicated in the table and chart, are included both those to whom raw rations were issued and those who were served with free meals at the hot meal kitchens.

3. Distribution of Clothing

Of secondary urgency was the demand for clothing. The requests for clothing were fewer than those for food, though many refugees fled from the burned areas with no clothing except nightgowns or calico slips, a poor protection from the cold nights and chilly April mornings and evenings.

The records of distribution are incomplete. General Greely estimated the number of persons who received clothing at 200,000. Much of the clothing donated bore the wellknown mark of the charity gift in kind. The second hand clothing in many cases was, to repeat General Greely’s comment, “more or less of a burden on the Red Cross.” Some was useless; some required to be cleaned and disinfected. The new clothing was, in the words of Captain Bradley, who had charge of its distribution, “of old and dead stock of mediocre and poor quality.” Part of the shoes and articles of clothing supplied from the army stores and charged against the appropriation from Congress were of obsolete pattern. The same criticism was made of some of the household goods donated. A large number of the cots, for instance, were worthless or of poor quality. There was the further handicap to the distributor, of not knowing what donations were to be expected or when they were to be received. This uncertainty meant serious delays in supplying the need and severe criticism of the administrators, but the latter did not feel themselves justified in making purchases of clothing in large quantities when clothing similar to that ordered might, later, be received as a gift.

The memory is vivid to some of those who worked in the refugee camps during the midsummer of 1906, of the children in striped sweaters and gay Tam-o’-Shanters. The caps were not suitable for summer wear, but they had been sent in large quantity with the sweaters to be distributed. The mental picture of Golden Gate Park with its scattered barracks and tents pitched close to ornamental lakes and neglected flower beds is accentuated by the note of high color given by the sweaters and caps.

Distribution of clothing, like the distribution of food, was quickly undertaken by independent groups of volunteers, who collected and gave out what could be got in the city itself. While the fire was spreading the army from its stores in the Presidio gave blankets and quantities of shoes, shirts, ponchos, and other clothing for men. As the donations from abroad began to arrive in large quantities they were quickly handed out without careful discrimination in sorting or adapting to individual needs.

On May 4 the army, in consultation with Dr. Devine, took charge of the organization of the clothing and household distribution. The Crocker School on Page Street was taken for use as a warehouse. A warehouse for second hand clothing exclusively was established ten days later in the Everett Grammar School, on Sanchez Street. Neither was adapted for use as a department store, but nine departments were organized, each in charge of an experienced clerk:

1. Men’s clothing and hats.

2. Men’s furnishings and underwear.

3. Women’s furnishings and underwear.

4. Boots and shoes.

5. Children’s clothing and hats.

6. Children’s underwear.

7. Bedding and furniture.

8. Household goods.

9. Tentage.

From the departments went during May a daily average of twenty truckloads; during June, eighteen. Among the household goods that had to be handled were towels, sheets, pillows, pillow cases, blankets, comforters, mattresses, stoves, cooking utensils, cutlery, dishes, brooms, wash tubs, washboards, boilers, irons, clotheslines, axes, chairs, tables, and sewing machines.

The method of distribution was similar to that for food. Each civilian chairman made requisition for the articles that were found by the superintendents of the stations to be needed within his section, and each requisition was filled so far as the warehouse stock would admit. The articles were sent to the separate stations for distribution. The army had charge of reception and distribution of goods; the Red Cross, of determining who should be entitled to aid. The first registration was used as a basis for determining need, but there was no uniform system of record and various forms are found to have been in use,—an instance of the necessity for a general, accepted form of registration and record.

Soldiers guarding the supply wagons

Warehouse for Second Hand Clothing

It was planned to complete by the middle of July the general distribution of clothing and household goods by determining whether each refugee at that time had a decent supply which would prevent present suffering. After that date the Rehabilitation Committee was to consider further need of clothing and household goods in relation to general need of rehabilitation. The distribution did end practically on August 1, when those who had requisitions for articles that had not been furnished were given by the Rehabilitation Committee the cash value of the articles called for on their requisitions as far as approved by the civilian chairmen of their sections.

The later development of the methods of distributing clothing shows increased efficiency as greater experience was gained.

After August 15 the Bureau of Special Relief[58] had charge of filling orders for clothing for those living outside the camps whose needs were urgent but not great; the more important cases of need of clothing and household goods were cared for by the Rehabilitation Committee. From August 6 the residents of the camps were supplied with all necessary clothing through the Department of Camps and Warehouses, an arrangement which continued until the middle of October, after which issues of clothing were made by requisition through the department headquarters on the supply of clothing kept in Golden Gate Park. From December, 1906, the Department of Camps and Warehouses sent individual requisitions for clothing to the Bureau of Special Relief. Possibly these were such as it could not itself fill.

[58] See Bureau of Special Relief, Part II, p. 145 ff.

All issues of clothing were stopped on May 16, 1907, and the supply on hand was turned over to the Rehabilitation Committee, which distributed it among a number of institutions. It is probable, however, that for a long time only a very small quantity of clothing had been issued to meet the needs of the aged, infirm, and sick at Ingleside.[59] It is to be noted further that as early as August, 1906, issues were limited, and were made only to destitute persons whose circumstances could easily be investigated.

[59] See Part VI, The Residuum of Relief, p. 319 ff.

4. Furnishing Transportation

The rapid exodus of refugees from the city during the first week after the disaster meant a desirable lessening of the task of providing food, clothing, and shelter. The transportation work, which divides itself into four administrative periods, began the first day of the fire, when refugees were given free passage across the bay, down the peninsula, and to points far inland. No special arrangement was made. The transportation companies merely threw open their gates and let the people crowd into the boats and trains. The committee on transportation of refugees, a sub-committee of the Citizens’ Committee, had comparatively little work to do. It told the public that the railroads were ready to carry the people and it made inquiry as to the ability and willingness of other communities to care for refugees. From many communities, some distant, came quick, generous offers to care for definite numbers of people.

When the first period, the period of indiscriminate free transportation, ended on April 26, the Southern Pacific Railroad, the only railroad running out of the city and the one that in normal times carried the greater part of the suburban traffic by ferry and train to towns across the bay, had transported, according to an official report, the following number of free passengers:

TABLE 12.—PERSONS CARRIED FROM SAN FRANCISCO AS FREE PASSENGERS BY THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD, FROM APRIL 18 TO APRIL 26, 1906

Destination	Persons carried
Suburban points around the bay	226,000
Other points in California	67,000
Other states	7,684
Total	300,684

The value of this service, according to the official report, was $456,000. The report states that on April 19 the refugees, most of whom went to Oakland and adjoining communities, left San Francisco at the average rate of 70 per minute. There is no report from any other transportation company. The 226,000 passengers carried to points around the bay included some thousands of persons that crossed more than once, many to go back and forth daily on public or private business, others, a considerable number, to view the fire and ruins.

On April 25, a committee on transportation was organized informally by the officials of the various railroads and the men in charge of relief work, in order to prevent an abuse of free transportation. The new committee, which was recognized as authoritative by the Citizens’ Committee, had for chairman William Sproule of the Southern Pacific Railroad, for secretary and executive, Oscar K. Cushing. On April 26, a transportation bureau was opened in a small office on Fillmore Street near Franklin Hall. The secretary was given power to issue orders for passes and part-rate tickets, which because of his experience in railroad business and in social work he could be relied upon to do with discretion. Each applicant in the long file which day by day stretched down Fillmore Street and around the corner to Sutter, a perplexed, restless file of men, women, and children, eager to be out of the city, was interviewed personally by him to determine whether the applicant were able to pay any part of his fare, whether the best way to restore him to self-support was to grant him transportation, and whether he would be a charge upon the community to which he wished to go. When letters of recommendation or personal interviews failed to give the information desired, a quick investigation was made. If the applicant were able he paid something toward his ticket but never more than at the rate of half fare.

On May 10 the railroads stopped the issue of free and reduced rate tickets as a relief measure. This marked the end of the second short period of regulated free transportation work. A week later, on May 18, the transportation work was merged with that of the Bureau of Special Relief and Rehabilitation,[60] and when Mr. Cushing became executive head of the joint work no material change was made in the method of caring for transportation cases.

[60] See Part I, p. 14.

During the third period, beginning May 10, the period of united effort, the committee guaranteed to pay in certain cases reduced railroad rates, at first a half-fare rate, later a one-cent-a-mile rate. The railroads in their discretion gave in other cases free passage provided the committee made a brief statement of the circumstances of the applicant with a recommendation for free passage.

When the permanent Rehabilitation Committee was organized, July 2, 1906, the transportation bureau was again merged, which marked the beginning of the fourth period of its work, the period of completed organization. During the fourth and last period, which ended June 2, 1908, when the last transportation grant was paid, the transportation methods held unchanged with but occasional variation of rates and with a rapidly decreasing number of cases to be considered.

The relative importance of the transportation work to the other rehabilitation work, on the basis of the number of individuals concerned, steadily decreased from one-half in the first two weeks to about one-eighth in the middle of July.

Many a case was brought to the attention of the Committee by a distant relative or friend. For instance, a man wrote from a little town in Illinois as follows:

“Dear Kind Friend,—I have an aunt by the name of —— ——. You will do me a favor if you will send Mrs. —— to Chicago, Ill. I would send the money to pay fare but as I have not got it to spare I cannot do it. I hope you will be kind-hearted enough to send her to Chicago. Also arrange to get her meals on the train for her. You can call on her, Mayor Schmitz, at —— and have a talk with her. Please get my Aunt Clara to come back if you can do so.——If there is anything I can do for your City please let me know and I will try and help you folks at once. There are tears in My eyes as I think of the beautiful City you once had that is now in ashes. Reply at once.”

“Aunt Clara” could not be found.

An inquiry addressed to a man in whose behalf the Committee had been asked for help by a Chicago clergyman brought this terse and satisfactory reply:

“Dear Sir,—We are no longer in need of relief and we do not desire transportation to Chicago. I have so informed Rev. ——.”

Vague plans, or plans that did not commend themselves, led to refusal. There were, for instance, a man who thought he would like to try his fortune in Nome; a Syrian who had an idea he might get on better in Portland, Oregon, though he had no relatives there and no prospect of work; a Scotch Australian with a large family, known to the Associated Charities for years, who looked hopefully to Australia, though he had left it because he was a failure there; two girls, domestic servants, who wanted to go back to Ireland because they “were afraid of the shakes”; an old man whose only reason for returning to Europe was his desire to see his son ordained a priest; a widow, “saleslady” by occupation, who asked to be sent to Los Angeles on the strength of a letter from a friend, apparently a traveling man living in a hotel, whose mildly expressed concern for her welfare she took as a promise to provide a home. A stonemason wanted to leave his family without resources and try his fortune in Canada. A man whose family had been sent to Massachusetts in the early days to leave him free to get a start got tired of trying and wanted to join them. Another man merely wanted to go away on a visit, leaving his family behind. After the middle of June, requests that wife and children be sent away for a visit while the man stayed behind at work, were refused, though in the abnormal conditions of the earlier days they were frequently allowed. In a considerable number of cases, as of carpenters, shoemakers, domestic servants, and laundresses, transportation was refused because it was known that nowhere else in the country was the opportunity so good for work and good pay in those occupations.

In looking over the records one finds many reasons given for leaving San Francisco. Jewelers, inventors, masseurs, hair dressers, producers of “art work,” said they could find little demand for their services in the first few weeks after the fire. Acrobats, mental science lecturers, teachers of elocution, music, Hebrew, religion, and higher mathematics, could find no one to demand their teaching. Saloonkeepers and barmen had lost their shops through the closing of the saloons, and when they opened July 5, conditions would be hard because a higher license was to be asked. It seems like a jest of fate that at a time when thousands of people were living in tents a tent-sewer could find no occupation. It also seems curious that physicians and nurses should have wished to leave the city, but it is a fact that the demand for their services was decreased rather than increased by the disaster. Physicians suffered perhaps as much as any other class of persons, for they lost not only their offices, libraries, and instruments, but also a large proportion of their patients,—the profitable, well-to-do ones left town, and the poorer ones were stimulated by the out-of-door life, plain food, or by necessity, into unusual good health.[61] Bakers, grocers, and lodging-house keepers asked for transportation because, though there was a demand for their services, they had no capital with which to make a new start. Tailors, dressmakers, milliners, printers, and a number of others could not, or would not, wait for the demand which came for them a few weeks later. In the middle of May, for example, it was thought that ladies’ tailors could not expect to make a living for six months; early in June employers could not begin to get the number they wanted. In but few cases could lack of occupation be accepted as the sole justification for leaving the city. Carpenters and laborers who could not get work in San Francisco in June could hardly be expected to get it anywhere.

[61] In Part IV the chapters which discuss condition and status of families in camp cottages, and of those who took advantage of the bonus and loan plans, show that the handicap of ill health was heavy after the first few months.

Sickness was a reason for transporting some of the refugees. A man who had been hurt in the earthquake was sent to relatives as soon as he was able to leave the hospital. Another man, whose little store had been wrecked by the earthquake, he himself injured, and his wife and one child killed, was sent to his sister in Chicago, his other children having been provided for by a charitable organization. A woman suffering from cancer was taken to her sister in Brooklyn by a nurse who was also being assisted to reach her destination. It was not uncommon in the earlier days to find a woman so nervous that her physical condition was a menace to the prospects of her family. One such woman would not allow her husband to do any regular work; another was so irritable that desertion seemed imminent. In such a case as the last the only hope of saving the family seemed, paradoxically, to lie in temporary separation. More than one woman who begged to be sent away for a visit was told, “We are doing this, you understand, because we are sorry for your husband and want to give him a chance to get on his feet here; but please encourage him by writing every week.” The policy, in spite of these instances, was definitely laid down that families should be kept together.

There were numerous examples of that re-distributing of responsibility for dependents which takes place when losses come to families individually. An aunt or grandmother in Nevada or Missouri or New York would offer to take care of a little boy or a young girl, in order to relieve the family in San Francisco. An epileptic woman whose daughters had lost their work on account of the fire was given a home by a cousin in Massachusetts. This cousin, with unnecessary caution, wrote to the woman: “I will not let him (Dr. Devine) know you have any daughters—only that you are without a home and in poor health.” A woman had been visiting her married daughter in San Francisco, and the daughter, after the fire, could neither entertain her longer nor pay her fare home. Still another instance was that of a Roumanian, seventy-seven years old. He had had a home with his granddaughters for the previous two years, but they were burned out and his only refuge was the old home in Roumania. Unfavorable surroundings as a reason for granting transportation may be illustrated by the case of a young girl who had been living in a basement with twenty refugees, men and women. She was sent to her father in Ohio.

The willingness of relatives and friends to receive refugees determined the transporting of a large number of persons. The letters that found their way to the files of the Rehabilitation Committee as evidence that the would-be travelers would not be unprovided for at the end of their journeys form a unique body of testimony. They give a glimpse of those obscure wells of charity in which we all believe, on account of frequent individual instances, but into whose depths we are seldom allowed to look. The open-hearted offers of hospitality that went out from humble homes all over the country were, in fact, a contribution to the relief fund, though they found no place in the list of donations, the quality of their mercy being too subtle. They may be given recognition by a few quotations from many letters:

From Delancey Street, New York, to a Jewish tailor with a wife and six children:

My dear brother,—I have received your letter, also dispatch, and in spite of all my efforts I send you only ten dollars. I cannot send you more for the present. I advise you to come over as soon as you can with your family, on my responsibility, as there are plenty of work for you. Don’t spend the time with nothing but come as soon as you possible can.

From a woman in Council Bluffs, to her sister:

You must and had better come here. J—— can work at his trade here and you can stop with us until you can do better.

From a little California town:

My dear cousin,—I am awfully sorry to hear you and all the family lost everything. But let you and Jennie and all the family come right up and stop with us. You will want for nothing as we have plenty for all and as many more. Hoping you will come right away, ———.

From a Russian woman in Chicago:

Beloved sister,—You shall not think about anything but come to Chicago———. You shall not worry about anything. Everything will be provided for you when you arrive here. You shall also get work.

A mother in Michigan wrote to her daughters, who had been in domestic service:

Girls, for my part I wouldn’t have any desire of living side of the Pacific ocean any longer and you know we would feel better to have you back here with us.

Another Michigan letter, from the brother of a refugee:

I want you to come with all your family and share our home until you get all rested up and see what is best to be done. Old frozen Michigan ain’t the worst place after all.

A woman in Spokane who offered a home to a friend and her little girl wrote, with a naïve appreciation of her own generosity and of the happy combination of disposition and circumstances to which she was able to refer:

I write to extend my sympathy to you and you know I have a big heart and a large house and would be only too glad to have you come and stay with me as long as you want to and it would not cost you one cent.

A man in Nevada who had secured work for a former business associate, wrote to him:

Through the kindness of friends (and I may say myself), we have furnished you and wife with a home furnished complete, so if you can get means to come up you will be O. K., as your rent is paid for a couple of months.

There could be no doubt that the boy whose mother in Los Angeles had found work for him, and who wrote him as follows, would be looked after:

A Mrs. T—— to whom I appealed for you gave me as a loan on the sly five dollars for your fare down, which must be returned as soon as possible so please do not use it unless you fail to get a pass.

Some friends in southern California offered a home to three sisters, working girls:

If you can get passes, which no doubt you can by applying to Mayor Schmitz, as I have written to him, asking for you, come down and stay with us for as long as you wish. We have a house in our yard which we can fix up for you without any inconvenience to us. You can live there as long as we stay here.

The great majority of these people who were assisted to leave the city seem to have been those that could easily be spared from San Francisco during its period of reconstruction. They were, on the whole, lacking in physical vigor or in mental qualities of courage and initiative, or in attachment to their city. They did, however, give the impression that, under less exacting circumstances, they would have been able to get along creditably. It seemed fair to expect that in nearly all the cases the substitution of a more favorable environment would have results so satisfactory as to justify transportation as a rehabilitation measure, while the burden of dependence, whatever it might be, would be so distributed as not to bear heavily in any one place. The policy of those responsible for decisions was not to send to other cities persons that were likely to become dependent on charity. The transportation agreement of the charity organization societies of the largest cities was respected. The prompt answers to telegraphic inquiries given by all the eastern cities was a very important help. It was reassuring to find that the plan that was satisfactory in ordinary times proved indispensable in the emergency.

For the second period of the work of transportation, which seems to represent about the average, Table 13 is given.

TABLE 13.—DESTINATION OF PERSONS SENT FROM SAN FRANCISCO BY THE TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, FROM APRIL 26 TO MAY 10, 1906, INCLUSIVE[62]

Destination	PERSONS SENT TO DESTINATION SPECIFIED
	Men	Women	Children	Total
California	122	541	379	1,042
Oregon	28	103	40	171
Washington	20	85	57	162
Colorado	11	46	35	92
Nevada	2	40	11	53
Utah	9	26	11	46
Montana	5	13	13	31
Arizona	4	8	..	12
Idaho	2	3	3	8
Wyoming	..	3	..	3
New Mexico	..	1	..	1
East (including Europe)	188	553	322	1,063
Total	391	1,422	871	2,684

[62] Compare date with date given in heading of Table 12. “April 26” appears in official reports as included in each of the first two periods, and probably was actually so included.

These figures are based, not on a study of individual cases, but on lists and registers kept by the various committees in charge of transportation. Although they probably are not absolutely correct, they are sufficiently exact for the present purpose. The term Pacific States in the following table includes the tier of states from Montana to New Mexico; all east of them is called East. Alaska and British Columbia destinations are included in Pacific States, and eastern Canadian and European points are included in East. The number of persons sent to such points was very small.

The following table shows the number carried for all periods, exclusive of those carried to suburban points.

TABLE 14.—PERSONS SENT FROM SAN FRANCISCO, BY PERIOD AND BY GENERAL DESTINATION, APRIL 26, 1906, TO JUNE, 1908[63]

Period		Total number of persons sent	PERSONS SENT TO					Average number of persons sent per day
			Cali- fornia points	Other Pacific States	East (in- cluding Europe)	Other foreign points
1906
2d Apr. 26-May 10		2,684	1,042	579	1,063	..		179.0
3d May 11-Jun. 30		1,015	212	193	609	1		20.0
4th	July	365	97	70	193	5		11.8
	August	350	221	23	106	..		11.3
	September	90	32	3	55	..		3.0
	October	128	13	45	57	13	[64]	4.1
	November	77	10	2	13	52	[64]	2.6
	December	37	11	3	17	6		1.2
1907
	January	37	7	6	19	5		1.2
	February	31	6	7	18	..		1.0
	March	21	3	3	10	5		[65]
	April	22	9	3	10	..		[65]
	May	8	1	4	3	..		[65]
	June	3	..	1	2	..		[65]
	July	4	..	..	4	..		[65]
	December	2	..	..	2	..		[65]
1908
	June	2	..	..	2	..		[65]
Total		4,876	1,664	942	2,183	87

[63] Exact information relative to the number of persons sent from San Francisco during the first period, from April 18 to April 26, and their destination, is not available. The figures showing the number of and destination of persons given free transportation by the Southern Pacific Railroad are given in Table 12, p. 58.

[64] Sent to Porto Rico in October, 9; in November, 50.

[65] Fewer than 1 per day.

TABLE 15.—TERMS OF TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS SENT FROM SAN FRANCISCO IN SECOND AND THIRD PERIODS

Terms of transportation	PERSONS TRANSPORTED
	April 26 to May 10, inclusive		May 11 to June 30, inclusive
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Carried free by railroads	2,096	78	136	13
Low rate paid by Applicant	588	22	188	19
Committee	..	..	597	59
Applicant and Committee jointly	..	..	94	9
Total	2,684	100	1,015	100

TABLE 16.—DESTINATION OF PERSONS SENT FROM SAN FRANCISCO IN SECOND AND THIRD PERIODS

Destination	PERSONS SENT TO DESTINATIONS SPECIFIED
	April 26 to May 10, inclusive			May 11 to June 30, inclusive
	Number	Per cent		Number	Per cent
California points	1,042	38	.8	212	20	.9
Other Pacific Coast states	579	21	.6	193	19	.0
East	1,063	39	.6	609	60	.0
Various foreign points	..		..	1		.1
Total	2,684	100		1,015	100

TABLE 17.—VALUE AT REDUCED RATES OF TRANSPORTATION FURNISHED THROUGH THE COMMITTEE

Terms of transportation	VALUE OF TRANSPORTATION FURNISHED
	May 11 to June 30, 1906	July 1, 1906, to June 2, 1908	Total
Paid by applicant	$4,987.27	$585.47	$5,572.74
Paid by Committee	10,878.32	30,921.70	41,800.02
Estimate of contribution by railroads	42,369.40	5,015.70	47,385.10
Total	$58,234.99	$36,522.87	$94,757.86

5. Providing Shelter

In April in San Francisco, the weather being temperate and dry, shelter for the homeless may properly be considered an easy third in order of importance in the supplying of relief. The first night after the earthquake the people who had been driven from their homes by fire or by fear of another shock, sought rest in the public squares and parks, in vacant lots and in military reservations. Bedding was the necessity carried from their homes by many refugees who expected to return to them after the danger was past. Each family took possession of the first spot available. The more fortunate separated themselves from other families by means of trunks or boxes, or by a sheet or blanket thrown over a pole that rested on two stakes driven into the ground. As the hours passed a few real tents were secured, and shacks were made out of loose boards, tin cans, and sheet iron. Soon, tents from the army stores and from private sources were provided in increasing numbers and were set up with varying degrees of order.

Two hundred thousand persons came out from the burned district homeless, of whom possibly 75,000 left the city. These latter are included in the number of refugees that sought transportation, as shown in the preceding section. Shelter was found in some parts of the city for a large number through the hospitality of friends or strangers, through payment for lodging in cash or credit, or through the use of unoccupied houses. Two thousand persons found shelter in vacant houses through the efforts of the police. The capacity to house the needy was swelled by the use of basements, attics, and barns. The number of the homeless was increased to some extent by the general rise in rentals, which was great in certain parts of the city and which forced a small number of people into the ranks of applicants for shelter. During the first two weeks perhaps a thousand persons had no shelter but what they could find in the burned district amid the ruins or on wharves.

Tents were provided in the first days by voluntary agencies, by the sub-committee on housing the homeless, by the army, and by the American National Red Cross. The first named committee, which was one of those hastily appointed by the Citizens’ Committee immediately after the disaster, also built barracks. It set to work with great energy, but with complete independence of any other committee, especially of the Finance Committee and of the committees on relief of the hungry and on transportation, whose work it therefore overlapped. It appointed another sub-committee, on roofing the homeless, which canvassed the city for vacant houses and rooms and then induced but few persons to make use of its finds. It formulated plans for the construction of two permanent camps and made recommendations to the army to place all the homeless in Golden Gate Park, to which park it had as early as April 20, assisted by an army officer, hauled lumber for the building of barracks, for the flooring of tents, and for latrines.

An administration headquarters

Camp No. 6, The Speedway, showing barracks

Camps in Golden Gate Park

This committee was discharged from duty, on request of its chairman, two weeks after its appointment, but its members continued to incur unauthorized expense for at least four weeks longer. The committee made such a fine showing for speed that its work got ready recognition, speed in those first days being at a premium; but its lack of deliberation led to the embarrassment of the relief authorities. The barracks could not be connected with street sewers because they were situated on low ground, so later there was difficulty in disposing of waste and surface water. One of the camps, Camp 6, could not be given fire protection, and both camps had to have heavy additions made to the initial expenditures to secure greater privacy and protection against drafts. In them the refugees were brought into an association so close as to be either demoralizing or humiliating. Both camps would probably soon have been closed if the authorities had felt justified in abandoning them after the large expenditure made. The initial mistake was to erect barracks during the emergency period. Tents, which the army and the American National Red Cross stood ready to provide, were much more practical. They could be moved at small expense from place to place, and until the rainy season set in they furnished sufficient shelter. Tents, not barracks, were the need of the emergency period.

The two barracks built in Golden Gate Park by the committee on housing the homeless were No. 1, known later as Camp 5, near the Children’s Playground, and No. 2, known later as Camp 6, or the Speedway Camp. Camp 5 consisted of 18 buildings with 16 two-room apartments in each, separated by a partition only 8 feet high. The rooms were 10 feet square—a front room with a window and a door and a rear room with no window or outside door. Camp 6 was of the same type of construction and consisted of 10 barracks and separate buildings for hospital, laundry, and other general purposes. The barracks of Camp 5 were occupied from the first of May to the middle of December; those of Camp 6 from June 1 to the latter part of August of the following year.

As late as the end of May General Greely reported that he could not get sufficient data on which to base housing recommendations. The first registration had shown that a little over a fourth of the applicants to the food stations were living at the same address when they were registered as on April 17, the day before the earthquake. In a few cases these people were no doubt housed in tents or shacks on the site of their burned homes. But most of them had not lost their homes or personal effects, though they had been affected by the disaster in other ways. They had lost their work, or had suffered some injury in health from the shock, or, merely demoralized by the general confusion and the abundance of free provisions, had assumed a mental attitude of dependence not really justified. Most of this last class, to be sure, did not survive the registration, but there were no doubt some who were not weeded out until after the canvass had been made. Sixteen per cent more are known to have been living in houses at the time of the registration, but as their addresses on April 17 were not given, it is impossible to know whether or not they had been driven out of their homes by the disaster.

TABLE 18.—HOUSING OF REGISTERED FAMILIES, BY CIVIL SECTIONS, MAY, 1906. NUMBERS

Residence at time of registration	NUMBER OF FAMILIES HOUSED AS SPECIFIED IN CIVIL SECTIONS							Total
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Same as on April 17	856	225	572	1,105	197	424	1,955	5,334
Tent or shack	741	79	1,407	272	1,082	467	317	4,365
A house different from that of April 17	640	294	669	924	681	945	2,168	6,321
A house; uncertain whether the same as or different from that of April 17	336	191	329	257	215	999	804	3,131
Total whose addresses in May were given	2,573	789	2,977	2,558	2,175	2,835	5,244	19,151
Addresses in May not given	17	24	120	19	45	41	21	287
Total registration	2,590	813	3,097	2,577	2,220	2,876	5,265	19,438

TABLE 19.—HOUSING OF REGISTERED FAMILIES, BY CIVIL SECTIONS. PERCENTAGES, BASED ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FAMILIES WHOSE ADDRESSES IN MAY, 1906, WERE GIVEN

Residence at time of registration	PER CENT OF FAMILIES HOUSED AS SPECIFIED IN CIVIL SECTIONS							Total
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Same as on April 17	33.3	28.5	19.2	43.2	9.1	15.0	37.3	27.9
Tent or shack	28.8	10.0	47.3	10.6	49.7	16.5	6.1	22.8
A house different from that of April 17	24.9	37.3	22.5	36.1	31.3	33.3	41.3	33.0
A house; uncertain whether the same as or different from that of April 17	13.0	24.2	11.0	10.1	9.9	35.2	15.3	16.3
Total whose addresses in May were given	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Less than a fourth of the 19,438 registered[66] were living in tents or shacks. These 4,365 families or parties included some 19,000 individuals. As the population of the “official camps”[67] outside of Golden Gate Park (which was not included in the registration) was less than 8,500 at the time, and as it was wellknown that some of the people in the permanent camps were already providing their own food, it is evident that in the early days of May about one-half of the registered tent and shack dwellers were in the unofficial, unsupervised camps and isolated makeshifts for shelter which were one of the most difficult problems of the situation. The registration card did not ask what the character of the dwelling was, and for this reason, as has already been said, the proportion of persons in tents and shacks was no doubt understated, since the description given by the enumerator of the “permanent location” of the family may not always have suggested, when it should, a tent or a shack to the tabulator.

[66] See Table 7, p. 45.

[67] See Part I, p. 78 ff.

In May about a third of all were living in houses which were not their homes on April 17. These families, together with those who were living in tents and shacks, made up 55.8 per cent of the total. Considerably over half, therefore, of those who were receiving rations in the middle of May had presumably been burned out of their homes, or “shocked out,” as one of them put it. Many of those who had found house shelter were living under very unfavorable conditions. Overcrowding does not show on the registration card, and bad sanitary conditions can only be guessed at. In 206 cases it was stated that the “house” was a basement or rear building; occasionally it was a barn.

The seven civil sections[68] naturally present contrasts in the matter of housing conditions. In Section VII only 6 per cent of the refugees were living in tents or shacks, while in Sections III and V almost half of them were. Section VII shows the highest percentage of families in houses to which they had moved after the fire, and Section IV is not far behind. The facts which come out about Section IV at first seem curious. Although it included about half of the burned area, it had the highest percentage of families living in the same place as on April 17. The unburned part of Section IV at the time of the fire probably was more thickly populated than any equal area in the city, for in other sections there were great areas either not built upon or occupied by factories, etc. This was practically one solid residence section filled mostly with flats and populated by persons employed chiefly in adjacent parts of the burned district, who thus lost employment, if not property. Although it contained several permanent camps, only 10.6 per cent of those who were receiving rations were living in tents or shacks. It is probable that 43.2 per cent who were living “at the same address” included a number of Italians on Telegraph Hill who were already back on the same house lot, though in shelters improvised from tarpaulins, boards, sheets of tin, corrugated iron, and other possible, though unusual, building materials. Most of the Italians and others who lived about Telegraph Hill had taken refuge, however, in Section III, in which a part of the Italian quarter lay.

[68] For section boundaries, see map opposite p. 3.

Section V shows the condition that would be expected in both IV and V,—half the refugees in tents or shacks, only a small percentage at their former addresses, and the rest crowded into the housing accommodations nearest to their old homes. It would have been interesting to tabulate the distance between the two addresses, but this would have involved so much labor that it could not be undertaken.

The nationality of the head of the family was given in 14,963 cases, over three-fourths of all. Over two-fifths of these were native Americans; nearly one-half were Germans and Austrians, Irish, Italians, English and Scotch, and Scandinavians, of numerical importance in the order indicated; and the rest represented many different countries. The facts are shown in Table 20.

Shelters of sheets and quilts

Tents and shacks

Early Shelters in Jefferson Square

It is not possible to compare these figures closely with the nationality of the population of San Francisco as given in the United States Census of 1900, because the census figures are for individuals, while these are for families, the nationality of the family being inferred from the nationality of its head. In the census figures the native born children of a German or Irish father appear as born in the United States, while in the refugee figures such a family group appears as a unit among the foreign born. In this way it is evident that if the refugee figures could have been made up on the same basis of individuals instead of families, they would have shown a considerably higher proportion than they do of native born, and a correspondingly lower proportion of nearly all the foreign nationalities. Possibly the native born children of foreigners would raise the percentage of native born among the refugees to an even higher percentage than they had in the total population of the city. A few comparisons, however, it is safe to make. The Irish and Italians are represented much more strongly among the refugees than their proportions in the population would require; while on the other hand, a population of over 10,000 Chinese[69] was represented by only 20 families drawing rations. In Table 20 the nationalities are arranged in the order of their importance in the population of the city in 1900. Only the first three groups maintained the same relative position among the refugees.

[69] See Part I, p. 95.

TABLE 20.—NATIONALITY OF POPULATION OF SAN FRANCISCO IN 1900, COMPARED WITH NATIONALITY OF HEADS OF FAMILIES AMONG REFUGEES IN 1906

Country of birth	POPULATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, 1900— INDIVIDUALS OF EACH SPECIFIED NATIVITY		REFUGEES, 1906— HEADS OF FAMILIES OF EACH SPECIFIED NATIVITY
	Number	Per cent	Number		Per cent
United States	225,897	66.0	6,229		41.7
Germany and Austria	37,035	10.8	2,264		15.1
Ireland	15,963	4.7	2,140		14.3
England and Scotland	11,956	3.5	972		6.5
China	10,762	3.1	20		0.1
Sweden, Norway, Denmark	9,591	2.8	709		4.7
Italy	7,508	2.2	1,208		8.1
Canada	5,199	1.5	167		1.1
France	4,870	1.4	400		2.7
Switzerland	2,085	0.6	104		0.7
Japan	1,852	0.5	31		0.2
Russia	1,511	0.4	125		0.8
Mexico	1,459	0.4	75		0.5
Australia	1,096	0.3	24		0.2
Other countries	5,998	1.8	495		3.3
Total	342,782	100.0	14,963	[70]	100.0

[70] Total number of families for whom the nationality of the head of the family was given; in 4,475 cases this information was omitted.

TABLE 21.—NATIONALITY OF HEADS OF FAMILIES AMONG REFUGEES, BY CIVIL SECTIONS, MAY, 1906. NUMBERS

Country of birth	NUMBER OF HEADS OF FAMILIES OF EACH SPECIFIED NATIONALITY IN CIVIL SECTIONS							Total
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
United States	1,015	354	790	1,106	736	177	2,051	6,229
Germany, Austria	331	85	264	413	289	158	724	2,264
Ireland	234	80	228	249	432	169	748	2,140
Italy	66	14	698	59	90	114	167	1,208
England and Scotland	169	48	103	133	125	61	333	972
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark	78	39	88	51	108	113	232	709
France	95	11	79	46	27	31	111	400
Canada	24	9	12	31	10	6	75	167
Russia	11	10	7	28	29	6	34	125
Switzerland	18	2	28	9	11	8	28	104
Mexico	24	..	42	3	3	1	2	75
Japan	6	..	11	11	..	..	3	31
Australia	3	2	3	2	6	1	7	24
China	3	2	9	6	..	..	..	20
Other countries	57	15	142	105	46	56	74	495
Total	2,134	671	2,504	2,252	1,912	901	4,589	14,963
Unknown	456	142	593	325	308	1,975	676	4,475
Grand total	2,590	813	3,097	2,577	2,220	2,876	5,265	19,438

TABLE 22.—NATIONALITY OF HEADS OF FAMILIES AMONG REFUGEES, BY CIVIL SECTIONS, MAY, 1906. PERCENTAGES BASED ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH INFORMATION AS TO NATIVITY WAS AVAILABLE

Country of birth	PER CENT OF HEADS OF FAMILIES OF EACH SPECIFIED NATIONALITY IN CIVIL SECTIONS							Total
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
United States	47.5	52.7	31.6	49.1	38.6	19.6	44.6	41.6
Germany, Austria	15.5	12.7	10.5	18.3	15.1	17.5	15.8	15.1
Ireland	11.0	11.9	9.1	11.1	22.6	18.8	16.3	14.3
Italy	3.1	2.1	27.9	2.6	4.7	12.7	3.6	8.1
England, Scotland	7.9	7.2	4.1	5.9	6.5	6.8	7.3	6.5
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark	3.7	5.8	3.5	2.3	5.6	12.5	5.1	4.7
France	4.5	1.6	3.2	2.0	1.4	3.4	2.4	2.7
Other countries	6.8	6.0	10.1	8.7	5.5	8.7	4.9	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The distribution of nationalities varies somewhat in the different sections. Sections III and VI have a considerably smaller proportion of native born than the others. Italians are conspicuously prominent in Section III and Irish in Section V. Germans and Austrians are relatively most numerous in Sections IV and VI, and least numerous in Section III; the proportion of Italian families is less than 5 per cent in all sections except III and VI; the proportion of Irish varies from 9 per cent in Section III to 23 per cent in Section V. In Section VI the nationality of over two-thirds of the families was not given, and in Section II, as has been explained, the registration was not representative of the total body of refugees within its boundaries.

The number of persons registered as having been provided with shelter was but a part of the whole. The estimated number of persons who were living in shacks and barracks on June 1 was 40,000[71] according to the census taken by General Greely; 42,000 according to the Southern Pacific Railroad; 39,000 according to a computation made for this Relief Survey.[72] Of this last number, 34,000 were in tents, 5,000 in barracks and rough shacks. There was a slight increase in the camp population in late May and in June, due to the return of refugees from Oakland and other points, but apart from this accretion the camp population was subject to slight variation.

[71] It must be borne in mind that the figures taken from the first registration covered but a part of the camp and shack population.

[72] Computation made on the basis of the number of tents issued by the army, the proportion of tents obtained from other sources and in use at the end of June, and the average number of persons to the tent.

The first of June a San Franciscan wrote to Charities and the Commons[73] an account of conditions, which gives a picture of what life in the camps meant to some of the refugees:

“The courage and energy of the population of San Francisco in the face not only of disaster but of extreme terror and sudden homelessness has not been exaggerated, but to a great many the full effect of the strain is not even yet apparent. The discomforts of living, in spite of adequate relief, are very great. Wind and fog—for the weather has been unusually cold for a month, dust unspeakable, cooking out of doors in camps and streets, lack of water for toilet appliances, the incessant boiling of water and milk for fear of fever, absence of light and means of transportation for some time—in short, the total uprooting of all the ordinary habits of life, is bearing more and more heavily on the women and children. Schools are closed, thus turning thousands of children literally into the ruined streets. It is now proposed to have a vacation school in Golden Gate Park for the children in camps there, but this is only a very small part of the whole number.

“And for those who stay by the city much of this discomfort will go on for several months to come. That under such circumstances men and women become apathetic and lose pride and self-respect when they can no longer endure the strain of petty hardships, is not surprising. Archbishop Riordan, on his way to the scene of the disaster, is said to have predicted, as the worst effect of it, the deterioration of health and character which would be its inevitable result upon those who are not of the exceptional stuff of which heroes and pioneers are made.”

[73] Smith (Coolidge), Mary Roberts: Relief Work in its Social Bearings. Charities and the Commons, XVI: 311 (June 2, 1906).

The Official Camps

The army had control of some camps from the beginning and gradually assumed charge of others until 21[74] camps were under military discipline. These camps became known by the rather misleading title of “permanent camps.” The first to be brought under army control were four situated in the Presidio, three in Golden Gate Park, one in Harbor View, and one in Lobos Square.

[74] For complete list of official camps, dates of opening and closing, and maximum population, see Appendix I, p. 404.

During May the Franklin Square camp, those at Fort Mason, and at 19th and Minnesota Streets were taken over by the army. Early in June the camps in Jefferson Square, Lafayette Square, Mission Park, Duboce Park, Hamilton and Washington Squares were added, and in July, Alamo Square, Precita Park, and Columbia Park. Each camp was in charge of a camp commander, who according to the size of the camp, had on his staff clerks, foremen, laborers, and a nurse for the hospital department.[75] One or two of the larger camps had a camp carpenter. Plumbing and carpentry for the smaller camps were done by mechanics from headquarters.

[75] See Part I, pp. 90-91.

Tent camp, opened May 9, 1906

Cottages

Camp No. 9, Lobos Square

During July and August the tents in the permanent camps were floored. Buildings were put up in each camp containing latrines and wash and bath-houses with hot and cold running water.

The unofficial camps, whose moral and sanitary condition was very unsatisfactory, harbored a large number of refugees. As late as September 1, 1906, their estimated population was from 10,000 to 15,000. The Finance Committee had tried to have the campers move into the official camps, but had failed because the police department, which was the only authority that could eject, was unwilling to remove any large number of persons. The police, of course, reflected the attitude of the general public, which seems to have classed as official, though it was not recognized as such by the Finance Committee, a large independent camp, which was a private business venture, renting land to refugees on which they might erect their own tents. General Greely, as has been described,[76] had tried to induce removal to the official camps. The importance of having all camp life under military discipline can be readily appreciated when one considers how difficult under any auspices it would be to give sanitary and moral protection to a large body of persons living under abnormal conditions.

[76] See Part I, p. 44.

The three essentials for camp tenants laid down as rules by General Greely were decency, order, and cleanliness. The camp commanders tried to get rid of the disorderly element as far as they could without causing hardship to others. When a person was ejected from one camp all other camps were notified and he was not allowed to enter any of them.

The following statement of the number of ejectments from May, 1906, to January, 1908, shows that there was constant attention to this problem. The dashes which appear in the columns representing ejectments, opposite June, 1906, and February and March, 1907, indicate that no ejectments were reported for these months, though it is probable that ejectments which were not reported occurred in the months mentioned and in the months between January, 1908, and the close of the relief work.

TABLE 23.—EJECTMENTS FROM CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK, BY MONTHS

Month and year		Eject- ments
1906	May	18
	June	..
	July	5
	August	108
	September	75
	October	43
	November	60
	December	35
1907	January	15
	February	..
	March	..
	April	1
	May	26
	June	11
	July	27
	August	23
	September	10
	October	10
	November	5
	December	4
1908	January	12
Total ejectments for period		488

Reasons for ejectments, as stated by the camp commanders, and the number of ejectments for each reason or group of reasons, are shown in Table 24.

TABLE 24.—REASONS FOR EJECTMENTS FROM CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK

Reason for ejectment	Eject- ments
Drunkenness	148
Drunken and disorderly conduct	133
Disturbance of the peace and disorderly conduct	74
Immorality	14
Refusal to pay rent	12
Refusal to work in camp	10
Vagrancy	9
Assault	5
Stealing and burglary	4
Miscellaneous reasons	48
Reason not stated	31
Total	488

Where the first cottages were built, September, 1906

Camp No. 20, Hamilton Square

Table 25 shows the total population of the official camps for each month from May, 1906, to June, 1908, inclusive.

TABLE 25.—POPULATION OF OFFICIAL CAMPS, EXCLUSIVE OF INGLESIDE MODEL CAMP, FROM MAY, 1906, TO JUNE, 1908, INCLUSIVE
(The figure given for each month is the maximum daily total)

Month and year		Persons sheltered
1906	May	13,170
	June	17,274
	July	17,959
	August	18,356
	September	18,305
	October	15,558
	November	13,969
	December	14,245
1907	January	14,616
	February	15,149
	March	16,447
	April	17,223
	May	17,524
	June	17,592
	July	17,300
	August	15,785
	September	11,424
	October	8,916
	November	5,331
	December	3,367
1908	January	1,760
	February	1,700
	March	1,392
	April	1,321
	May	1,230
	June	948

Although the data available for determining the character of the camp population are incomplete, from the weekly reports of the camp commanders we can derive figures which probably represent a fair average of the conditions. It appears that from September to December, 1906, about 39 per cent of the persons sheltered were men, about 31 per cent women, and about 30 per cent children. Approximately 55 per cent of the members of the camp population were at work. The proportion of persons who were at work was about 89 per cent among the men, about 39 per cent among the women, and about 25 per cent among the children.

The large percentage of men who were working is worthy of notice. There were numerous complaints during the existence of the camps that these were harboring a large number of idle, shiftless men. Those who offered such criticisms failed to take into account that there is even in normal times a considerable percentage of unemployed men who spend much of their time in public places. A part of the apparently well and able-bodied were in reality incapable of much work, and others though apparently unemployed were night workers. When the haunts of the idle were covered with ashes, it is hardly strange that they should have been found in numbers in the public parks and squares.

In Chapter 1 the story has been told of the need felt for making some permanent provision for the refugees before the oncoming of the rainy season. The Corporation, after making a careful study of the situation in the camps, decided to adopt a separate cottage plan for temporary as well as for permanent housing, except in one locality, South Park, whose limited area gave no space for separate cottages.

On August 1, 1906, the care of the camps passed from the army to the Department of Camps and Warehouses.[77] From then until June 30, 1908, when the last camp was closed, that department had entire charge of maintenance. The Department of Lands and Buildings was responsible for the construction of the cottages built to replace the tents. The first of August, 1906, the Corporation made public its plan to build cottages[78] and let the contracts for the erection of buildings. Building began September 10, and on the sixteenth 20 cottages in Hamilton Square were completed. At least two or three months, however, intervened before any considerable number of houses could be made ready for the refugees. Before completing its work the Department of Lands and Buildings had installed in the public squares for use in connection with the 5,610 cottages which it had built, 667 patent flush closets, 247 hoppers, over six miles of gas and water pipe and over five miles of sewer pipe; also the necessary fittings, which included 325 galvanized sinks, with faucets and traps, and 624 gas brackets.[79]

[77] See Part I, p. 26.

[78] See Part IV, p. 217.

[79] See Part IV, p. 221.

Thus for the period of approximately six months those who had no resources to build found house room as best they might. Many difficulties were met by those who controlled the funds. Building had had to be delayed because of the extraordinary amount of work involved in supplying food, clothing, water, sanitary protection, and temporary shelter. The pressure on the relief machinery seemed to tax its utmost capacity. When it was necessary to push rebuilding plans, additional machinery and more workers had to be provided.

In the official camps the refugees had in large measure been supplied with tents free of charge. As the time came for the removal of tents and temporary shacks and the substitution of wooden buildings, the question was raised, who would be entitled to their use, and on what terms? Cottages were assigned by the camp commanders, first, to those in the official camps; second, to those in shacks and tents outside; third, to those still in the city who were living in cellars and similar places, including those who were receiving shelter from friends, and those who were citizens but were living outside the city. Some who had not been burned out, but needed to be better housed, received cottages and moved them for permanent use to lots which they owned or leased.

For seven months the people had been furnished with tents free of charge, but when the change was made to the wooden cottages, it was thought best to charge a nominal rental.[80] The argument was that to give everything and ask nothing in return, on the one hand killed the self-respect of the efficient class and on the other gave opportunity to the idle to shirk all civic and social responsibility; that the no-rent policy had brought about serious economic disturbances, and its continuance would prepare the way for yet more serious trouble.

[80] See Part IV, p. 222, for explanation of miscarriage of plan.

Finally, it was foreseen that the abnormal real estate conditions which had made it possible for the homeless to secure shelter, would not be relieved until those living in camp cottages should seek and be able to secure quarters elsewhere. Accordingly, it was definitely decided that as fast as buildings were made available in the camps, they should be leased to refugees by camp commanders at nominal rates. A special form of lease was provided which, theoretically, each applicant was compelled to sign before occupying a cottage.

The San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds, a corporation, was the lessor; and the refugee, the lessee. The lease was in effect a contract of purchase, for it provided that the tenant should become the owner of the cottage if he paid his rent to August 1, 1907. In general the applicant agreed to pay a specified rent and gas rate per month, to comply with all rules and regulations of the camp department and the camp commanders. He agreed not to assign his lease to another nor sublet without written consent. He agreed furthermore to vacate the house at the expiration of his lease unless through full payment of all rents and charges he had acquired ownership. In that event he agreed to remove the house from the camp at his own expense before August, 1907. Failure to remove meant to forfeit ownership. When on account of ill-health or other disability a person was not able to pay rent, the camp commander notified the Rehabilitation Committee.

The shelter furnished by the army and the Finance Committee was with few exceptions on public land. When the Corporation was ready to build cottages it asked the park commission for permission to use certain parks and squares. The commission having no power to give the authority agreed, on August 17, 1906, to ignore the occupation of parks and squares, on the understanding that such use was for a period of not more than one year; the cottages were then to be removed as rapidly as possible.

The parks and squares were the most suitable places in which to give temporary shelter. The damage and loss to the city from their use were insignificant, and in the camps policing and sanitation were supplied. There would have been rivalry among owners of land to secure the camps, and consequent charges of favoritism, graft, etc. The parks and squares were well situated with reference to the centers of industry and the building operations. Throughout the work the park commissioners co-operated with the Relief Corporation and rendered valuable assistance. To have followed the suggestion of the committee on housing the homeless to establish but one encampment, would have been very unwise. In the summer following the disaster many persons were hindered from becoming self-supporting because of their remoteness in Golden Gate Park from centers of work.

The camp in South Park, already spoken of as unique in character, consisted of nineteen two-story tenement buildings and a one-story bath-house and laundry building. Some of the buildings were divided into 16 suites of two rooms each and the others into 12 tenements of two rooms each. The total number of rooms was 656. The maximum population was 648. They had adequate fire protection and the occupants were required to take part regularly in a fire drill. There was steady demand for the rooms, by reason of the nearness of the camp to the shipping and manufacturing districts. The tenements were full almost all the time.

Where two-story tenements were built

Camp No. 28, South Park

Removal from the Camps

The terms of the contract signed by applicants fixed, in large measure, the conditions under which cottages could be removed from the camps and become the permanent property of their owners.[81] Whenever a person proved to the Department that he had purchased or leased a lot in the city and county of San Francisco, he was permitted at his own expense to move his house.

[81] See Part IV, pp. 222 and 232.

In June, 1907, the park commissioners requested the Relief Corporation to clear the public squares of cottages by August 17. Clearing the squares and parks of these cottages proved to be a difficult task, for many occupants sought delay on the ground of being unable to secure other quarters. In a few cases the persons had either to be evicted or to have the houses pulled down over their heads. On account of the poverty of many occupants, and in order to secure better sanitary supervision while the fear of bubonic plague lasted, the camp at Lobos Square was retained after the others had been abandoned. It was used by the poorest of the refugees from other camps, as well as by its own unusual number of dependents. This camp was not entirely abandoned till June 30, 1908.[82]

[82] For population of the camp April, 1908, see Part I, p. 29.

Cottages to the number of 5,343 were removed from the camps, all but a few to be used as dwellings. Real estate firms which applied to purchase cottages to establish them in groups on their own lots were refused by the Department on the ground that any such arrangement would tend to perpetuate camp life; lacking superintendence and control, such camp life would be worse than that which then existed. Despite the action of the Department, however, large vacant lots were sub-divided and rented to individual owners of cottages.[83] Seventy-four of the cottages were given to philanthropic agencies and were installed by them in various parts of the city for use as club rooms or for similar purposes.

[83] See Two Cottage Settlements, Part IV, p. 234 ff.

The work of the Associated Charities in moving and repairing cottages deserves special mention. The Corporation arranged with the Associated Charities to move from the camps the cottages belonging to widows with children and to families having incapacitated breadwinners. The moving of cottages, which began in July, 1907, was not ended until the latter part of June, 1908.[84] The amount of work accomplished at a cost comparatively small shows excellent business management. The greater part of the work of moving, installing, and repairing the cottages was done by unemployed carpenters, plumbers, and laborers. “Considering the number of cottages moved and made habitable, we have had very few complaints as to the workmanship,” is noted in a report of the Associated Charities,—a comment that could not be made in connection with many houses erected by the regular contractors.

[84] The total number of cottages moved or repaired by the Associated Charities was 703, at an expenditure of $55,963.50 or an average of $79.61 per cottage. The appropriation for this work allowed for a maximum expenditure of $150 per cottage.

The efforts being made by families permanently to own homes are shown by the following figures: The number of cottagers buying lots was 208; paying ground rent, 447; owning own property, 30; given one month’s rent to move from camp but present condition unknown, 18. Total, 703.

Under the supervision of the Associated Charities the 208 families buying lots bid fair, according to reports given in 1908, to own them in the immediate future. It is doubtless true that but for the direction of the society these families never would have seriously considered owning a house and lot.

From August 1, 1906, to June 30, 1908, there is accurate information from which to determine the cost of the camps. During this period 7,171,522 days’ shelter was furnished at a cost of $884,558.81 for construction of cottages and of $453,000.04 for maintenance, a total of $1,337,558.85, a daily per capita cost of 18.7 cents. The daily per capita cost of maintenance was 6 cents. No allowance is here made for the value of the tents in use from August 1 till they were replaced by the cottages, but their value is more than offset by that of the cottages when they were vacated.[85]

[85] For total expenditures of all departments for housing, see Table 64, p. 220.

For the whole period of the relief work, the cost of the camps was as follows:

TABLE 26.—COST OF CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK

Value of shelter furnished by the army as reported by General Greely	$421,195.08
Paid by Finance Committee for shelter up to August 1, 1906	187,056.56
Paid for sanitation of camps and city up to August 1, 1906	155,473.60
Cost of building camp cottages and tenements after August 1, 1906	884,558.81
Paid by Department of Camps and Warehouses, for maintenance after August 1, 1906	453,000.04
Total	$2,101,284.09

In addition to the shelter furnished at Ingleside and the Relief Home, an estimate of 11,000,000[86] days of shelter for the entire relief period may be given, a figure that is probably too small. From it we get an average daily per capita cost of 19.1 cents.

[86] Estimated number of days of shelter from April 18, 1906, to August 1, 1906, 3,828,478.

The apparently greater cost of shelter for the early period is due possibly to too low an estimate of the number of days’ shelter furnished outside of official camps. It must be kept in mind that the disbursements given above include all disbursements for sanitation and for medical care in the camps, and also that the residents of the camps included a large proportion of aged, infirm, and dependent persons. The actual cost would be reduced if it were possible to deduct the value of the tents and cottages at the time they ceased to be used.

What is astounding in this story of giving shelter to a great displaced city population of 250,000[87] souls is not the number of days that shelter had to be provided or the sum total of cost. The astounding fact is that when Camp Lobos, the last stamping ground of the residuum,[88] was closed to refugees on June 30, 1908, the number of persons that had to be cared for by the Associated Charities and the Relief Home was so small. In June, 1906, 40,000 persons were living at the expense of the relief funds in camps and shacks; two years later, leaving out of consideration those who had been given shelter at Ingleside, only 703 had to be aided by charitable agency to obtain permanent shelter.

[87] 200,000 is the number given for persons burned out of house and home. The difference is accounted for by the number made homeless because of loss of income and because of the homes made temporarily uninhabitable by the earthquake.

[88] See Part VI, p. 357, and Part V, p. 305 ff., for number that had to be taken care of permanently. The small number who left the almshouse to seek shelter in the camps is also noted in Part VI.

This section may well be closed by a brief and necessarily inadequate statement of the social work undertaken in connection with the camp life. Four important settlements were swept to ashes by the fire,—the South Park Settlement, a pioneer work in San Francisco, the Telegraph Hill Neighborhood Association, the Nurses’ Settlement, and the Columbia Park Boys’ Club. The residents of each showed, as did the Associated Charities, their power of readjusting their work to meet the new demands for service. They transferred their activity to the camps where they, as well as groups of other volunteers, tried to improve social conditions.

Various organizations of women co-operated also to help carry on the work of the sewing center at the Hearst Grammar School, which was established the middle of May by the representative of the American National Red Cross, in connection with its employment bureau. Here volunteers met and distributed garments and taught women and girls to sew, giving materials to some in exchange for their work on garments, which were distributed to other refugees. The work grew so that sewing circles were opened in various camps and other suitable places, which furnished proper clothing and gave employment and instruction to women and girls. By July, 1907, over 75,000 garments had been made in the 75 centers that had been established in camps, churches, public schools, and settlements. The work itself had been brought under the Corporation as a part of its Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, and had been given the name of Industrial Bureau, with Lucile Eaves as director, Rev. D. O. Crowley as adviser, and six seamstresses on salary. Miss Eaves, formerly head worker of the South Park Settlement, had been in charge of the sewing circles before the incorporation of the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds. There is no account of expenditures made for this work to August 1, 1906. After that date the Corporation expended $37,895.70. The two largest items of expenditure were $28,521.09 for dry goods and other supplies and $4,464 for service.

Temporary social halls were built at the expense of the Corporation to be used by residents of the camps as meeting places and by social workers for kindergartens, day nurseries, reading rooms, sewing classes, and improvement clubs, for religious meetings, for lectures, and for concerts.

The story of the quick recovery of the settlements themselves and of how, awaiting the building of new quarters, they by makeshifts got the people together, cannot be told here. To show in a measure what it meant to the social worker to find himself suddenly bereft of all the means to serve his end, the following paragraphs written by a probation officer are given:

“On the morning of April 20, practically every vestige of the three years’ work of the juvenile court had vanished.

“Our office was cleaned out; little piles of delicate white ash represented our records, compiled with such care and toil. Where the detention home stood was a heap of tangled scrap iron. Three out of five of our officers were homeless. Our probationers were scattered to the four winds of heaven. Fortunately, none of the children in detention was injured; during the first day of the fire they were safely conveyed to a sand-dump camp at the western edge of the city.”

6. Safeguarding Health

Sanitation was at once recognized to be a pressing problem. As has been told, latrines were quickly built in the camps and in other parts of the city, and a large force of plumbers was kept at work to repair leaks in sewers so as to prevent the seepage of sewage into the water supply. Citizens were ordered to boil all drinking water and the authorities took charge of all milk as soon as it was delivered to the city. Sanitary orders were cheerfully obeyed. “Obey the Sanitary Law or be shot” tacked on a partially wrecked house showed that some of the refugees held to a pioneer code. That they did so, and that the authorities were alert, the excellent health record of the months that followed bears testimony. The sanitary problem was to a small degree lessened by the fact that with the terror of the earthquake and fire in their eyes, the vicious and parasitic classes fled from the city; to a large degree by the fact that nature was kind in giving conditions that were peculiarly favorable to life in the open.

To put emphasis on sanitation was an essential. Colonel G. H. Torney,[89] of the army medical department, was placed in charge of all sanitary work, both of the camps and of the city. By April 28 a medical officer had been assigned to each of the six military districts.[90] This officer assigned inspectors to make daily inspections of the camps in his district, to keep a close watch for infectious diseases, and to see that there was a large force of scavengers. The expense of the work was borne by the army and was drawn from the Congressional appropriation.

[89] Later appointed Surgeon General of the United States Army.

[90] See Part I, p. 11.

Because of the army’s efficiency during the first few weeks there was no serious outbreak of disease, though there was for a short time a fear that smallpox might become epidemic. As long, however, as the city authorities permitted groups of people to live in isolated camps proper sanitary supervision was impossible. The greatest danger was from the flies and from the use of water drawn in the early days from wells and other unusual sources of supply. As soon as possible sterilizers were installed in the camps and weekly tests made of the water used in each.

Early in May a physician named by the city authorities was stationed at each district headquarters to have charge of all health regulations and to be subject to the orders of Colonel Torney.

The services of the army officers were retained to make reports on conditions until the middle of May, when the division into sanitary districts was abandoned and Colonel Torney’s duties were changed so that he might become chief sanitary officer of permanent camps under General Greely, the division commander. An army medical officer was then assigned to each official camp. He was responsible for the sanitation of his camp, but not for territories beyond its boundaries. He could be called upon to advise the civil authorities who were responsible for the final removal of all camp garbage and refuse after it had been taken from the camps designated to places outside camp limits.

The board of health, acting under orders of the Executive Commission, appointed a health corps which was paid by the Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross Funds and subject to the direction of the camp commander. The personnel of the corps under the board of health in each camp consisted, varying according to the camp population, of one to two surgeons, one to four nurses, a pharmacist, and from two to ten laborers. There were for service at large one surgeon, two dentists, two sanitary inspectors, one pharmacist, six laborers, and two chauffeurs. The total number in the corps was: surgeons, 24; nurses, 26; dentists, 2; laborers, 89; inspectors, 2; pharmacists, 15; chauffeurs, 2.

Taking into account the character of the camp population, a considerable part of which was of the class that does not understand the need of sanitary precautions, the freedom from epidemic during the first few months is remarkable. A report of the medical department of the army shows that 30 cases of typhoid fever occurred in April, 55 in May, and 10 up to June 23, 1906. As the average number of cases per month reported by the city to the state board of health for the two years previous to the fire was only 12, there is apparently an increase of this disease during April and May. The 30 cases which developed in April must have been due to infection previous to April 18, so that unless the statistics of either the army or the city board of health are incorrect, an increase of this disease must have threatened before the fire. Of the 95 cases which developed between April 18 and June 23 only five developed in official camps. Of smallpox there were 123 cases between April 18 and June 23. Five of these were reported by the board of health as camp cases, but none of them originated in official camps under army control.

In October and November, 1906, there was a decided increase in the number of cases of typhoid fever, the bureau of hospitals alone having charge at one time of 155 cases. The patients came from camps, official and unofficial, and from houses. The epidemic, if it can be called such, was found to be carried not by contaminated milk or water but by flies. The sanitation methods of the board of health had not been good enough to protect the refugees in the various camps. The board of health, therefore, not the Department of Camps and Warehouses, was responsible for the number of typhoid fever cases.

The care of the sick was a minor problem of the relief work. The number of persons seriously injured by the fire and earthquake was but 415. Most of the hospitals stood outside the burned section, and though some of them suffered heavy damage by the earthquake, no demand had to be made for hospital facilities that could not be met fairly adequately. Some of the sick were immediately cared for in neighboring communities, and by the army in its hospitals at the Presidio and at Fort Mason, and in a field hospital established in Golden Gate Park.[91] At one time during the summer following the disaster many of the city hospital beds were vacant, even though numerous chronic cases became hospital charges when relatives and friends were no longer financially able to provide for them.

[91] The establishment of a field hospital in Golden Gate Park is a good instance of the great care that was taken to be prepared for whatever emergency might arise.

The physicians and nurses who came immediately after the disaster to San Francisco to offer their services could not be utilized, as the demand for medical and nursing service was not greater than could be supplied by local physicians and nurses. A party of fourteen nurses that came from Seattle soon after the disaster reported for duty at five o’clock one afternoon. “Have you return transportation?” asked the chairman of the committee that received them. “Yes,” was the answer. “Well, there is a train which starts for Seattle tomorrow morning at nine o’clock,” was the laconic order.

In this incident we see the need of a clearing house of information to be established as one of the very first agencies in a large work of relief. It would in this case have prevented the sending of unnecessary nurses and physicians and would have saved expense. More important, however, would have been its service in standardizing the methods of record keeping and in preventing overlapping of work of the various departments.[92]

[92] See Some Lessons of the Relief Survey, p. 369 ff.

There was immediate need of medical supplies to replace the stock destroyed by fire. But the sub-committees on drugs and medical supplies and on care of the sick and wounded, appointed by the Citizens’ Committee, could find little to do in those early days after the disaster, as the army practically took charge of the distribution of the medical supplies and was using the California Red Cross as its agent. This branch of the Red Cross not only cared for some of the sick directly, but did much more important work in collecting information as to the needs of the sick and as to the condition of the hospitals throughout the city.

The Finance Committee, acting early in May on the advice of Colonel Torney, established 26 free dispensaries which were supplied by the army with drugs and other medical supplies. It was careful not to compete with retail trade, so closed any dispensary near which a retail drug store was later opened. The Finance Committee also appointed early in May a committee on hospitals and authorized it to make payments to designated hospitals for the care of destitute patients. The hospitals which were to receive payments from the relief funds were at first named by the board of health, later by the Finance Committee itself, which made selection of six hospitals. An executive officer, a physician, was appointed to pass on the eligibility of the patients who applied for free care and to determine the time of discharge of each from the hospital.

In July this executive officer, whose title was that of supervisor of accredited hospitals, served under direction of the Executive Commission; but after August 1 he was subject to the Corporation, an arrangement which held until July 1, 1908, when the Bureau of Hospitals of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation was closed. The Associated Charities was then given authority by the Corporation to send destitute patients directly to the hospitals. The Corporation reimbursed the hospitals for care given. The hospitals selected to receive patients whose care was paid for from the funds were changed from time to time.

The value of the compensation to hospitals was at first equivalent to $13 or $14 a week for each patient. On July 18 the Executive Commission had fixed the maximum rate of $2.00 per day without supplies. This was to cover cost of operations and attendance. It had remained in force until the Bureau of Hospitals was closed.

The Bureau’s records, which are inadequate in some respects, show that the highest number of hospital cases for one week, 276, was reached during the period of the typhoid epidemic. Later reports show an average of about 212 patients per week from August, 1906, to September, 1907. Of the patients sent to hospitals through the Bureau 10 per cent were children, 35 per cent men, and 55 per cent women.

The financial report of the Corporation shows that the total cost for the care of the sick to May 29, 1909, was $344,165.07. In addition, food, medical supplies, and furnishings were given to hospitals to the value of $97,670.16. Of the $344,165.07, there was expended previous to August 1, 1906, $107,396.43. The sum of $278,070.76 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients, on presentation of vouchers, while the balance of $66,094.31, though not paid directly to the hospitals, was expended in various ways for the benefit of the hospital patients. Between August 1, 1906, and June 1, 1909, $231,110.46 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients. This latter sum, less $1,960.25 which cannot be distributed, represents 134,373 days of hospital care at an average cost of $1.71 per patient per day. The average rates of the different hospitals varied from $1.07 to $2.00.

Although the rates paid by the relief funds were often less than the actual cost to the hospitals of caring for patients in normal times, it was to the advantage of the hospitals to care for the sick, many of whom they would have had to take in any case. The volume of business helped to lower the per capita cost of maintenance. It was also an incentive to the directors to increase their facilities and to private benefactors to give money toward their support.

7. Relieving the Japanese and Chinese

The Japanese asked for very little relief, in part because many had difficulty in speaking English, but more generally because all were aware of the anti-Japanese feeling of a small but aggressive part of the community; this in spite of the fact that Japan contributed directly to the local committee and through the American National Red Cross nearly a quarter of a million dollars.

On April 20, independent relief associations were formed by Japanese residents in San Francisco and Oakland, but on the same day they wisely united under the name Japanese Relief Association to care for practically all their fellow countrymen.

Tanks for Sterilizing Water, Lobos Square Camp

The Japanese Relief Association estimated the number of their countrymen made destitute by the fire to be over 10,000, which is about 3 per cent of the total number of persons made dependent for short or long periods of time. On July 6, 1906, not over 100 Japanese were receiving assistance from the Relief and Red Cross Funds. Of these about 50 were receiving shelter only, in Lafayette Square, and 50 were receiving help at relief stations. That is, the Japanese constituted not more than one-half of 1 per cent of the bread line and about a quarter of 1 per cent of the population of the official camps. Even at the beginning the number receiving help from the Relief and Red Cross Funds was probably not much greater. The Relief Survey estimates that the total value of relief of all kinds furnished by the army and the Finance Committee to Japanese did not exceed $3,000. Among the 30,000 or more persons who applied for rehabilitation, there was not one Japanese. Their own relief association, assisted by Japanese throughout the state, within ten days after the disaster sent between 7,000 and 8,000 of them to places outside of San Francisco. On July 6 some of these had returned and the number of Japanese refugees then in the city was estimated by the association to be 4,000, two hundred of whom it was supplying with provisions.

China contributed $40,000 to the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds for the general work of relief.

There is not much information available about the Chinese. They probably received altogether more food than the Japanese and they certainly received more in the way of shelter, yet the total value of all aid given them was relatively insignificant. Like the Japanese, and for the same reasons, they did not ask for much. At the beginning a separate camp was established for them,—Number 3, in the Presidio reservation. The population of this camp on May 8, 1906, was 186. Later, when cottages were built in Portsmouth Square, on the border of Chinatown, 37 out of the 153 cottages were assigned to Chinese. Not over 140 applications for rehabilitation were made by Chinese. About half of the number were assisted at an average expenditure of about $70. Nearly all these cases were brought to the notice of the Committee by social workers, as only a few Chinese applied voluntarily for relief. Ten thousand dollars is a liberal estimate of the value of relief given to the Chinese.