San Francisco Relief Survey

Some Lessons of the Relief Survey

SOME LESSONS OF THE SURVEY

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Part	I.	Organization and The Emergency Period	369
Part	II.	Rehabilitation	370
Part	III.	Business Rehabilitation	371
Part	IV.	Housing Rehabilitation	371
Part	V.	After-Care	372
Part	VI.	The Aged and Infirm	372

Some Lessons of the Relief Survey

What then are some of the lessons to be learned from this review of the San Francisco relief work that may be applied in other great disasters?

Part I. Organization and the Emergency Period

We see among other things:

1. The importance of postponing the appointment of sub-committees until a strong central committee has been able to determine general policies and methods of procedure.

2. The wisdom of reducing the bread line and the camp population as quickly as possible after the disaster so that the relief resources may be conserved to meet the primary need of rehabilitation.

3. The value of utilizing for emergency administration a body so highly organized and so efficient as the United States Army, to take charge of camps, and to bring to points of distribution the supplies required for those in need of food and clothing.

4. The necessity of utilizing the centers of emergency distribution for the later rehabilitation work of district committees and corps of visitors.

5. The need of establishing a central bureau of information to serve from the beginning of the relief work as a clearing house, to prevent confusion and waste through duplication of effort.

6. The importance of legal incorporation for any relief organization that has to deal with so large a disaster.

7. The importance of a strict audit of all relief in cash sent to a relief organization. The impossibility of an equally strict accounting for relief in kind, because of the many leaks and the difficulties attendant upon hurried distribution.

8. The desirability that contributions, especially those in kind, shall be sent without restrictions, as only the local organization is able to measure relative needs at different periods of the work.

9. The recognition of the American National Red Cross, with its permanent organization, its governmental status, and its direct accountability to Congress for all expenditures, as the proper national agency through which relief funds for great disasters should be collected and administered; thus securing unity of effort, certainty of policy, and a center about which all local relief agencies may rally.

Part II. Rehabilitation

We have to recognize:

1. The need, in at least the early stages of rehabilitation, of the district system, in order to facilitate application and investigation and to insure prompt committee action upon calls for assistance.

2. The need of a bureau of special relief from beginning to end of the rehabilitation work in order to meet the emergent and minor requirements of families and individuals without having to use the necessarily complicated slow-moving machinery of the rehabilitation organization itself.

3. The fact that even in a community where the residences of over half of the population have changed and the business section has been completely destroyed, it is possible to make individual investigations of family wants such as will generally mean the adding of the judgment of one outsider at least to that of the family.

We have to recognize further:

4. That the period of time elapsing between applications and grants will not be greatly altered if, after the early stages of rehabilitation, a centralized system is substituted for a district system.

5. That a flexible scheme of rehabilitation is furthered when no rigid limit is fixed for an individual grant and deliberation is required in each case where a grant of large amount is made.

6. That though rehabilitation may proceed generally along the line of fortifying each family in one particular direction, as for instance, in its business relations or housing accommodations, it will always be necessary to provide a considerable proportion of the families with subsidiary grants for other purposes.

7. That any centralized system which attempts to fix arbitrarily the different types of cases with which different committees shall deal will create a certain amount of confusion. If a centralized system seem desirable, the question is whether the committees in the central office should not have authority to consider cases according to geographical divisions rather than according to typical classes of applicants.

Part III. Business Rehabilitation

We learn, and the fact deserves to stand apart:

That when grants are made for the re-establishment in business of persons of little ability or experience, close supervision of plans and expenditures by agents of the relief committee is necessary to secure the best results.

Part IV. Housing Rehabilitation

We have to recognize:

1. That to provide but one form of housing rehabilitation is far from satisfactory.

2. That in a general way the three forms provided in San Francisco met the needs of the three general classes to be reached.

(a) With reference to the camp cottages it is too soon to say how successful the experiment will ultimately be of giving cottages for removal to other sites to those who may be classed as comparatively weak in resourcefulness and character. It is certain, however, that the permanent close grouping of the cottages in great numbers on open lots is a danger to be guarded against.

(b) With reference to the grant and loan houses, though it seems that in general the houses built by applicants were better than those built by the housing committee for the applicants, it by no means follows that direct grants of money if commonly adopted would always bring good results. Individual capabilities must be one determining factor. As to grants and loans, it may be said that a double standard is not practicable. A grant on one house and a loan on its neighbor lead to dissatisfaction and often failure on the part of the borrower to meet his debt.

3. That because of the highly specialized business ability required, a separate department of the relief organization should have charge of all building and details of building.

4. That decisions upon housing applications and dealings with housing applicants should be centered in a rehabilitation department.

Part V. After-Care

We are brought to see that:

1. The applications made to an emergency relief organization will not include all who, as a result of the disaster, will eventually be obliged to seek succor. It is demonstrated that some permanent agency must be prepared to help those who, fighting heroically to the very end of their resources, give up after the temporary relief organization has discontinued active work.

2. The number of sufferers who need after-care may be increased by families who have been attracted to the city by illusive expectations of work.

3. The problems of family relief after a great disaster are essentially those requiring the personal care and attention which are characteristic of the work of an associated charities under normal conditions. The number of families that have come to the San Francisco Associated Charities in the years since the Corporation turned over the relief work to it, has been far larger than before the fire. It follows that for some years after so tremendous a disaster there should be an increase in the force of trained workers proportionate to the increase in the applications for rehabilitation. The community must be prepared to pay the additional cost.

4. Grants of relief, when they must be given regularly and for a considerable period (in the form that is often described as pensions), should be sufficiently large to assure reasonable standards of living.

Part VI. The Aged and Infirm

We see finally that:

1. A great disaster increases especially the number of the aged and infirm who become public charges.

2. One of the tasks of delicate readjustment is to remove from the almshouse the aged men and women who, merely through the rough chance of a great catastrophe, are thrown with those whose lifelong habits and disabilities lead to the almshouse.

3. A critical test of the quality of a community is how far the responsibility for the aged, infirm, and handicapped who, save for the disaster, would never have become dependent upon public relief, is resumed by relatives, friends, or others who in the ordinary course of events would have cared for them; how completely the standard of private and family care for them shall be as though the disaster had never occurred.