1916 — The Battle of Verdun
The fortress of Verdun, the basin of Briey, the fortress of Metz.
During 1915, Germany was particularly on the defensive, in Artois (May-June) and in Champagne (September-October). Her successes in Serbia and Russia had not brought the final victory which could only be won on the Western front.
Germany feared an allied offensive and was anxious over the continual increase of their forces in men and material. To forestall this offensive would cause it to miscarry and keep the initiative in her own hands.
The Germans wanted too, to make an impression on the world at large which began to have doubts about her ultimate victory. Finally they were influenced by political considerations at home. The rationing of the population had lowered the general morale, and the prestige of the Crown Prince had slumped heavily on account of his failure in Argonne. A grand victory was necessary to strengthen the German morale, to appease dissension and to rehabilitate the prestige of the Imperial family. The German High Command chose Verdun. Was this choice of ground as paradoxical as it has been said?
“Verdun in all the war is the hinge of the door which swings open sometimes on France, sometimes on Germany”. (L. Gillet.)
The only communication between Verdun and the rear was by the Meusian railway and the “Sacred Way”. The Verdun-Commercy railway was cut by the Saint-Mihiel salient and the Verdun-Sainte-Menehould railway would be cut by shell fire at the very outset of the battle.
To capture Verdun was to threaten the whole French right wing, to gain an important stake, a stronghold fronting the rich basin of Briey, and to get the benefit of a great moral effect.
The Verdun salient lent itself to converging enemy attacks and concentrated fire. On the right bank the defenders of Verdun would be fighting with their backs to the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Verdun with its valleys and woods, facilitated the moving of troops and the concentration of artillery screened from view.
The enemy too had fourteen railways at his disposal and Metz close at hand from which to bring up troops and supplies.
On the French side, there was only one broad gauge railway connecting Verdun, via Saint-Menehould, with the rest of France. This railway, too, was always liable to be cut off by shell-fire. (See illustration opposite).
Geographical Sketch
The table-lands of Verdun where the battle was to be fought are the last of the series of heights which form the top of the basin in which Paris lies. The Meuse which often overflows in winter divides them from North to South.
The terrace of the table-lands of the right bank, for some ten kilometres in width, separates the valley of the Meuse from the marshy plain of the Woëvre.
Numerous streams flow at a depth of more than a hundred metres for a very short distance, thus hollowing out deep ravines which give to the hills of the Meuse a contour “jagged, cut in festoons, as though it was hand-modelled in a clay substance”. The summit line, where not indented, contains the highest points (388 m.), keys to the battle field.
“All this country with its partitions and compartments seemed built like a natural fortress. The sheltered ways and ravines provided covered approaches and first-rate artillery positions. Every wood and copse could be converted into a redoubt.
“If the branching off of the valleys and their innumerable ramifications added to the dangers of movement or manœuvre or facilitated surprise attacks, the ridges, on the other hand, made marvellous observation posts. On all sides were the very slopes, banks and flank protection which engineers could desire.” (L. Gillet: La Bataille de Verdun).
German Plans for a Decisive Attack
Following the lesson of the offensives in Artois (May 1915) and Champagne (September 1915), the German commander intended to put into practice the French offensive methods but to add, by means of artillery fire, an unparalleled ferocity. To concentrate masses of artillery, to cut by shell fire the only broad-gauge railway that connected Verdun with France (see plan p. 18), to flatten out the French defences, to isolate the occupants by barrages of heavy shells, then to rush headlong on the town and crush the last resistance, at the same time sending forward overwhelming masses of troops, without regard to losses: such was the plan which the Germans carried out on February 21st, 1916.
Character of the Battle of Verdun
The battle of Verdun was a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. The method was to concentrate the fire of all the guns, not over a line but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured but also as far as possible in rear on everything that could support the position. The simile that best expresses it is no longer that of a battering ram striking against a wall, but that of a rammer falling perpendicularly and hammering an encircled zone. The encircled zone was the part where the old territorials who were screening from observation a road behind the lines, ran almost as great a danger as men in other battles did in an attacking wave. Here, while the shells continued to fall, no fatigue party of men or munitions could go three hundred metres without being wiped out entirely. Here the wounded in deep-dug aid-posts went mad from lack of air. Here often a mug of water meant life or death to a man. This encircled zone was bounded by a narrow stretch of ground which the opposing artilleries tried to spare because the infantry were fighting there hand to hand, with bombs, machine guns, and flame-throwers; every square yard of ground being hotly disputed.
“In front of Verdun, one day, the O. C. of a new force asks the officer of the chasseurs whom he has just relieved: “Where does our line run here?—I’ll show you. There where you will find on the ground my dead chasseurs, lying side by side, that is where our line runs”.
“In front of Verdun, one day, a battalion commander being completely cut off sends twenty runners one after another, to the Colonel’s headquarters. These runners are bound to follow a certain track to go and another to return. Not one comes back and on the next day he finds the bodies of all twenty, ten lying on the path there and ten on the path back.
“In front of Verdun, one day, at nightfall, a battalion commander goes up towards the front line to see his men and cheer them on. The front line is a string of shell holes and in these holes, one by one, the men are crouched. He leans over one of these pits of darkness, for the night was pitch black, and in a low voice so that the enemy may not hear asks: “How goes it?”. There is no movement but a voice replies in muffled tones as though telling a secret: “All well, Colonel, they shall not pass”. He goes on his way continuing his rounds “How goes it?” and from each dark shell-hole rises the same secret whisper.
“Where was that? At Mort-Homme or Froideterre? At Haudromont farm or Chapelle Sainte-Fine? It makes no difference! It was “in front of Verdun, one day” any day you like in this battle, in which so many days were alike, and these innumerable stories, so magnificent that no poet could have had the genius to invent one of them, these stories—each one so immortal—are all as alike in their essentials as were the countless actions in this “battle of annihilation” (Joseph Bédier: L’Effort français).