Author’s Preface
As a result of having delivered many lectures, under official auspices and in compliance with private invitations, on “The Blocking of Zeebrugge,” the author has received several requests to record the story in more permanent form. Underlying these requests there appears to be a feeling that first-hand accounts of enterprises in the Great War should be of some value towards preserving that spirit which rallied all classes of individuals in the British Empire, in the Allied Countries, and in the United States of America, to the common cause of upholding civilisation in the face of danger. That opinion, indeed, has been openly stated to the author in Great Britain, by leading members of the educational profession and of the Church, by naval and military officers and others. Opinions of a similar type also have been received from the United States, where, during a recent series of visits to many of the larger cities, the author personally experienced that solid friendship for Great Britain which is sometimes hidden beneath surface irritations of a political nature.
Misunderstandings must occasionally arise between communities and between the members of any single community; they readily take root and develop into serious argument where the existence of a common cause is forgotten. For that reason the author feels that the above-mentioned opinions are not without foundation. Whilst attempting to show that co-operation between the several units of a fighting force and confidence between superiors and subordinates are important factors towards success in war, he has made this humble endeavour to induce the belief that co-operation and confidence in other walks of life are no less necessary.
There is danger of this blocking enterprise being allotted a false position in the contemporary histories of the late war owing to the somewhat prevalent custom of describing war operations with little reference to the various considerations, factors, and events which gave them birth.
The man-in-the-street is sometimes carried away by enthusiasm or despondency, as the case may be, when unexpected events occur during hostilities; he is apt to give little thought to the “why” and “wherefore” of the occurrences. That fact has been exemplified clearly enough with respect to this particular event, for, on all sides, one heard the public verdict, given in the colloquial vulgarism of the period, that the affair was a fine “stunt.” The word “stunt,” as unmusical to the ear as it was offensive to those concerned in the operations, has been defined as “a voluntary act, spectacular, usually unnecessary, sometimes involving risk, and designed to attract attention.” However, the man-in-the-street meant well, and, after all, could justifiably plead that his lack of education on naval matters was to blame. The author has therefore addressed this book to the man-in-the-street, and has endeavoured to “put him wise,” as our cousins across the water are in the habit of remarking.
The official despatches dealing with the blocking operations on the Flanders coast were published early in 1919, and, as far as despatches can go, gave a splendid account of the enterprise forming the subject of this book. But despatches are strictly limited in length and necessarily deal more with cold-blooded statements of fact than with psychological aspects. When one reads despatches of the great leaders of the past concerning the operations in their campaigns one cannot fail to notice the almost complete absence of any reference to the moral factor in war. Yet Napoleon himself declared, “The moral is to the physical as three is to one.” Material results can easily be gauged under peace conditions, whereas moral effect on human nature in war is only discoverable from one’s own war experiences, which are necessarily limited, and from the experiences of others as set forth in the historical records of past wars. It was partly for that reason, presumably, that Napoleon studied the campaigns of Cæsar and Hannibal although their instruments of war were long since out of date.
The usual reasons for the omission of the moral factors from despatches are twofold. Firstly, the leader from whom the despatch emanates may consider it inadvisable to publish his preconceived ideas as to the eventual effect of the operations on the morale of the enemy; this concealment is especially necessary if the despatch is published before the declaration of peace. Secondly, the writer of the despatch is often unaware, at the time of writing, of the effect already obtained against the enemy’s morale; such effects may not be discoverable for many months after the operations have been concluded. Under certain circumstances it may also be temporarily inadvisable to present to the enemy, through the medium of despatches, information concerning psychological effects on one’s own personnel. These omissions, therefore, must not be taken to infer that the moral factors were ignored. It is clear, then, that post-war accounts of operations may be far from superfluous whether considered from the point of view of the man-in-the-street or that of the student of war.
Without some conception of the strategical situation arising from the German occupation of the Flanders coast it would be difficult to grasp the true nature of the enterprise described herein. An examination of the strategical outlook alone, however, would be insufficient. The geographical and hydrographical, and even the meteorological, situations largely influenced the choice of tactical methods to be pursued for the attainment of the object in view. It is therefore important to consider the situation from these various standpoints in some detail.
The book has been divided into two parts. Part I deals with the Situation, the Object, the General Plan for the attainment of the Object, the Preparatory Work involved, and the various occurrences up to the eve of the Attack. Part II describes the events which occurred during the operation itself, and includes some consideration of both the material and moral results of the enterprise and the lessons to be drawn therefrom.
For the illustrations the author is much indebted to the Admiralty, Air Ministry, Imperial War Museum, and Press, to whom he makes this grateful acknowledgment.
With regard to the personal side of the story, it may be as well to point out that many of the officers and men concerned were mentioned in the official despatch; that fact lessens one of the difficulties attached to the author’s task. A compromise between the purely impersonal attitude and the very natural desire to render full justice to each individual, regardless of the reader’s patience, has been aimed at.
The author trusts that the reader will be tolerant of omission and repetition, and will forgive the rather obvious shortcomings of a literary nature which, alas, appear all too frequently in the book.
ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
8th March, 1921
CONTENTS
PART I
Introduction by Admiral Earl Beatty
Appreciation by Rear-Admiral Sims, U.S.N.
Author’s Preface
I. The Strategical Situation. The German Bases in Flanders. The Conception of the Plan
II. The Local Situation. The Local Defences
III. The Outlying Obstacles. Considerations of Salvage
IV. Past Experience. Smoke Screens. The Chances of Success
V. Planning The Operation. Matters Affecting the Plan. Attacks on the Mole
VI. The Vessels Involved: Their Duties. The Rescue Work
VII. Matters affecting the Passage. The Supporting Forces. The German Sea-Forces. The Preparatory Work
VIII. The Personnel. Secrecy. Training. Some Personalities
IX. The Waiting Period. The Volunteering Spirit
X. Meteorological and Tidal Conditions. Visibility
XI. The Orders and Instructions. The Time Factor
XII. The First Attempt. The Return to Harbour
XIII. The Second Attempt and Return. Preparing for the Third Attempt. Rewriting the Orders. German Optimism
PART II
Foreword
I. The Start. The Oversea Passage
II. The Approach
III. The Commencement of the Attack
IV. The Fight on the Mole. H.M.S. Iris
V. The Attack on the Railway Viaduct
VI. The Smoke Screening. Subsidiary Attacks
VII. The Work of the Blockships
VIII. The Retirement
IX. The Material Results
X. The Moral Effect
XI. Some Remarks on the Enterprise
Appendix. A List of Vessels and Craft in the Operations
ILLUSTRATIONS
Storming the Mole......... _Frontispiece_
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter
A Portion of the German Battery on the Lighthouse Extension of the Mole
View of the Canal Entrance with its Curved Piers
Aerial Photograph of the Canal Entrance
The Northeastern End of the Mole
The Blockships fitting out for the Enterprise
H.M.S. Vindictive before Fitting Out
A Portion of the Broad Part of the Mole
The Outer Wall, Showing the Parapet Pathway Sixteen Feet Above The Floor of the Mole
H.M.S. Vindictive’s Specially Constructed Gang-Ways
One of the Monitors
H.M. Ships Iris (right) and Daffodil
Lieut.-Commander Arthur L. Harrison
Vice-Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes (missing from book)
Diagrammatic Sketch of the Attack
Drawn By Charles De Lacy From Details Supplied By The Author
H.M.S. Vindictive’s Bridge and Flame-Thrower Hut (right)
The Fight on the Mole
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Aerial Photograph taken through the Clouds a Few Hours after the Enterprise
The Three Blockships shortly after the Attack
Intrepid and Iphigenia
The Western Side of the Blocked Channel
The Eastern Side of the Blocked Channel
H.M.S. Vindictive at Dover after the Attack
H.M.S. Vindictive on her Return to Dover
MAPS AND PLANS
Chart showing the Relative Positions of Dover, Zeebrugge, Heligoland, and the Exits from the North Sea
The Canal System of Belgium
The Port of Zeebrugge
Plan of Canal Entrance Channel
Sectional Sketch of Sunken Blockships
Section of the Mole through No. 3 Shed
Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period