Chapter II The Proposed Inter-Oceanic Canal: Early Explorations; Survey of Colonel Childs in 1851; Various Lines From Lake Nicaragua to the Pacific; etc., etc.
From what has been said in the preceding chapters, it sufficiently appears that Nicaragua is a country of great beauty of scenery, fertility of soil, and variety and richness of products. But she has attracted the attention of the world less on these accounts than because she is believed to possess within her borders the best and most feasible route for a canal between the two great oceans. The project of opening such a communication through her territories began to be entertained as soon as it was found that there existed no natural water communication between the seas. As early as 1551, the historian Gomara had indicated the four lines which have since been regarded as offering the greatest facilities for the purpose, viz.: at Darien, Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantepec. There were difficulties, he said, “and even mountains in the way, but,” he added, “there are likewise hands; let only the resolve be formed to make the passage, and it can be made. If inclination be not wanting, there will be no want of means; the Indies, to which the passage is to be made, will supply them. To a king of Spain, with the wealth of the Indies at his command, when the object is the spice trade, that which is possible is also easy.”
But, although occupying so large a share of the attention of all maritime nations, and furnishing a subject for innumerable essays in every language of Europe, yet it was not until after the discovery of gold in California, and the organization of an Anglo-American State on the shores of the Pacific, that the question of a canal assumed a practical form, or that of its feasibility was accurately determined.
In 1851, a complete survey was made of the river San Juan, Lake Nicaragua, and the isthmus intervening between the lake and the Pacific, by Colonel Childs, under the direction of the late “Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company.” Until then, it had always been assumed that the river San Juan, as well as Lake Nicaragua, could easily be made navigable for ships, and that the only obstacle to be overcome was the narrow strip of land between the lake and the ocean. Hence, all of the so-called surveys were confined to that point. One of these was made under orders of the Spanish government, in 1781, by Don Manuel Galisteo. Another, and that best known, by Mr. John Baily, under the direction of the government of Central America, in 1838. An intermediate examination seems to have been made early in the present century, the results of which are given in Thompson’s Guatemala. The following table shows the distances, elevations, etc., on the various lines followed by these explorers:
| Authorities | Distance from Lake to Ocean. | Greatest Elevation above Ocean. | Greatest Elevation above Lake. | |
| Miles. | Feet. | Feet. | Feet. | |
| Galisteo, 1781 | 17 | 200 | 272 | 134. |
| Quoted by | ||||
| Thompson | 17 | 330 | 296 | 154. |
| Baily, 1838 | 16 | 730 | 615 | 487. |
| Childs, 1851 | 18 | 588 | 159 | 47½ |
As the survey of Colonel Childs is the only one which can be accepted as conforming to modern engineering requirements, it will be enough to present the detailed results at which he arrived. The line proposed by him, and on which all his calculations and estimates were based, commences at the little port of Brito on the Pacific, and passes across the isthmus between the ocean and the lake, to the mouth of a small stream called the Rio Lajas, flowing into the latter; thence across Lake Nicaragua to its outlet, and down the valley of the Rio San Juan to the port of the same name, on the Atlantic. The length of this line was found to be 194⅓ miles, as follows:—
| MILES. | |
| Western Division:—Canal from the port of Brito on the Pacific, through the valleys of the Rio Grande and Rio Lajas, flowing into Lake Nicaragua | 18.588 |
| Middle Division:—Through Lake Nicaragua, from the mouth of Rio Lajas to San Carlos, at the head of the San Juan river | 56.500 |
| Eastern Division—First Section:—Slack water navigation on San Juan River, from San Carlos to a point on the river nearly opposite the mouth of the Rio Serapiqui | 90.800 |
| Second Section:—Canal from point last named to port of San Juan del Norte | 28.505 |
| Total, as above | 194.393 |
The dimensions of the canal were designed to be—depth, 17 feet; excavations in earth, 50 feet wide at bottom, 86 feet wide at nine feet above bottom, and 118 feet wide at surface of water; excavations in rock, 50 feet wide at bottom, 77 feet wide at nine feet above bottom, and 78-1/3 feet wide at surface of water.
The construction of the canal on this plan contemplates supplying the western division, from the lake to the sea, with water from the lake. It would, therefore, be necessary to commence the work on the lake at a point where the water is seventeen feet deep, at mean level. This point is opposite the mouth of a little stream called Rio Lajas, and twenty-five chains from the shore. From this point, for one and a half miles, partly along the Rio Lajas, the excavation will be principally in earth, but beyond this, for a distance of five and a half miles, which carries the line beyond the summit, three-fourths of the excavations would be in trap-rock; that is to say, the deepest excavation or open cut would be 64½ feet (summit, 47½ feet + depth of canal, 17 feet = 64½ feet), and involve the removal of 1,800,000 cubic yards of earth, and 3,378,000 cubic yards of rock. The excavation and construction on this five and a half miles alone was estimated to cost upwards of $6,250,000. After passing the summit, and reaching the valley of a little stream called Rio Grande, the excavation, as a general rule, would be only the depth of the canal. Col. Childs found that the lake, at ordinary high water, is 102 feet 10 inches above the Pacific at high, and 111 feet 5 inches at low tide, instead of 128 feet, as calculated by Mr. Baily. He proposed to accomplish the descent to Brito by means of fourteen locks, each of eight feet lift. The harbor of Brito, as it is called, at the point where the Rio Grande enters the sea, is, in fact, only a small angular indentation of the land, partially protected by a low ledge of rocks, entirely inadequate for the terminus of a great work like the proposed canal, and incapable of answering the commonest requirements of a port. To remedy this deficiency, it was proposed to construct an artificial harbor of thirty-four acres area, by means of moles and jetties in the sea, and extensive excavations in the land. If, as supposed, the excavations here would be in sand, it would be obviously almost impossible to secure proper foundations for the immense sea-walls and piers which the work would require. If in rock, as seems most likely, the cost and labor would almost surpass computation. Assuming the excavations to be in earth and sand, Col. Childs estimated the cost of these improvements at upwards of $2,700,000.
Returning now to the lake, and proceeding from seventeen feet depth of water, opposite the mouth of the Rio Lajas,51 in the direction of the outlet of the lake at San Carlos, there is ample depth of water for vessels of all sizes for a distance of about fifty-one miles, to a point half a mile south of the Boacas Islands, where the water shoals rapidly to fourteen feet; for the remaining five and a half miles to San Carlos, the depth averages only nine feet at low, and fourteen feet at high water. For this distance, therefore, an average under-water excavation of eight feet in depth would be required, to carry out the plan of a canal of seventeen feet deep. But if the lake were kept at high level, the under-water excavation would have an average of only about three feet. Colonel Childs proposed to protect this portion of the canal by rows of piles driven on each side, and supposed that when the excavation should be completed, there would be a sufficient current between them to keep the channel clear.
We come now to the division between Lake Nicaragua and the Atlantic, through or along the Rio San Juan. Colonel Childs carried a line of levels from the lake at San Carlos to the port of San Juan, and found the distance between those points to be a hundred nineteen and a third miles, and the total fall from the level of high-water in the lake to that of high-tide in the harbor, one hundred seven and a half feet. From San Carlos to a point half a mile below the Serapiqui river, a distance of 91 miles, Col. Childs proposed to make the river navigable by excavating its bed, and by constructing dams, to be passed by means of locks and short canals; the remaining twenty-eight miles to be constructed through the alluvial delta of the San Juan, inland, and independently of the river. Of the whole fall, sixty-two and a half feet occur on that portion of the river which he proposed to improve by dams, and on which there were to be eight locks, and the remaining forty-five feet on the inland portion of the works, by means of six locks—fourteen locks in all, each with an average lift of nearly eight feet. It was proposed to place the first dam, descending the river, at the Castillo rapids, thirty-seven miles from the lake, and to pass the rapids by means of a short lateral canal. By means of this dam the river was to be raised, at that point, twenty-one and a half feet, and the level of Lake Nicaragua five feet above its lowest stage; or, in other words, kept at high-water mark, to avoid the extensive submarine excavations which would be necessary to enable vessels to enter the river. The fall, at this dam, would be sixteen feet. The other dams were to be four of eight feet fall, and one of thirteen and a half feet, and another of fourteen and a half feet. Between all these it was found there would be required more or less excavation in the bed of the stream, often in rock. Col. Childs also proposed to improve the harbor of San Juan by means of moles, etc., and also to construct an artificial harbor or basin, in connection with it, of thirteen acres area. As regards the amount of water passing through the San Juan, it was found that at its lowest level, June 4, 1851, the discharge from the lake was 11,930 cubic feet per second. The greatest rise in the lake is five feet. When it stood 3.43 feet above its lowest level, the flow of water in the river, at San Carlos, was 18,059 cubic feet per second, being an increase of upwards of fifty per cent. Supposing the same ratio of increase, the discharge from the lake, at extreme high-water, would be upwards of 23,000 cubic feet per second. The river receives large accessions from its tributaries, which, at the point of divergence of the Colorado channel, swell the flow of water to 54,380 cubic feet per second, of which, 42,056 cubic feet pass through the Colorado channel, and 12,324 cubic feet into the harbor of San Juan.
The cost of the work was estimated by Col. Childs as follows:
| Eastern Division (from Port of San Juan to lake) | $13,023,275 |
| Central Division (through lake) | 1,068,410 |
| Western Division from lake to Pacific | 14,475,630 |
| $28,567,315 | |
| Add for contingencies 15 per cent. | 4,285,095 |
| Total estimated cost | $32,852,410 |
The charter of the Company, under the auspices of which Col. Childs was sent to Nicaragua, stipulated that the canal should be of dimensions sufficient “to admit vessels of all sizes.” A canal therefore, such as that proposed, but seventeen feet deep, and one hundred and eighteen feet wide at the surface of the water, could not meet the requirements of the charter, nor be adequate to the wants of commerce. To pass freely large merchantmen and vessels of war, a canal would require to be at least thirty feet deep, with locks and other works in proportion, which would involve at least three times the amount of excavation, etc., of the work proposed above, and a corresponding augmentation of cost. A canal so small as to render necessary the transhipment of merchandise and passengers is manifestly inferior to a railway, both as involving, in the first instance, greater cost of construction, and, in the second place, greater expense in working, with less speed.
The surveys and estimates of Col. Childs were submitted to the British government, and by it referred for report to Mr. James Walker, civil engineer, and Captain Edward Aldrich, Royal Engineers. The report of this commission, proceeding on the assumption that the plans, measurements, etc., of Col. Childs were correct, was, on the whole, favorable. It however suggested that the item of “contingencies” in the estimate should be increased from fifteen to twenty-five per cent. Of all the works of the proposed navigation it pronounces the Brito or Pacific harbor as least satisfactory. “Presuming the statements and conclusions of Col. Childs to be correct, the Brito harbor is, in shape and size, unworthy of this great ship navigation, even supposing the Pacific, to which it is quite open, to be a much quieter ocean than any we have seen or have information of.” Subsequently, the plans and reports were laid before a committee of English capitalists, with a view to procure the means for the actual construction of the work. This committee, after a patient investigation, declined to embark in the work, or to recommend it to public support, on the ground;—1st. That the dimensions of the proposed work were not such as, in their opinion, would meet the requirements of commerce; 2d. That these dimensions were not conformable to the provisions of the Company’s charter; 3d. That supposing the work not to exceed the estimated cost of $32,800,000, the returns, to meet the simple interest on the investment, at six per cent,, would require to be at least $1,950,000 over and above its current expenses; or, to meet this interest, and the percentage to be paid to Nicaragua, not less than $2,365,000 over and above expenses; or allowing $1,000,000 per annum for repairs, superintendence, cost of transportation, etc., then the gross earnings would require to be $3,400,000; 4th. Putting the toll at $3 per ton, the collection of this revenue would involve the passage of upwards of 1,000,000 tons of shipping per annum; 5th. That not more than one-third of the vessels engaged in the oriental trade could pass through a canal of the proposed dimensions, even if the route which it would open were shorter than that by way of Cape of Good Hope, instead of being more than 1000 miles longer to Calcutta, Singapore, and other leading ports of British India; 6th. That the heavy toll of $3 per ton on ships would generally prevent such vessels as could do so from passing the canal, inasmuch as on a vessel of 1000 tons the aggregate toll would be $3000, or more than the average earnings of such vessels per voyage; 7th. That a work of the dimensions proposed, under the present condition of commerce, would not attract sufficient support to defray the cost of repairs and working, and could not therefore be safely undertaken by capitalists. Upon the publication of this report the canal company obtained the privilege of opening a transit by steamers and carriages through Nicaragua, and the project of a canal seems to have been definitely abandoned—unless we regard the fantastic proceedings of certain adventurers from Europe, as directed seriously toward the execution of the enterprise.
The construction of a ship-canal between the oceans through Nicaragua is unquestionably within the range of engineering feasibilities, but it can be as safely affirmed that, with the present requirements of commerce, and under the laws which govern the use of capital, it is not likely to be seriously undertaken. The assumption upon which most of the speculations regarding the utility of such a work are founded, viz., that it would shorten the distance between the ports of Europe, and those of Asia in general, is erroneous as will appear from the following table:
| Via Cape of Good Hope. | Via proposed Canal. | Net Loss. | Net Gain. | |
| From England | MILES. | MILES. | MILES. | MILES. |
| To Canton | 12,900 | 13,800 | 900 | .. |
| ″ Calcutta | 11,440 | 15,480 | 4040 | .. |
| ″ Singapore | 11,880 | 15,120 | 4240 | .. |
| “ Sidney via Torres Straits | 14,980 | 12,550 | 2430 | |
| From New York | ||||
| To Canton | 14,100 | 11,820 | 3280 | |
| ″ Calcutta | 12,360 | 13,680 | 1320 | .. |
| ″ Singapore | 12,700 | 11,420 | 1280 | |
| ″ Sidney | 15,720 | 9,480 | 6240 |
It will be observed that the sole advantage which the canal would afford to Great Britain, as regards the East, would be a saving in distance (equally attainable by a railway across the isthmus) of 2430 miles in communicating with Australia. As regards the Sandwich Islands, and the western coast of America, the gain in distance, both to England and the United States, would be considerable, as shown in the subjoined table:
| Via Cape Horn. | Via proposed Canal. | Gain. | |
| From England | MILES. | MILES. | MILES. |
| To Valparaiso | 8,700 | 7,500 | 1,200 |
| ″ Callao | 10,020 | 6,800 | 3,220 |
| ″ Sandwich Islands | 13,500 | 8,640 | 4,860 |
| From New York | |||
| To Valparaiso | 8,580 | 4,860 | 3,720 |
| ″ Callao | 9,900 | 3,540 | 6,360 |
| ″ Sandwich Islands | 13,200 | 6,300 | 6,900 |
It must not be supposed that the investigations of Col. Childs were confined to the single line described in the foregoing paragraphs. He examined that also by way of the Rio Sapoa to the bay of Salinas, but found that to pass the summit, a cut of 119 feet in depth would be requisite, an up-lockage from the lake of 350 feet, and a down-lockage to the Pacific of 432 feet. Water to supply the upper locks, it was ascertained, could only be got with difficulty, and at great cost; and, furthermore, a rock-cut of three-fourths of a mile long would be necessary, from low-tide mark in the bay of Salinas to deep water. In short, the physical difficulties of this line, if not of a nature to make the construction of a canal impossible, were nevertheless such as to make it impracticable.
It seems that Col. Childs was limited by his instructions to an examination of the direct line between Lake Nicaragua and the Pacific, provided that any of the routes proposed should prove feasible. As a consequence, finding a route which, in his opinion, was practicable, he made no surveys of the various lines which had been indicated by myself and others, from the superior lake of Managua to the ports of Tamarinda, Realejo, and the Bay of Fonseca. This is a source of regret, especially in view of the deficiency on the surveyed line of a reasonably good harbor on the Pacific—Brito, as already said, being utterly inadequate for a work of the kind proposed, while Realejo and the Bay of Fonseca are all that can be desired as ports.
A line, however, extending to any of the ports here named, would require not only to pass through the entire length of Lake Nicaragua, but also to overcome the obstacles which intervene between that body of water and Lake Managua. Much of the confusion and misapprehension, as to the connection between these lakes, has been set right in Chapter XV. of the preceding narrative. The distance between the two is about sixteen miles, of which twelve miles is overcome by a broad, shallow arm of Lake Nicaragua, called the Estero de Panaloya. It varies from six to fifteen feet in depth, with low banks, and generally a muddy bottom. Strictly speaking, this Estero is part of Lake Nicaragua, and the actual distance between the lakes does not, therefore, exceed four miles.
The estate of Pasquiel, at the head of this estuary, is the limit of navigation. Above, for a mile and a half, to Paso Chico, the bed of the river is full of large and isolated rocks, resting upon a bed of volcanic breccia. Beyond Paso Chico, the bed, or rather the former bed of the river, (for except in rainy seasons there is no water here beyond what flows from springs,) is the same solid breccia, worn into basins and fantastic “pot-holes” by the water. Within one mile of the lake of Managua is the fall of Tipitapa, opposite the little village of that name. It is a ledge of the rock above described, and is from twelve to fifteen feet in height. The bed of the stream is here not less than 400 feet in width. From the falls to the lake, the bed is wide but shallow, covered with grass and bushes, resembling a neglected pasture. At the time of my visit (1849), no water flowed through it, nor, so far as I could learn, had any flowed there for years. I can, however, readily believe that in an extremely wet season a small quantity may find its way through this channel, and over the falls. It is, nevertheless, very evident that no considerable body of water ever passed here.52 There is an arm of Lake Managua which projects down the channel for three or four hundred yards, but the water is only two or three feet deep, with an equal depth of soft, gray mud, the dwelling-place of numerous alligators, with reedy shores, thronged with every variety of water-birds. The water of Lake Managua, near the so-called outlet, is not deep, and the channel, in order to admit of the passage of large vessels, would probably require to be well dredged, if not protected by parallel piers. At the distance of about three-fourths of a mile from the shore, I found, by actual measurement, that the water did not exceed two fathoms in depth. No great obstruction to building the proposed canal exists in the section between the two lakes. The rock is so soft and friable that a channel can easily be opened from Lake Managua to the falls. Beyond this the banks are high for three miles, forming a natural canal which only needs to be properly dammed, at its lower extremity, to furnish a body of water adequate to every purpose of navigation. Locks would then be required to reach the estuary of Panaloya. From this point to the lake, I conceive, may prove the most difficult part of this section, although apparently the easiest. Where the bottom is earth or mud, the desirable depth of water may be secured by dredging; but where it is rock, as it certainly is near its upper extremity, some difficult excavation will be required. The banks downward to Lake Nicaragua are so low as to prohibit assistance from dams, except by diking the shores.
Lake Managua may thus be said virtually to have no outlet. The streams which come in from the Pacific side are insignificant; and though, as already stated, the Rio Grande and other streams of considerable size flow into it from the direction of Segovia, yet they vary much with the season of the year, and seldom furnish a greater quantity of water than is requisite to supply the evaporation from so large a surface, in a tropical climate. Nevertheless, a reservoir like that of Managua, with 1,200 square miles of surface, would be adequate to supply all the water required for a ship canal at this point, without any sensible diminution of its volume.
The country between Lake Managua and the Pacific is much more favorable for the construction of a canal than that between Lake Nicaragua and the same ocean. The dividing ridge, to which I have alluded in a previous chapter, as separating the waters of the latter lake from the sea, also extends along the intervening isthmus, very nearly to the head of Lake Managua. Here it is wholly interrupted, or rather subsides into broad plains, rising but a few feet above the lake, and thence descending in a gentle slope to the ocean. Three lines across these plains have been suggested; 1st, by the left shore of the lake to the small port of Tamarinda; 2d, by the same shore to the well-known port of Realejo; and 3d, by the upper shore of the lake to the Gulf of Fonseca, or Conchagua. It is probable that all of these lines are feasible, but a minute survey can only determine which is best.
1.—The first line suggested, to the port of Tamarinda, is considerably shorter than either of the others, not exceeding fifteen or eighteen miles in length. But the water of the lake upon its north-western shore, in the bay of Moabita, is shallow. I sounded it in July, 1849. It deepened regularly from the shore to the distance of one mile, when it attained five fathoms. After that it deepened rapidly to ten and fifteen fathoms. The country between the lake and Tamarinda, so far as can be ascertained, (it being covered with forests) is nearly level, and offers no insuperable obstacle to a canal. There is no town or village near the port, and it seems to have escaped general notice. Nor is it known that it has ever been entered by vessels, except in one or two instances for the purpose of loading Brazil wood. It is small, and tolerably well protected; but is not a proper termination for a work like the proposed canal.
2.—The second line is that to the well known and excellent port of Realejo, formed by the junction of the Telica or Doña Paula and Realejo rivers, and protected on the side of the sea by the islands of Cardon and Asserradores, and a bluff of the main-land. It is safe and commodious, and the water is good, ranging from three and four to eight and nine fathoms. The volcano of El Viejo, lifting its cone upwards of 6,000 feet above the sea, to the north-eastward of the port, forms an unmistakable landmark for the mariner, long before any other part of the coast is visible. This line, starting from the nearest practicable point of Lake Managua, cannot fall short of forty-five miles in length. It is said that the Estero of Doña Paula, which is only that part of the Telica river up which the tide flows, might be made use of for a considerable distance; but that can only be determined by actual survey. I can discover no reason why this route could not be advantageously pursued. It has the present advantage of passing through the most populous and best cultivated part of the country, and terminating at a point already well known. There is no stream upon this line which, as has been supposed by Louis Napoleon and some other writers on this subject, can be made available for supplying this section of the proposed canal with water. The “Rio Tosta,” of which they speak, (by which, from its described position, it is supposed the Rio Telica is meant, for no stream known as the Rio Tosta exists), is a stream of some size, but never furnished a quantity of water sufficient to supply an ordinary canal. The local geography of the plain of Leon is little known to its inhabitants; and, as the roads are hemmed in by impenetrable forests, it is impossible for the traveller to inform himself of the minor topographical features of the country. The Rio Telica empties into the Estero Doña Paula, and it may possibly be made to answer a useful purpose. I have crossed it at many points where it has (as it has for nearly its entire length) the character of a huge natural canal, from sixty to eighty feet deep by perhaps one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards wide at the top, with steep banks, for the most part of a friable substratum of rock or compact earth. And as, at its source, it is not more than fifteen miles distant from Lake Managua, it is not improbable that, by proper cuttings, the waters of the lake might be brought into it, and, after the requisite level is attained, the bed of the stream might be used from that point to the sea, securing the necessary depth of water by locks or dams. If this suggestion is well founded, the principal part of the estimated excavation of this section of the canal may be avoided. In any event, the cutting would not, with the aids furnished by this mechanical age, be an object to deter the engineer.
Every traveller who has passed over the plain of Leon, concurs in representing that the range of hills separating Lake Nicaragua from the Pacific are here wholly interrupted; and I can add my unqualified testimony in support of the fact. The city of Leon is situated in the midst of this plain, midway between the lake and sea; and, from the flat roof of its cathedral, the traveller may see the Pacific; and, were it not for the intervening forests, probably the lake. “A. G.,” quoted by Louis Napoleon, and whose observations are uniformly very accurate, states that the ground, between lake and ocean, at a distance of 2,725 yards from the former, attains its maximum height of 55 feet 6 inches, and from thence slopes to the sea. Other observers vary in their estimates of this maximum elevation, from 49 feet 6 inches to 51 feet. Of course, the precise elevation can only be determined by actual survey. The city of Leon is distant, in a direct line, about fifteen or eighteen miles from the lake. Captain Belcher determined its height, above the Pacific, to be 140 feet; which, deducted from the height of the lake, 156 feet, shows that the plain, where it is built, is sixteen feet below the level of the lake.
It is probable that the deepest cutting on this line, allowing thirty feet for the depth of the proposed canal, would not exceed eighty feet, and this only for a short distance. We have examples of much more serious undertakings of this character. In the canal from Arles to Bouc the table-land Lèque has been cut through to the extent of 2,289 yards, the extreme depth being from 130 to 162 feet. I need hardly add that the Lake of Managua must supply the water requisite for the use of the canal, from its shores to the sea, as there are no reservoirs or streams of magnitude upon this line.
3.—There is still another route, to which public attention has never been generally directed, but which, if feasible, offers greater advantages than either of the others just named, viz., from the northern point of Lake Managua via the Estero Real to the Gulf of Fonseca or Conchagua. The upper part of Lake Managua is divided into two large bays by a vast promontory or peninsula, at the extreme point of which stands the giant volcano of Momotombo. Between this volcano and that of the Viejo, to the north-east of Realejo, running nearly east and west, is a chain of volcanoes, presenting, probably, in a short distance, a greater number of extinct craters, and more evidences of volcanic action, than any other equal extent of the continent. This chain is isolated. Upon the south is the magnificent plain of Leon, bounded only by the sea; and upon the north is also another great plain, the “Llano del Conejo,” bounded by the auriferous hills of Segovia. This plain extends from the northern bay of Lake Managua to the Gulf of Conchagua, which is equalled only by that of San Francisco, and may be described as a grand harbor, in which all the vessels of the world might ride in entire security. It much resembles that of San Francisco in position and form; the entrance from the sea is, however, broader. Its entire length within the land is not far from sixty miles, and its breadth thirty miles. The three States of San Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, have ports upon it. All the adjacent coasts are of unbounded fertility, and possess an unlimited supply of timber. The bay embraces several islands of considerable size and beauty, surrounded by water of such depth as to enable vessels of the largest class to approach close in-shore. The most important of these, from the circumstance of its size, and the fact that it commands and is the key to the entire bay, is the island of Tigre, belonging to Honduras. This island was the head-quarters and dépôt of Drake, and other piratical adventurers, during their operations in the South Sea. On it is situated the free port of Amapala. Its possession, and the consequent control of the Gulf of Fonseca, by any great maritime power, would enable that power to exercise a command over the commerce of the western part of the continent, such as the possession of Gibraltar by the English gives them over that of Europe.
From the southern extremity of the Gulf of Fonseca extends a large estuary, or arm, called the Estero Real. Its course is precisely in the direction of the Lake of Managua; which it approaches to within fifteen or twenty miles, and between it and the lake is the Plain of Conejo, which is, in fact, a part of the plain of Leon. This Estero is as broad as the East River at New York, and has, for most of its extent, an ample depth of water. At thirty miles above the bay it has fifty feet. There is a narrow bar at its mouth, on which, at low tide, there are but about three fathoms. The tide rises, however, nearly ten feet; and with artificial aid the bar could, doubtless, be passed at all times. This Estero is one of the most beautiful natural channels that can be imagined; preserving, for a long distance, a very nearly uniform width of from three hundred to four hundred yards. Its banks are lined with mangroves, with a dense background of other trees.
Captain Belcher, who was here in 1838, went thirty miles up the Estero, in a vessel drawing ten feet of water. He says: “To-day we started with the Starling, and other boats, to explore the Estero Real, which, I had been given to understand, was navigable for sixty miles; in which case, from what I saw of its course in my visit to the Viejo, it must nearly communicate with the Lake of Managua. After considerable labor, we succeeded in carrying the Starling thirty miles from its mouth, and might easily have gone farther, had the wind permitted, but the prevailing strong winds rendered the toil of towing too heavy. We ascended a small hill, about a mile below our extreme position, from which angles were taken to all the commanding peaks. From that survey, added to what I remarked from the summit of the Viejo, I am satisfied that the stream could be followed many miles farther; and, I have not the slightest doubt it is fed very near the Lake Managua. I saw the mountains beyond the lake on its eastern side, and no land higher than the intervening trees occurred. This, therefore, would be the most advantageous line for a canal, which, by entire lake navigation, might be connected with the interior of the States of San Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and extend to the Atlantic. Thirty navigable miles for vessels drawing ten feet we can vouch for, and the natives and residents assert sixty [thirty?] more!”
From the course of the Estero, and the distance it is known to extend, it probably would not require a canal of more than twenty miles in length to connect its navigable waters with those of Lake Managua; in which case there would be a saving over the Realejo line, besides having the western terminus of the great work in the magnificent bay which I have just described. It may, therefore, be safely asserted that a passage from the Lake of Managua to the sea is entirely feasible, and it only remains to determine which of the routes here indicated offers the greatest advantages.
| Routes from the Port of San Juan to the Pacific. | Length of the Rio San Juan. | Distance on Lake Nica- ragua. | From Lake Nica- ragua to Pacific. | Between Lakes Nica- ragua and Managua. | Distance on Lake Managua. | Between Lake Managua and Pacific. | Actual Canal-ization. | Total Length. |
| To Brito | 119 | 57 | 18 | .. | .. | .. | 137 | 194 |
| ″ Tamarinda | 119 | 120 | .. | 4 | 50 | 16 | 139 | 309 |
| ″ Realejo | 119 | 120 | .. | 4 | 50 | 45 | 168 | 338 |
| ″ Estero Real | 119 | 120 | .. | 4 | 50 | 20 | 143 | 313 |
The above table exhibits the estimated distances from sea to sea, on the various lines already described, as also the probable extent of actual canalization. It is assumed, throughout, that the river San Juan cannot be made navigable for ships, and that a lateral canal must be made, for its entire length. The length of the river, including its windings, is nearly one hundred and twenty miles; but it is probable that the distance, in a right line, between the lake and the Atlantic does not exceed ninety miles.
The length of the proposed line of communication from San Juan to Realejo is estimated by Louis Napoleon at 278 miles, as follows: Length of the San Juan, 104 miles; of Lake Nicaragua, 90 miles; River Tipitapa, 20 miles; Lake Leon, or Managua, 35 miles; and distance from the lake to Realejo, 29 miles. This is positively erroneous in some particulars; as, for instance, the distance from Lake Managua to Realejo, which, so far from being only 29 miles, is actually from 40 to 45 miles.
Chapter III — Outline of Negotiations in Respect to the Proposed Canal
In the preceding chapter I have considered solely the question of the practicability of the projected inter-oceanic canal. It will be interesting next to notice, briefly, some of the measures which have been taken towards the construction of the work.
Although its feasibility was asserted early in the sixteenth century, nothing was practically attempted until late in the eighteenth century, when the attention of the Spanish government was called to the subject once more by Godoy, “the Prince of Peace,” and a survey of the route made, under his direction, by Galisteo. After the independence of Central America, another attempt toward the accomplishment of the same object was made by Señor Manual Antonio de la Cerda, afterwards Governor of the State of Nicaragua, who, in 1823, urged the matter upon the Federal Congress, but failed in securing its attention.
During the year 1824, however, various propositions were made from abroad, in respect to the enterprise. Amongst these was one from Messrs. Barclay & Co., of London, bearing date Sept. 18, 1824. They proposed to open a navigable communication between the two oceans, via the River San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, without cost to the government, provided the latter would extend the requisite assistance in other modes. On the 2d of February, 1825, other propositions were made, by some merchants of the United States, signed by Col. Charles Bourke and Matthew Llanos, in which they observe that they had, in the month of December preceding, (1824), sent an armed brig to San Juan, having on board engineers and other persons charged to make a survey of the proposed route. They prayed, in consideration of the advances already made, and the evidences of good faith thus exhibited, that the government would grant them, 1st, an exclusive proprietorship and control of the canal; 2d, an exclusive right of navigating the lakes and dependent waters by steam; 3d, free permission to use all natural products of the country, necessary for the work; 4th, exemption of duty on goods introduced by the Company, until the completion of the work. In return for this, they proposed that the government should receive twenty per cent. on the tolls, and that at the end of the term of —— years, the entire work should revert to the government. Whether the armed brig, and the party of engineers referred to, ever reached their destination, is unknown; nor is it known that the government of Central America ever took any specific notice of their propositions.
The subject was nevertheless regarded as of primary interest throughout all Central America, and the minister of that republic in the United States, Don Antonio José Cañas, was specially instructed to bring the matter prominently before the American government. This he did in an official letter, bearing date Feb. 8, 1825, addressed to Henry Clay, then Secretary of State. In this letter, Sr. Cañas solicited the coöperation of the United States, on the ground “that its noble conduct had been a model and a protection to all the Americas,” and entitled it to a preference over any other nation, both in the “merits and advantages of the proposed great undertaking.” He proposed also, by means of a treaty, “effectually to secure its advantages to the two nations.” The Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Central America, Col. John Williams, was accordingly specially instructed to assure the government of that country of the deep interest taken by the United States in an undertaking “so highly calculated to diffuse a favorable influence on the affairs of mankind,” to investigate with the greatest care the facilities offered by the route, and to remit the information to the United States. But it appears no information of the character required ever reached the American government.
During this year, however, (1825,) various proposals were made to the government of Central America, from abroad, upon the subject; and in June of that year, the National Congress, with a view of determining the principles upon which it desired the work undertaken, passed a decree to the following purport:
“Article 1. Authorizes the opening of a canal, fitted for the passage of the largest vessels, in the State of Nicaragua.
“Art. 2. The works to be of the most solid construction.
“Art. 3. The Government shall offer to the undertakers an indemnification equivalent to the cost and labor of the work.
“Art. 4. The Government shall use all means of facilitating the object; permitting the cutting of wood—assisting the surveyors—forwarding the plans, and generally, in every manner not injurious to public or private interests.
“Art. 5. No duty shall be charged on instruments and machinery imported for the works of the canal.
“Art. 6. The expense of the work shall be acknowledged as a national debt, and the tolls of the canal shall be applied to its extinguishment, after deducting the necessary costs of maintenance and repairs, and the support of a garrison for its defence.
“Art. 7. Any dispute regarding its liquidation or proofs of outlay, shall be determined according to the laws of the republic.
“Art. 8. The Congress shall be entitled to establish, and at all times alter, the rates of toll, as it may think proper.
“Art. 9. The navigation shall be open to all nations, friends or neutrals, without privilege or exclusion.
“Art. 10. The government shall maintain on the lake the necessary vessels for its defence.
“Art. 11. If invincible impediments, discovered in the course of the work, prevent its execution, the republic shall not be liable to make any remuneration whatever.
“Art. 12. In case only a boat canal can be opened, the indemnification shall be proportioned to the smaller benefit which will then result to the republic.”
This decree was published jointly with another fixing six months for receiving proposals; but the term designated was too short for any measures to be taken on the part of companies or individuals, and the Congress only received a repetition of a part of the proposals before made.
The principal of these were made by Mr. Baily and Mr. Charles Beniski—the first as agent of the English house of Messrs. Barclay, Herring, Richardson & Co., and the second of Mr. Aaron H. Palmer, of New York. Mr. Baily’s offer was conditional, while Mr. Beniski’s was positive, and was therefore accepted by the republic. The contractors, under the name and style of the “Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company,” were bound to open through Nicaragua a canal navigable for vessels of all sizes, and to deposit in the city of Granada the sum of $200,000 for the preliminary expenses within six months; to erect fortresses for the protection of the canal, and to have the works in progress within a period of twelve months. In compensation they were to have two-thirds of the profits of the tolls upon the canal until all the capital expended in the work was repaid, with interest at the rate of ten per cent., beside afterwards receiving one-half of the proceeds of the canal for seven years, with certain privileges for introducing steam vessels. The government was to put at their disposal all the documents relating to the subject existing in its archives, to permit the cutting of wood, and to furnish laborers at certain rates of wages. In case of non-completion, the works were to revert unconditionally to the republic. This contract bore date June 14, 1826, and the contractors at once endeavored to secure the coöperation of the government of the United States. A memorial was presented to Congress, and referred to a committee, which reported in due time; but here the matter stopped, although it appears to have received the sanction of De Witt Clinton and other distinguished men.
In fact, Mr. Palmer executed a deed of trust to Mr. Clinton, by which that gentleman, Stephen Van Renssalaer, C. D. Colden, Philip Hone, and Lynde Catlin, were constituted directors of the work. Mr. Clinton’s part was undertaken in entire good faith, and, as he himself expressed it, “for the promotion of a great and good object, which should be kept free from the taint of speculation.” Mr. Palmer went to England in 1827, to secure the coöperation of British capitalists in his enterprise; but, owing to various untoward circumstances, his mission proved abortive, and in the autumn of that year he appears to have abandoned the undertaking.
Although the administration of Mr. Adams did not at once fall in with the proposition of the Central American minister, it was not from a want of interest in the subject, but because it did not desire to commit the country to any specific course of conduct, until the feasibility of the enterprise and the leading facts connected with it should be better known and established. In the mean time, the principles upon which it conceived the work should be undertaken and executed, were well exhibited in Mr. Clay’s letter of instructions to the ministers of the United States, commissioned to the famous Congress of Panama. Mr. Clay said:
“A canal for navigation between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans will form a proper subject of consideration at the Congress. That vast object, if it should ever be accomplished, will be interesting, in a greater or less degree, to all parts of the world; but especially to this continent will accrue its greatest benefits; and to Colombia, Mexico, Central America, Peru, and the United States, more than to any other of the American nations. What is to redound to the advantage of all America, should be effected by common means and united exertions, and not left to the separate and unassisted efforts of any one power. * * * If the work should ever be executed, so as to admit of the passage of sea vessels from one ocean to the other, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated by any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe, upon the payment of just compensation or reasonable tolls. * * You will receive and transmit to this government any proposals that may be made, or plans that may be suggested, for its joint execution, with assurances that they will be attentively examined, with an earnest desire to reconcile the interests and views of all the American nations.”
It will be seen that Mr. Clay, who was at that time a true exponent of the American system of policy, regarded the construction of this work as an enterprise peculiarly American, to be executed by the parties most deeply interested in it, to be under their control, but not therefore exclusive.
After the failure of Mr. Palmer’s project, the whole matter seems to have been allowed to slumber until some time in October, 1828, when the work was proposed to be undertaken by an Association of the Netherlands, under the special patronage of the King of Holland. In March, 1829, General Verveer arrived in Guatemala, as plenipotentiary of the king, with instructions regarding the undertaking of the canal. In consequence of civil distractions, the subject was not taken up until the succeeding October, when commissioners were appointed to treat with Verveer, and on the 24th of July, 1830, the plan agreed upon between them was laid before the National Congress. It was ratified on the 21st of September following. The principal features of the agreement were as follows:
1st. The proposed canal to be open on the same terms to all nations at peace with Central America; but vessels engaged in the slave trade, and all privateers, not to be allowed either to pass the canal or hover in the vicinity of its mouths.
2d. Armed ships not allowed to pass without the express consent of the government of the republic, and this permission never to be granted to a flag at war with any other nation.
3d. The government to use all its endeavors to have the neutrality of the canal recognized by all maritime powers, as also that of the ocean for a certain extent around its mouths.
4th. The republic to make no charge for the land used by the canal, or the raw materials used for its construction; nor to impose taxes on persons employed in the work, who were to be under the protection of the agents of the country to which they might belong.
5th. The work to be of sufficient dimensions to admit the largest ships; and the execution to be left entirely to the parties undertaking it, and to be made wholly at their expense.
6th. The interest on the capital expended to be ten per cent., and as security for both capital and interest, a mortgage to be granted upon the lands for a league on both sides of the canal.
7th. The canal to remain in the hands of the contractors until it had paid cost of construction and repairs, with ten per cent. annual interest thereon, and also until it had paid three millions of dollars, to be advanced as a loan to the government, and then to revert unconditionally to the republic.
8th. The rate of tolls to be regulated by the government and contractors jointly, but always in such a manner as to give it a decided advantage over Cape Horn.
9th. A free commercial city to be founded on the banks, or at one of the entrances of the canal, which, while enjoying entire freedom of trade, religious tolerance, a municipal government, trial by jury, and exemption from military service, to constitute nevertheless a part of the republic, and to be under the special protection thereof.
10th. In respect to navigation and commerce generally, the Netherlands to be put upon a footing of equality with the United States.
Arrangements were accordingly made to send envoys to the Netherlands, with full powers to perfect the plan; and, for a time, the work seemed in a fair way to a commencement; but the revolution in Belgium and its separation from Holland, put an end to these hopes. The news of these events was received with profound regret. Mr. Henry Savage, U. S. Consul, in a letter to Mr. Van Buren, dated Guatemala, December 3, 1830, said: “All concur, and every one now seems tacitly to look forward to the United States for the completion of this grand project. They say that the United States, identified in her institutions with this government, ought to have the preference.”
In 1832, endeavors were made to renew the negotiations with Holland, and the State of Nicaragua passed resolutions agreeing to the propositions of the Dutch envoy, but nothing was accomplished.
Upon the 3d of March, 1835, public attention having again been directed to the subject, a resolution passed the Senate of the United States, “that the President be requested to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the governments of other nations, and particularly with the governments of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of effectually protecting, by suitable treaty stipulations with them, such individuals or companies as may undertake to open a communication from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, by means of a ship canal across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and of securing for ever, by means of such stipulations, the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all nations, on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such undertaking and complete the work.”
Under this resolution, a special agent (Mr. Charles Biddle) was appointed by General Jackson, to proceed without delay, by the most direct route, to the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, ascend the river San Juan to the Lake of Nicaragua, and thence proceed across the continent, by the contemplated route of the proposed canal or railroad, to the Pacific ocean; after which examination, he was directed to repair to Guatemala, the capital of the republic, and, with the aid of Mr. De Witt, the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States, procure all such public documents connected with the subject as might be in existence, and especially copies of all such laws as had been passed, and contracts and conventions as had been made, to carry into effect the undertaking, and also all plans, surveys, or estimates in relation to it. From Guatemala he was directed to proceed to Panama, and make observations and inquiries relative to the proposed connection of the two oceans at that point. Unfortunately, from the difficulties of procuring conveyances to San Juan, the agent went to Panama first. From adverse circumstances, he never reached Nicaragua, and died soon after his return to the United States. He nevertheless made a partial report concerning the isthmus of Panama, to the effect that it was not practicable for a canal.
In 1837, the subject was again taken up in Central America, by General Morazan, who resolved to have the proposed line of the canal properly surveyed, intending to raise a loan in Europe for the execution of the work. Mr. John Baily was employed for the former purpose, but his work was brought to a sudden close by the dissolution of the government of the republic. He nevertheless made a survey of the narrow isthmus intervening between Lake Nicaragua and the Pacific, and also some observations on the river San Juan.
In 1838 a convention was made between the States of Nicaragua and Honduras, under which Mr. Peter Rouchaud was authorized to conclude an agreement in France, for the formation of a company to make a canal, and for other objects; but he effected nothing. The same result attended the efforts of Señor Don George Viteri, subsequently Bishop of San Salvador, and afterwards of Nicaragua, who was sent ambassador to Rome.
In the same year, Mr. George Holdship, representing a company composed chiefly of citizens of the United States, residing in New Orleans and New York, arrived in Central America, with a view of contracting for the opening of the canal with the general government. Finding that Nicaragua had “pronounced” against Morazan, and assumed an independent position, he proceeded to that State, where he at once entered into a contract, which provided for opening the canal, for the establishment of a bank to assist the enterprise, and for colonization on an extensive scale. He returned to the United States—and the matter ended.
This year was also signalized by some further movements on the subject in the United States. A petition was presented to Congress, signed by several citizens of New York and Philadelphia, viz., Aaron Clark, Wm. A. Duer, Herman Leroy, Matthew Carey, and Wm. Radcliff, setting forth that the wants of trade required the opening of a ship communication between the Atlantic and Pacific; that the accumulation of wealth among nations, and the prevalence of peace seemed to indicate a favorable opportunity for the undertaking; and recommending “that an extensive and powerful combination should be formed, and the most judicious and liberal measures adopted, for the purpose of carrying the plan into effect, and securing its benefits permanently to the world at large.” This memorial was referred to a committee, of which Chas. F. Mercer was chairman, who, March 2, 1839, made a report upon it, concluding with the following resolution, which was adopted:
“Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to consider the expediency of opening or continuing negotiations with the governments of other nations, and particularly with those the territorial jurisdiction of which comprehends the Isthmus of Panama, and to which the United States have accredited ministers or agents, for the purpose of ascertaining or effecting a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the construction of a ship canal; and of securing forever, by suitable treaty stipulations, the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all nations, on the payment of reasonable tolls.”
The subsequent action, both of the Executive and Congress, was directed to the opening of a route across the Isthmus of Panama, and resulted in the negotiation of a treaty between the United States and New Granada, by which the neutrality of the Isthmus was guarantied by the former, in consideration of a free transit conceded by the latter. Under this treaty, the existing Panama Railroad Company was organized, and that route of communication between the two oceans placed in American hands.
The disturbances incident on the dissolution of the republic of Central America precluded any serious attention to the project of a canal from 1838 until 1844, when Señor Don Francisco Castellon, having been appointed minister from Nicaragua to France, and failing to interest that government, entered into a contract with a Belgian company, under the auspices of the Belgian king, for the construction of the work. The grant was for sixty years, at the end of which time it was to revert to the State without indemnity, the State receiving meantime an interest of ten per cent. in the profits.
Still later, in April, 1846, a contract was made by Mr. Marcoleta, Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affairs to Belgium, with Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, then a prisoner at Ham, which differed but little from the preceding one, except that the canal was to be called “Canal Napoleon de Nicaragua.” Beyond the publication of a pamphlet upon the subject, under the initials of L. N. Bonaparte, this attempt also proved abortive.53
“France, England, Holland, Russia, and the United States have a great commercial interest in the establishment of communication between the two oceans; but England has, more than the other powers, a political interest in the execution of the project. England will see with pleasure Central America become a flourishing and powerful State, which will establish a balance of power, by creating in Spanish America a new centre of active enterprise powerful enough to give rise to a great feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing Mexico, any further encroachment from the north.”
So the matter rested until 1849, when the acquisition of California by the United States, and the discovery there of vast mineral wealth, again directed public attention to the project in a more serious manner than at any previous period. It now began to assume a practical form, and, as a consequence, there was a renewal of propositions to the government of Nicaragua. The first of these, in the form of bases subject to future adjustment, came, under date of 16th of February, from Mr. Wm. Wheelwright, the projector of the British line of steamers on the western coast of South America, on behalf of an English company. It embodied, substantially, the provisions of the contract of 1844 with the Belgian company, but was never acted upon by the Nicaraguan government.
The second was in the form of a detailed contract, and was entered into between Mr. D. T. Brown, representing certain citizens of New York, and General Muñoz, Commissioner of the Nicaraguan government, on the 14th of March, 1849. Although it was very promptly ratified by the executive, it was not ratified by the company within the time stipulated by its terms.
In the meantime, however, namely, as early as January, 1848, when it became evident that the Mexican war could only terminate in large territorial acquisitions to the United States, the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, the only possible eastern terminus of the proposed canal, was seized by Great Britain, under the pretext of supporting the territorial rights of a savage, facetiously styled “King of the Mosquitos.” This act could not be viewed with indifference by the government of our own country; for it not only violated the principle constantly recognized and asserted by the United States, that the routes of transit between the two oceans should be free to the whole world, uncontrolled by any great maritime power, but it violated also a principle early and well established among the American nations, namely, the exclusion of all foreign, and especially monarchical, interference from the domestic and international affairs of this continent. The real purpose of the seizure of San Juan was too apparent to escape detection; and the government of the United States, upon these principles, would have been bound to interpose against the consummation of the felony. But it was specially bound to interpose, after it had been earnestly and repeatedly solicited to do so by the injured republic in question. These solicitations were forcibly made, in letters addressed to the President of the United States by the Supreme Director of Nicaragua, dated Dec. 15, 1847, as also in letters from the Secretary of State of that Republic of the dates respectively of Nov. 12, 1847, and March 17, 1848. “The obvious design of Great Britain,” said the Director of Nicaragua, “in seizing upon the port of San Juan, and setting up pretensions to sovereignty, in behalf of savage tribes, within the territories of Nicaragua, is to found colonies, and to make herself master of the prospective interoceanic canal, for the construction of which this isthmus alone has the requisites of feasibility and facility.”
Although the matter was thus brought before the American government, it does not seem to have elicited any action beyond certain vague instructions from Mr. Buchanan, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hise, appointed Chargé d’Affairs to Central America. “The object of Great Britain in this seizure,” said Mr. Buchanan, “is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her history, of seizing upon every valuable commercial point in the world, whenever circumstances have placed it in her power. Her purpose probably is to obtain the control of the route for a railroad and canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by way of Lake Nicaragua.” But while insisting upon the policy of “excluding all interference on the part of European governments in the domestic affairs of the American republics,” Mr. Buchanan gave no specific instructions as to the line of conduct to be pursued by Mr. Hise in respect to the proposed canal or the British usurpation. He confined himself to a denial of the British pretensions, and concluded by observing that “the government of the United States has not yet determined what course it will pursue in regard to the encroachments of the British government.”
About this time, viz., under date of April 4, 1849, Mr. Manning, British Vice Consul in Nicaragua, wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows:
“My opinion, if your lordship will allow me to express it, as regards this country for the present, is, that it will be overrun by American adventurers, and consequently bring on Her Majesty’s government disagreeable communications with that of the United States, which possibly might be avoided by an immediate negotiation with Mr. Castillon for a protectorate and transit favorable to British interests. * * The welfare of my country, and the desire of its obtaining the control of so desirable a spot in the commercial world, and free it from the competition of so adventurous a race as the North Americans, induces me to address your lordship with such freedom.”
On his arrival in Central America, Mr. Hise became speedily convinced that the whole scope of British policy in that country was directed to acquiring permanent control of the Nicaraguan isthmus. Deeply impressed with the importance to the United States of a free transit across it, although not empowered to treat with Nicaragua, he nevertheless conceived himself authorized, under the circumstances, in opening negotiations with the government of that republic. He therefore requested the appointment of a commissioner for that purpose to meet him in Guatemala, where, upon the 21st of June, 1849, a special convention relating to this subject was agreed upon. The provisions of this convention, it is not to be denied, were, in some respects, extraordinary, and not in entire harmony with the established exterior policy of the United States. It provided,
1st. That the United States should enjoy the perpetual right of way through the territories of Nicaragua by any means of conveyance then existing or which might thereafter be devised.
2d. That the United States, or a company chartered by it, might construct a railroad or canal from one ocean to the other, and occupy such lands and use such natural materials and products of the country as might be necessary for the purpose.
3d. That the United States should have the right to erect such forts on the line, or at the extremities of the proposed work, as might be deemed necessary or proper for its protection.
4th. That the vessels and citizens of all nations at peace with both contracting powers might pass freely through the canal.
5th. That a section of land two leagues square at either termination should be set apart to serve as the sites of two free cities, under the protection of both governments, the inhabitants of which should enjoy complete municipal and religious freedom, trial by jury, exemption from all military duty, and from taxation, etc., etc.
6th. That in return for these and other concessions, which it is unnecessary to enumerate, the United States should defend and protect Nicaragua, her territorial rights, her sovereignty, preserve the peace and neutrality of her coasts, etc., etc., which guarantees were to extend to any community of States of which Nicaragua might voluntarily become a member.
But while Mr. Hise was thus occupied in Central America, the administration of General Taylor had been inaugurated. The affairs of that country attracted his immediate attention. The letters addressed by the government of Nicaragua to Mr. Polk and Mr. Buchanan, and which had remained unanswered, were replied to in the friendliest spirit; and before the expiration of the first month of General Taylor’s term of office, Mr. Hise was recalled, and the writer of these pages appointed in his stead, as Chargé d’Affaires of the United States to Guatemala, besides receiving special commissions to the other States of Central America, with full powers to treat with them separately, on all matters affecting their relations with this republic. It will be seen, therefore, that Mr. Hise was not only not empowered to treat with Nicaragua, but also that his negotiations were undertaken after the date of his letter of recall, which, however, failed to reach him until after the signing of the special convention, and after my arrival in the country. Under these circumstances, and having meantime determined on a specific line of policy, this convention was neither approved by the American government, nor accepted by that of Nicaragua.
The spirit in which the matter was taken up by the administration of General Taylor, and the principles upon which its action was predicated, are fully and clearly exhibited in the following passages from the instructions addressed to me by Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State. After disproving, in an unanswerable manner, the pretensions of Great Britain on the Mosquito Shore, Mr. Clayton submits the following significant question, and equally significant reply:
“Will other nations interested in a free passage to and from the Pacific, by the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, tamely allow that interest to be thwarted by the pretensions of Great Britain? As regards the United States, the question may confidently be answered in the negative.
“Having now,” continues the Secretary of State, “sufficiently apprised you of the views of the Department in regard to the title to the Mosquito Coast, I desire you to understand how important it is deemed by the President so to conduct all our negotiations on the subject of the Nicaraguan passage as not to involve this country in any entangling alliances on the one hand, or any unnecessary controversy on the other. We desire no monopoly of the right of way for our commerce, and we cannot submit to it if claimed for that of any other nation. We only ask an equal right of passage for all nations on the same terms—a passage unincumbered by oppressive restrictions, either from the local government within whose sovereign limits it may be effected, or from the proprietors of the canal when accomplished. To this end we are willing to enter into treaty stipulations with the government of Nicaragua, that both governments shall protect and defend the proprietors who may succeed in cutting the canal and opening water communication between the two oceans for our commerce. Nicaragua will be at liberty to enter into the same treaty stipulations with any other nation that may claim to enjoy the same benefits and will agree to be bound by the same conditions. We should naturally be proud of such an achievement as an American work; but if European aid be necessary to accomplish it, why should we repudiate it, seeing that our object is as honest as it is openly avowed, to claim no peculiar privileges, no exclusive right, no monopoly of commercial intercourse, but to see that the work is dedicated to the benefit of mankind, to be used by all on the same terms with us, and consecrated to the enjoyment and diffusion of the unnumbered and inestimable blessings which must flow from it to all the civilized world?”
On arriving in Nicaragua, I found there a gentleman representing certain citizens of New York, the object of whose mission was to procure a charter or grant for the construction of a canal through the territories of that republic. Having previously entertained so many projects for the accomplishment of this object, all of which had failed, the government of Nicaragua was indisposed to listen to any further propositions until it was assured, as I was authorized to assure it, that the American government was willing to extend its guarantees to any charter, of a proper character, which might now be granted. Under the confidence inspired by this assurance, it proceeded with alacrity to arrange the terms of a charter, more liberal than any ever before conceded, which was signed on the 27th of August, 1849, and ratified on the 23d of the month following.
The terms of this grant are very well known; yet the following synopsis of its provisions will not prove out of place in this connection. It provides,
1st. That the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship-Canal Company may construct a ship canal, at its own expense, from the port of San Juan, or any more feasible point on the Atlantic, to the port of Realejo, or any other point within the territories of the republic, on the Pacific, and make use of all lands, waters, or natural materials of the country, for the enterprise.
2d. The dimensions of the canal shall be sufficiently great to admit vessels of all sizes.
3d. The grant is for the period of eighty-five years from the completion of the work; the preliminary surveys to be commenced within twelve months; the work to be completed in twelve years, unless unforeseen events, such as earthquakes or wars, shall intervene to prevent it; if not completed within that time, the charter to be forfeit, and whatever work may have been done to revert to the State; at the end of eighty-five years the work to revert to the State, free from all indemnity for the capital invested; the company, nevertheless, to receive fifteen per cent. annually of the net profits, for ten years thereafter, if the entire cost shall not exceed $20,000,000; but if it does exceed that sum, then it shall receive the same percentage for twenty years thereafter.
4th. The company to pay to the State ten thousand dollars upon the ratification of the contract, and ten thousand dollars annually, until the completion of the work; also, to give to the State two hundred thousand dollars of stock in the canal, upon the issue of stock; the State to have the privilege of taking five hundred thousand dollars of stock in the enterprise;-of receive, for the first twenty years, twenty per cent. annually out of the net profits the canal, after deducting the interest on the capital actually invested, at the rate of seven per cent.; and also to receive twenty-five per cent. thereafter, until the expiration of the grant.
5th. The company to have the exclusive right of navigating the interior waters of the State by steam, and the privilege, within the twelve years allowed for constructing the canal, of opening any land or other route or means of transit or conveyance across the State; in consideration of which, the company shall pay, irrespective of interest, ten per cent. of the net profits of such transit to the State, and transport, both on each route, and on the canal, when finished, the officers of the government and its employees, when required to do so, free of charge.
6th. The canal to be open to the vessels of all nations, subject only to certain fixed and uniform rates of toll, to be established by the company, with the sanction of the State, graduated to induce the largest and most extended business by this route; these rates not to be altered without six months’ previous notice, both in Nicaragua and the United States.
7th. All disputes to be settled by referees or commissioners, to be appointed in a specified manner.
8th. All machinery and other articles introduced into the State for the use of the company, to enter free of duty; and all persons in its employ to enjoy all the privileges of citizens, without being subjected to taxation or military service.
9th. The State concedes to the company, for purposes of colonization, eight sections of land on the line of the canal, in the valley of the river San Juan, each six miles square, and at least three miles apart, with the right of alienating the same, under certain reservations; all settlers on these lands to be subject to the laws of the country, being, however, exempt for ten years from all taxes, and also from all public service, as soon as each colony shall contain fifty settlers.
10th. “Art. XXXVI. It is expressly stipulated that the citizens, vessels, products, and manufactures of all nations shall be permitted to pass upon the proposed canal through the territories of Nicaragua, subject to no other nor higher duties, charges, or taxes than shall be imposed upon those of the United States; provided always, that such nations shall first enter into the same treaty stipulations and guarantees, respecting said canal, as may be entered into between the State of Nicaragua and the United States.”
Article xxxvi., which is quoted in full, was drawn up by myself, and its insertion insisted on, in conformity with my instructions. Its simple object was, to put upon the same footing with the United States every nation which should undertake the same obligations with ourselves, in respect to the proposed work. These obligations were distinctly set forth in the treaty of commerce and friendship which was negotiated, simultaneously, with the Nicaraguan government, and which, in Article xxxv., provided as follows:
“ARTICLE XXXV.
“It is stipulated by and between the high contracting parties—
“1st. That the citizens, vessels, and merchandise of the United States shall enjoy in all the ports and harbors of Nicaragua, upon both oceans, a total exemption from all port-charges, tonnage or anchorage duties, or any other similar charges now existing, or which may hereafter be established, in manner the same as if said ports had been declared free ports. And it is further stipulated, that the right of way or transit across the territories of Nicaragua, by any route or upon any mode of communication at present existing, or which may hereafter be constructed, shall at all times be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States, for all lawful purposes whatever; and no tolls, duties, or charges of any kind shall be imposed upon the transit, in whole or part, by such modes of communication, of vessels of war, or other property belonging to the government of the United States, or on public mails sent under the authority of the same, or upon persons in its employ, nor upon citizens of the United States, nor upon vessels belonging to them. And it is also stipulated that all lawful produce, manufactures, merchandise, or other property belonging to citizens of the United States, passing from one ocean to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of exportation to foreign countries, shall not be subject to any import or export duties whatever; or if citizens of the United States, having introduced such produce, manufactures, or merchandise into the State of Nicaragua, for sale or exchange, shall, within three years thereafter, determine to export the same, they shall be entitled to drawback equal to four fifths of the amount of duties paid upon their importation.
“2d. And inasmuch as a contract was entered into on the twenty-seventh day of August, 1849, between the republic of Nicaragua and a company of citizens of the United States, styled the ‘American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company,’ and in order to secure the construction and permanence of the great work thereby contemplated, both high contracting parties do severally and jointly agree to protect and defend the above-named company in the full and perfect enjoyment of said work, from its inception to its completion, and after its completion, from any acts of invasion, forfeiture, or violence, from whatever quarter the same may proceed; and to give full effect to the stipulations here made, and to secure for the benefit of mankind the uninterrupted advantages of such communication from sea to sea, the United States distinctly recognizes the rights of sovereignty and property which the State of Nicaragua possesses in and over the line of said canal, and for the same reason guarantees, positively and efficaciously, the entire neutrality of the same, so long as it shall remain under the control of citizens of the United States, and so long as the United States shall enjoy the privileges secured to them in the preceding section of this article.
“3d. But if, by any contingency, the above-named ‘American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company’ shall fail to comply with the terms of their contract with the State of Nicaragua, all the rights and privileges which said contract confers shall accrue to any company of citizens of the United States which shall, within one year after the official declaration of failure, undertake to comply with its provisions, so far as the same may at that time be applicable, provided the company thus assuming said contract shall first present to the President and Secretary of State of the United States satisfactory assurances of their intention and ability to comply with the same; of which satisfactory assurances the signature of the Secretary of State and the seal of his Department shall be complete evidence.
“4th. And it is also agreed, on the part of the republic of Nicaragua, that none of the rights, privileges, and immunities guarantied, and by the preceding articles, but especially by the first section of this article, conceded to the United States and its citizens, shall accrue to any other nation, or to its citizens, except such nation shall first enter into the same treaty stipulations, for the defence and protection of the proposed great interoceanic canal, which have been entered into by the United States, in terms the same with those embraced in section 2d of this article.”
The provisions of this article were not only in conformity with my instructions, but their design and inevitable tendency were to make it to the interest of every nation in the world to maintain the neutrality of the canal, and the independence and territorial integrity of Nicaragua. They secured to the United States every desirable privilege in her intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with Nicaragua; yet those privileges were in no wise exclusive; they would accrue to every other nation, upon the same conditions; conditions to which no nation except England could possibly object, and she only in the event of insisting on her pretensions over the Mosquito Shore.
And this is precisely the reason why the treaty containing this article was met by the unqualified hostility of the British government; it placed England in a position of antagonism to the whole world, and made it to the interest of every maritime country that she should relinquish her hold on San Juan. To avoid the alternative which the consummation of this treaty would impose, the utmost efforts of her diplomacy were put forth to defeat its acceptance by the contracting parties. In Nicaragua these efforts signally failed; the treaty was unanimously ratified by the Legislative Chambers, simultaneously with the canal contract, on the 23d of September, 1849. It was at once dispatched to the United States, approved by General Taylor and his cabinet, and submitted, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution, to the Senate for its ratification.
This step caused the greatest alarm in the British legation, and Sir Edward Bulwer put forth every influence at his command to postpone, if he could not defeat, the approval of the Senate, which would have brought the whole question of British pretensions to an open issue and a definite conclusion. His exertions to this end were active and unremitting. In the Senate chamber and out of it, publicly and privately, over the council board and over the festive board, everywhere and at all times, this restless and unscrupulous agent wrought out his policy of opposition. His plans were greatly assisted by the distractions of Congress, which was at that moment engaged in the exciting decennial task of “saving the Union,” to the utter neglect of all other business. The blunt honesty and singleness of purpose of General Taylor, it is true, were unassailable; but the weakness and credulity of his Secretary of State proved more than a compensating advantage to Sir Henry in his diplomatic campaign. He prevailed upon this officer to enter into a convention, signed April 19, and proclaimed July 5, 1850, which has since obtained notoriety as the “Clayton and Bulwer treaty,” and has created infinitely greater trouble than it professed to cure. It provided in general terms for the joint protection of the proposed canal by Great Britain and the United States, as follows:
1st. That neither party “will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over” the proposed canal, or erect fortifications commanding the same or in its vicinity, “or occupy, colonize, or assume or exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Shore, or any part of Central America, nor make use of any protection which either affords, or any alliance which either has or may have, for the purpose of erecting, or fortifying, or colonizing the region above named, or any part of it, or for the purpose of assuming or exercising dominion over the same,” nor will either party make use of its relations with those countries to procure exclusive privileges for itself or its subjects in the proposed canal.
2d. Neither party will capture or detain the vessels of the other while passing through the canal, or while within —— distance of either of its extremities.
3d. To protect the parties undertaking the construction of the canal, from “unjust detention, seizure, or violence.”
4th. To use their influence respectively to facilitate the work, and their good offices to procure the establishment of a free port at either end.
5th. To guarantee the neutrality of the canal, so long as the proprietors shall not make unfair discriminations on vessels in transit, or impose unreasonable tolls; to enter into treaties with the Central American States to promote the work; to interpose their good offices to settle all disputes concerning it, etc., etc.
6th. Both governments to lend their support to such company as shall first present evidences of its intention and ability to undertake the work, with the consent of the local governments; one year to be allowed from the date of the ratification of the convention, for the company now in existence to “present evidence of sufficient capital subscribed to accomplish the undertaking,” it being understood that if, in that time, no such evidence shall be presented, then both governments shall be at liberty to afford their protection to any person or company which shall then be prepared to commence and proceed with the work in question.
7th. The same general protection to extend to every practicable route of communication across the continent, on the same principles.54
“Department of State
“Washington, May 7, 1850.}
“E. G. Squier, etc., etc.:
“Sir:—* * * It is proper that I should now inform you that I have negotiated a treaty with Sir Henry Bulwer, the object of which is to secure the protection of the British government to the Nicaraguan canal, and to liberate Central America from the dominion of any foreign power.
“I hope and believe that this treaty will prove equally honorable both to Great Britain and the United States, the more especially as it secures the weak sister republics of Central America from foreign aggression. All other nations that shall navigate the canal will have to become guarantors of the neutrality of Central America and the Mosquito Coast. The agreement is, ‘not to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the canal, or in the vicinity thereof; nor to occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion whatever over any part of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or Central America; nor to make use of any protection or alliance, for any of these purposes.’
“Great Britain having thus far made an agreement with us for the great and philanthropic purpose of opening the ship communication through the isthmus, it will now be most desirable immediately after the ratification of the treaty, on both sides, that you should cultivate the most friendly relations with the British agents in that country, who will hereafter have to devote their energies and coöperation with ours, to the accomplishment of the great work designed by the treaty. Kindness and conciliation are most earnestly recommended by me to you. I trust that means will speedily be adopted by Great Britain to extinguish the Indian title, with the help of the Nicaraguans, or the company, within what we consider to be the limits of Nicaragua. We have never acknowledged, and never can acknowledge, the existence of any claim of sovereignty in the Mosquito king, or any other Indian in America. To do so, would be to deny the title of the United States to our own territories. Having always regarded an Indian title as a mere right of occupancy, we can never agree that such a title should be treated otherwise than as a thing to be extinguished at the will of the discoverer of the country. Upon the ratification of the treaty, Great Britain will no longer have any interest to deny this principle, which she has recognized in every other case in common with us. Her protectorate will be reduced to a shadow—‘Stat nominis umbra’; for she can neither occupy, fortify, nor colonize, or exercise dominion or control in any part of the Mosquito Coast or Central America. To attempt to do either of these things, after the exchange of ratifications, would inevitably produce a rupture with the United States. By the terms neither party can occupy to protect, nor protect to occupy.
(Signed) |“John M. Clayton.”|
Within a week after the promulgation of this convention, Gen. Taylor died. This event was followed by an entire change in the foreign policy of the government, which during the whole of Mr. Fillmore’s administration vibrated between the extremes of gross subserviency and indecent bravado. The British envoy deemed the opportunity favorable for his purpose, and redoubled his exertions to procure the rejection of the treaty with Nicaragua, or its essential modification, so as to do away with the alternative, so fatal to British designs, which its terms imposed. Communication after communication reached the State Department from this zealous officer, in which the circumstance that General Taylor’s administration had condescended to enter into treaty relations with Nicaragua was abundantly ridiculed, and the feeble government of that State not only characterized as ignorant, weak, and poor, but unsparingly denounced as faithless and corrupt. A special point of objection to the treaty, and that on which the envoy placed the greatest stress, was its incompatibility (as he alleged) with his convention with Mr. Clayton. That gentleman, in fact, was accused of duplicity and bad faith in permitting the Nicaragua treaty to rest in the hands of the Senate, which might at any time take it up for ratification, and thus topple down the cunning diplomatic fabric that he had raised.55 These appeals and representations were addressed to a willing ear, and on the 29th of September, 1850, Sir Henry exultingly wrote to Lord Palmerston that “Mr. Webster furthermore said, that he should recommend the Senate to do nothing further, for the present, in respect to Mr. Squier’s treaty.” In what form that recommendation was made is not known; it is perhaps well for the memory of the dead, it certainly is for the credit of American statesmanship, that the details of this surrender of American dignity, honor, and interests lie under “the seal of secrecy.” It is enough to know that soon after the date of Sir Henry’s triumphant announcement to Lord Palmerston, Congress adjourned without action on the treaty. The next session passed with the same result, leaving on the minds of the Nicaraguan people a profound impression of broken faith and impaired national honor.
Returning now to the special subject of the proposed interoceanic canal, we find the “American Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company” so far complying with its charter as to send out a corps of engineers, under Colonel Childs, to survey the line of the work, with the results set forth in a preceding chapter. The expedition had not been long in the field, however, before it became obvious that the undertaking would prove of a much more formidable character than had been supposed, and that the whole idea of constructing a canal conformably to the charter must be abandoned. The survey was nevertheless continued, and an apparent compliance with the letter of the charter kept up, while the grantees dispatched one of their own number to Nicaragua with the view of procuring a separation of the privilege of exclusive steam-navigation, in the interior waters of the State, from the more serious obligations of the canal contract, and to secure other additional privileges necessary to establish a monopoly of transit. This exclusive privilege having been principally conceded for the purpose of facilitating the construction of the canal, and regarding the attempt to procure the separation as covering a design to abandon the proposed canal, by securing independently all that could, for many years at least, prove of value, the government of Nicaragua at first refused its assent to the application. Political disturbances subsequently occurring, the constituted authorities of the State were overthrown, and two distinct governments installed, one at Leon, another at Granada. Availing himself of the necessities of the latter, in respect of arms and money, the agent of the company succeeded in obtaining from it the concessions desired, although under protest from the government established in Leon. With this contested if not invalid concession he returned to New York, and the California emigration being then at its height, a company was readily formed under it, with the denomination of the “Nicaragua Accessory Transit Company,” which, after an infamous career of deception and fraud, the history whereof is written in the proceedings of our courts of law, finally broke up, disastrously, from internal dissensions. With the organization of this company, the anterior canal company was practically dissolved, nor has it since been heard of, except in connection with some abortive attempts to give currency to certain documents called “canal rights,” issued by the grantees of the canal, before the supplementary concession was made, and before the original charter became forfeited for non user. By the provisions of that charter the canal was to be completed within twelve years, ten of which have elapsed without action, and consequently any effort to represent the “American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company” as having a legal or even constructive existence can only be characterized as an impudent attempt at imposture.
As already said, the results of Col. Childs’ survey in Nicaragua were such as to discourage any idea of opening a canal through that country, at a cost within the range of legitimate enterprise. Subsequent efforts to find other and more practicable canal routes, at Darien and Atrato, were unsuccessful, and the surveys of Maj. Barnard at Tehuantepec proved that a canal at that point was simply impossible. The public mind, furthermore, having now for the first time taken up the question of a canal, from a practical point of view, soon settled down into the conviction that however desirable a canal might be for certain purposes, railways would far better subserve the more important and essential requirements of travel and of trade. This conviction gathered strength from the experience of the Panama railway, which, notwithstanding its deficiencies in position and ports, and the deadliness of its climate, was found adequate to the general requirements of commerce. These considerations, still more than the distracted political condition of Nicaragua, were effectual to divert the public mind from the subject of the proposed canal, and it was allowed to rest in abeyance, and probably would have gone entirely out of sight for the remainder of this century, had not attention been called to it again by the fantastic proceedings of a certain Monsieur Felix Belly, of Paris, “publicist, and knight of the orders of San Maurice and Lazarus, and of the Medjidie.” Taking advantage of the reaction against Americans which followed the expulsion of Gen. Walker from Nicaragua, and by adroit implications of being the confidential representative of the Emperor Louis Napoleon, (who, as we have seen, had himself been principal to a contract respecting the canal,) he received from the acting president, or rather dictator, of Nicaragua, a new concession for opening the proposed canal. The instrument bears date, “May 1, 1858, the anniversary of Walker’s capitulation!” Its provisions are such as might be expected from the character of the contracting parties, and do not merit recital. They may, however, be inferred generally from the stipulation of Art. 26, “that the French government shall have the right to keep two ships-of-war stationed in the canal, or in Lake Nicaragua, for the entire duration of the works.” The contract, furthermore, by an eminently Gallic appreciation of congruity and propriety, is accompanied by a grand political manifesto, setting forth that “hitherto all the official agents of the United States in Nicaragua have been accomplices and auxiliaries of fillibusters,” and that, for this and other reasons, Nicaragua was then, and by virtue of that manifesto, “placed under the guarantee of the three powers which have guaranteed the Ottoman Empire—England, France, and Sardinia”—these powers being adjured “no longer to leave the rich countries of Central America to the mercy of barbarians!” Late advices from Nicaragua affirm that the contract with the “Knight of San Maurice and Lazarus” was ratified, with various modifications, on the 8th of April, 1859, by the Legislative Chambers of the State.56 It will thus be seen that the somewhat dreary history of earnest but unsuccessful attempts to connect the seas by means of a canal, is finally to be relieved by a comic episode; and we may indulge the pleasing hope, that the all too sad reminiscences connected with the undertaking, like the too serious impressions left by a tragedy, are to be happily dissipated by the opportune introduction of a farce! To Punch and Charivari remains the congenial task of recording and illustrating the future career and the prospective triumphs of Monsieur Belly, “Publicist, Knight, etc.,” in Nicaragua!
END
Notes
51. No one should be deceived by the use of the term Rio as applied in Spanish America. It may mean anything from a mere rill upwards to the largest river. Thus, the Rio Lajas is a running stream for only part of the year. During the dry season it is simply a long, narrow lagoon, of sluggish Lethean water, without current, and the bar at its mouth is dry, cutting off all connection with the lake. The lake along this part of the coast is very shallow, the bottom rock. The engraving shows its appearance in the month of December.
52. It is said that the river Tipitapa was a considerable stream up to 1844, but that, in consequence of an earthquake in that year, it ceased to flow. Hence, it has been inferred that some subterranean channel was then opened, sufficiently large to pass the water which had previously flowed through the Tipitapa channel. This statement lacks confirmation. Oviedo tells us that in his time (1527) the amount of water in the river underwent great variations with the change of seasons. That the level of water in the lake is subject to great changes, I can personally bear witness. In 1849, the road from Matearas to Nagarote ran, for a long distance, along the shores of the lake, over a beach varying from one hundred to three hundred yards in width. In 1853, I found the water entirely covering this beach, as well as the old mule-path along the shore, to the depth of from five to ten feet. The low stage of water in the lake in 1849, and its absence in the channel of Tipitapa, were doubtless due to a succession of comparatively light rainy seasons, or of dry years. I have no doubt that in 1853, there was a considerable flow of water through the channel of Tipitapa. At any rate, I am not inclined to ascribe any marked change in the hydrographic system of the country, to the earthquake of 1844.
53. The following paragraph from the pamphlet in question furnishes a remarkable commentary on the “enlightened views and liberal policy” attributed to the emperor by his partisans:
54. This treaty was ratified by the United States, less on the merits of the guarantee which it extended to the projected canal, than because it was understood to put an end to the obnoxious protectorate, amounting to absolute dominion, of Great Britain on the Mosquito Shore. Such was the understanding of the treaty by Mr. Clayton, the negotiator on the part of the United States, who, in a despatch under date of May 7, 1850, said, in reference to it:
55. See Letters of Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Palmerston and Mr. Webster, pp. 70, 71 of “Correspondence with the United States respecting Central America,” printed by order of Parliament, 1856.
56. It is stated also that this ratification is coupled with certain arrangements to open a transit route, by means of small boats on the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, and by carriages from the lake to the Pacific, as was done by the extinguished “Accessory Transit Company.” So far as M. Belly has any practical object, it is probably this—to obtain the exclusive right for such a transit, or the concession of such privileges as will give a practical monopoly. This may easily be done, notwithstanding that Nicaragua has declared the transit “open and free.”