Chapter XIII Man and the Ape
The primary object of the present essay is to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Darwin and other writers as to the origin of man—that he has sprung from the ape by simple descent—can be depended on, and if not, what is the nature of man’s relationship to the animal kingdom.
Without further preface, I shall proceed to consider as briefly as possible the main arguments adduced by Mr. Darwin in support of this conclusion.364 Those which are derived from the consideration of physical data appear to me to be of comparatively small importance, since they may be admitted without seriously affecting the question at issue. They are almost all connected with the fact that man is “constructed on the same general type or model with other mammals.” Thus it is with the brain, every chief fissure and fold of which is declared to be developed in the brain of the orang equally with that of man. Their constitutional habit, however, appears also to be the same. Thus man and monkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious diseases; medicines produce the same effect on both, and most mammals exhibit the mysterious law of periodicity in various diseases. These are interesting facts, but the most important for the argument of the ape-descent of man are those which show the existence in the human body of certain rudimentary organs and structures which are fully developed with some of the lower animals. It is possible, however, to explain this phenomenon without having recourse to the hypothesis of a simple ape-descent; even if it be admitted with M. Broca, that in the parallel between man and the anthropoids, the comparison of organs shows only some slight differences.365 This may be granted even as to the brain, and that “the immense superiority of man’s intelligence depends, not on the anatomical structure of his brain, but on its volume and power.”366 But then, if such is the case, it is all the more difficult to account for the vast difference which, says Broca, a comparison of function reveals, and which led M. Gratiolet to exclaim that, although man is indeed by his structure a monkey, yet by his intelligence he is a God.367
While admitting that physiological considerations reveal a much wider interval between man and the anthropoid apes than anatomical data require, M. Broca would hardly allow that the former exhibits anything peculiar in his mental action. So, also, Mr. Darwin says that man and the higher mammals “have some few instincts in common. All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations—similar passions, affections, and emotions, even the more complex ones; they feel wonder and curiosity; they possess the same faculties of imitation, attention, memory, imagination, and reason, though in very different degrees.”368 The faculty of articulate speech, moreover, is said not in itself to offer “any insuperable objection to the belief that man has been developed from some lower form;” while the taste for the “beautiful” is shown not to be peculiar to the human mind.369 The moral sense is supposed by Mr. Darwin to be the most distinctive characteristic of man; but even this is asserted to have been developed out of the social instincts which man and many of the lower animals have in common.370 Finally, self-consciousness, abstraction, &c., even if peculiar to man, are declared to be “the incidental results of other highly-advanced intellectual faculties;”371 and these again are mainly due to the continued use of a highly-developed language, which originated in “the imitation and modification, aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals and man’s own instinctive cries.”372
If, however, all this be true, how are we to account for the wonderful intellectual superiority of man? Haeckel gives an explanation which, although ingenious, is far from satisfactory. He says that it is owing to the fact that “man combines in himself several prominent peculiarities, which only occur separately among other animals.” The most important of these are the superior structure of the larynx, the degree of brain or soul development, and that of the extremities, the upright walk, and, lastly, speech. But, says Haeckel, “all these prerogatives belong singly to other animals—birds with highly-organised larynx and tongue, such as the parrot, &c., can learn to utter articulate sounds as perfectly as man himself. The soul’s activity exists among many of the higher animals, particularly with the dog, the elephant, and the horse, in a higher degree of cultivation than with man when most degraded. The hand, as a mechanical instrument, is as highly developed among the anthropoid apes as with the lowest men. Finally, man shares his upright walk with the penguin and other animals, while capacity for locomotion is more fully and more perfectly developed among many animals than with man.” Haeckel concludes, therefore, that it is “solely the fortunate combination of a higher organisation of several very important organs and functions which raises most men, but not all, above the animals.”373 This explanation, however, appears rather to increase the difficulty than to remove it. Some of Haeckel’s statements might probably be challenged with success; but even admitting their truth, what cause can be given of the marvellous combination in man, of qualities possessed separately by animals, the highest in the class to which they belong?
Mr. Darwin justly remarks, that “the belief that there exists in man some close relation between the size of the brain and the development of the intellectual faculties, is supported by the comparison of the skulls of savage and civilised races of ancient and modern peoples, and by the analogy of the whole vertebrate series.”374 There must, indeed, be a certain agreement between the brain and its intellectual products, and hence the large size of the human brain requires that the mental phenomena of man should be of a vastly superior nature to those presented by the lower animals. Whether, according to the developmental view of the correspondence between human and brute mental faculties, the lower races of man, as compared with animals, really exhibit an intellectual superiority commensurate with the largeness of their brains, may be questioned. Mr. Wallace, indeed, declares that they do not, and he goes so far as to say that “a brain slightly larger than that of the gorilla would, according to the evidence before us, fully have sufficed for the limited mental development of the savage.”375 This opinion is correct, on the assumption that animal and human mental action is perfectly analogous, and Mr. Wallace would undoubtedly be right in asserting that the savage possesses a brain “quite disproportionate to his actual requirements,” if by this phrase is meant his mere animal wants. But the savage is a man, and the size of brain required by him must be judged of, not by the degree of intellectual action he exhibits, but by its accompaniments—not by quantity, but by quality.
The source of man’s superiority must be sought in an examination of his mental faculties, and yet the inquiry is vitiated at the very commencement, by the assumption that the mind of man differs from that of the animal only in the degree of its activity. I am prepared to admit that the higher mammalia, at least, have the power of reasoning, with all the faculties which are essential to its exercise. But this very fact makes it utterly incomprehensible how the result of human mental activity can be so superior, unless some further principle or faculty than those which the animal mind possesses operates in that of man. What this principle or faculty is, may be shown by reference to certain facts connected with language. Mr. Darwin ascribes the origin of human speech to imitation and modification of natural sounds and man’s own instinctive utterances.376 That the primitive elements of man’s language were thus obtained is doubtless true. Something else, however, is required to explain the phenomena presented by the languages of uncultured peoples. Such, for instance, cannot have been the origin of certain ideas which are apparently common to the minds of all peoples however savage. It has been said that these peoples, although having names for every particular object, have no words to express a class of objects. This statement must be received with caution. But if absolutely true in the sense intended, it cannot be denied that nearly all primitive languages have words denoting colours, and these by their very nature, as expressive of attributes, are applicable to a series of objects.
Now there is not the slightest reason to believe that animals have any idea of qualities, as such. Even the taste for the beautiful, which Mr. Darwin tells us is not unknown to various animals—especially birds, has relation to the object which attracts by its colour, &c., and not to the colour itself. But it is just this perception of the qualities of objects which is at the foundation, and forms the starting point, of all human progress. The essential instrument of intellectual development, articulate language, was first prompted by such a perception, and it was in the recognition of the qualities of actions, by reflection on their consequences, that the moral sense was gradually evolved. It can hardly be that a power which has had so wonderful an effect, and one which is so different from anything met with among the lower animals, can be referred to any of the ordinary faculties which these possess. If not, we must ascribe it to a new faculty altogether, a kind of spiritual insight, which can be explained only as resulting from the addition of a principle of activity superior to that which is the seat of the animal life. If we were to trace the beginning of every single branch of human culture, it would be found to have originated in the exercise of such a faculty of reflection as that here described. The elements of knowledge man possesses in common with the animals around him; but these have not built up any superstructure, because they have no spiritual insight such as will enable them to analyse those elements, and thus to fit them for re-combination into that wonderful series of forms which they have taken in the human mind.
It is hardly necessary to discuss here the nature of the principle which thus shows its energy in the mind of man. Whether it is the cause or the effect of the refined organisation exhibited by the human body need not now be considered. If the latter, however, it may be objected that—assuming the human bodily organism to have been derived by descent from a lower animal form, according to the principles of natural selection—the intellectual faculty peculiar to man must have had analogous origin. To this it might be answered that man’s special faculty could not have been derived from an animal organism which does not itself possess it; but it is advisable rather to test that conclusion by a consideration of the physical data, and to see how far the argument for natural descent can be supported. According to this view, the tendency to the bipedal character was the first to become operative in the gradual development of man out of the ape. The erect form is supposed, however, to have been assumed that the arms and hands might have full play,377 and it is evident that the free use of these would not have been of any special advantage without an increased brain-activity to guide them. Probably the changes required in the physical structure would be concomitant, but if they had a starting point it would surely be in the brain rather than in the extremities.
The great development of the encephalon in man as compared with the monkey tribe would, in fact, require all the other supposed changes. Thus the greatly increased size and weight of the brain and its bony case, combined with the position of the foramen magnum at the base of the skull, would necessitate the erect position of the body, and this would supply the arms and upper part of the trunk with the required freedom of movement. These changes would be accompanied by the modification of the pelvis and lower limbs, while the increased sensitiveness of the skin, resulting from man’s more refined nervous structure, will sufficiently account for its general nakedness,378 without supposing, with Mr. Darwin, the influence of sexual selection.379 It is therefore in reality only the large size of the human brain that has to be accounted for, and this is by no means easy on the principle of natural selection. No doubt, with the increased activity of the mental powers, the brain would become more voluminous. But what was to determine that increased activity? It can only have been an improvement in the conditions of existence, to which man’s supposed ape progenitors were subjected, for which no sufficient reason can be given. Moreover, those progenitors would be subjected to the inevitable struggle for existence—a struggle which, even with man, in an uncivilised state, has a tendency to brutalise rather than to humanise. Under these conditions it would seem to be impossible for man to have raised himself to so great a superiority over his nearest allies as even the lowest savage exhibits. “His absolute erectness of posture, the completeness of his nudity, the harmonious perfection of his hands, the almost infinite capacities of his brain, constitute,” says Mr. Wallace, “a series of correlated advances too great to be accounted for by the struggle for existence of an isolated group of apes in a limited area,”380 as Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis supposes.
While firmly convinced, on the grounds already stated, that man cannot have been derived from the ape by descent with natural selection, I am by no means prepared to admit that he may not have been so derived under other conditions. Although man undoubtedly has a mental faculty of the utmost importance which the animals do not possess, agreeing with his superiority of physical structure, there can be no question that, both physically and mentally, he is most intimately allied to the members of the animal kingdom. Before endeavouring to furnish a solution of the difficult question of the origin of man under these conditions, I would point out, what is so ably insisted on by M. Broca,381 that transformism, to use the continental term, is wholly distinct from “natural selection,” or any other mode by which the transformation may be originated or effected. This is a most important consideration, and one which Mr. Darwin has incidentally referred to.382 That man is the final term in a process of evolution, the beginning of which we cannot yet trace, appears to me to be a firmly established truth. The descent of man from the ape under the influence of external conditions is, however, a totally different proposition, and one of which no actual proof has yet been furnished, the argument really amounting to this, that the correspondences between man and the higher mammals render it more likely that he has descended from the ape than that he has been specially created. This may be true, and yet those correspondences be owing to a very different cause from the one thus supposed for them.
Mr. Herbert Spencer affirms that “successive changes of conditions would produce divergent varieties or species” of the organisms subject to them, apart from the influence of “natural selection,” which, in the absence of such successive changes of conditions, would effect “comparatively little.”383 It is to the latter especially Mr. Spencer traces the gradual evolution of nature, on the process of which he has thrown so much light. Thus, when treating elsewhere of that evolution, he says, “While we are not called on to suppose that there exists in organisms any primordial impulse which makes them continually unfold into more heterogeneous forms; we see that a liability to be unfolded arises from the actions and reactions between organisms and their fluctuating environments. And we see that the existence of such a cause of development pre-supposes the non-occurrence of development where this fluctuation of actions and reactions does not come into play.”384 It is evident that this theory, like that of Mr. Darwin, supposes the occurrence of slight structural changes which, in the absence of knowledge as to their exciting causes, may be described as “spontaneous,” and the perpetuation of which is the establishment of new forms or species. But among domestic animals, and by analogy we may assume, therefore, among wild animals, variation in the way supposed is not the only mode by which the physical structure may be modified. Various instances of sudden change have been collected which are very difficult to deal with, and they have led Mr. Huxley to remark that Mr. Darwin’s position “might have been even stronger than it is if he had not embarrassed himself with the aphorism ‘natura non facit saltum,’ which turns up so often in his pages.” Mr. Huxley adds “that nature does make jumps now and then, and a recognition of the fact is of no small importance in disposing of many minor objections to the doctrine of transmutation.”385 Minor objections may certainly be thus removed, but only by introducing one of much greater moment. If, as Mr. Spencer says, “natural selection is capable of producing fitness between organisms and their circumstances,”386 it must be by the perpetuation of slight changes, and there does not, indeed, appear to be any room in the hypothesis of natural selection for the saltatory movements which it is so necessary to explain.
The changes which organisms undergo, whether sudden or gradual, and whatever their approximate exciting cause, take place in pursuance of the evolution of organic nature, and there can be no doubt that this proceeds under the guidance of law. Professor Owen expresses this fact in saying that “generations do not vary accidentally in any and every direction, but in preordained, definite, and correlated courses.”387 This may be accepted as expressing a general truth, subject to some qualification of the word “preordained.” It is not exactly true, however, for variations are not always regular and orderly. Within certain limits, indeed, they would seem to take place in any direction, but there is always a tendency for them to accumulate in that course along which they meet with the least resistance. This is in accordance with the principle laid down by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that everything tends towards equilibration, the state being one not of absolute but of moving equilibrium, while “throughout evolution of all kinds there is a continual approximation, and more or less complete maintenance of this moving equilibrium.”388 The ultimate result is that, “when through a change of habit or circumstance an organism is permanently subject to some new influence, or different amount of an old influence, there arises, after more or less disturbance of the old rhythms, a balancing of them around the new average conditions produced by this additional influence.”389 It is evident that the variations which have been originated before the attainment of the state of temporary stability thus established would have little chance of being perpetuated; and we have probably here the explanation of the fact that the progress of evolution reveals itself so often by sudden movements. In these cases, where the disturbing influence has rendered the equilibrium of the organism affected more or less unstable, a new centre of equilibrium will be formed, and the appearance of a fresh specific form be the result.
However fitted this explanation may be to account for the gaps which so often present themselves in developmental series of animal structures, it is far from sufficient to account for the origin of man, at least on the assumption of evolution governed merely by mechanical principles. Neither man nor animals, in fact, could have come into being at all unless there had been an organic necessity, quite independent even of the general average effects of the relations of living bodies to their environments, insisted on by Mr. Spencer. That these agencies have been very influential in the evolution of organic nature is undoubtedly true. But their influence in this respect depends altogether on the organism on which they act being in a condition of unstable equilibrium. Mr. Spencer declares, when speaking of the condition of homogeneity being a condition of unstable equilibrium, that this instability is “consequent on the fact that the several parts of any homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different forces—forces that differ either in kind or amount.”390 This may be true in relation to animal and vegetable forms, whose germs are supposed not to show the slightest trace of the future organism, although even as to these Mr. Spencer can say that “doubtless we are still in the dark respecting those mysterious properties which make the germ, when subject to fit influences, undergo the special changes beginning this series of transformations.”391 But the unstable condition of the primeval homogeneous substance of nature could not be due to the cause assigned. For it requires the impossible case of certain forces, the action of which is supposed to result in the condition of instability, existing outside of that substance which, as being identified with the Absolute, we must assume to be present throughout all space. The notion of an universally diffused homogeneous substance, acted on by external forces, appears to be contrary to reason; and the proper explanation of the original condition of instability would seem to be that it is natural to the primeval substance as the result of an innate energy, the internal force which constitutes its vitality. But this substance cannot have been merely “material.” There is just as little room for transition from the inorganic to the organic as from the animal to man; there is but one satisfactory starting-point—nature itself viewed as organic.
If such is the case when the changes observable in nature are viewed as strictly evolutional, much more so is it when they are traced to the lower activity of natural selection. Mr. J. J. Murphy well remarks that “the facts of variability being the greatest in the lowest organisms, while progress has been most rapid among the higher ones, shows that there is something in organic progress which mere natural selection among spontaneous variations will not account for.”392 Elsewhere the same writer declares that “no solution of the questions of the origin of organisation and the origin of organic species can be adequate which does not recognise an organising intelligence over and above the common laws of matter”—i.e., the laws of self-adaptation to circumstances and natural selection.393 This organising intelligence is supposed to have been bestowed once for all on vitalised matter by the Creator, so as to prevent the necessity of separately organising each particular structure,394 although it is suggested that man’s spiritual nature may be a direct result of creative power.395 Mr. Wallace objects to the law of “unconscious intelligence,” that “it has the double disadvantage of being both unintelligible and incapable of any kind of proof.”396 This is true enough, but it has the equally serious defect of reintroducing the notion of special “creation,” with all the difficulties attendant on the origin of matter, and the separate existence of independent spiritual and material substances.
Mr. Wallace himself is so much struck with the imposing position occupied by man that he thinks that “a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms.”397 He supposes, moreover, that “the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the will of higher intelligences, or of one supreme intelligence.”398 It seems to me, although Mr. Wallace thinks otherwise, that this notion completely undermines the hypothesis of natural selection. If not only the whole universe, but also a particular portion of it—man—has been divinely “willed,” analogy will lead us to believe that every other portion of the whole has thus originated.
The difficulties attendant on theories such as those of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Wallace, and the unsatisfactory explanation afforded by the theory of evolution, as usually understood, of the origin of man, have led me to the opinion that nature as a whole is organic, and that man is the necessary result of its evolution. Not only so, however; man must be viewed as the real object of the evolution of nature viewed as a living organism. Without him nature itself would be imperfect, and all lower animal forms must, therefore, be considered as subsidiary to the human organism, and as so many stages only towards its attainment. But if living nature is an organic whole, its several parts must be intimately connected. Hence the numerous correspondences between man and the higher mammals cannot be accidental or even merely designed similarities. They betoken an actual and intimate connection between the organisms presenting them, and such an one as is consistent only with a derivation of one from the other. This view differs from that of Mr. Darwin, not in the fact of man’s derivation from the ape, but in the mode and conditions under which it has taken place. Derivation, by virtue of an inherent evolutional impulse, is totally different from simple descent, aided by natural selection. In the latter case the appearance of man may be described as in some sense accidental; in the former, not only is it necessary, but it is that for which all evolution has taken place, the only condition, in fact, under which evolution was possible.
How far such a development of organic forms as I have supposed is consistent with design is a difficult question. It is apparent that when nature is conceived of as forming an organic whole, the universe becomes identified with the Absolute, of whose being relative nature is merely an expression. But is not the possession by relative existences of intellectual faculties, and of the marvellous power of insight or reflection, evidence that the same powers belong also to the absolute Being? The possession by man of intelligence is, in fact, proof that organic nature is intelligent. Still, however, the need of design is not apparent. Granting that relative nature has been evolved out of the absolute existence, such evolution can have taken only one course—that which led to man, who could appear only when the conditions of nature were fitted for him, and who must appear when those conditions were so fitted. Moreover, as man was from the beginning the object of organic evolution, this must have taken place along the line which led to him, without any actually preconceived design or intention other than that which is implied in the preknowledge of man’s appearance. It does not follow, however, that other branches of organic nature besides that which ended in man may not have reached a stage of structural perfection. No doubt they have so done, and thus we can understand how it is that certain animals seem to have been, as Professor Owen asserts, “predestined and prepared for man.” The fitness pointed out by our great anatomist “of the organisation of the horse and ass for the needs of mankind, and the coincidence of the origin of the Ungulates having equine modifications of the perissodactyle structure with the period immediately preceding, or coincident with, the earliest evidence of the human race,” is certainly remarkable.399 I cannot see in these facts, however, anything more than a necessary coincidence arising from the progress of evolution along different planes. It is possible, however, that Professor Owen may mean little more than this, and that he would be satisfied to admit the identity between the “predetermining” agent and organic nature, acting by virtue of the laws of its own evolutional impulse. So at least may be supposed from the fact that he rejects “the principle of direct or miraculous creation,” and recognises “a ‘natural law or secondary cause’ as operative in the production of species in orderly succession and progression.”400 It is difficult to understand how otherwise there could be an “innate tendency to deviate from the parental type.”
Before concluding, reference should be made to certain facts connected with the development of the brain and the human organism generally, which at first sight seem to be quite irreconcilable with the notion of man’s derivation from the ape, even under the conditions I have proposed. Thus, M. Pruner Bey has shown that in man and the anthropomorphous apes there exists “an inverse order of the final term of development in the sensitive and vegetative apparatus, and in the systems of locomotion and reproduction.” The same inverse order is exhibited in the development of individual organs. Thus it is, says Pruner Bey, with a portion of the permanent teeth; Welcher makes a similar remark as to the modifications of the base of the skull in relation to the sphenoidal angle of Virchow; and Gratiolet points out an analogous fact in the development of the brain. The language of the great French anatomist is very precise. He says: “With man and the adult anthropormorphous apes there exists a certain resemblance in the mode of arrangement in the cerebral folds which has imposed on some persons and on which they have strongly insisted. But this result is attained by an inverse process (marche inverse). In the monkey the temporosphenoidal convolutions which form the middle lobe appear and perfect themselves before the anterior convolutions which form the frontal lobe. With man, on the contrary, the frontal convolutions appear the first, and those of the middle lobe show themselves the last.” In referring to these facts, M. de Quatrefages declares that “when two organised beings follow an inverse course in their development, the more highly developed of the two cannot have descended from the other by means of evolution.”401 If by evolution is meant simple descent under the influence of natural selection and modification of external conditions, this conclusion is certainly correct. It is true that, contrary to the opinion expressed by Gratiolet, that “the human brain differs the more from that of the monkey the less it is developed, and an arrest of development can only exaggerate this natural difference.”402 M. Carl Vogt declares that the human brain may, under certain conditions, not only externally resemble that of the higher apes, but also that the superior portion of it (parties voûtées) in microcephalic idiots is really developed after the simian type,403 the skull itself having both simian and human elements.404 But does not the fact that the lower part of the microcephalic skull, and the portion of the brain which is the earliest developed, are formed on the human type, amply justify the assertion of Gratiolet that “the microcephale, however degraded, is not a brute, but only a modified man?” Is it not evident, moreover, that however highly an ape brain may be developed, it could not become like that of a man, at least by descent with natural selection? It is different, however, if we view man as the necessary product of the evolution of organic nature. We may well believe that when the sudden advance from the ape structure to that of man was made, under the conditions above proposed, the great increase in the size of the brain and the change in the position of the foramen magnum were accompanied by an alteration in the order of development, not only of the different parts of the brain, but also of the internal apparatus as pointed out by M. Pruner Bey. But the advance having once taken place, the human type can no more be lost; and although the approach to the simian type which appears in the abnormal microcephalic brain evidences the intimate connection between man and the ape, yet it furnishes no disproof of derivation, one from the other, by the agency of internal evolutional impulse.
In conclusion, I would again refer to the fact, so strongly insisted on by M. Broca, that the truth of the theory of evolution is not dependent on that of the hypothesis of natural selection. The great defect of “natural selection” as an agent in organic evolution, is that it cannot do more than perpetuate certain structural peculiarities, the appearance of which it is powerless to explain. The hypothesis is properly defined as “natural selection among spontaneous variations;” and it is the appearance of these variations which constitutes the most important part of the problem. They can be explained only on the assumption of “an internal tendency to deviate from the parental type;” and granting that this tendency results from a necessary evolution of nature viewed as an organic whole, there is no difficulty in accounting for all the facts dwelt on by Mr. Darwin without supposing the derivation of man from the ape by simple descent, although not without identifying the universe with Deity, and viewing its various manifestations as His organs.
Footnotes:
1 Eng. Trans., vol. ii., p. 647.
2 “The History of India,” vol. i., p. 8.
3 Ditto, p. 13.
4 “Origin of Pagan Idolatry,” vol. iii., p. 117.
5 “Histoire abrégée de differens Cultes,” vol. ii.
6 “A Discourse on the Worship of Priapus.”
7 “Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London,” vol. i., p. 320.
8 Dulaure, op. cit., vol. ii., 219.
9 “Rural Bengal,” p. 203.
10 Ennemoser’s “History of Magic” (Bohn), vol. ii., p. 33.
11 Dr. Fernand Castelain, in his work, “La Circoncision est-elle utile?” comes to the conclusion (p. 14) that it is both hygienic and moral. The value of circumcision may be admitted, without ascribing its origin to a sanitary motive.
12 Herodotus, “Euterpe,” sec. 104.
13 De Coulanges, “La Cité antique,” 6th ed., pp. 36, 100.
14 M. Elie Reclus, in a remarkable paper presented in 1879 to the Anthropological Institute, affirms (p. 16, et seq.) that circumcision is derived from the custom of emasculation practised on captives, which is equivalent to death, and that it is a substitute for human sacrifices. He admits, however (p. 32), that, among the Semites at least, circumcision was a “consecration of the sexual organ to a Phallic divinity.”
15 “Ante-Nicene Christian Library,” vol. iv. (Clement of Alexandria), p. 27.
16 The Hebrew word bara translated “created” can be used in a different sense.
17 “Jashar,” by Dr. Donaldson, 2nd ed. (1860), p. 45, et seq.
18 Smith’s “Dictionary of the Bible”—Art., “Apple-tree.” Inman’s “Ancient Faiths,” vol. i., p. 274.
19 “Zambesi and its Tribes,” p. 188.
20 “Missionary Travels in South Africa,” p. 495.
21 “Journey to Ashango Land,” p. 295.
22 “River Zaire,” p. 181.
23 “Travels through Central Africa,” p. 394, 407.
24 “Travels,” vol. ii., p. 391; and vol. iii., p. 665.
25 Journal of R. Geog. Society, vol. xvi., p. 240.
26 “The Malayan Archipelago,” vol. i., p. 158.
27 Wilkinson, vol. iv., p. 260, 313.
28 Tennent’s “Ceylon,” vol. ii., p. 520.
29 M. Littré sees in the two trees of Genesis only the soma, which was introduced into the Brahmanical Sacrifices, which, with the Iranians, was transformed into two mystic trees.—La Philosophie Positive, 3rd vol., p. 341, et seq.
30 Op. cit., vol. ii., p. 448.
31 Gen., xxxv. 4.
32 Ezek., vi. 13.
33 “Celtic Researches,” p. 446.
34 “Aryan Mythology,” vol. i., p. 274n.
35 Ditto, vol. ii., p. 19.
36 See Grimm’s “Teutonic Mythology,” p. 571, et seq.
37 Cox, op. cit., vol. i., p. 274n.
38 According to Gen., ii. 23, the name isha (woman) was bestowed by Adam on the first woman, because she was taken out of man (Ish)—terms which were used in reference to man and wife. This is shewn by the subsequent reference to marriage (v. 24). See Smith’s “Dictionary of the Bible”—Art. “Marriage.”
39 “Ancient Egyptians,” vol. iv., p. 313.
40 Ditto, p. 313.
41 Dulaure’s “Histoire abregée de differens Cultes,” vol. ii., p. 169.
42 See Guigniaut’s “Religions de l’Antiquité” (1825), vol. i., p. 149.
43 See on this, Inman, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 462.
44 The Hindu legend expressly mentions the fig. See infrà.
45 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 108, 527. In the East the pomegranate symbolises the full womb.
46 See Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iv., p. 225, 255, 288.
47 “History of Herodotus,” vol. i., p. 600.
48 Wilkinson’s “Ancient Egyptians,” vol. iv., p. 412, 413; and King’s “Gnostics,” p. 31. See also Bryant’s “Ancient Mythology,” vol. iv., p. 201. The last-named work contains most curious information as to the extension of serpent-worship.
49 See “The Serpent Symbol in America,” by E.G. Squier, M.A.—“American Archæological Researches,” No. 1 (1851), p. 161, et seq.; “Palenqué,” by M. de Waldeck and M. Brasseur de Bourbourg (1866), p. 48.
50 Lajard—“Mémoires de l’Institut Royal de France” (Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres), T. xiv., p. 89.
51 Wood’s “Natural History of Man,” vol. i., p. 185; also Squier’s “Serpent Symbol,” p. 222, et seq.
52 I have a strong suspicion that in the primitive shape of the Hebrew legend, as in that of the Mexicans, both the father and mother of the human race had the serpent form.
53 Op. cit., p. 46. Rudra, the Vedic form of Siva, the “King of Serpents,” is called the father of the Maruts (winds). See infrà as to identification of Siva with Saturn.
54 The idea of circularity appears to be associated with both these names. See Bryant, op. cit., vol. iii., p. 164, and vol. ii., p. 191, as to derivation of Typhon.
55 Lajard. Op. cit., p. 182, “Culte de Mithra,” p. 45; also “Mémoire sur l’Hercule Assyrien de M. Raoul-Rochette.”
56 Mr. J. H. Rivett-Carnac suggests that the snake is a “symbol of the phallus.” He adds, “The sun, the invigorating power of nature, has ever, I believe, been considered to represent the same idea, not necessarily obscene, but the great mystery of nature, the life transmitted from generation to generation, or, as Professor Stephens puts it, ‘life out of death, life everlasting.’”—Snake Symbol in India (reprinted from. “Journal of As. Soc. of Bengal”), 1879, p. 13.
57 Wilkinson, op. cit., vol. v., p.65
58 Ditto, p. 243.
59 Ditto, p. 239.
60 See Ennemoser’s “History of Magic” (Bohn), vol. i., p. 253.
61 Ditto, p. 243.
62 Guigniaut’s “Le Dieu Serapis,” p. 19.
63 Op. cit., p. 12.
64 Faber’s “Pagan Idolatry,” vol. 1, p. 424n.
65 Prof. Max Müller derives cherubim from [Greek: gryphes], griffins, the guardians of the Soma in the Veda and Avesta. “Chips from a German Workshop,” 2nd ed., i. 157.
66 Ez., c. 28, v. 14-16.
67 See Colenzo’s “Pentateuch” (1865), p. 341.
68 See Faber’s “Pagan Idolatry,” vol. iii., p. 606.
69 C. i., v. 10.
70 C. x., v. 14.
71 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 422.
72 Ez., c. i., v. 7.
73 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 404.
74 “Chinese,” p. 376.
75 See Faber, op. cit., vol. i., pp. 404-410.
76 Lajard, “Le culte de Mithra,” pp. 56, 59.
77 Lajard, op. cit., p. 50; infrà, p. 39.
78 This superstition is found among peoples—the Kafirs, for instance—who do not appear to possess any trace of planetary worship.
79 This is evident from the facts mentioned above, notwithstanding the use of this animal as a symbol of wisdom.
80 In connection with this subject, see St. Jerome, in his letter on “Virginity” to Eustachia.
81 The turning of Aaron’s rod into a serpent had, no doubt, a reference to the idea of wisdom associated with that animal.
82 “The Fallen Angels” (1857).
83 Moor’s “Hindu Pantheon,” p. 101.
84 The Bo-tree. See suprà, p. 18.
85 Probably the fruit is really intended. Higgins refers to “a peculiar property which the fig has of producing its fruit from its flowers, contained within its own bosom, and concealed from profane eyes,” as a reason why the leaves of the fig-tree were selected by Adam and Eve to cover their nakedness. Anacalypsis, vol. ii., p. 253.
86 Hardwicke’s “Christ and other Masters,” vol. i., p. 305-6.
87 Mr. Hardwicke states that the sacred Indian fig is endowed by the Brahmans and Buddhists with mysterious significance, as the tree of knowledge or intelligence.
88 See Beausobre’s curious and learned work, “Histoire de Manichée et du Manichéisme,” Liv. vii., ch. iii.; Gibbon’s “Fall and Decline of the Roman Empire,” vol. ii., p. 186.
89 As already suggested, these may be the ish and isha of Genesis.
90 Lajard, “Le culte de Mithra,” p. 52.
91 Ditto, p. 60.
92 This is shown by Mr. Gerald Massey in his remarkable work, “The Natural Genesis,” and particularly the chapter entitled “Typology of the Fall in Heaven and on Earth.”
93 Lajard, op. cit., p. 49.
94 “Ormazd et Ahriman,” by James Darmesteter, pp. 154, 159.
95 It may be objected that the “Boundehesch,” which gives the above details, is comparatively a modern work. It must be noted, however, that the destruction of purity in the world by the serpent Dahâka is mentioned in the 9th Yaçna, v. 27, which is much earlier, and that Dr. Haug supposes the “Boundehesch” to have had a Zend original (“Essays on the Sacred Language, &c., of the Parsees,” p. 29). Windischmann, also, says that “a closer study of this remarkable and venerable book, and comparing it with the original text preserved to us, will induce us to form a much more favourable opinion of its antiquity and contents.” (“Zoroastrische Studien,” p. 282). The opinion of this latter writer is that, notwithstanding the striking resemblance between the narrative of the fall of man contained in the “Boundehesch” and that in Genesis, the former is original, although inferior in simplicity to the Hebrew tradition (idem, p. 212). The narratives are so much alike, however, that they can hardly have had independent origins, and the very simplicity of the latter is a very strong argument against its priority.
96 See suprà, p. 24.
97 Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London, vol. ii., p. 264, et seq., and compare with the Gnostic personification of “Truth,” for which see King’s “Gnostics and their Remains,” p. 39.
98 Lajard, op. cit., p. 96.
99 Jehovah threatens death, but the Serpent impliedly promises life, the former having relation to the individual, the latter to the race.
100 Lajard, op. cit., p. 60, note.
101 Some of the Essenes, who appear to have had connection with Mithraism, taught this doctrine.
102 It is well known to Biblical writers that this legend formed no part of the earlier Mosaic narrative.
103 Faber’s “Pagan Idolatry.”
104 See Dulaure, op. cit., vol. i., as to the primeval Hermes.
105 Smith’s “Dictionary of Mythology”—Art., “Hermes.”
106 Gen., xxxi. 45-53.
107 Linga means a “sign” or “token.” The truth of the statement in the text would seem to follow, moreover, from the fact that the figure is sacred only after it has undergone certain ceremonies at the hands of a priest.
108 Or tamarisk tree.
109 Gen., xxi. 33.
110 Dr. Inman suggests that ashera is the female counterpart of Asher. See under these names in “Ancient Faiths,” vol. i.
111 Even if the statement of this event be an interpolation, the argument in the text is not affected. The statement is not inconsistent with the form of worship traditionally assigned to Abraham.
112 Bætylia were “stones having souls.”
113 Rawlinson’s “Five Ancient Monarchies,” vol. i., p. 617; vol. ii., p. 247.
114 Dr. Alexander Wilder says: “The later Hebrews affected the Persian religion, in which the sun was the emblem of worship. Abraham evidently had a like preference, being a reputed iconoclast. The lunar religionists employed images in their worship.”
115 Josephus’ “Antiquities of the Jews,” ch. viii. 2.
116 The Serpent-symbol of the Exodus is called “Seraph.”
117 “The History of Israel” (Eng. Trans.), vol i., p. 532.
118 See “Sanchoniatho” (Cory, op. cit.)
119 Much discussion has taken place as to the nature of these animals. For an explanation of the epithet “fiery,” see Sanchoniatho, “Of the Serpent” (Cory, op. cit.)
120 Numbers, xxi. 8, 9.
121 Wilkinson’s “Ancient Egyptians,” vol. iv., p. 435.
122 Ditto, p. 434.
123 Egypt, vol. iii., p. 426.
124 “God in History,” vol. i., pp. 233-4.
125 Exodus, xxxiv. 20.
126 Numbers, xix. 1-10.
127 As to the god Seth, see Pleyte’s “La Religion des Pré-Israelites” (1862).
128 Fürst renders the name Mo-cese, “Son of Isis,” Inman’s “Ancient Faiths,” vol. ii., p. 338.
129 According to Pleyte, the Cabalists thought that the soul of Seth had passed into Moses (op. cit., p. 124). It is strange that the name of the Egyptian princess who is said to have brought up Moses is given by Josephus as Thermuthis, this being the name of the sacred asp of Egypt (see “suprà”). We appear also to have a reference to the serpent in the name Levi, one of the sons of Jacob, from whom the descent of Moses was traced.
130 “Fragments.” Book xxxiv. (See also in connection with this subject, “King’s Gnostics,” p. 91.)
131 Bunsen’s “God in History,” vol. i., p. 234.
132 Ewald notices the fact. (See “op. cit., vol. i., 454.”)
133 “Egypt,” vol. iii., p. 433.
134 Op. cit., vol. iv., p. 434.
135 “Le Livre des Morts,” par Paul Pierret, p. 259.
136 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iv., p. 208.
137 Ditto, vol. iii., p. 427.
138 Op. cit., p. 319.
139 Op. cit., vol. vi., p. 328.
140 As to the use of this symbol generally, see Pleyte, op. cit., pp. 109, 157.
141 On these points, see M. Raoul-Rochette’s Memoir on the Assyrian and Phœnician Hercules, in his “Mémoires de l’Institut National de France. Académie des Inscriptions,” tom. xvii., p. 47, et seq.
142 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 60; vol. ii., p. 201.
143 Pleyte, op. cit., p. 172.
144 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iv., p. 249.
145 Ditto, p. 217.
146 See ditto, pp. 226-9.
147 The ram appears to have been the first month of the Akkadian calendar. “Law of Kosmic Order,” by Mr. Rob. Brown, jun., 1882, p. 36.
148 Rawlinson’s “History of Herodotus,” vol. i., p. 620.
149 Rawlinson’s “History of Herodotus,” vol. ii., p. 291.
150 Op. cit., p. 89, et seq.
151 Wilkinson, op. cit., vol. iv., pp. 342, 260.
152 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. i., p. 423.
153 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 388.
154 In the temple of Hercules at Tyre were two symbolical steles, one a pillar and the other an obelisk. See Raoul-Rochette, op. cit., p. 51, where is a reference to a curious tradition, preserved by Josephus, connecting Moses with the erection of columns at Heliopolis.
155 Wilkinson, op. cit., vol. iv., p. 299.
156 Rawlinson’s “Herodotus,” vol. i., p. 608.
157 Ditto, p. 620.
158 Mau, the name of the Egyptian God of Truth, certainly signifies “light,” but probably only in a figurative sense.
159 The importance ascribed to the mechanical arts may perhaps lead us to look for the formal origin of this character in the “wedge,” which was the chief mechanical power the ancients possessed.
160 Faber, op. cit., vol, ii., p. 20.
161 Bryant, in his “Ancient Mythology,” has brought together a great mass of materials bearing on this question. The facts, however, are capable of quite a different interpretation from that which he has given to them.
162 “Origin and Destiny of Man,” p. 339.
163 Dr. Inman points out that, in the ancient languages, the term for “garden” is used as a metaphor for woman. “Ancient Faiths,” i. 52; ii. 553.
164 Guigniaut’s “Religions de l’Antiquité,” vol. i., p. 146.
165 Op. cit., i. 315.
166 “Egypt,” vol. iv., p. 257.
167 “Egypt,” vol. iv., p. 209.
168 Mr. Gerald Massey appears to regard the crime of Lamekh as the practice of abortion, men not desiring to have children. Op. cit., ii. 119.
169 Gen., iv. 23, 24.
170 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iv., pp. 285-6.
171 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iii., p. 413.
172 Bunsen’s “Egypt,” vol. iii., p. 437.
173 Ditto, vol. iv., p. 286.
174 If space permitted, we might trace to their source the developments which the primeval goddess of fecundity underwent. To the ideas embodied in her may be referred nearly all the feminine deities of antiquity.
175 Faber, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 246.
176 Kenrick’s “Phœnicia,” p. 307.
177 See Faber, op. cit.; also Note at the end of this chapter.
178 On this question, see the “Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London,” vol. ii., p. 265; also “Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus,” in the “Asiatic Researches,” vol. xvii. (1832), p. 216, et seq.
179 This question is fully considered by Dr. Muir in his Sanscrit Texts, part iv., p. 54, et seq.
180 Ditto, pp. 161, 343.
181 “Rural Bengal,” p. 187, et seq., 152. This association of the mountain and the river is found also in the Persian Khordah-Avesta. See (5) Abun-yasht, v. 1-3.
182 See “Tree and Serpent Worship,” p. 70; also Sherring’s “Benares,” pp. 75-89. Here the serpent is evidently symbolical of life. In the Mahabharata, Mahadeva is described as having “a girdle of serpents, ear-rings of serpents, a sacrificial cord of serpents, and an outer garment of serpent’s skin.” Dr. Muir, op. cit., part iv., p. 160.
183 Op. cit., p. 70.
184 Ditto, p. 62.
185 Mr. Sellon, in the “Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London,” vol. ii., p. 273.
186 It should not be forgotten that the Vedic religion was not that of all the Aryan tribes of India (see Muir, op. cit., part ii., pp. 377, 368, 383), and it is by no means improbable that some of them retained a more primitive faith—“Buddhism” or “Rudraism”—i.e., Siva-ism.
187 Op. cit., p. 62. To come to a proper conclusion on this important point, it is necessary to consider the real position occupied by Gautama in relation to Brahmanism. Burnoux says that he differed from his adversaries only in the definition he gives of salvation (du salut). “Introduction à l’Histoire du Buddhisme Indien,” p. 155.
188 Fergusson, op. cit., pp. 67, 222, 223.
189 See Guigniaut, op. cit., vol. i., pp. 293, 160 n.
190 Schlagenweit, “Buddhism in Tibet,” p. 120.
191 Higgins’ “Anacalypsis,” vol. i., p. 332, et seq. See also p. 342, et seq.
192 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 1, et seq., 25.
193 Dr. Hunter points out a connection between Siva-ism and Buddhism. Op. cit., p. 194.
194 Mr. Fergusson, op. cit., p. 70. The serpent is connected with Vishnuism as a symbol of wisdom rather than of life.
195 Op. cit., p. 71.
196 Hence Siva, as Sambhu, is the patron deity of the Brahman order, and the most intellectual Hindus of the present day are to be found among his followers. See Wilson, op. cit., p. 171. Sherring’s “Sacred City of the Hindus,” p. 146, et seq.
197 The bull of Siva has reference to strength and speed rather than to fecundity, while the Rig-veda refers to Vishnu as the former of the womb, although elsewhere he is described as the fecundator. Muir, op. cit., part iv., pp. 244, 292, 83, 64.
198 This question has been considered by Burnoux, op. cit., p. 547, et seq. But see also Hodgson’s “Buddhism in Nepaul,” and paper in the “Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,” vol. xviii. (1860), p. 395, et seq.
199 See Herring, op. cit., p. 89.
200 Schlagenweit, op. cit., p. 181.
201 Maurice’s “Indian Antiquities,” vol. vii., p. 566.
202 As to the identity of Siva and Saturn, see Guigniaut, op. cit., vol. i., p. 167 n.
203 Sherring, op cit., p. 305, et seq.
204 It should be noted that many of the so-called “circles” are in reality elliptical.
205 See, on this subject, Higgins’ “Anacalypsis,” vol. i., p. 315, et seq.
206 We must look to the esoteric teaching of Mithraism for the origin and explanation of much of primitive Christian dogma. The doctrine of “regeneration,” which is a spiritual application of the idea of physical generation, was known to all the religious systems of antiquity, and probably the Phallic emblems generally used were regarded by the initiated as having a hidden meaning. I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer to the second volume of my “Evolution of Morality” for information on the subject of the “re-birth.”
207 The serpent elevated in the wilderness is said to be typical of Christ. A Gnostic sect taught that Christ was Seth.
208 Didron’s “Christian Iconography” (Bohn), pp. 272-286.
209 It is a curious fact that Buddhist saints are often represented in the Vesica and with the nimbus. See Hodgson’s figures (Plates v. and vi.) in the “Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,” vol. xvi.
210 Didron, pp. 27, 231.
211 Ditto, p. 29.
212 Ditto, p. 215.
213 “History of Magic” (Bohn), vol. i., p. 253, et seq.
214 As to these, see King’s “Gnostics and their Remains,” p. 72.
215 In the philosophy of St. Paul, the death of Christ was rendered necessary by the fall. By the first man, Adam, came death, and in Christ the second Adam are all made alive. Mankind reverts to the position occupied by Adam before he sinned; and as in the New Jerusalem there is no marriage, so in the earthly paradise of the Hebrew legend man was at first intended to live alone.
216 Theodoret did not distinguish between an Egyptian sect called Sethians and the Gnostic Ophites or serpent-worshippers.
217 The heavenly serpent, Danh, of the Dahomans, is said by Captain Burton to be the god of wealth. “His earthly representative is esteemed the supreme bliss and general good.” The Slavonian Morlacchi still consider that the sight of a snake crossing the road is an omen of good fortune.—Wilkinson’s “Dalmatia and Montenegro,” vol. ii., p. 160.
218 Mr. Lane states that each quarter of Cairo is supposed to have its guardian genius, or Agatho-dæmon, in the form of a serpent.—Vol. i., p. 289.
219 Warburton supposes that the worship of the One God Kneph was changed into that of the dragon or winged-serpent Knuphis.
220 Vishnu is often identified with Kneph.
221 According to Gaelic and German folklore, the white snake when boiled has the faculty of conferring medicinal wisdom. The white snake is venerated as the king of serpents by the Scottish Highlanders as by certain Arab tribes, and it would appear also by the Singhalese of Ceylon.
222 The snake is one of the Indian tribal totems.
223 Pausanias, iv., 14, mentions Aristodama, the mother of Aratus, as having had intercourse with a serpent, and the mother of the great Scipio was said to have conceived by a serpent. Such was the case also with Olympias, the mother of Alexander, who was taught by her that he was a god, and who in return deified her.—Le Mythe de la Femme et du Serpent, par Ch. Schoebel, 1876, p. 84.
224 Mr. Robert Brown, jun., says that the serpent has six principal points of connection with Dionysos:—1, As a symbol of, and connected with, wisdom; 2, As a solar emblem; 3, As a symbol of time and eternity; 4, As an emblem of the earth-life; 5, As connected with fertilising moisture; 6, As a Phallic emblem.—The Great Dionysiak Myth, 1878, ii., 66.
225 Mr. Cooper states (loc. cit., p. 390) that prominent in the Egyptian religious system was the belief in a monstrous personal evil being typically represented as a serpent, and that the principle of good was there likewise represented by an entirely different serpent, a constant spiritual warfare being maintained between the two.
226 “The Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt,” published in the “Transactions of the Victoria Institute,” vol. vi., 1872.
227 Adonai, “Our Lord,” was converted by the Greeks into Adoneus, as a synomym of Pluto, i.e., Dis. (King’s “Gnostics,” p. 101). Through his name, Sandan or Adanos, these deities are connected with Hercules, and hence with Ares (Mars).
228 Le Mythe de Votan, by H. de Charencey, 1871, pp. 95, 103. Gautama was only the last of the Boudhas, and the identification of Woden is therefore not necessarily with Gautama. Dr. Brinton, “in order to put a stop to such visionary etymologies” as those which connect Votan with Wodan and Buddha, derives Votan from a Maya radical (American Hero-Myths, 1882, p. 217). It must be noted, however, that the Maya meaning of Votan (heart fig. spirit) closely agrees with that of Wodan (mind) and Buddha (knowledge).
229 M. de Ujfalvy has found that even the purest Iranian type of Central Asia is brachycephalic.
230 Sir John Lubbock’s “Origin of Civilisation,” 3rd ed., p. 96.
231 Clio, sec. 199.
232 Bk. ii., Melpom., 172.
233 “Ancient Egyptians,” iv., 204.
234 Mrs. Spier’s “Life in Ancient India,” p. 281.
235 “Journey,” iii., 219.
236 Op. cit., p. 120.
237 “Juventus Mundi,” pp. 408, 411.
238 “Kamilaroi and Kurnai,” p. 54.
239 Mr. Fison alludes to the New Zealand practice of a woman’s suitors wrestling for her, which is called punarua. This word, he says, is the Hawaiian punalua, which denotes the common-right of tribal brothers to certain women (note, p. 153).
240 “A Phrenologist among the Todas,” by Col. William E. Marshall, p. 213.
241 Ditto, p. 226.
242 “A Phrenologist among the Todas,” by Col. William E. Marshall, p. 43.
243 “The Abode of Snow,” p. 233.
244 “Ancient Society,” by J. F. M’Lennan, p. 158.
245 Op. cit., p. 234.
246 “Tohful-ul-Mujahideen,” p. 63.
247 “Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,” pp. 128, 235.
248 “Journal of the Anthropological Institute,” vol. viii. (1879), p. 144, et seq.
249 The Ethnology of Bengal.
250 “Studies in Ancient History,” p. 444.
251 Ditto, p. 181.
252 “Studies in Ancient History,” pp. 54, 57.
253 Ditto, pp. 104, 110.
254 Ditto, p. 174.
255 Ditto, p. 112.
256 Ditto, p. 139.
257 Ditto, p. 113.
258 “Ancient Society,” p. 512.
259 Ditto, p. 511.
260 Ditto, p. 69.
261 “Ancient History,” p. 124.
262 Ditto, p. 139.
263 Loc. cit., p. 418.
264 Loc. cit., p. 419.
265 M’Lennan, p. 150.
266 M’Lennan, p. 134.
267 “Ancient Society,” p. 516.
268 “Ancient Society,” p. 67.
269 Ditto, p. 60.
270 “Principles of Sociology,” vol. i., p. 662.
271 Ditto, p. 665.
272 Ditto, p. 666.
273 Ditto, p. 667.
274 Lahontan, “Mémoires,” ii., pp. 144, et seq.
275 “Te Ika A Maui,” p. 357.
276 Ditto, p. 337.
277 “Sixth Report of the Directors of the African Institution” (1812), p. 128.
278 Op. cit., p. 336.
279 Ditto, p. 536.
280 “Ancient Society,” p. 71.
281 “Ancient Society,” p. 75, 528.
282 Ditto, p. 530.
283 See Lafitau “Les Mœurs des Sauvages,” ii., p. 564, et seq.
284 See Lafitau, ii., p. 77, et seq.
285 “Ancient Society,” p. 88.
286 Ditto, p. 63.
287 “Ancient History,” p. 418.
288 “Types of Sociology,” pp. 665, 669.
289 Ditto, p. 667.
290 “Ancient Society,” p. 516.
291 Ditto, p. 515.
292 Ditto, p. 516.
293 “Ancient Society,” p. 103.
294 “Travels in Northern America,” p. 378.
295 “Memoirs,” ii., p. 150.
296 “La Cité Antique” (6th Ed.), 1876, p. 133.
297 “Early History of Institutions,” pp. 64, 65.
298 Ditto, p. 68.
299 P. 630, note.
300 “Principles of Sociology,” p. 769.
301 Ditto, p. 771.
302 I have not forgotten the so-called Mutterrecht. Whatever the influence of woman, as head of the family or household, however, her position in society was a secondary one, except under the conditions referred to in the chapter on “Sacred Prostitution.”
303 A more remarkable case even than this was the appearance to Professor De Wette of his own double.
304 This was first published in “Anthropologia,” in 1875.
305 See “Theosophy, Religion, and Occult Science” (1885), p. 236, et seq.
306 Casalis’ “Les Basoutos,” p. 221. The Hottentots are said to have given animal names, such as Horse, Lion, Sheep, Ass, &c., to their children. Kolben’s “Cape of Good Hope,” p. 147.
307 “Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,” pp. 17,192, et seq.
308 Quoted by Dr. J. F. M’Lennan in the Fortnightly Review, vol. vi., new series, p. 418.
309 The “Genealogical Tree of the Turks” ascribes a wolf paternity to the sons of the Princess Choyumna Khan (Miles’ Translation, p. 47). Is there a totemic reference in the game of Kökburi, “green-wolf,” practised by the Nomads of Central Asia in imitation of bride-racing? Vambery’s “Travels in Central Asia,” p. 323.
310 “Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity,” by Lewis H. Morgan, p. 424.
311 These and nine other animals give names to the twelve years of the Mogul calendar.
312 Mahabharata.—Talbot Wheeler’s “History of India,” vol i., p. 412.
313 Fortnightly Review, vol. vi., n. s., p. 563, et seq.
314 “The Native Tribes of South Australia,” p. 260.
315 “Kamilaroi and Kurnai,” p. 166.
316 “Ancient Society,” p. 69.
317 “Travels in North-Western Australia,” vol. ii., p. 229.
318 “Description of the Coast of Guinea,” p. 129.
319 “Life in the Southern Isles,” p. 25.
320 Turner’s “Nineteen Years in Polynesia,” p. 238.
321 See Tylor’s “Primitive Culture,” vol. ii., p. 213.
322 Wood’s “Natural History of Man,” vol. ii., pp. 271, 290.
323 Seemann’s “Mission to Viti,” p. 391. On the temple at Dorey in New Guinea are sculptured the representations of the crocodile and serpent ancestors of some of the Dorean families. D’Estrey’s “Papouasie,” p. 132.
324 “Manners and Customs of the Indians,” vol. i., p. 36, and vol. ii., 247.
325 “Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast,” vol. ii., p. 128.
326 Fortnightly Review, vol. vi., n. s., p. 408.
327 Ditto, p. 569, and vol. vii., n. s., p. 214.
328 “Kinship and Marriage,” p. 186, et seq.
329 “Kinship and Marriage,” p. 204.
330 “Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l’Orient,” 4th edition, p. 28.
331 Lenormant, “Histoire Ancienne de l’Orient,” 9th edition, t. ii., p. 212, et seq.
332 “Origine de tous les Cultes,” t. i., p. 77.
333 Fortnightly Review, vol. vi., n. s., p. 563.
334 Dupuis Op. cit., t. iii., “De la Sphere,” p. 19.
335 “Custom and Myth,” 2nd edition, p. 262.
336 As to supposed use of the totem as a tattoo mark, see M’Lennan, loc. cit., p. 418, and Smith’s “Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,” p. 213, et seq.
337 “Origin of Civilisation,” 3rd edition, p. 199.
338 Ditto, p. 327.
339 Ditto, p. 253.
340 “Primitive Culture,” vol. ii., p. 215.
341 Loc. cit., p. 422.
342 Dupuis “Abrégé de l’Origine,” pp. 71, 83.
343 Ditto, p. 66.
344 English edition, p. 250.
345 Ditto, p. 145.
346 Ditto, p. 255.
347 Op. cit., p. 167, et seq.
348 “American Hero-Myths,” p. 65.
349 “Les Mœurs des Sauvages,” t. i., 465.
350 See Gubernatis’ “Zoological Mythology,” passim. Dr. Brinton shows that the Great Rabbit of Algonkin Mythology is the Light God.—Op. cit., p. 47.
351 “Chaldean Magic,” p. 228.
352 Ditto, p. 231.
353 Fortnightly Review, vol. vii., n. s., p. 212.
354 Op. cit., p. 199.
355 This idea survives in the personal patron saints of the Greek Church. The special god was of a peculiar character, “partaking of the imperfections and foibles of human nature,” and, like the Mazdian fravishi, it was part of the man’s soul. Lenormant says, however, that in the Mazdian books, “the conception rose to a higher degree, detaching itself from the materiality and imperfections of the terrestrial nature.”
356 See “Evolution of Morality,” vol. ii., p. 154, et seq.
357 Loc. cit., p. 423.
358 See Tylor, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 6.
359 Osburn’s “Egypt and Her Testimony to the Truth,” p. 2. The God Amoun is said to address Sethos as “my beloved son, my lineal descendant.”—Ditto, p. 49.
360 Professor Robert Smith (op. cit., p. 17) refers to Arab tribes, called “Children of the Sun” and “Children of the Moon.”
361 See De Gubernatis, op. cit., passim. He states that the stag, the bear, and some other animals represent the luminous appearances in the darkness, rather than the moon itself.
362 “Kamilaroi and Kurnai,” p. 169.
363 Op. cit., p. 43.
364 “The Descent of Man,” vol. i., p. 10, et seq.
365 “L’Ordre des Primates,” p. 173 (1870).
366 Ibid., p. 168.
367 Ibid., p. 173.
368 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 48.
369 Ibid., p. 63.
370 Ibid., p. 70, et seq.
371 Ibid., p. 105.
372 Ibid., p. 56.
373 “Generelle Morphologie der Organismen,” vol. ii., p. 430 (1866).
374 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 145.
375 “Natural Selection,” p. 343 (1870).
376 Op. cit., vol. i., p. 56.
377 Darwin, op. cit., vol. i., p. 141.
378 See Owen’s “Anatomy of the Vertebrates,” vol. iii., p. 186.
379 Op. cit., vol. ii., p. 376.
380 The “Academy,” No. 20, p. 183 (1871).
381 “Revue des Cours Scientifiques,” 30th July, 1870, p. 558.
382 “Descent of Man,” vol. i., p. 152.
383 “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 447, n.
384 “Principles of Biology,” vol. i., p. 430.
385 “Lay Sermons,” p. 326.
386 “Principles of Biology,” vol. i., p. 446.
387 Op. cit., vol. iii., p. 808.
388 “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 489.
389 Ibid., p. 500.
390 “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 404.
391 Ibid., p. 444.
392 “Habit and Intelligence,” vol. i., p. 348 (1869).
393 Ibid., vol. i., p. 295.
394 Ibid., vol. ii., p. 8.
395 Ibid., vol. i., p. 331.
396 Op. cit., p. 360.
397 Op. cit., p. 359.
398 Ibid., p. 368.
399 Op. cit., vol. iii., p. 795.
400 Ibid., p. 789.
401 “Rapport sur les Progrès de l’Anthropologie,” p. 247 (1867).
402 Ibid.
403 “Mémoire sur les Microcéphales,” p. 197.
404 Ibid., p. 81.