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‹Better GutenbergRoman StoicismChapter XV — Counsels of Perfection · 17 of 20Contents›

Roman Stoicism

by E. V. Arnold

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Chapter XV Counsels of Perfection

Precepts.

395. We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, both in its high philosophic framework and in its more detailed treatment, in which it prescribes what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the soul is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It remains for us to study the application of the system to individual cases, a matter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy as understood at the present day, but is an essential part of the work of churches and social organizations. This department of philosophy was termed by the ancients ‘precepts,’ or (more fully) ‘advice, dissuasion, admonition, exhortation, consolation, warnings, praise, reproof’ and so forth1; by some philosophers, as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in contempt, by others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone worthy of pursuit2. But the steady conviction of the main body of Stoic teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand3; that moral principles have no strength apart from their daily application4, and that practical suggestions apart from a sound and reasoned system are like leaves cut from the bough, without lasting greenness5. Since precepts apply directly to individual persons and particular circumstances, they presuppose some relationship between teacher and hearer6; the latter must be either a convert to the school or one who has grown up under its influence. In the Roman period the department of precepts is of increasing importance; we have something to learn from Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material in the lectures (διατριβαί, ‘diatribes’) and letters of Musonius, Seneca, Epictetus and other teachers of the period of the principate.

Training of the young.

396. The ‘precepts’ which we find illustrated by our various authorities are not easily systematized, but they have all the more the charm of personal intimacy; through them we are admitted to the home life of the Stoics. As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic fathers, Stoic teachers, Stoic jurists, address those who came within their influence. Believing every man to have the seed of virtue in him, they had confidence that by their words it would often be stirred to life7; and that in other cases, in which the promising shoot had become overshadowed by ignorance or evil habits, it would by the same means begin to grow again8. But the full benefits of precepts could only be seen where they fell on well-prepared ground, and formed part of a training extending from infancy to the grave; where the instructor could daily ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This opportunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the young; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted to one period of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a ‘Theory of Education.’ It was under all circumstances guided by the rule of ‘little by little.’ Precepts must be few9, and must be in themselves easy for the individual to carry out10; but by steady practice great things will be accomplished.

The teacher’s example.

397. Since the value of precepts depends on the personal influence of the instructor, it is clear that his example will be of the greatest importance, and we may first ask what the discipline is to which he himself submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advantage, for he lives in the sight of all men; and the Indian, who allows himself to be scorched or burnt to show his contempt for pain, makes a still more forcible appeal11. The Stoic does not parade himself in this fashion, but neither does he lock the door of his private life against any who wish to examine it12. In the early morning he shakes off sleep, rousing himself to do the day’s work of a man13. Having clothed himself, he turns his mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises; he resolves during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to bear cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him14. He will then give a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his health15; after which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter or summer, a plunge into the cold bath16; next comes the slightest of meals17; then a short nap or reverie18. From this he is aroused by the stir around him, and he then applies himself to the day’s studies, being careful to alternate reading and writing, so that his mind may be neither exhausted by the latter nor relaxed by the former19. Later on he will consider his practical duties towards his relatives, his friends, and society in general. He will order his household and settle the disputes of his dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and there in season20, but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry21. He will encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and sharply warn those who are in danger of a fall22. He advises a young mother to nurse her child at her own breast; and when he meets with objections, points out the wisdom and propriety of obeying the prescriptions of nature23. Returning home, he will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining perhaps in a game of ball; his thoughts however will not always turn on success in the game, but he will consider how many principles in physics and ethics may be illustrated by it24. Now that evening comes on, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in the company of one or two favourite pupils25. Afterwards comes the temptation to burn the midnight oil in gathering seeds of wisdom for the morrow from the well-thumbed manuscript of Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus26. Retiring to his chamber, he will examine his conscience, review the events of the past day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps27.

The child’s life.

398. With the training of children the Stoic teacher is perhaps not altogether familiar, but he knows its importance28; it must be based on simplicity and austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury are most dangerous stimulants to the passions29. The child must learn to eat and drink in a mannerly way30, to refrain from loud talking and laughing31, to express himself in respectful and graceful words32. He must be taught to do right before he can understand the reason why33, or else by doing wrong he will make it difficult for himself afterwards to do right; he must be ruled until he can rule himself34. For this reason we give children proverbs (sententiae) or anecdotes (χρεῖαι) to write out and learn, such as ‘honesty is the best policy’ or ‘Socrates being asked of what city he was...’; and these short pithy sayings sink deep35. But in the school life of children no attempt must be made to grapple with the real problems of life, because these are too hard for them, though parents often forget this objection36. Games and amusements may be permitted; for though in discussions on high principle the Stoics may be entirely opposed to ‘relaxation of soul37,’ yet in practical life they freely admit its importance38. All dealings with children should be gentle; the discipline of the rod has long ago been abandoned by all sensible parents and teachers39.

Harm of soft living.

399. Soft living is at all ages to be avoided40. It is in these days a danger to the bodily health; for when a man is accustomed to be protected from a draught by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm by foot-warmers constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even temperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him in danger of his life41. Those who envy men who ‘live softly’ forget that their character becomes soft thereby42. In particular clothing should not be such as altogether to protect the body from heat in summer, and from cold in winter. It is better to wear one shirt than two, best still to have only a coat. Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go without shoes; for after all to be shod is not very different from being fettered, and runners do not use shoes43. So also avoid luxurious furniture; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be made of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold? We eat, drink, and sleep better without these things. In all these matters the Spartans set us a good example; for while disease injures the body only, luxury corrupts both body and soul44.

Training of girls.

400. Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature teaches us, for we train colts and puppies without any regard for the difference of sex. The true education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and these are the same for men and for women. Women need Wisdom to understand the ordering of a household, Justice to control the servants, Soberness that they may be modest and unselfish. But they also need Courage; in spite of the name ‘manliness’ (ἀνδρεία), this is not a virtue reserved for men. Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts. Females of all kinds fight to defend their young; the Amazons too were good fighters, and it is only for want of practice that women cannot do the same to-day. That men, being the stronger, should do the heavier work, and women the lighter, is an arrangement which is often convenient, but circumstances may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn equally with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low spirits about anything that happens; to avoid grasping habits, to love equality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or woman45.

Obedience to parents.

401. Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of reason. We do not obey a father who gives orders for the treatment of a sick person contrary to those of the physician; nor one, who being himself ill, demands things that are not good for him; nor one who bids his son steal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful bloom. We do not even obey him when he tells us to spell a word wrongly or strike a false note on the lyre. If your father forbids you to philosophize, show him by your manner of life, by prompt obedience, by good temper, by unselfishness, how good a thing philosophy is. But after all, the command of the universal Father is more urgent upon you; which is, to be just, kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled; above labours and above pleasures; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not assume the outward appearance of a philosopher; for the power of philosophy is in the innermost part of the soul, which the father can no more reach than the tyrant46.

Example of gladiators and soldiers.

402. The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the vision of virtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; they are like soft cheese which slips away from the hook by which it is taken up47. We must therefore put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in which the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent to the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, and the soldier48. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try again after each fall49; the trained boxer is eager to challenge the most formidable opponent50. The gladiator has learnt the lesson that pain is no evil, when he stands up wounded before a sympathetic crowd and makes a sign that it matters nothing51. But most of all the soldier’s oath serves as an example, when he pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully all his life: let the young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God as faithfully, to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to obey willingly the command to act or to suffer52. Without effort, as Hesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained53.

The ‘contrary twist.’

403. In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength before they can be rooted out, and it will be well to anticipate this evil by exercising body and soul in advance in a direction contrary to that of the most common temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his precepts an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to bring about a proper standard in practice54. Thus since luxury is a chief enemy of virtue, the body should at least occasionally be brought low. A practice approved by the example of eminent men is to mark out from time to time a few days for the exercise of the simple life; during this time life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough dress and all the surroundings of poverty55. Since Cynism is a ‘short cut to virtue56,’ philosophers may well employ the methods of Diogenes for short periods, as a corrective to any tendency to excess; rich people do as much for love of change57.

Personal appearance.

404. On the question of personal appearance there is much to be said on both sides. Foppishness is a disagreeable vice, and it is contemptible that a young man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total disregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics; ‘it is against nature’ says Seneca ‘to be averse to neatness in appearance58.’ In these outward matters a sensible man will conform to fashion, nor will he wish to make the name of philosopher still more unpopular than it is59. The founders of Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the same dress; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural distinction of the sexes; and to men the beard should be an object of just pride, for it is more becoming than the cock’s comb, or the lion’s mane60. This is to the Stoic a point of honour; he should part with his head more readily than with his beard61. But the beard may be trimmed; for, as Zeno has observed, nature provides rather against the ‘too little’ than against the ‘too much,’ and reason must come to her help. Women do right to arrange their hair so as to make themselves more beautiful; but for men any kind of artistic hair-dressing is contemptible62.

Solitude and society.

405. The young should train themselves alternately to bear solitude and to profit by society63: since the wise man is never dependent on his friends, though none can take better advantage of them64. In living alone a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know his own heart65. But solitude must not be a screen for secret vices; a man only uses it rightly when he can without shame picture the whole world watching his hours of privacy66. The right choice of friends calls for true wisdom; for the soul cannot but be soiled by bad company67. The only true friendship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk68; therefore the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are unacquainted69. It is well to consider much before choosing a friend, but afterwards to give him implicit trust70; for a true friend is a second self71. Such friendship can only arise from the desire to love and be loved72; those who seek friends for their own advantage, will be abandoned by them in the day of trial73. In the companionship of well-chosen friends there grows up the ‘common sense,’ which is an instinctive contact with humanity as a whole, making each man a partner in the thoughts and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal aim of philosophy74. But the young philosopher should make no enemies; he should be free from that dislike of others which so often causes a man to be disliked, and should remember that he who is an enemy to-day may be a friend to-morrow75.

Comradeship in marriage.

406. As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he will turn his mind towards marriage as a political and social duty76; but if he is really touched by the divine flame, he will also find in it that enlargement of his own sympathies and opportunities of which the wise man is always glad77. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid development of personal sympathy between husband and wife; and though in society girls who attended philosophers’ classes had an ill name as being self-willed and disputatious78, yet it is from this very circle that the ideal of a perfect harmony of mind and purpose was developed most fully. Musonius often speaks on this subject:

‘Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn together, and to have all things in common, soul, body and property. Unlike the lower animals, which mate at random, man cannot be content without perfect community of thought and mutual affection. Marriage is for health and for sickness alike, and each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not seeking his own advantage, but that of his partner79.’

‘A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable of hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But the soul is far more important; for as a crooked stick cannot be fitted with one that is straight, so there can be no true agreement except between the good80.’

Seneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to doubt that his life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic marriages. Thus he excuses himself for taking more thought for his health than a philosopher should, by saying that the happiness of Paulina depends upon it. ‘Her life is wrapped up in mine, for its sake I must take care of my own. What can be more delightful than to be so dear to one’s wife, that for her sake one becomes dearer to himself81!’

Celibacy.

407. On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a contrary note, characteristic of his time, and of his bias towards Cynic practice:

‘In the present state of things, which is like that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of God? To say nothing of other things, a father must have a heating apparatus for bathing the baby; wool for his wife when she is delivered, oil, a bed, a cup; and so the furniture of the house is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to the public interests,

“The people’s guardian and so full of cares82”

whose duty it is to look after others; to see who uses his wife well, who uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his family well, and who does not? Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him83!’

To this very definite conception of a celibate order of philosophers, devoting themselves to the good of humanity and entitled thereby to become the rulers of society, Musonius makes the following reply in advance from the true Stoic standpoint:

‘Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates; and who were better philosophers than they? Since marriage is natural, philosophers should set the example of it. Why else did the Creator separate the human race into two divisions, making the honourable parts of the body distinct for each, and implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished them to live together and to propagate the race? He who would destroy marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No relationship is so essential or so intimate; friend does not agree so well with friend, nor does a father feel so keenly separation from his son. And why should a philosopher be different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a hindrance to a philosopher; but by doing his daily duty as a man he will become kindlier in disposition and more social in his thoughts84.’

Means of livelihood.

408. The head of a household must have a means of living; and therefore the making of money (χρηματισμός, cura rei familiaris) comes within the range of precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means of livelihood; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a king’s minister or general; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting as a magistrate or a judge; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by teaching philosophy to those who are wishing to learn85. To each profession there are obvious objections; indeed the sharp critic of Stoicism can see no reason why a wise man, who lacks nothing, should trouble himself about money-making. Each of the three professions named assumes the existence of men willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not easily found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees should be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more reasonable that a student should only pay if he profits by his teaching; but on the other hand no one can absolutely promise to make a man good in a year, and deferred payments are often found unsatisfactory86. Under the Roman principate we hear little of the professions connected with public life; but it is clear that the teacher and the physician are held in special regard87. Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or the sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer88. Yet Chrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said that ‘the wise man will turn three somersaults for a sufficient fee89’; and no rule can be laid down except that a man should earn his own living without injuring his neighbour90. Agriculture, as a calling favourable both to health of body and to innocence of soul, continued to be praised, but was seldom practised except as an amusement91.

Kingly duties.

409. For every profession philosophy has appropriate precepts, beginning with the king. There came one day to Musonius a king of Syria, for in those times there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius addressed him thus:

‘You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to protect and benefit your fellow-men; to do that, you must know what is good and what is evil. A king too must understand Justice; for wars and revolts come about because men quarrel about their rights. Also he must show Soberness and Courage, that he may be an example to his subjects92. The ancients thought that a king should be a living law (νόμος ἔμψυχος), and an imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.’

The king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any boon he would. ‘Abide by my words,’ said Musonius, ‘that will be the best boon both for me and for you93.’

Two precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The first, that they should encourage friends who will speak the truth to them. Even Augustus Caesar needed this lesson; bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa and Maecenas, he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they lived94. The second, that they should practise clemency, following the example of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence upon which he might have punished his enemies95. None does this virtue better become than kings and rulers96.

Court life.

410. To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to move in the society of the great and the powerful. Epictetus gives us a striking description of the man who desires to be on the list of the ‘Caesaris amici,’ which he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is not such.

‘Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? “Come forward and tell us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar’s friend?” Immediately you hear the answer, “Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me; you know not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth; then come troubles and cares.” “Well, and did you sup with more pleasure, now or before?” Hear what he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do anything foolish. As befits so great a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar97.’

It is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough training in philosophy is of really practical value.

‘When you are going in to any great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than that other. He then who sees from above asks you: “In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace?” “That they are things indifferent.” “And the end of life, what is it?” “To follow thee.” “Do you say this now also?” “I do.” Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things: and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things, when he is among men who have not studied them. I imagine that you will have such thoughts as these; “Why do we make such great and so many preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which is named power? All this is nothing98.”’

Yet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the powerful; he will turn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm99. The virtuous affection of caution must be called in to help him, so many are his dangers. An independence of look, a slight raising of the voice, an outspoken expression, an appeal to public opinion, even unsought popularity are enough to excite suspicion100. Perhaps after all the poet may be the wisest, who advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it is a place where there is no room for them101.

Life in the city.

411. A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of city life. Here fashion dictates a round of occupations which are unnatural, but in which men and women are alike absorbed102. Half of the morning is absorbed in sleep103; then follows the visit to the public shows, which are centres of demoralisation104, and conversation with numerous friends, each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle105. In the clubs all the most worthless members of society foregather106. The baths, which were at one time simply constructed, and for the purpose of cleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; and the water is now so hot as to be better fitted for torture than pleasure107. For the evening meal there must always be some novelty discovered, even if it is only to begin with the dessert and end with the eggs108; even the order of the seasons must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter109. Upon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy headache the next morning110. From the temptations of such a life the adherent of Stoicism will gladly escape.

Life in the country.

412. A more real happiness is reserved for the man who gives up town life for that of the country. For it is most natural to win sustenance from the earth, which is our common mother, and liberally gives back many times over what is entrusted to her; and it is more healthy to live in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It matters little whether one works on one’s own land or on that of another; for many industrious men have prospered on hired land. There is nothing disgraceful or unbecoming in any of the work of the farm; to plant trees, to reap, to tend the vine, to thrash out the corn, are all liberal occupations. Hesiod the poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him from telling the story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius) perhaps the best of all occupations; for even farm work, if it is exhausting, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body, whereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philosophizing also.

It is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and too refined to live a country life; but philosophy would be well rid of these weaklings. A true lover of philosophy could find no better discipline than to live with some wise and kindly man in the country, associating with him in work and in relaxation, at meals and in sleeping, and so ‘learning goodness,’ as Theognis tells us to do, ‘from the good111.’

The householder.

413. Within the household the head of it is a little king, and needs to display the kingly virtues of Justice and Soberness. In his dealings with the perverse he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing the truth112. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small virtue; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as far as possible to correct his own ways113. Punishment must be reserved for extreme cases, and is always to be administered with calmness; it is felt more keenly when it comes from a merciful master114. Persistent kindness wins over even bad men115. It is further the privilege of the head of a household to distribute kindnesses to those below him. His wealth he must regard as given him in trust; he is only the steward of it, and must neither hoard nor waste; for he must give both a debit and a credit account of all116. But if the right use of money causes the possessor anxious thought, no trace of this should appear to others; giving should be without hesitation, and as a delight117. The good citizen will pay his taxes with special pleasure, because in his eyes the welfare of the community stands higher than his own or that of his family118; but he will not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is in need119; and in giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by his manner that he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his fellow-man120. In short, he will give as he would like to receive121, and with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share with another122.

Treatment of slaves.

414. The good householder will associate on easy terms with his slaves, remembering that they too are men, made of flesh and blood as he is himself123. It is however a difficult matter to decide whether a master should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find this a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in its favour124. We do not need to inquire into a man’s social position, if his character is attractive125. Plato has well said that we cannot find a king who is not descended from a slave, or a slave who is not descended from a king126; and in fact many a Roman slave was far better educated than his master127. Even if we do not suppose that Seneca’s rule was commonly practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws a pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the master was thus called upon to ignore differences of social position, as much might be expected of the slave. With him it was doubtless an instinct to prize liberty, ‘the power of living as you like,’ as the dearest of possessions. Yet many a slave who won this reward by years of faithful service found that liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in the home where he was valued128.

Large families.

415. A question of pressing practical importance is that of large families (πολυπαιδία). Statesmen have always considered it best that the homes of citizens should be crowded with children; and for this reason the laws forbid abortion and the hindrance of conception; they demand fines for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large families. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of many children is honoured as he goes about the city, and how charming is the sight of a mother surrounded by a swarm of children129! No religious procession is so imposing. For such parents every one feels sympathy, and every one is prepared to cooperate with them130. But nowadays even rich parents refuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be the richer. But it is better to have many brothers than few; and a brother is a richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune attracts enemies, but a brother helps to repel them131.

Comfort in poverty.

416. We have now accompanied the man of mature years in his duties and his temptations: philosophy has also a word to speak with regard to his trials. It is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets of fortune are no real evils; but this doctrine can be supplemented by other consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement by the death of friends and children, we have already spoken; we may now consider two other conditions usually held to be evil, namely poverty and exile. In poverty the first comfort is in the observation that poor men are usually stronger in body than the rich132, and quite as cheerful in mind133. Further the poor are free from many dangers which beset the rich; they can travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the road134. Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes to philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor135. A poor man is not troubled by insincere friends136. In short, poverty is only hard for him who kicks against the pricks137.

Comfort in exile.

417. The subject of exile has the special interest that in fact so many philosophers endured this evil. To the Stoic there is in principle no such thing as exile, since the whole world is his country; but he does not for this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero was plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but also when he was away from Rome in an honourable position; Seneca at least made the attempt to bear exile more bravely. Is it then so hard to be away from one’s native place? Rome is crowded with strangers, who have come thither for pleasure or profit, study or novelty138. True, it is a beautiful town; but there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly, not even this Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men choose it to reside in as a matter of taste139. Whole peoples have changed their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of barbarism, and the Macedonian language in India140; wherever he conquers the Roman dwells141. The exile has everywhere the company of the same stars above142, of the same conscience within him143; even if he is separated from those near and dear to him, it is not for the first time, and he can still live with them in his thoughts and affections.

Old age.

418. Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, wherever a man stands in the order of society, old age comes at last and imperiously stops all ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time of sadness144; to associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only because it is paradoxical145. Cicero’s work de Senectute shows how old age became attractive according to Roman tradition; Seneca is hardly so successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to effort dies away in old age146; but though philosophy forbids idleness, nature cries out for rest. We cannot then approve when old men follow their professional occupations with undiminished zeal147, and we must highly blame those who cannot quit their pleasures148. The great boon which old age brings is leisure; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have longed in vain149. This leisure gives the opportunity of making acquaintance with great men through their books, but better still, that of making acquaintance with our own selves.

Musonius’ ‘viaticum.’

419. ‘Give me,’ said one to Musonius, ‘a viaticum for old age.’ He replied as follows:

‘The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and according to nature150. Do not grieve because you are cut off from the pleasures of youth; for man is no more born for pleasure than any other animal: indeed man alone is an image of the deity151, and has like excellences. And do not consider the divine excellences as beyond your reach; for we have no other notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing good men, whom therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has acquired in youth sound principles and systematic training will not be found to complain in old age of the loss of pleasures, of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by friends and acquaintance; he will carry about with him a charm against all these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not been rightly educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser than himself, and listen to his teaching and profit by it. And specially he will ponder over death, how it comes in nature’s course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such thoughts he will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life. But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age; that it does not bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a crowd of rich old men, who are in bad temper and low spirits, and feel deeply aggrieved152.’

Will-making.

420. When we see death before us there remains a last act to be performed. We look at the wealth which no longer belongs to us, and consider to whom it can most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the position of a judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom and good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around us153.

Death.

421. For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation; yet when it is no longer a matter of uncertain fear, but close at hand and sure, some last words are to be said. All this is in the course of nature, is according to the will of the Creator.

‘God opens the door and says to you, “Go.” “Go whither?” To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements154. What there was in you of fire goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, but all is full of gods and demons155. God has invited you; be content when he calls others to the feast in your place.’

The philosopher does not look forward to renewing his personal life, or to meeting again with parent, wife, or child. But death is a release from all his pains and troubles; and he who has striven to live his life well will know how to meet death also at its due time156. If it come to him in the shipwreck, he will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena, he will not shrink from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last short crisis he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal lot157.

Footnotes

1 ‘omnia ista [monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes, obiurgationes, laudationes] monitionum genera sunt’ Sen. Ep. 94, 39.

2 ‘eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta... quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat’ ib. 94, 1 and 2. The Cynics gave exhortations, but without having a system for the purpose. See above, § 52.

3 ‘Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat’ ib. 95, 65. Cf. Cic. Off. i 3, 7; Sen. Ep. 94, 34.

4 ‘ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione, ad quam praecepta perducunt’ ib.

5 ‘quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant; sic ista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae’ Sen. Ep. 95, 59.

6 See below, § 397, note 21.

7 Sen. Ep. 94, 29 and 108, 8.

8 ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et situ, modo officii inscitia’ Ben. v 25, 6.

9 ‘plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa non habeas ad manum’ Ben. vii 1, 3; ‘We ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater’ Epict. Disc. i 18, 18.

10 ‘debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est opprimant onera, quae ferente maiora sunt’ Sen. Dial. ix 6, 4.

11 Arnim i 241.

12 ‘sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus’ Sen. Ep. 83, 1.

13 ‘In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the thought “I am rising for man’s work. Why make a grievance of setting about that for which I was born, and for sake of which I have been brought into the world? Is the end of my existence to lie snug in the blankets and keep warm?”’ M. Aurel. To himself v 1.

14 ‘I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising his acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him; and while I lived it was my duty to praise God’ Epict. Disc. iii 26, 29 and 30. See also above, § 258.

15 ‘minimum exercitationi corporis datum’ Sen. Ep. 83, 3.

16 ‘ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi’ ib. 5.

17 ‘panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium’ ib. 6.

18 ‘brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare desiisse. aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor’ ib.

19 ‘nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus; altera res contristabit, vires exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet’ Sen. Ep. 84, 2.

20 ‘nulli enim nisi audituro dicendum est’ ib. 29, 1.

21 ‘[Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios monuerunt. hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum’ ib. 29, 1 and 3.

22 ‘audebo illi mala sua ostendere’ ib. 4.

23 A. Gellius, N. A. xii 1. Favorinus, of whom this is related, was not himself a Stoic.

24 Sen. Ben. ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, 1 to 4.

25 See above, § 125, note 90.

26 ‘at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures | fruge Cleanthea’ Pers. Sat. v 62-64; ‘quid est tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas?’ Sen. Ep. 8, 8.

27 ‘qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam tranquillus, quam altus ac liber!’ Dial. v 36, 2.

28 ‘plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui’ ib. iv 21, 1.

29 ‘tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis’ ib. 11; ‘nihil magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda’ ib. 6.

30 ‘if he... eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly progresses’ Epict. Disc. i 4, 20 and 21.

31 ‘veritatis simplex oratio est’ Sen. Ep. 49, 12; ‘Let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few words. Let not your laughter be much’ Epict. Manual 33, 2 and 4.

32 ‘loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa adicienda—pluris quam putas obligasti’ Sen. Ben. ii 24, 4.

33 ‘inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire—hoc vitabis, hoc facies’ Ep. 94, 50.

34 ‘regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere’ ib. 51.

35 ‘facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa. ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant’ ib. 33, 6 and 7.

36 ‘He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things; and we ought to use this fact as an argument to parents’ Epict. Disc. i 26, 4 and 5.

37 See above, § 316.

38 ‘lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et temperat’ Sen. Dial. iv 20, 3; ‘danda est animis remissio’ ib. ix 17, 5; ‘mens ad iocos devocanda est’ ib. 4.

39 Chrysippus had approved of the rod: ‘caedi discentis, quamlibet receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim’ Quint. Inst. Or. i 3, 14. But Seneca writes quite otherwise: ‘uter praeceptor dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit... an qui monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?’ Clem. i 16, 2 and 3.

40 ‘fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem’ Sen. Dial. i 4, 9.

41 ‘quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter fomenta subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet’ ib.

42 ‘audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus invidetur—molliter vivit hoc dicunt—mollis est’ Ep. 82, 2.

43 Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius).

44 ib. 29, 75.

45 Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123.

46 Muson. ib. iv 79, 25.

47 ‘It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold soft cheese with a hook’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 9.

48 See above, § 326.

49 ‘See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they say, wrestle again till you are made strong’ Epict. Disc. iv 9, 15.

50 ‘[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere’ Sen. Dial. i 2, 3.

51 ‘[gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat nihil esse et intercedi non patitur’ ib. ii 16, 2.

52 ‘ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia’ ib. vii 15, 7; Epict. Disc. i 14, 15 and 16.

53 See above, § 33; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood: ‘nil sine magno | vita labore dedit mortalibus’ Sat. i 9, 59 and 60.

54 ‘quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant’ Sen. Ben. vii 22, 1; ‘We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure; I will incline to the contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise’ Epict. Disc. iii 12, 6 and 7.

55 ‘interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo cibo, dura atque horrida veste, dicas tibi “hoc est quod timebatur?”... grabatus ille verus sit et sagum et panis durus ac sordidus—hoc triduo ac quatriduo fer’ Sen. Ep. 18, 5 and 7; ‘quod tibi scripsi magnos viros saepe fecisse’ ib. 20, 13.

56 Diog. L. vii 121.

57 ‘divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro argentoque fictilibus utantur’ Sen. Dial. xii 12, 3.

58 ‘contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. Ep. 5, 4; ‘I would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed’ Epict. Disc. iv 11, 25.

59 ‘asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita. intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat’ Sen. Ep. 5, 2.

60 ‘We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.... How much more becoming is the beard than the cock’s comb and the lion’s mane! For this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given’ Epict. Disc. i 16, 13 and 14.

61 ‘Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.’ If I am a philosopher, I answer, ‘I will not shave myself.’ ‘But I will take off your head.’ ‘If that will do you any good, take it off’ Epict. Disc. i 2, 29.

62 Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius).

63 ‘miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac frequentia’ Sen. Dial. ix 17, 3.

64 ‘ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit’ Ep. 9, 5.

65 ‘proderit per se ipsum secedere; meliores erimus singuli’ Dial. viii 1, 1; ‘A man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For Zeus dwells by himself and is tranquil by himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 13, 6 and 7.

66 ‘tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico; parietes plerumque circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed ut peccemus occultius’ Sen. Ep. 43, 3.

67 ‘It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself’ Epict. Disc. iii 16, 3.

68 Diog. L. vii 124.

69 ‘Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos; nihil est enim virtute amabilius’ Cic. N. D. i 44, 121; so Stob. ii 7 11 i.

70 ‘post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum’ Sen. Ep. 3, 2.

71 Ζήνων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος “ἄλλος ἐγώ” ἔφη Diog. L. vii 23.

72 ‘Hecaton ait; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium: si vis amari, ama’ Sen. Ep. 9, 6; ‘multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt’ ib. 6, 3.

73 ib. 9, 8.

74 ‘hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem’ ib. 5, 4; ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ ib. 6, 4.

75 ‘monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum’ ib. 95, 63.

76 See above, § 349.

77 ‘[sapiens] ducit uxorem se contentus, et liberos tollit se contentus’ Sen. Ep. 9, 17; ‘If indeed you had [this purpose], you would be content in sickness, in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true’ Epict. Disc. iii 5, 18 and 19.

78 ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126.

79 Stob. iv 22, 90.

80 Stob. iv 22, 104.

81 ‘nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?’ Sen. Ep. 104, 2 and 5.

82 Hom. Il. ii 25.

83 Epict. Disc. iii 22, 69 to 75.

84 Stob. iv 22, 20.

85 Stob. ii 7, 11 m.

86 Plut. Sto. rep. 20, 10.

87 ‘omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas, magna reverentia est’ Sen. Ben. vi 15, 1; ‘ex medico ac praeceptore in amicum transeunt’ ib. 16, 1.

88 Ep. 88, 18 and 22.

89 Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 3.

90 ‘sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est; alteri deripere ius non est’ Cic. Off. iii 10, 42.

91 See below, § 412.

92 So too Epictetus: ‘To whose example should [the many] look except yours [the governors’]?’ Disc. iii 4, 3.

93 Stob. iv 7, 67.

94 Sen. Ben. vi 32, 4.

95 Dial. iv 23, 4.

96 ‘nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet’ Clem. i 3, 3.

97 Epict. Disc. iv 1, 46 to 50.

98 ib. i 30, 1 to 7.

99 ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. Ep. 14, 7.

100 Dial. iii 18, 2.

101 ‘exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non coëunt: semper metuet, quem saeva pudebunt’ Lucan Phars. viii 493 to 495.

102 Sen. Ep. 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21.

103 ‘turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die incipit’ ib. 122, 1.

104 ‘nihil tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo desidere’ ib. 7, 2.

105 ‘inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit’ ib.

106 ‘vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit]’ Dial. i 5, 4.

107 Ep. 86, 9 and 10.

108 ib. 114, 9.

109 ib. 122, 8.

110 ‘oculos hesterna graves crapula’ ib. 122, 2.

111 Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country life: ‘non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nec frugalitatem docent rura; sed ubi testis et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt, quorum monstrari et conspici fructus est’ Ep. 94, 69.

112 ‘de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur veri patiens sit’ Dial. v 36, 4.

113 ‘moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est; flectendus est paucis animus, sui rector optimus’ Ben. v 25, 4.

114 ‘gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur’ Clem. i 22, 3.

115 ‘vincit malos pertinax bonitas’ Ben. vii 31, 1.

116 ‘quid tanquam tuo parcis? procurator es, in depositi causa [divitiae] sunt’ Ben. vi 3, 2; ‘donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos eligens, ut qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse reddendam’ ib. 23, 5.

117 ‘demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione’ Ben. ii 1, 1.

118 Cic. Off. i 17, 57.

119 ‘non desinemus opem ferre etiam inimicis’ Sen. Dial. viii 1, 4.

120 ‘[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars maior horum qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos adiuvat contingique ab his timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit’ Clem. ii 6, 2.

121 ‘sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere’ Ben. ii 1, 1.

122 ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ Ep. 6, 4.

123 ‘servi sunt? immo homines. servi sunt? immo humiles amici’ ib. 47, 1; ‘animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat paribusque elementis’ Juv. Sat. xiv 16 and 17.

124 ‘cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem decet. rideo istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare’ Sen. Ep. 47, 1 and 2.

125 ‘refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status’ Ben. iii 18, 2.

126 Ep. 44, 4.

127 ‘[Calvisius Sabinus] magna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum teneret, unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit. magno emisse illum non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos locavit’ Ep. 27, 6.

128 Epict. Disc. iv 1, 33 to 40.

129 But hear Epictetus on the other side: ‘Are those men greater benefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons contribute more to the community than Homer?’ Disc. iii 22, 77 and 78.

130 Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius).

131 ib. 27, 21.

132 See above, § 399.

133 ‘compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus; saepius pauper et fidelius ridet’ Sen. Ep. 80, 6.

134 ‘etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est’ ib. 14, 9.

135 ‘si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis’ ib. 17, 5.

136 ‘[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis non te, sed aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum amanda paupertas quod, a quibus ameris, ostendet’ ib. 20, 7.

137 ‘paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti’ ib. 123, 16.

138 Dial. xii 6, 2.

139 ‘usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hic quoque locus a patria quosdam abduxerit’ ib. 5.

140 ib. 7, 1.

141 ‘ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat’ ib. 7, 7.

142 ib. 8, 6.

143 ‘licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre’ ib. 8, 1.

144 ‘subeunt morbi tristisque senectus’ Verg. G. iii 67 quoted by Sen. Ep. 108, 29.

145 ‘plena est voluptatis [senectus], si illa scias uti’ Sen. Ep. 12, 4.

146 ‘nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123; ‘iuvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere’ Sen. Ep. 108, 27.

147 ‘adeone iuvat occupatum mori?’ Sen. Dial. x 20, 3. He instances an old gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post at that age; but when the time came, he threw his whole household into mourning until he got his work back again.

148 ‘luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est’ Cic. Off. i 34, 123.

149 Sen. Dial. x 4, 1 and 2.

150 τὸ ζῆν ὁδῷ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.

151 ἄνθρωπος μίμημα θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων (see on hymn of Cleanthes, l. 5, in § 97).

152 Stob. Flor. 117, 8 (M).

153 ‘ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum iudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus; nec quicquam cura sanctiore componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet’ Sen. Ben. iv 11, 5.

154 ‘reverti unde veneris quid grave est?’ Dial. ix 11, 4.

155 Epict. Disc. iii 13, 14 and 15; ib. iv 1, 106.

156 ‘male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori’ Sen. Dial. ix 11, 4; and see above, §§ 298, 299.

157 ‘quod tam cito fit, timetis diu?’ Sen. Dial. i 6, 9; ‘puto fortiorem eum esse, qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem. mors enim admota etiam imperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia; sic gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et errantem gladium sibi adtemperat’ Ep. 30, 8; ‘the ship is sinking! what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish; for I am not an immortal being’ Epict. Disc. ii 5, 11 to 13.

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