Part VI The Communist Underground
20 — How the Underground Works
The communist above-ground, as we have seen, constantly seeks to represent itself as a legitimate political organization working for the best interests of America. When large segments of the people are hoodwinked into believing this fraudulent claim, it becomes easier for the Party to carry on its revolutionary propaganda through mass agitation, infiltration, and fronts. Without some degree of public acceptance, the Party is doomed to an isolated impotence.
Communist tactics require that above-ground activities be pushed as far as possible. However, when the Party begins to abuse its constitutional privileges and the government takes steps to protect itself from outright treason and subversion, more and more Party activities are shifted underground, that is, to the illegal apparatus. As Lenin taught, the Party must always have two levels, above-ground and underground. Both must exist at the same time. One without the other is incomplete.
In times of “nonprosecution”—that is, when “hostile” governments are not attacking—the Party, like a submarine, will surface, carrying on the bulk of its work above ground. But a portion (the underground) will always stay submerged, concealing the Party’s illegal activities, such as aid to Soviet espionage; endeavoring to place concealed members in sensitive positions in government, education, and industry, maintaining clandestine communication networks.
In event of an emergency, this undercarriage quickly expands, providing the Party with well-prepared and extensive undercover operations. Within days, hundreds of above-ground comrades can be absorbed. The Party submerges, the above-ground shrinks.
The Party will submerge only as long and as deep as absolutely necessary, always preferring surface operations (with a supporting underground). That’s why it desperately fights all legislation curtailing its activities. Only to prevent annihilation will it go completely underground. This action reduces contact with the masses, wastes energy on nonproductive security measures, and decreases effectiveness. Except for outright liquidation, it is practically impossible to drive the Party completely underground or completely above ground.
As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, the Party experienced two periods of intensified underground activities: (1) shortly after its founding, and (2) in the mid-1951 to mid-1955 period. Both were caused primarily by prosecutive action of state and federal governments.
To understand the underground we must realize that it is a maze of undercover couriers, escape routes, hide-outs, and clandestine meetings. It’s not the place for the beginner, the half-indoctrinated, or the doubtful. Only the most loyal members are selected. These men and women are carrying on the Party’s deceitful work away from the watchful eye (so they hope) of the FBI and other governmental agencies.
It was early in the morning. The taxi had been summoned to a number on James Street. The driver looked. On the corner stood an attractive woman, dressed in a polka-dotted blouse and navy blue skirt. From her shoulder dangled a brown purse.
“Take me to Elm and Cherry Streets,” she said, jumping into the cab.
When the taxi arrived at the destination, the woman changed her mind. “Take me to the Surplus Store,” she instructed. The driver complied, now almost doubling back to where he had started. The woman, however, still wasn’t satisfied. She asked to be taken to another location. There she alighted.
A few minutes later she hailed another cab and went straight to her destination, a railroad station on the east side of town, some fifteen miles away, even though she was then only a short distance from a terminal where she could have caught the same train.
This wasn’t the Case of the Woman Who Changed Her Mind, but the shift of a Party underground leader to a new hide-out. Why the strange gyrations? She was endeavoring to make certain she wasn’t being followed.
In a northern state a scene similar to the Girl in the Polka-dotted Blouse was being enacted. A woman with black curly hair, dressed in a smart gray herringbone suit and wearing a large-brimmed hat, boarded a southbound train. She carefully surveyed the passengers, then took a seat near the rear. She was carrying on her left arm a blue tweed suit and a hook-weave black coat. In her right hand she held a brown suitcase trimmed in light tan. It was a long ride, all afternoon and night. Upon arrival she sped to an address in an older section of town. A knock, the door opened, and she disappeared inside. The woman was a high-ranking Party leader reporting for a new underground assignment.
These two women, neatly dressed and looking like ordinary travelers, were but two of many hundreds involved in Party underground work from 1951 to 1955. Many were away from home for months, even years, living under assumed names in obscure rooms; moving under cover of darkness from one city to another; scurrying along streets late at night; eating irregular meals. Life in the underground for most is hard work, drudgery; not romance, adventure, and fun.
How are comrades chosen for underground work?
As we have seen, only the most trusted and dedicated of Party members are chosen. A study of the case histories of twenty-five top Party leaders active in the underground during 1951-55 disclosed that all had been in the communist movement for over twenty years. Their average age was somewhat over forty.
Party “loyalty” is determined by an elaborate “verification” system. A prospect is compelled to execute a questionnaire asking for detailed information about his family, former employment, education, Party history. One questionnaire, for example, requested a member to analyze the “political position” of relatives, and then asked, “Have you had any extra-marital relations since you’ve been married? If so, with whom and how often?” Many times, older comrades must vouch for the prospect.
To enter the underground usually means simply disappearing quickly, abruptly, without warning. Whispers float: “Where’s Gordon?” The answer: “He’s gone under” or merely the telltale sign, a clenched fist with the thumb pointed down.
It was a Monday morning. Everybody came to work except one, a woman who had been with the firm for many years. Nobody thought anything about it. Probably she was sick. But the next day, the next week, the next month, she didn’t return, although she had almost a hundred dollars in wages coming to her. At her apartment it was the same story. She had quickly moved out. Nobody knew where she had gone.
She had entered the communist underground.
These departures are carefully planned. Above-ground comrades will handle any pending personal matters, such as storing the member’s furniture, moving his family, caring for his car. Sometimes departures have been so rapid that hot meals have been left on the table.
Once underground, the member is made ready for assignment. This means, first of all, assuming a new identity; that is, being made into “another person.” As a general rule this involves the securing of a new name, date, and place of birth, even changing physical appearance. One functionary, for example, lost between thirty-five and forty pounds, giving him a gaunt appearance. Others were told to gain weight. Still another grew a mustache, donned glasses, and dyed his hair black. Identification marks, such as moles and warts, have been removed by surgery. One underground official boasted that he could walk down Main Street every day and even his wife could not recognize him!
In addition, the member must be supplied with fake identification papers, Social Security cards, drivers’ licenses, library cards, bank-deposit books. If he is stopped on the street he must be able to prove his “identity.” Likewise, he should acquaint himself with his adopted place of birth, know something about its newspapers, streets, and stores. Does it have a baseball team? It’s usually best to pick a small town, for there is less chance of meeting somebody from there.
Frequently the member, in his new pose, will attempt, at least on a temporary basis, to secure employment. His underground work will be conducted in the evenings and on week ends. Some of the comrades are on the Party’s payroll, but most are not. One member became, in the words of her employer, an “efficient, affable, and able” secretary. Little did he dream that she was a communist on special underground assignment. In another instance a comrade, when hired for a job, said she was born in a Southern city, had attended a certain grade and high school, and had previously worked in another city. Later FBI investigation revealed that her story was a complete falsehood. Her job was only a front for secret communist work.
That’s why the underground is a nightmare of deceit, fear, and tension, where one has to tell falsehoods, fabricate a background, adopt a new name, and live in fear of being recognized by old friends or acquaintances.
Suppose the Girl in the Polka-dotted Blouse, in order to carry out an assignment, must pose as a widow or the estranged wife of a sea captain, or as the retired owner of a ladies’ dress shop? Think of the problems that would arise. What types of stories must be improvised? What kind of personal possessions must be purchased to keep up the cover?
The Party has thoroughly studied these problems. Let’s look at a secret study issued for the instruction of women underground comrades, like the Girl in the Polka-dotted Blouse. Here’s the advice:
1. Suppose you are posing as a widow (after having been married some twenty years) and you have now come to this city “to get away from it all and try to forget.”
Answer: Well, you shouldn’t come in (as to a rooming house) empty-handed, with only a handbag. You “must make some show of previous accumulation,” for example, have “a few personal ‘precious’ things,” such as “picture(s), little mementoes.” Where can you get them? “In any 5-10c store.”
2. Suppose you have an inquisitive landlady who has access to your apartment.
Answer: You might first say (to cover up the scarcity of your personal belongings) that, being so sad over becoming a widow, you “haven’t had the heart to unpack everything yet.” If you stay longer, you better buy a dustmop and some other items, “so that the story of having been a housewife for so many years will ring true.” And by all means have some luggage, preferably “beat-up” luggage. “The more luggage a woman moves in with the better is she accepted on the strength of her story.”
3. What if you’re underground in a small town? What about social life? People are sure to become suspicious if you stay seven nights a week at home. Moreover, unlike a man, it doesn’t look right to go to a late movie alone.
Answer: Take a short trip out of town. This not only takes away suspicion but gives you something to talk about.
4. Then there is the problem of extra expense incurred by women.
Answer: A woman must have more luggage (she’s expected to have more clothing, etc.). Then she must use a taxi; she can’t carry her own suitcases. Also there is the problem of “personal upkeep.” Suppose you are a blonde and you come into town as a brunette. As the study points out, you have to keep that up, to a tune of about six dollars for each trip to the beauty parlor and two dollars extra for eyebrow dye.
Attention to detail must be exacting, even to the clothes worn on given occasions. Here’s a sample of a “How I was Dressed” diary kept by the Girl in the Polka-dotted Blouse:
—wore dark grey dress, high heels, walked to the movie...
—wore low heels, two-piece blue suit, red tam...
—wore high heels, white blouse and blue hankie. Carried umbrella, looked like rain.
In meeting noncommunists she doesn’t want to be a strawberry blonde one day and the next week a natural brunette. If she is representing herself as a “poor widow,” she probably should wear the same dress every time, not come in a variety of outfits.
Assignments in the underground vary. A select few are engaged in highly secret disciplinary work. Security is most important. The telephone and mails are to be avoided. Never carry Party documents or names on your person. Disciplinary squads may stop members and search their purses. Woe if a compromising slip of paper is found bearing a name or telephone number.
Security precautions also affect the above-ground Party. No membership books (or cards) are issued; large clubs are broken up into small groups; records are destroyed. In a Western state a Party member was instructed to go to the post office for mail. He was to carry a brown paper sack and, upon leaving, proceed to the restroom of a nearby building. There another Party member, carrying an identical brown sack containing nothing but rubbish, would meet him. They would exchange sacks. In this way, so it was thought, the person with the mail could not be detected.
Then there are couriers who carry secret messages, often in code. In addition, they bring supplies and funds, meet Party leaders in hide-outs, contact mail drops. Couriers are of various types: (1) Party officials “just going through,” (2) Party members, such as salesmen and truck drivers, whose occupations allow them to travel without suspicion, (3) “professional” couriers who are trained to operate on a full-time basis.
Some comrades are given special assignments, such as stock-piling supplies (paper, ink, printing presses, funds). Others, working with above-ground comrades, secure, for future underground use, extra drivers’ licenses, birth certificates, car titles, etc. In addition, comrades operate hide-outs and escape routes or hide Party records. The underground from 1951 to 1955 actually harbored Party leaders who were criminal fugitives, having been convicted by United States courts.
Depending on local conditions, the organizational structure of the underground varies from area to area. As a general rule, because of security reasons, the leadership is rotated. The Party may feel that a member is going “stale.” If so, he may be shifted to another assignment or temporarily “furloughed upstairs” (meaning allowed to reappear in the “open”). A reserve leadership is always ready, in case the functioning leaders are arrested or otherwise incapacitated. This reserve may consist of other underground comrades or members still “upstairs.”
On the West Coast, for example, a clandestine communist group using the code name of “Mollie” had full responsibility for carrying through not only underground but also many above-ground functions. For security reasons underground contacts are always downward, not to a higher level. This means that top officials can contact those in lower levels, but the latter (who seldom even know the identity of their superiors) cannot contact above themselves. In event of an “enemy breakthrough,” only the identity of those on the level “broken through,” or lower level, will be revealed.
As we have mentioned, the closest cooperation must exist between the underground and above-ground apparatuses. The former cannot operate as a self-contained unit. It must constantly be serviced from above; otherwise it would die of suffocation. As we noticed in Chapter 17, communist fronts serve as periscopes to the “upper world” through which funds, supplies, and instructions are funneled. The deeper the Party goes underground, the greater the reliance on fronts.
The overriding consideration of the underground is security, not to be discovered by the FBI. Let’s see how this affects the Party’s operations.
Hide-outs
Generally speaking the underground uses three types of hide-outs: (1) temporary, an abode for a courier or Party member en route to another destination. This will probably be a room in the home of a “politically reliable” individual; (2) emergency, a home or apartment where a member, perhaps feeling he is being watched or suddenly becoming sick, can hide on an emergency basis. It is not to be used too frequently; (3) permanent, or “deep freeze,” where one or more comrades can remain for extended periods, maybe a month, or even a year, with all necessities being provided. Farms or cabins in remote areas make excellent “deep freezes.”
Here are some of the requirements demanded for a “safe” hide-out. They illustrate the Party’s attention to detail.
1. The owner must be absolutely loyal to the Party.
2. If an apartment, there must be no doorman or elevator operator. A walk-up apartment of three or four stories is preferable.
3. If a family home, the members must be thoroughly reliable. There should be no children, relatives, or maids.
4. The proprietor should not be too closely identified with the Party, either as a sympathizer or member.
5. The hide-out must be located where there are no curious or talkative neighbors.
6. The quarters must be sufficiently large to accommodate extra guests. Excessive cramping attracts attention.
7. The neighborhood should be well known to the owner and one in which some trusted friends reside. In this way any inquiries in the vicinity will immediately come to their attention.
Meetings
Elaborate security must surround all underground contacts, whether between just two people or groups. Here are a few points the underground has to remember:
1. Don’t use the same meeting place too frequently. It might excite suspicion.
2. If a meeting is held at a home, a member of the family (who, of course, is thoroughly reliable) should be there to answer the door in case an outsider knocks. He can handle the situation and also serve as a lookout.
3. If large numbers are involved, times of arrival and departure should be staggered. Everybody should not arrive or depart at the same time.
4. If the comrades don’t know each other, a predetermined means of identification (a code word, piece of clothing, etc.) should be used.
5. Bring no more documents (books, papers, etc.) than absolutely necessary. Avoid note-taking. Make effective use of memory.
6. Upon departure, a “rear-guard” comrade should thoroughly check for any incriminating items. Have any papers been left on the floor? Is there a telephone number scratched on the wall? Has someone forgotten his coat, which might contain Party data?
In one instance six weeks allegedly were spent in bringing twenty people to a national underground conference.
If two comrades don’t know each other, advance arrangements must be made, usually by notes, to effect identification for a meeting. Here is one example. The note read:
On Friday, April 6, 8 P.M. at NE corner, Oak and 9th Sts.—my courier will be standing with a Field and Stream magazine. Bill’s courier will approach her and ask, “Mrs. Polk, what time is it?” She will reply, “I’m sorry, my watch is stopped.”
Note the use of a magazine and code words for identification. Just in case the first contact didn’t work out, there were alternative instructions. The note continued:
In case no one shows, she will be on the SW corner, Walnut and 10th, same magazine, Friday, 13, 8 P.M., same question and answer. She will wait around only ten minutes each time.
Noncommunists probably will find it difficult to understand the reckless abandon, personal risk, and sheer physical endurance displayed by communists to conceal their underground activities. Here are a few of the tactics employed by communists to determine if they are being followed:
Driving cars:
1. Driving alternately at high and low rates of speed.
2. Entering a heavily traveled intersection on a yellow light, hoping to lose any follower or cause an accident.
3. Turning corners at high rates of speed and stopping abruptly.
4. Suddenly leaving a car and walking hurriedly down a one-way street in the direction in which vehicle traffic is prohibited.
5. Entering a dark street in a residential area at night, making a sharp U-turn, cutting into a side alley, and extinguishing the car’s lights.
6. Driving to a rural area, taking a long walk in a field, then having another car meet them.
7. Waiting until the last minute, then making a sharp left turn in front of oncoming traffic.
8. Stopping at every filling station on the highway, walking around the car, always looking, then going on.
On foot:
1. Leaving subways, buses, and trains at the last minute, even holding the door open and jumping off.
2. Entering hotels, bus terminals, and department stores where there are many exits.
3. Stooping over in the aisles, then suddenly rising and looking around to see if anybody is searching for them.
4. Doubling back after rounding a corner.
5. Putting a coin in a pay telephone booth, dialing a number, then rushing to the adjoining booth to see if anybody is trying to listen.
6. Leaving a taxicab, but instructing the driver to go around the block and pick them up again.
7. Using store windows as mirrors to see behind them.
8. Walking slowly to a corner, then starting to run down an alleyway.
Always there is the fear of being followed. One Party couple registered at a motel, then the husband parked the car several miles away. He walked back and climbed through a side window. Maybe in this way he could conceal his night’s lodging!
A woman in a Midwestern city kept riding streetcars, buses, and taxis for thirty hours, stopping at no time except for meals. In communist language she was “dry-cleaning”; that is, making certain that she was not being followed.
The pressure becomes terrific. As long as a comrade feels he is “dirty” (that is, he suspects the “enemy,” meaning the FBI, is near), he must keep up his “dry-cleaning.” He can make his “meet” or enter a hide-out only when he’s certain he is “clean.”
Two dry-cleaning techniques are of special interest. One is the switch-point operation: The communist leader is driven to a certain location in a car (called a “drop car”). There he alights and enters another car (called a “pickup car”). Before entering the second car, however, he will walk across a parking lot, over a bridge, or through a department store—the object being to lose any pursuer. In the double switch, the pickup car drops the Party leader at a second switch, where he will be picked up by a third vehicle and then taken to his destination.
In the scramble, members (as on leaving meetings) enter automobiles. The drivers start the motors. Suddenly the doors of the cars will open and the comrades will get out, including the drivers. They scramble, meaning they quickly take seats in the other cars, whereupon all autos will move away in different directions. It’s hard for any “pursuer” to tell who went in which car.
The underground creates intense strains on family life. The undeviating demands of the Party (its interests must come first, regardless of personal consequences) leave deep scars.
For years many families are separated. On some occasions a midnight contact or a few days of furlough are permitted. Children grow up without seeing their fathers. In one instance a child was stricken with polio. His underground father did not leave his Party work to come to the child’s bedside. Mothers are often hard pressed to give answers to the question, “Where’s Daddy?” Some “explain” that Daddy is away on a trip, in another town, or dead. One little boy, whose father was gone, said: “I wish my father was in jail. Then I could at least see him.”
Normal family relationships are disrupted. The Party may promise financial assistance to the families of underground comrades, but many times the support is miserly or does not come at all. Heart-rending results ensue:
During the past four years, Hank and I have been separated most of the time [one Party wife wrote]. There has never been any question about carrying out the decisions made, even when Hazel [small daughter] and I were set adrift by the Party with no financial provision and I had to go to my family so that my infant could have food and a place to live. When Hazel almost died from third-degree burns, Hank didn’t even know about it since we had no way to communicate. I have been cut off from my family completely. The furniture, clothes and other things that we accumulated during our marriage we’ll probably never see again. We have moved, and moved, and moved yet again... dragging Hazel around from place to place, carrying out decisions made, guarding our security and that of others.
The total effect was demoralizing. The wife continues:
I can’t have an operation because it would mean six months in a cast and on my stomach—and there is no one to take care of Hazel.... I get overtired physically, and the past four years of the kind of life we have led, with its many pressures of loneliness, financial scrounging, security measures and the sword of Damocles—that of being discovered—hanging over my head, finally took its toll.
Despite this woman’s hardships the Party brought charges that her husband had been seeing her without permission. The utter fanaticism of Party discipline is shown by her reaction toward the charges: “If in spite of all this the Board feels that there has been a breach of discipline, then I am willing to abide by any decision made and accept whatever control is agreed upon.”
The underground, perhaps more than any other phase of Party activity, brings out the fanaticism of communist discipline. The member becomes so entranced with his mission that his hardships, sufferings, and obstacles become challenges to overcome, not reasons for discouragement. The very thought of working on this assignment, as one Party leader stated, should make him “ooh and ah.”
Some Party wives, however, did not always “ooh and ah,” but bitterly resented their husbands’ long absences from home and the disruption of family life. This presented the Party with a serious problem. These wives were potential weak links in communist security; they might jeopardize the husbands’ location by making unauthorized contacts, might give information to the “enemy” or impair morale by their uncongenial attitude. One Party instruction, for example, urged that wives should be spoken to and the importance of the Party’s policies explained. They must be indoctrinated more. For some Party wives it would certainly take a lot of explaining.
Children have been born in the communist underground, children who were not even given their true family names. In one instance a father and mother living as an underground couple (transformed couple) entered their child at a nearby school under the family alias. In another case a baby born to underground parents was registered with county authorities under the underground alias. Imagine the hypocrisy of such a family situation. A whole world of falsehoods must be invented to satisfy youthful curiosity. What about the parents’ childhoods? What about grandparents? Every family matter discussed must be carefully weighed: Will it give away any secrets?
The very character of the underground, with its emphasis on stealth and deceit, degrades human values. While many comrades struggle in poverty, living in squalid conditions at great personal sacrifice, a few enjoy the very best—comfortable hide-outs equipped with all conveniences. For them the underground is a “good life,” with others paying the bill. Moreover, Party discipline often places great power into the hands of some who, as petty dictators, do not hesitate to use it to inflict revenge and spite on their personal enemies. Many times the underground becomes a catacomb of back-stabbing and the settling of old scores.
Sexual immorality is also abetted. In one instance an organizer, leaving his wife and children, lived in Chicago with another woman. In an Eastern city, a woman whose husband was underground carried on an affair with another man. In still another instance a wife kept company with a man while her husband was forbidden by the Party’s underground leaders to see her.
This is the communist underground. It may appear as a “beehive of crazy confusion.” But it is not. All these shifts, midnight meetings, and escape routes find meaning in only one thing: the strengthening of the Party. The cardinal question always is, “What is best for the Party?”
As one Party leader stated, “Our best people are in this field.... They are not in it for adventure, romance, thrills or pleasure....” They “are in it because that is where the Party wants them for political reasons....” “... it is... probably one of the toughest and hardest assignments for anyone.”
That is why the Party, as we have seen, tries desperately to create the communist man, the individual obedient even when he is beyond the Party’s immediate control. “It’s not me who speaks,” one leader said, “but the Party.” Any allegiance outside the Party must be broken. The underground worker is the member who, even if cut off from leadership, will know what to do, will carry out the assignment, regardless of what it is. He is the man on whom all revolutionary plans depend.
Here is an example of how this fanaticism works:
Shortly before noon one day a top Party official drove east out of town. At the outskirts he doubled back, twice turning corners and coming to abrupt stops. Then, at speeds varying from forty to eighty miles an hour, he continued east for twenty-six miles. Turning around, he retraced his route at eighty miles an hour.
He was “dry-cleaning” in a most dangerous and reckless fashion. Back in town, for three hours he parked and reparked his car, darting up streets, entering and immediately leaving hotels.
At roughly 4:00 P.M. he left town again, this time driving south, again at various speeds. After five hours he cut east for fourteen miles, north for two, doubled back for twelve, south-east for forty-two, sometimes running without his lights; parking for a few minutes near buildings, then darting out at savage speed.
Late that night, after roughly twelve hours of furtive, reckless driving, often at highly dangerous speeds, he arrived at his destination and checked into a hotel. He had covered some 360 miles; the normal driving distance was 195.
This type of fanatical communist, if so instructed, would not hesitate to lead a riot, steal vital military secrets, sabotage defense industries, or perform illegal activities. Here is the true communist at work, without concern for personal risk or safety.
21 — Espionage and Sabotage
The communist underground is designed to carry forward phases of the Party’s program which cannot be conducted openly and lawfully. In addition, it contains weapons of attack which must always remain hidden (the permanent part of the underground), such as aid to Soviet espionage, attempts to place members in strategic positions in industry for potential sabotage, techniques to discredit law enforcement, and endeavors to infiltrate the armed forces.
Lenin taught that the enemy must be weakened in advance. To wait for something to happen is not the way to achieve revolution. The way must be prepared. The enemy must be softened up: weaken his will to resist, nullify his capacity for counteraction, impair his morale. Then, as in November, 1917, in Russia, when the crisis comes, communists can march to power through the ranks of a demoralized enemy.
The Party’s relation to Soviet espionage is one of the most potent weapons in the communist underground arsenal. As past events have proven—for instance the Harry Gold-Klaus Fuchs combination and the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed in 1953 on espionage charges—Moscow-directed spying represents a vital danger to the integrity and safety of free government. Espionage is utilized not only to secure information but also to weaken the “enemy” from within.
The Soviets very early instituted espionage operations against the United States with the full cooperation of the Communist Party. In 1919 the Comintern was established and, as we have seen in Chapter 4, Comintern “reps” became common figures in Party circles. In January, 1919, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, a member of the Russian Communist Party, was appointed as the first Soviet representative to the United States. Although never recognized by the American government, he set up an office in New York City. Arthur Adams, later identified as a Soviet atom spy, was a member of Martens’ staff.
In the light of today’s well-organized, efficiently operated spy apparatus, the Soviets in the early days were crude and clumsy. Many of the Russians were not proficient in English. They lacked knowledge of our customs and possessed no special espionage training. Many were propaganda as well as espionage agents and could be identified by their rabid preaching of communism. Often the security of their communications was not of the best.
In late July, 1920, a seaman on the SS Stockholm walked up Pier 95 in New York City. Noticing customs officials searching two other seamen, he turned and ran down the pier. Later, after the seaman’s apprehension, a package was found concealed in his trousers. Inside was a series of envelopes, one inside the other with the smallest containing over 200 uncut diamonds valued at 50,000 dollars. The smuggling of diamonds was one of the early Bolshevik techniques of financing operations in the United States. For whom was the package destined? Inside was a typewritten letter starting, “Comrade Martens.”
Unfamiliarity with America made dependence on the Communist Party, USA, more important than ever. Without the ready base of the Communist Party, USA, with its fanatical allegiance to Moscow, Soviet espionage would have had tremendous problems in getting started. As it was, there were Party members available, able and willing to carry out Soviet instructions. Often it was difficult to distinguish between a member’s work for the Party and for Moscow. Comrades traveled back and forth to Russia, were given assignments by the Kremlin, and felt it their highest duty to gather information for the Bolsheviks.
Party officials made assistance to Moscow priority Number One. We have seen in Chapter 4 how the communist leadership, for example, promised to help Comrade Loaf (a Comintern agent) collect information on the American labor movement. In another instance the Party Secretariat actually approved the release of a Party member for Soviet intelligence duties.
What were some of the ways through which the Communist Party, USA, rendered aid to Soviet espionage?
Most important, of course, was recruitment. The Party was able, time after time, to supply recruits, both members and sympathizers, for espionage use. Suppose the Soviets needed a photographer? a source of information in a Pennsylvania steel plant? a trusted short-wave radio expert? The Party would be expected to, and did, “fill the bill.”
This funneling of talent to the Soviets was often accomplished through a special Party contact who was called a “steerer.” A trusted old-time member, he was able to spot recruits for espionage among the Party’s ranks and to fulfill requests made by the Soviets. As espionage operations became more complex, the “steerer’s” role became ever more vital. The Party was a vast recruiting ground for spy talent.
The Party provided many essential “services” to Soviet espionage. Suppose a Russian espionage agent secretly entered the United States, to operate here or while en route to another country. Most likely, as so often happened, he would need a “new identity,” or, in espionage language, a “change of feathers.” This probably meant a faked birth certificate, a false passport, and other identification papers. Maybe he would be placed in “deep freeze” for several months. If so, he had to be “serviced”—that is, fed and clothed. After being “re-feathered,” he would be on his way.
Then there were “business covers.” A Party member, perhaps with Soviet funds, would set up a business, allegedly for legitimate purposes but actually for espionage. In 1927, World Tourists was incorporated in New York, ostensibly for tourist business. Actually, this “business,” under the operation of Jacob Golos, a communist “steerer,” became an active espionage “cover.”
The Party, in addition, helped arrange the transfer of funds, established mail drops (where espionage communications come to a third person, later to be given to the espionage network), and operated couriers. In one instance a Party member even served as an interpreter for a Soviet agent.
Even from these early days, however, evidence existed that the Soviets were aware of the dangers of too close an affiliation with the United States Party. An espionage operation might be jeopardized by a known Party member’s participation. Similarly, in the event of a “blow-up,” the Party, in the public’s eyes, would be linked directly with a foreign power, Soviet Russia. This was one thing both the Soviets and Party officials wanted to avoid. Hence, by the early 1940’s there was a definite lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the U.S. Party for espionage assistance.
The Soviet spy system, moreover, was now better able to stand on its own feet. In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation (a Soviet government commercial agency) was established. This gave the Soviets their first “legal” base for espionage operations. In this way persons or institutions in a country openly as representatives or agents of a foreign power have an ideal cover to fulfill their assignments of clandestine espionage. In 1933 diplomatic recognition was afforded the Soviet Union. Now trained espionage agents, operating under diplomatic immunity, could direct operations. After World War II Russians assigned to the United Nations in this country gave additional striking power to Soviet espionage. Moreover, assistance was possible through the espionage networks of Soviet satellite countries operating in the United States.
This lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the Party was a gradual development. Whereas in the early 1920’s Party and espionage work were often indistinguishable, the Soviets now instructed members tapped for service to drop all connections with the Party. One old-time Party member, turned spy, told the FBI that the Soviets had instructed agents to conceal their Party affiliations. This soon became a standard technique. If engaged in espionage, cut off all connections with the Party, even contacts with former Party friends. Ethel Rosenberg, for example, indicated that she no longer bought the Daily Worker at her usual newsstand. Another agent, while in the company of a Soviet superior, stopped to purchase a communist publication. He was severely reprimanded. The communist label might betray the espionage ring.
The Soviets, however, still depended on communists or sympathizers for assistance. In one major apparatus detected by the FBI, for example, twelve of seventeen participants had been Party members. Both Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, executed as Soviet spies, had communist backgrounds.
Elizabeth Bentley, moreover, has given testimony as to how she collected dues from secret members of the Party when she came to Washington as a courier of the Soviet espionage system. Among those from whom she has stated she collected dues were officials of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Department of Commerce, the Air Corps, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Treasury Department, and others. In some instances one person would collect dues for a group and hand them over to Miss Bentley. One such individual was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, who, according to Miss Bentley, headed a group. (Silvermaster denied the disclosures initially and later invoked the Fifth Amendment.) On occasions a member of a group when coming to New York would deliver the Party dues collected to Miss Bentley there. The Party also benefited, as disclosed by testimony, because, as in some instances, information collected for the Soviets was made available to the leadership of the Party for review.
In 1945 the defection of Igor Gouzenko, cipher clerk assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Canada, revealed close tie-ups between Soviet espionage and Canadian communists. Then the appearance of FBI informants at Smith Act trials shocked the Soviet Union as to the amazing extent to which the FBI had penetrated the Communist Party, USA. These, among other revelations, encouraged even more the Soviet tendency to lessen its direct dependence on the Party. Today, with some exceptions, the Soviets are attempting to operate their espionage networks independent of the Party, staying away, as much as possible, from Party assistance. This does not mean, however, that the Party is today not playing an important role in Soviet espionage. As we shall see, the Party is doing much to prepare the way for Soviet espionage and, when the need arises, will unhesitatingly supply vital assistance. The present “drawing away” from direct Party assistance is strictly a Soviet tactical maneuver, subject to instant change.
Soviet espionage is no longer a clumsy, crude affair, as it was in the days of the rollicking “reps,” but a deadly efficient profession, skillfully directed from Moscow, with well-trained agents supplied with money, modern technical equipment, and experience. To the Soviets, espionage is a part of over-all state policy.
On an April night in 1951, just two minutes before seven o’clock, a tall man wearing a tweed sport coat walked through the darkness toward the Washington Monument in our nation’s capital. Brilliant lights played on the famous shrine. The usually bustling place was deserted. Everything was quiet.
Suddenly the tall man stepped from the circle of darkness into the light. He stopped a moment, peered up at the 555-foot top, looked at his watch, then started to walk around the base. On his left hand he wore a glove. A band of adhesive tape circled the middle finger of his right hand, and he carried a red-covered book under his left arm. This man was an employee of our Defense Department. As part of his work he had access to highly confidential information, just what the Russians wanted.
Exactly at seven o’clock, another man clad in a dark business suit stepped from the shadows. An espionage contact set up months previously in Austria was being consummated to the minute. The second man was Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Novikov was well known to the FBI, since his activities in the United States had gone far beyond those of a diplomatic official. He was audacious almost beyond description. His brazenness reached a climax when he sat with defense counsel during the espionage trial of the onetime Justice Department employee, Judith Coplon. During this trial he would write out questions and hand them to defense counsel to direct to FBI agents on the witness stand. He was particularly interested in having questions asked pertaining to our internal administration and procedures.)
When Novikov met the government employee he said, “I’m Mr. Williams,” the code words of recognition, along with the glove, tape, and red book. The two shook hands, then Novikov took the military specialist by the elbow, directing him from the light. A few words, arranging another meeting, and they parted.
From that night, for an entire year, the Soviets made secretive contacts with the government employee, never realizing that he was a “double agent” of the FBI. Seldom were meetings held in the same place. Some were on lonely lanes or in dead-end streets; one on a narrow rock bridge on a deserted Maryland road after dark. One time Novikov stood in a movie line; the double agent was to pass by and, seeing him there, would know that a meeting was scheduled one hour later at a nearby school. Then there were chalk marks on trash cans and a pencil mark on page 100 of the Manhattan (New York) telephone directory in Washington’s Union Station, elaborate code signals between Novikov and the man from the defense establishment.
I hasten to add that the government employee was a loyal American, and in meeting Novikov he was merely carrying out a duty imposed upon him when he was assigned in Austria with the air force. His services were solicited by Otto Verber, who came to the United States as a refugee, as did Kurt L. Ponger, who had married Verber’s sister. Both Verber and Ponger were in the armed services, both had acquired American citizenship, and, after the war, both had served in Europe. Upon returning to private life, both settled in Vienna, where they took advantage of the GI bill and benefits and enrolled in the University of Vienna. In 1949 Ponger was recruited by the Soviet intelligence service, and he in turn recruited Verber. It was later learned that Ponger had been a member of a Communist Party cell in England before he came to the United States as a refugee. He also had indoctrinated Verber.
The air force representative promptly reported Verber’s approach to his superiors and from that time on acted under instructions. Prior to his return to the United States, Verber and Ponger arranged for the meeting at the Washington Monument. The Treasury of the United States, of course, received the thousands of dollars of Soviet funds paid to the loyal American.
In June, 1953, after pleading guilty to an espionage indictment, Ponger was sentenced to a prison term of from five to fifteen years, while Verber received a sentence of from three years, four months, to ten years. Novikov, who was named in the indictment as a co-conspirator, was declared persona non grata and returned to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet spy system is a disciplined structure, composed of many networks. There are the “legal” networks; that is, espionage controlled by legal representatives of the Russian government, such as diplomats. This was the case of Novikov. Then there are illegal networks, meaning spy rings operated by Moscow independent of the legal establishments. More and more the Soviets are concentrating on building illegal networks and planting “sleeper” agents. Such was the case of Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, of Soviet intelligence, who was arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in June, 1957, at the request of the FBI, after we had identified him as a concealed agent. After his indictment in August, 1957, on espionage charges, information was made public concerning him which the FBI could not previously disclose. In November, 1957, after being convicted in Federal Court, Eastern District of New York, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined 3000 dollars. Subsequently, a notice of appeal was filed.
Ordinarily a network includes a principal (the boss), always a Russian national in a “legal” network. Then there are, depending on the size of the network, group leaders, couriers, sources of information. Non-Russians, such as Harry Gold, may reach as high as a group leader or may be even a principal, but at all times they are under the firm control of Soviet superiors. In espionage, as in all features of communism, native comrades exist only to serve the Russian master.
Strange as it may sound, it is difficult to become a Russian espionage agent. The Soviets are highly selective. They will not accept just anybody. Does the prospect have access to confidential data? Will he accept discipline? What is his background? The Russians want to know everything about him. Sometimes elaborate verification checks, from Soviet contacts around the world, are run. Moreover, the breaking-in period of a prospect may be very slow. At first he may be given minor assignments to test his flair for intelligence work and discernment of details, all without risk to any established espionage operation. If he “comes through,” he’ll be given more responsible work.
Why does an individual engage in espionage? Why do native Americans betray their country for a foreign tyranny?
The motives are many, and often intertwined: money, the temporary thrill of secretive work, personal weaknesses, blackmail, feelings of spite against America because of an imagined wrong, a hope to assist relatives in communist countries. Very important, however, is ideological motivation, an attraction to the theory of communism and/or misguided admiration for Soviet rule in Russia.
Let’s examine more closely this ideological motivation since it is playing such a major role today. We can distinguish two major categories:
1. Non-Party ideological motivation: that is, a feeling for or acceptance of the alleged principles of communism. In prior years many thousands were hoodwinked into believing, because of propaganda, that Russia represented a new “era” in humanity, that anti-Semitism was being abolished, that injustices were being rectified, that the problems of hunger, poverty, and racial discrimination were being solved. Among the reasons Harry Gold, who was never a Party member, gave for entering Russian espionage were:
A genuine desire to help the people of the Soviet Union to be able to enjoy some of the better things of life.... Here, too, in the person of the Soviet Union was the one bulwark against the further encroachment of that monstrosity, Fascism.... Anything that was against anti-Semitism I was for, and so the chance to help strengthen the Soviet Union seemed like a wonderful opportunity.
2. Party ideological motivation: the conditioning of thousands of members and sympathizers in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, schooling them in loyalty to Moscow. Every Party member, through his training, is a potential communist espionage or sabotage agent. Julius Rosenberg, a fanatical Party member, actually volunteered his services. David Greenglass, Rosenberg’s brother-in-law, was also an ardent communist. Walking along Highway 66 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 1944, his wife, Ruth, who had just come from New York City, told David that Julius wanted him to furnish information about his work at Los Alamos, where the atom bomb was being prepared. (David was assigned there as an army technician.) At first David said no—but his ideological motivation as a communist reversed his decision, and he agreed. He was to do great damage to America by furnishing the Russians, through Rosenberg, with valuable information about our greatest weapon.
Then there are other methods of motivating agents:
1. Threat of exposure and blackmail. Agents are given money (sometimes even against their will). Usually the amount is small, but a receipt is obtained, thus compromising their independence. Or they are made to sign papers, reports, or documents. If the initial ideological enthusiasm wears off, as it probably will, the agent is trapped. Even if he so desires, he cannot break away.
2. Use of hostages. Once they have control over relatives and loved ones the Soviets do not hesitate to let it be known that unless their victim does their bidding a whole family will be liquidated.
Today the Party, with its thousands of members, represents a vast reservoir of potential espionage agents. Moreover, its vast propaganda and ideological program is daily saturating their hearts, minds, and souls with a sympathetic acceptance of communism. To be a Party member does not automatically mean being an espionage agent, but it makes the member potential spy material, if the request for aid to Russia ever comes. This is a tremendous and present danger to our security.
The United States is strategic spy target Number One for the Soviets. Every effort is being made to penetrate our defenses. The Soviets are interested in literally everything. Any person who believes that espionage means securing only military information is unacquainted with the nature of twentieth-century spying. An army manual, security regulations of a government building, the “political” views of a clerk in an industrial firm, incidents in the life of a prominent person which might be used for blackmail—these and many more are prize espionage targets. Soviet espionage is both mass (seeking information at random) and specific (trying to obtain a certain blueprint or military operational plan); open (gathering public source items, such as newspapers, magazines, maps, navigational charts, patents, aerial photographs, technical journals) and undercover (use of illegal means to steal information).
Here are some major “areas of interest” of Soviet espionage in the United States:
1. Scientific research and development, with particular attention to atomic energy, missiles, radar defense, electronics, and aeronautics.
2. The strength, deployment, training methods, strategy, and tactics of the armed forces of the United States, together with ordnance, weapons, and military equipment.
3. The intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the United States, possibilities for penetration.
4. International relations of the United States.
5. Weaknesses in American public and private life that can be exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes.
6. Anti-Soviet political opposition groups, refugees from the Soviet Union and satellite countries, and nationality groups in the United States.
The world of Soviet espionage, like the communist underground, is bleak and dreary. An individual may work for years and know his superior only as “Bill” or “Henry.” His rewards: a smile, a promise, or a token award. Harry Gold, who gave a lifetime to the Soviets, was awarded the Order of the Red Star, which, among other things, gave him the privilege of free trolley rides in Moscow. To those hoping to get money, the promise is always big, but results are meager. Here are Gold’s own words:
... the difficulty in raising money for... trips; the weary hours of waiting on street corners in strange towns where I had no business to be and the killing of time in cheap movies; and the lies I had to tell at home and to my friends to explain my supposed whereabouts (Mom was certain that I was carrying on a series of clandestine love affairs).... It was drudgery... anyone who had an idea this work was glamorous and exciting was very wrong indeed—nothing could have been more dreary.
Life is disciplined to the final detail. The individual is a cog in a vast, inhuman, demanding machine. Klaus Fuchs, for example, while committing espionage in New York, asked permission from the Soviets for his sister in Massachusetts to stay with him. A petty detail but, disciplined agent that he was, he got the necessary approval.
The pressure is terrific, with the Soviet principals always wanting more and more. “If you were in Russia,” one Soviet superior barked at a sub-agent who had done something wrong, “you would suffer the same fate as the traitors in the Moscow trials,” referring to the purges of the 1930’s. Everything is geared to promote Russian interests. If the agent fails, there are threats of dire consequences.
Espionage’s twin partner is sabotage. In 1917 and after, sabotage played an important part in the Bolshevik rise to power. Revolution for the communists is a “science,” of which sabotage is an important element. Not to use it, according to communist tactics, is to hinder victory.
The Communist Party, USA, has not reached the point where preparations for sabotage are vital to its future plans. Its small numbers, fear of FBI penetration of its inner discussions, and the existence of federal laws against sabotage and insurrection militate against such plans. So far the communists have carefully refrained from any show of terrorism. Any such act, even random sorties, the communists realize, would cause more harm to the Party by counter prosecutive action than any damage achieved by violence. Moreover, basic communist revolutionary tactics dictate against any such sabotage attempts until the eve of hostilities, which we pray and hope will never come. According to communist teaching, the comrades should not “tip their hands” until the “time is ripe.” At a time when the Party was more open and truthful in proclaiming its objectives and tactics, Party organizers were instructed, “To raise the slogan of an armed demonstration without any anticipation of a speedy transformation into an armed revolt, and before the preconditions for a successful revolt exist, is to be guilty of playing with revolution.”
Never must we forget, however, that even though acts of sabotage are not now part of the Party’s program, they may become so in the future. In fact, the communist underground provides a cover to commit sabotage when it will serve the communist cause.
As part of the Party’s underground the communists are pursuing a program called colonization, designed to place concealed members in strategic positions in basic industries and defense facilities. Colonization is part of the Party’s industrial concentration program, which aims at increasing communist influence in industry and labor. This always has a high Party priority. Basic industry is a commonly used Party term, which one communist manual has defined as those industries “upon which the whole economic system depends.” Hence to have a Party member in a steel plant would be more advantageous to the communists than one in a corncob-pipe factory. This technique is also often called “A Party Rooted Among the Workers.”
In event of an emergency these colonizers, because of their key positions and concealed capacities, would be able to commit sabotage. A trained communist, by a flip of a switch, the pull of a lever, or the release of death-generating germs, could disrupt the work of thousands. One publication described the Party’s objective:
In order to overthrow the capitalist system, the working class must control the key positions in the capitalist system. These are not the state and federal capitals, public buildings, or residential neighborhoods, but the heart of the capitalist system—the shops, mines, mills and factories.
Moreover, the location of communist members in key industrial facilities places the Party in a position, if it desires, to promote strikes and slowdowns, which can be used as forms of sabotage. These tactics are vital, in communist thinking, to create “revolutionary situations” preparatory to the seizure of power.
Colonizers do not participate in open Party activities. Often they come from other areas of the country, even giving up their chosen professions. Sometimes a man and wife (a colonizer couple) will be sent into this phase of underground operations. The emphasis is on young people—those in their twenties and thirties. Operating under aliases, they attempt to work their way into more strategic industrial positions. These colonizers represent a deadly communist underground weapon. They are “sleepers” who, upon Party instructions, may one day rise up against our nation.
Another potential danger arises from previous sabotage training of Party members. Some, as we have seen, attended Moscow’s Lenin School. There they learned, among other things, the techniques of guerrilla warfare, how to make sabotage devices and organize civilian resistance. Others served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. According to William Z. Foster, 15,000 Party members saw duty with American military forces during World War II. The Party realizes that the enrollment of members in the armed forces provides military experience which, in a time of revolutionary crisis, could be utilized to communist advantage—at “capitalist” expense.
All the time, while the Party is attacking free government, both above-ground and underground, it seeks complete license to pursue its schemes. Any opposition by the government is labeled “persecution,” “Red baiting,” or “thought control.”
For this reason communists grasp every opportunity to discredit, weaken, and vilify the institutions enforcing law and order. As long as the American judicial system is strong and realistically recognizes the threat of subversion to our constitutional republic, their efforts will be hampered. They know that.
Listen to these teachings. Are they calculated to instill respect for our democratic heritage?
—The law-enforcement officer: “... a servant of the boss class.... He is your enemy.”
—The courts: “... the workers must... recognize the capitalist court as a class enemy—as a weapon in the bosses’ hands....” “The worker must also understand that courts are not impartial....”
At all times communists are told to try to make “bourgeois” courts look weak and silly. If members are brought to trial, turn the courtroom into a sounding board for communism. “... the aim should be to turn the trial into an open tribunal for the spreading and propagating of Communist ideas and aims.” “The class struggle goes on in the courtroom as well as it does on the picket line, in the shops, and in the mines.”
That’s why every possible tactic is used inside the courtroom to obstruct the orderly operation of justice. Outside, another attack is coordinated: letter-writing campaigns, fund-raising drives, propaganda leaflets, literature, all alleging that the communists on trial are being “persecuted” and that American courts are “unfair,” “partial,” and “undemocratic.”
Another weapon in the Party’s underground arsenal is the attempted infiltration of our armed forces. “Illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy and police,” Lenin proclaimed. Another communist writer adds, “The capitalist class has the army, navy and police at its disposal precisely for the purpose of keeping the working class from seizing power.”
Yet, in the final analysis, as the communists well know, force and violence will be needed to bring about the revolution.
In fact this is exactly what Khrushchev had in mind when he told the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:
... Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence always and everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists from the reformists, the opportunists. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable....
Over 100 years ago Marx and Engels made this point perfectly clear in the Communist Manifesto. “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” Lenin was more pointed:
As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.
Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev reveals his own hypocrisy when, in the same breath, he boasts that the communist world has no aggressive intentions and then declares as he did in August, 1957, “We are Leninists and are for peaceful cooperation.” Through the use of Aesopian language he is seeking to induce the Western world to relax its guard until the time when the communist world is ready to launch its offensive and hopes to chant the “funeral dirge” over the free world.
How can loyal Americans resist this attack? I turn to this subject in the concluding chapters.
22 — What Can You Do?
The responsible person who gains an understanding of communism knows that such understanding should lead to the question: “But what can I do about it?”
My answer is that we can do a lot.
1. First and most important is to make sure that we do not permit the communists to fool us into becoming “innocent victims.” Our defense? First, to know the answers to the “Five False Claims of Communism” given in Chapter 7. Next, to know the ways to “spot” deceptive communist fronts, listed at the end of Chapter 17.
2. Members of a trade union or any civic, fraternal, or social organization can help by spotting, exposing, and opposing communist efforts to infiltrate and capture that organization. How this can be done is told in Chapter 16.
3. And, finally, there may well be occasions when everyone might have the opportunity to help expose and prevent attempts at espionage, sabotage, and other types of subversive activity.
“Yes,” one might say, “but I’m just a private citizen. Isn’t spy-hunting a job for the FBI?”
Of course it is a job for the FBI, one given it by Presidential directives, acts of Congress, and rulings of the Attorney General. But the FBI can’t do it all alone. The FBI has jurisdiction over more than 140 violations of federal law, and in a country with over 170,000,000 inhabitants there are fewer than 6200 agents of the FBI. Hence, all of these agents are not available for the investigation of subversive activities. We need the help of all loyal Americans.
Furthermore, in a democracy like ours, citizenship carries with it not only rights but obligations. One of these is to do our part to preserve, protect, and defend the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign. The President of the United States, for example, in issuing directives giving the FBI the responsibility over matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, specifically called upon all patriotic citizens and individuals to assist us.
Therefore, those individuals who place information they have regarding the communist conspiracy into the proper hands are making a contribution of great value to the security of their country.
“But,” one may say, “what can I do? I lead an ordinary life. I don’t know any communists. So how can I be of any help?”
My answer to that is: You never know! Here is a case history of another average American who thought he “didn’t know any communists.”
This incident might be called the Case of the Forgotten Rubbish.
It was on a Saturday. A man telephoned one of our field offices. “I’ve been cleaning out my garage,” he said, “and I’ve found some old rubbish there.”
“Yes,” said the special agent.
“I guess I’m crazy calling about this, but I thought you might be interested. The stuff doesn’t belong to me. It was left here by some roomers who moved a month or two ago. There’s a box with a lot of cards.”
“What kind of cards?”
“Don’t know,” the man answered. “I never saw any like them before. There are no names on them. Have words like ‘club’ and ’section’ and some different colored tabs on them. Guess I should have burned them and not....”
“We’re certainly glad you called,” the agent said. “Mind if we come to see you?”
That telephone call enabled the FBI to secure the membership records of a complete section of the Communist Party. Marked for destruction by the section membership secretary, they had, by mistake, found their way into the forgotten rubbish.
Now an alert, patriotic citizen had placed these records into the fight against communism, helping to identify many of the most dangerous subversives in his very own community.
In this way he, like many others who report information to the FBI, was helping protect his own home, family, and nation.
Don’t think one must have evidence establishing the identity of a spy, the hide-out of an underground Party leader, or the location of stolen blueprints before he can report information. Many cases start with very small clues, a scrap of paper, a photograph, an abandoned passport. Then, bit by bit, the entire picture is developed by investigation.
Here are a few suggestions of what Americans can report to the FBI:
1. Any information about espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities. The FBI is as close to every person as the nearest telephone. See the front of any telephone book for the FBI’s number.
2. Don’t worry if the information seems incomplete or trivial. Many times a small bit of information might furnish the data we are seeking.
3. Stick to the facts. The FBI is not interested in rumor or idle gossip. Talebearing should always be avoided. The FBI is not interested in what a person thinks but what he does to undermine our national security.
4. Don’t try to do any investigating yourself. Security investigations require great care and effort. The innocent must be protected as well as the guilty identified. That is the job for the professional investigator. Hysteria, witch hunts, and vigilantes weaken our internal security.
5. Be alert. America’s best defense lies in the alertness of its patriotic citizens.
As we have seen, identifying communists is not easy. They are trained in deceit and trickery and use every form of camouflage and dishonesty to advance their cause.
For this reason we must be absolutely certain that our fight is waged with full regard for the historic liberties of this great nation. This is the fundamental premise of any attack against communism.
Too often I have seen cases where loyal and patriotic but misguided Americans have thought they were “fighting communism” by slapping the label of “Red” or “communist” on anybody who happened to be different from them or to have ideas with which they did not agree.
Smears, character assassination, and the scattering of irresponsible charges have no place in this nation. They create division, suspicion, and distrust among loyal Americans—just what the communists want—and hinder rather than aid the fight against communism.
Another thing. Time after time in this book I have mentioned that honest dissent should not be confused with disloyalty. A man has a right to think as he wishes: that’s the strength of our form of government. Without free thought our society would decay. Just because a man’s opinion is unpopular and represents a minority viewpoint or is different he is not necessarily disloyal. Hence, one should have the facts before accusing anyone of propagating the Party line.
One of the chief jobs of the FBI, fully as important as tracking down spies, is to protect the civil rights of individuals.
In the FBI our objective in any investigation is to secure the facts which will establish the truth or falsity of a complaint or allegation. We do not evaluate nor do we make recommendations for a course of action as to whether a man should be prosecuted, hired, or removed from a job. The FBI is strictly a fact-gathering agency, responsible, in turn, to the Attorney General, the President, the Congress, and, in the last analysis, to the American people. The investigative and adjudicatory processes simply do not belong in the same organization.
When the clouds of World War II began to lower, large segments of our people became conscious for the first time that America was confronted with an enemy from within. One of the disgraces of our era is that it was ever necessary to question the loyalty of Americans. The record, however, is clear: There were some who, using the protective cloak of the rights of all Americans as a cover, sought to conceal traitorous and subversive activities.
In carrying out our responsibilities we soon became very conscious of the fact that each allegation and complaint had to be carefully checked. There are literally thousands of people in this country who have been the target of accusation and thousands whose loyalty could be established only by investigation. Most have been grateful. Some have been resentful that they were investigated at all; but we had a job to do, and it was done with impartiality and a zealous regard for the rights and reputation of the individuals involved. One of the happiest moments in our day-to-day activities is when we can establish the innocence of a man wrongfully accused.
Here are a few illustrations of the outcome of investigations which have given us a feeling of satisfaction:
A New York man changed his name to one that was more pronounceable. He was with the Merchant Marine and the accusation was made that he was a member of the Communist Party; that he had been educational director of a Party section and had signed a Communist Party petition. We investigated. We found that the man in changing his name had taken the name of a Communist Party member who was an educational director of a section of the Party in New York. Beyond that, we secured handwriting specimens of the man with the changed name, and our laboratory technicians established that he had not signed the Party petition.
A scientist was seeking a job with the army. The accusation arose that he had signed a communist petition. We investigated and found that a man with the same name and initial had signed such a petition but he was not the scientist.
A government agency received a letter bearing a fictitious signature stating that a government employee was working with the Communist Party. We investigated. Our inquiry revealed that all comment concerning the employee was highly favorable, except for the statement of a seventy-two-year-old woman residing in Philadelphia who was a neighbor of the government worker. This woman advised she had overheard the employee say, “I’m working for the Communist Party” but admitted the employee said she had made the statement in jest. The neighbor said she had never written any agency of the government concerning the employee. During the investigation we secured specimens of the elderly neighbor’s handwriting and determined she had written the defamatory letter out of spite.
An allegation was made that a former army officer was the nephew of a French communist leader and maintained a close relationship with him. Our investigation disclosed that the two men had the same name, but were not related. The only contact the army officer ever had with the French communist leader was when he met the Frenchman on one occasion and inquired as to his ancestry.
When a citizen thinks he has been wrongfully accused of communist activity, we, as a matter of long-standing policy, are more than happy to receive any statement he might care to make. Then, if we receive a future allegation, his statement will be on file and can be considered in connection with any investigation we are called on to make.
As I have stated, time after time FBI investigations exonerate the innocent. The latest scientific knowledge, finger-prints, new investigative techniques, careful training of our special agents in the mechanics and ethics of conducting good investigations—all these represent the assurance that the FBI is zealously protecting not only the internal security of the nation but also the rights, life, and property of the individual.
There are some who feel that a national police agency should be established to meet and handle all phases of the communist menace, since under the present structure of government many agencies have a responsibility for internal security. This, they say, would cut through the “red tape,” centralize all investigations and determinations, and make for more “efficiency.” I disagree. This nation has no need for a national police. Such an agency would be contrary to American tradition. The present system of cooperation among the nation’s law-enforcement agencies is completely adequate to meet the needs. Weaknesses do exist. They lie not in the system itself but in its implementation. These weaknesses can be and are being overcome.
What can one do in the fight against communism?
I repeat: a lot. Always remember that this fight is something which must be carried on soberly, seriously, and, above all, responsibly. Our best weapons are facts and the truth. “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” Don Whitehead in his book, The FBI Story, in concluding his study of the FBI and its problems stated the case most accurately when he said:
The top command of the FBI have no illusions that communism can be destroyed in the United States by the investigation, prosecution and conviction of Communist Party leaders who conspire to overthrow the government by force and violence. That is merely one phase of the job to be done in a world-wide struggle.
The FBI knows that the bigger job lies with the free world’s intellectuals—the philosophers, the thinkers wherever they may be, the professors and scientists and scholars and students. These people who think, the intellectuals if you please, are the ones who can and must convince men that communism is evil. The world’s intellectuals themselves must see that communism is the deadliest enemy that intellectualism and liberalism ever had. They must be as willing to dedicate themselves to this cause as the Communists have been to dedicate themselves to their cause.