IV
If the relationship between Comte’s philosophy and the doctrines which preceded it is sufficiently evident, it does not follow that this philosophy has brought with it nothing new. On the contrary, the “transposition” of problems and the constant effort to substitute the relative to the absolute point of view, entails serious consequences with very far reaching effects. Some of these were at once apparent, and first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of the public. Others, more remote, but no less important, appeared more slowly.
The negative consequences almost alone attracted attention at first. The chief characteristic of the new philosophy seemed to be the denial of the legitimacy and even of the possibility of metaphysics in all its forms: rational psychology, the philosophical theory of matter and of life, rational theology, etc. It seemed also to deny the possibility of introspective psychology, of ethics in its traditional form, as well as of logic. In a word, one after another, it excluded all the parts of what constituted a “course of philosophy.” No wonder, then, if this doctrine which took the name of “positive” appeared to be chiefly negative.
However, in reality, the negation only affected the so-called “rational” or “philosophical sciences.” Comte reproached them with what Aristotle calls τὸ κένως ζητεῖν. Stringently applying the principle of the relativity of knowledge, he refused to admit anything absolute. He was therefore perfectly true to himself in rejecting doctrines founded upon metaphysical principles. But this entirely negative aspect of his philosophy is very far from being the one according to which we can best understand it. Truly speaking, it is only preparatory, and historians have often committed the mistake of allowing people to believe that it is essential. “We only destroy what we replace,” said Comte.
The question was not to ruin but to transform the psychological, moral and social sciences. As we have seen, positive philosophy does not deny the possibility of a psychology.
On the contrary, it establishes that psychical phenomena, like the others, are subject to laws, and that these laws must be looked for by the positive method. It only rejects the psychology of the ideologists as abstract, and that of Cousin as metaphysical. It claims that, in presence of the phenomena which he is studying, the psychologist should assume the same attitude as the biologist or the physicist, that any search after cause or essence should be carefully avoided, that any metaphysical or ethical after-thought should be set aside. Then a science of physical phenomena will be established; still it will only be able to study the highest mental functions in the “universal subject,” in humanity. If we wish to do so, we may continue to call it by its traditional name, although it is to the old psychology only what the chemistry of our day is to alchemy.
A similar transformation gives rise to social science. Here again, the indispensable condition for the scientific knowledge of facts and of laws is a new attitude of mind in presence of these facts. We must set aside what interests us subjectively in them, and consider what is “specifically social” in them, just as the physiologist studies what is “specifically biological” in the phenomena of the organism. M. Durkheim, as a real heir of Auguste Comte, reasonably maintains that this is a condition sine qua non of positive sociology. This only exists as a science if there are facts which are properly social, subject to special laws, besides the more general laws of nature which rule them also, and if these facts, by constant objective characteristics, are sufficiently distinct from the phenomena called psychological.
Positive psychology is now already constituted. Positive sociology is being formed. The science of language, the science of religions, the history of art are also assuming a positive form. The movement which has begun, and of which we only see the beginnings, will probably extend much further than we think. It supposes at least a provisional separation between the scientific interest and the political, moral and religious interests. Being already constituted for a considerable part of our knowledge, this separation for the remainder is still distasteful to the traditional habits of the majority of minds. We are accustomed to speculate upon physical or chemical nature with perfect disinterestedness as to the metaphysical consequences of the results which we may obtain. For we are convinced that the laws of these phenomena do not necessarily imply any consequences of this kind, or that they can be almost indifferently brought into accord with any form of metaphysics we may be pleased to adopt. What do physics, chemistry, natural philosophy prove, as to the destiny of man or the supreme cause of the universe? Nothing, and it does not occur to us to be surprised at it. We consider that these sciences are in accordance with their definition if they give us a knowledge of the laws of phenomena, and if this knowledge enables us within certain limits to exercise a rational and efficacious action upon nature.
Are we in the same position in what concerns psychology and the moral and social sciences? This is doubtful. The very name of “moral sciences” is significant enough on this point. We cannot refrain from thinking that these sciences “prove” something outside themselves. For several of the schools of this century, psychology is still the path that leads to metaphysics. Spirituality and the immortality of the soul seem to have a direct interest in it. In a more or less conscious manner orthodox political economy has found itself “proving” the legitimacy of the modern capitalist régime, and has represented it as being in conformity with the immutable laws of nature. The historical materialism of Marx “proves” the necessity of collectivism. History too often serves national interests, or political parties.
Comte’s most interesting and fertile leading idea is that the sciences conceived in this way are still in their infancy and do not deserve their name. Those who take them up should, in the first place, convince themselves of the fact that they prove no more in favour of spiritualism or materialism, of protection or of free exchange, than physics or chemistry prove in favour of the unity or the plurality of substances in the universe. In the school of the more advanced sciences men may be taught to distinguish between the objects of positive research and the metaphysical or practical questions. They will see also that the human mind did not begin by making this distinction in the case of inorganic and of living nature. For a long time it could only think of physical phenomena religiously. Without the admirable effort of the Greek men of science and philosophers, we might yet find ourselves in this period, and positive philosophy might still be awaiting the hour of its birth. To-day this philosophy has come into being. In order to prove finally established, it requires that individual and social human nature should become the object of a science as disinterested as physics and biology have already become. From that day alone will the “Social sciences” be definitely constituted.
It is true that since in a certain way the object of these sciences is ourselves, it seems paradoxical to look upon them in the same way as if it were a question of salts or of crystals. We persist in believing that any knowledge of this order, as soon as it is acquired, admits of immediate applications to our condition or conduct. But this is an illusion. Is not the importance of the “milieu” in which we find ourselves, and of the forces which affect us from without for our welfare and even for our preservation which depends upon them at every moment, a simple matter of evidence? Nevertheless, we seek a purely abstract, scientific knowledge of the laws of phenomena, because we know that our effective power upon natural forces is subordinate to science. In the same way we separate physiology from therapeutics and medicine, and we especially await the progress of these from physiology. So in the same way, pædagogy, rational economy, politics, and in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated to the theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man, when this science has been constituted by means of a purely positive method, and is no longer expected to “prove” anything but its laws.
This may perhaps be the work of centuries. We are only witnessing its early beginnings. We still have only a vague idea of a polity founded upon science; and we do not yet know what individual and social psychology will yield as a positive science. Comte anticipated results which could not be immediate. This is yet another feature which he has in common with Descartes, to whom we have so often had occasion to compare him. Having conceived a certain mathematical ideal of physical science, Descartes pictured the problems of nature, and especially of living nature, as being infinitely less complex than they are. Our scientific men to-day no longer venture to put to themselves the biological questions whose solution appeared to Descartes to be comparatively easy. In the same way, Auguste Comte, having recognised that moral and social phenomena should be objects of science, just as those of inorganic and living nature, believed this new science to be far more advanced by his own labours than it was in reality.
It is easy to understand his mistake. He was anxious to proceed to the “social reorganisation,” in view of which he was constructing his philosophy. Then, given the conception he had formed of social science, he was bound to think that the discovery of the great dynamic law of the three States was sufficient to finally constitute it. In his eyes “the hardest part of the work was done.” Sociologists at present believe that almost everything remains to be done. But, here again, we may renew the comparison between Descartes and Comte. In the work of both, without much difficulty, we can distinguish what is done by the scientific man properly so-called and what is done by the philosopher. It is the same with Comte the sociologist as with Descartes the physicist. Their hypotheses have met with the fate common to scientific labours, of which Comte himself has so well set forth the necessary transitoriness. The other portion of their work, more general in character, is possessed of more enduring qualities. In this sense, and setting aside his political and religious views, which belong to another order, the speculative philosophy of Comte is living still, and pursues its evolution even within the minds of those who are engaged in opposing it.
The End
Footnotes
1 Lettres à Valat, p. 156-7 (25 Décembre 1824).
2 Lettres à Valat, p. 99.
3 Lettres à Valat, p. 128.
4 Revue Occidentale, 1881, I, p. 288.
5 Politique positive, II, p. XX.
6 V. book, I, ch. vi. p.
7 Correspondence de J. S. Mill et de Comte, Lettre de Comte du 14 juillet 1845, p. 456-7.
8 Correspondance de Comte and de Stuart Mill, p. 456-7. Lettre de Comte du 14 juillet 1845.
9 cf. infra. book iii. ch. v. p.
10 Cours de philosophie positive, I, 19 (5e edition, Paris, 1892).
11 Cours, VI, 786.
12 Pol. pos. IV, appendice, p. 77.
13 Cours, I. 3.
14 Cours, I. 6.
15 Cours IV, 526.
16 Cours IV, 548.
17 Cours, IV, 554-5.
18 Pol. pos., IV. Appendix, p. 144.
19 Correspondence de H. Comte avec John Stuart Mill. Lettre du 5 avril 1842, p. 51.
20 Cours, V. 573-5.
21 Cours, IV, 523.
22 Cp. infra, book II, chap. V, p.
23 Cours, I, 46-47.
24 Cours, I, 14-15.
25 Cours, I, 82, 12.
26 Herbert Spencer: The Classification of the Sciences. London, 1864, p. 42.
27 Discours sur l’esprit positif (1844) p. 24.
28 Cours, VI. 610.
29 Correspondence de H. Comte and de John Stuart Mill. Lettre du 5 novembre 1842, p. 132.
30 Cp. infra, book I, ch. VI.
31 1 Cours, vi. 651-3.
32 2 Cours, vi. 651-3.
33 Discours sur l’esprit positif, p. 16; Pol. pos. III, 25.
34 Cours, III, 4.
35 Cours, VI, 647.
36 Cours, I. 108: II. 18, 188-9.
37 Cours, VI. 646 sqq.
38 Cours, II. 18: III, 11-12.
39 Cours, IV, 147.
40 Cours, II, 195-7.
41 Cours, II, 187.
42 Cours, IV, 672-3.
43 Revue générale des Sciences, 30 septembre, 1897.
44 Discours sur l’Esprit positif, p. 15.
45 Cours, 756., VI.
46 Cours, I. 4.
47 Discours sur l’Esprit positif, p. 23.
48 Cours, II. 505.
49 Cours, VI. 648.
50 Cours, VI, 659.
51 Cours, VI, 655.
52 Discours sur l’esprit positif, p. 17.
53 Lettre inedite a M. Papot, 8 mai 1851 (archives de la société positiviste).
54 Cours, VI, 662.
55 Cours, II, 36.
56 Cours, III, 362.
57 Cours, VI, 833.
58 Cours, III, 339, 365.
59 Cours, IV, 452.
60 Cours, IV, 470.
61 Pol. pos. i, 641.
62 Cours, III, 235.
63 Pol. pos. iv, Appendice p. 17.
64 Cours, ii, 26-27.
65 Cours, iii, 366.
66 Dialogues on natural religion, VIII.
67 Système de la nature, II. 187.
68 Cours, III. 363-4.
69 Pol. pos. II. 42.
70 Cours, IV. 274.
71 Pol. pos. Appendice, p. 25.
72 Cours, III. 325.
73 Cours, I, 128-9.
74 Cours, III. 642.
75 Pol. pos. II. 427.
76 Pol. pos. 431.
77 Cours, VI. 690.
78 Pol. pos. I. 588.
79 Pol. pos. II. 30.
80 Cours, XI., 740-46; Pol. pos., I, 494-5.
81 Pol. pos., IV., 173-80.
82 Pol. pos., II. 33.
83 Cours, III. 336-7.
84 Synthèse subjective, p. 85.
85 Cours, VI., 708.
86 Cours, I, 32.
87 Cours, VI, 709.
88 Cours, V, 79.
89 Cours, VI, 731.
90 Cours, VI, 704.
91 Cours, II. 324-5.
92 Lettres à Valat, p. 93 (24 septembre, 1828).
93 Cours, VI. 712-15.
94 Cours, VI. 720 sq.
95 Cours, VI. 74.
96 See above, Introduction, pp.
97 An allusion to a famous passage in Victor Hugo’s “Notre Dame de Paris.”
98 Cours, III, 210.
99 Cours, VI. 610.
100 Pol. pos., I. 447.
101 Pol. pos., II. 101-2.
102 Cours, I, 101.
103 Cours, I, 121-4.
104 Cours, I, 112
105 Cours, I, 256.
106 Cours, I, 195-7.
107 Cours, I, 286-7.
108 Elements de philosophie, I, p. 132-3.
109 Cours, I, 298. sq.
110 Cours, i, 314-16.
111 Cours, i, 383-4.
112 Cours, i. 322-3.
113 Cours, i. 422. sq.
114 Cours, i, 455-463.
115 Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées, 30 septembre 1897.
116 Pol. pos. I, 499-507.
117 Cours, VI, 749.
118 Cours, III, 93.
119 Cours, II, 16-17.
120 Cours, II, 14-15.
121 Pol. pos. I. 500.
122 Cours, II, 153.
123 Cours, II, 132-3.
124 Cours, VI, 751.
125 Cours, II, 133.
126 Cours, II, 266-7.
127 Cours, II. 7.
128 Cours, VI, 751.
129 Pol. pos. I, 508.
130 Pol. pos. IV. 212.
131 Pol. pos. I. 508-13.
132 Cours. II. 297.
133 Cours II. 310.
134 Pol. pos. I, 516-18.
135 Cours, II, 313-15; Pol. pos. I, 519.
136 Cours, II, 317.
137 Cours, II, 321.
138 Cours, II, 336 sq.
139 Pol. pos. 520.
140 Pol. Pos., I, 532.
141 Cours, III, 3-4.
142 Cours, III, 186-9.
143 Cours, III, 195.
144 Cours, I. 118: II. 311.
145 Cours III. 11-12.
146 Cours, III. 206.
147 Cours, III. 35.
148 Cours, III. 87-8.
149 Pol. pos. I. 551.
150 Cours, II. 24-26.
151 Cours, II. 331.
152 Cours, III. 75.
153 Pol. pos. I, 561.
154 Cours, VI, 772.
155 Cours, IV, 285-7.
156 Cours, III, 8-239.
157 Cours, III, 490, 510.
158 Cours, III, 224-7.
159 Cours, III, 271-2.
160 Cours, III, 237.
161 Cours, III, 326 sq.
162 Cours, III. 259-65.
163 Cours, III. 284-5.
164 Cours, III. 282-546.
165 Cours, III. 437.
166 Cours, III. 456-7.
167 Cours, III, 452.
168 Cours, III, 444.
169 Cours, III, 441-2.
170 Cours, III, 452-3.
171 Cours, III, 529-31; Pol. pos., I, 594.
172 Cours, III, 553-6.
173 Cours, III, 380-1.
174 Cours, III, 562-3.
175 Pol. Pos., I, 591.
176 Pol. Pos., I, 587.
177 Pol. Pos., I, 587; Cours, III, 419-20.
178 Pol. Pos., I, 589.
179 Cours, VI, 766-68.
180 Correspondance de Comte, et de John Stuart Mill, p. 162 (27 février 1843.) p. 365 (21 oct. 1844).
181 Pol. pos., IV, Appendix, p. 218.
182 Lettres à Valat, p. 89-91.
183 Cours, III. 614-16.
184 Cours, III, 618-19.
185 Cours, III, 601-2; 621-22.
186 Cours, III, 611.
187 Lettres à Valat, p. 134 (8 septembre 1824).
188 Cours, III, 631-2.—Gall, Anatomie and physiologie du système nerveux, Paris 1810, II, 6-7.
189 Cours, III, 626-7.
190 Cours, III, 666-8.
191 Cours, III, 654-5.
192 Cours, III, 15-26.
193 Pol. pos., I, 729.
194 Pol. pos., I, 671-2.
195 Pol. pos., I, 672-3.
196 Pol. pos., I, 731-2.
197 Cours, III, 596-8; Pol. pos. I, 598-9.
198 Pol. pos. I, 727.
199 Pol. pos. II, 383.
200 Pol. pos. I, 712-14.
201 Cours, III, 660.
202 Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 218.
203 Maine de Biran, œuvres inédites (éd. Cousin), II, 55-58.
204 Cours, III. 661.
205 Pol. pos., I, 602.
206 Pol. Pos., I. 638-9.
207 Cours, I. 81.
208 Cours, IV, 498-500.
209 Cours, III, 624-5.
210 Pol. pos. II, 229-30.
211 Pol. pos. I, 613-4.
212 Cours, V. 30.
213 Pol. pos. II, 348-9.
214 Cours, V, 100-1.
215 Cours, III, 563.
216 Pol. Pos. II, 248-52.
217 Pol. Pos. I, 722-3.
218 Pol. Pos. II, 226.
219 Pol. Pos. II, 220-1.
220 Pol. Pos. II, 217.
221 Pol. pos. I, 288-9.
222 Pol. pos., II, 250-1.
223 Pol. pos., II, 254-6.
224 Pol. pos., II, 240-1.
225 Pol. pos., II, 260-2.
226 Pol. pos., II, 237.
227 Pol. pos., II, 254-6.
228 Cours, IV, 200.
229 Cours, IV, 191-2.
230 Cours, IV, 193-99; Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 106.
231 Cours, IV, 200-205; Pol. pos. IV, Appendice, p. 109.
232 Cours, IV, 243-4.
233 Lettres à Valat, p. 138-9 (8 septembre, 1824).
234 Cours, IV, 2-3.
235 Cours, IV, 391; VI, 775-6; Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 124-7.
236 Pol. pos., II. 288-9.
237 Cours, IV. 326.
238 Cours, IV. 387.
239 Pol. pos., IV. Appendix, p. 124-7.
240 Cours, IV. 279-80.
241 Cours, IV. 337.
242 Cours, IV, 342-44.
243 Cours. IV. 354-sq.
244 Cours, IV, 360.
245 Cours. IV, 225.
246 Cours, IV., 366 sq; Pol. pos., IV. Appendice, p. 135 sq.
247 Cours, IV, 371-3; Pol. pos., I, 624-6.
248 Pol. pos., III, 47-48.
249 Pol. pos., I, 442.
250 Cours, IV, 430.
251 Cours, IV. 258.
252 Pol. pos., II, 265.
253 Cours, IV, 432-6.
254 Cours, iv, 459. Correspondance de Comte et de John Stuart Mill, p. 219-288.
255 Cours, IV, 450.
256 Cours, IV, 472 sq.
257 Pol. pos., II, 281-3; IV, Appendice, p. 67.
258 Cours, IV, 482-5.
259 Cours, IV, 430.
260 Cours, IV, 299. See also chapter II in Book I.
261 Cours, IV, 290-7.
262 Cours, IV, 182-6.
263 Pol. pos., II, 332-3.
264 Cours, V, 366.
265 Cours, IV, 185-7.
266 This referred in the Author’s mind to the famous quarrel in French literature between the admirers of ancient poetry like Boileau, who declared it to be superior to modern poetry, and their opponents like Perrault and Fontenelle, who took the contrary view.
267 Cours, IV, 257-9.
268 Pol. pos., I, 60-3.
269 Cours, IV, 188.
270 Pol. Pos., IV, Appendice, p. 199.
271 Cours, IV, 304-6.
272 Discours sur l’esprit positif, p. 59-60.
273 Pol. Pos., I, 106-8.
274 Pol. Pos., I, 54-56.
275 Lettres à Valat, p. 140 (8 septembre, 1824).
276 Cours, IV, 314-20.
277 Pol. pos. II, 450.
278 Cours, IV, 273.
279 Cours, VI, 825.
280 Cours, IV, 30-1; V, 241-2.
281 Cours, IV, 266.
282 Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 95.
283 Cours, IV, 326.
284 Cours, IV, 510-12.
285 Cours, IV, 310-11.
286 Cours, VI, 457.
287 Cours, V, 4-5.
288 Cours, V, 360-1: VI, 50.
289 Cours, V, 318.
290 Cours, V, 124-7.
291 Cours, VI, 148.
292 Cours, VI, 156-7.
293 Cours, VI, 248.
294 Cours, VI, 194.
295 Cours, V, 325.
296 Pol. pos., II, 121-131.
297 Cours, V, 306 sq.
298 Cours, V, 362.
299 Cours, V, 335.
300 Pol. pos., II.
301 Cours, V, 541-5.
302 Correspondance de Comte et de John Stuart Mill, p. 458 (14, juillet 1845.)
303 Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 193.
304 Cours, V, 413.
305 Cours, VI, 23.
306 Cours, V, 414.
307 Cours, V, 314-16.
308 Cours, V, 431-33; 467-8; 511-13.
309 Cours, V, 531.
310 Cours, V, 435.
311 Cours, VI, 236.
312 Cours, V, 589.
313 Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 180-1.
314 Cours, VI, 36.
315 Cours, IV, 60.
316 Cours, IV, 159.
317 Cours, IV, 75 sq.
318 Cours, IV, 40.
319 Cours, IV, 100.
320 Cours, IV, 46.
321 Cours, IV, 46.
322 Pol. pos., II, 436-7; III, 46-50; IV, 233, Catéchisme positiviste, 57-59, 121-123.
323 Cours, V, 345-6.
324 Cours, IV, 103-8.—See Book III, chapter V.
325 Cours, IV, 104.
326 Pol. pos., I, 9.
327 Pol. pos., I, 92.
328 Catéchisme positiviste, p. 10.
329 Catéchisme positiviste, p. 138.
330 Pol. pos., II. 26-30.
331 Pol. pos., I, 23.
332 Pol. Pos., IV, appendix, p. 18.
333 Cours, VI, 376.
334 Pol. pos. I, 128-9.
335 Cours, V, 357.
336 Pol. pos., II, 410-12.
337 Cours, VI, 268-9.
338 Cours, V, 608; Pol. pos. III, 585.
339 Cours, IV, 218-24.
340 Cours, IV, 212-15.
341 Pol. pos. I, 154.
342 Pol. pos. I, 160-3.
343 Cours, IV, 97-9.
344 Pol. pos. I, 159.
345 Cours, VI, 480; Pol. pos. I, 361-3; II, 87.
346 Cours, VI, 543-6.
347 Pol. pos. 156-64.
348 Pol. pos. II, 409.
349 Cours, VI, 511-15.
350 Pol. pos. II, 16.
351 Pol. pos. IV, Appendice, p. 211.
352 Pol. pos. I, 169.
353 Pol. pos. I, 97-8.
354 Lettres à Valat, p. 54, (15 mai 1818).
355 Cours, III, 232 sq.
356 Cours, IV, 810-11; Pol. pos. I, 363-5.
357 Cours, IV, 365.
358 Pol. pos. I, 221.
359 Cours, IV, 351.
360 Pol. pos., II, 59.
361 Pol. pos., I, 341.
362 Pol. pos., I, 411.
363 Catéchisme positiviste, p. 30-31.
364 Pol. pos., I, 411.
365 Discours sur l’esprit positif, 75-6.
366 Pol. pos., I, 346-7.
367 Pol. pos. II, 60-62.
368 Pol. pos., 262.
369 Pol. pos., IV, 36.
370 Cours, IV, 237.