The Duchess of Newcastle
London
Printed by a. Maxwell, in the Year 1668
To All the Universities in Europe
Most Learned Societies,
All Books, without exception, being undoubtedly under your Iurisdiction, it is very strange that some Authors of good note, are not asham’d to repine at it; and the more forward they are in judging others, the less liberty they will allow to be judg’d themselves. But, if there was not a necessity, yet I would make it my choice, To submit, willingly, to your Censures, these Grounds of Natural Philosophy, in hopes that you will not condemn them, because they want Art, if they be found fraught with Sense and Reason. You are the Starrs of the First Magnitude, whose Influence governs the World of Learning; and it is my confidence, That you will be propitious to the Birth of this beloved Child of my Brain, whom I take the boldness to recommend to your Patronage; and as, if you vouchsafe to look on it favourably, I shall be extreamly obliged to your Goodness, for its everlasting Life: So, if you resolve to Frown upon it, I beg the favour, That it be not buried in the hard and Rocky Grave of your Displeasure; but be suffer’d, by your gentle silence, to lye still in the soft and easie Bed of Oblivion, which is incomparably the less Punishment of the Two. It is so commonly the error of indulgent Parents, to spoil their Children out of Fondness, that I may be forgiven for spoiling This, in never putting it to suck at the Breast of some Learned Nurse, whom I might have got from among your Students, to have assisted me; but would, obstinately, suckle it my self, and bring it up alone, without the help of any Scholar: Which having caused in the First Edition, (which was published under the name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions) many Imperfections; I have endeavoured in this Second, by many Alterations and Additions, (which have forc’d me to give it another Name) to correct them; whereby, I fear, my Faults are rather changed and encreased, than amended. If you expect fair Proportions in the Parts, and a Beautiful Symmetry in the Whole, having never been taught at all, and having read but little; I acknowledg my self too illiterate to afford it, and too impatient to labour much for Method.
But, if you will be contented with pure Wit, and the Effects of meer Contemplation; I hope, that somewhat of that kind may be found in this Book, and in my other Philosophical, Poetical, and Oratorical Works: All which I leave, and this especially, to your kind Protection, and am,
Your most humble Servant, and Admirer,
MARGARET NEWCASTLE.
A Table of the Contents
The First Part.
I. Of Matter
II. Of Motion
III. Of the Degrees of Matter
IV. Of Vacuum
V. The difference of the two Self-moving Parts of Matter
VI. Of dividing and uniting of Parts
VII. Of Life and Knowledg
VIII. Of Nature’s Knowledg, and Perception
IX. Of Perception in general
X. Of double Perception
XI. Whether the Triumphant Parts can be perceived distinctly from each other
XII. Whether Nature can know her self, or have an absolute Power of her self, or have an exact Figure
XIII. Nature cannot judg herself
XIV. Nature poyses or balances her Actions
XV. Whether there be degrees of Corporal Strength
XVI. Of Effects and Cause
XVII. Of Influence
XVIII. Of Fortune and Chance
XIX. Of Time and Eternity
The Second Part.
I. Of Creatures
II. Of Knowledg and Perception of different kinds and sorts of Creatures
III. Of Perception of Parts, and united Perception
IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts, have a Perception of each other
V. Of Thoughts, and the whole Mind of a Creature
VI. Whether the Mind of one Creature, can perceive the Mind of another Creature
VII. Of Perception, and Conception
VIII. Of Human Supposition
IX. Of Information between several Creatures
X. The reason of several kinds and sorts of Creatures
XI. Of the several Properties of several kinds and sorts of Creatures
The Third Part.
Chap. 1. to 7. Of Productions in general
VIII. Productions must partake of some parts of their Producers
IX. Of Resemblances of several Off-springs, or Producers
X. Of the several appearances of the Exterior parts of one Creature
The Fourth Part.
I. Of Animal Productions, and of the difference between Productions and Transformations
II. Of different Figurative Motions in Man’s production
III. Of the Quickning of a Child, or any other sort of Animal Creatures
IV. Of the Birth of a Child
V. Of Mischances, or Miscarriages of Breeding-Creatures
VI. Of the encrease of Growth and Strength of Mankind, or such like Creatures
VII. Of the several properties of the several exterior shapes of several sorts of Animals
VIII. Of the Dividing and Uniting parts of a particular Creature
The Fifth Part.
I. Of Man
II. Of the variety of Man’s Natural Motions
III. Of Man’s Shape and Speech
IV. Of the several Figurative Parts of human Creatures
V. Of the several perceptions amongst the several parts of Man
VI. Of divided and composed Perceptions
VII. Of the ignorances of the several perceptive Organs
VIII. Of the particular and general perceptions of the exterior parts of human Creatures
IX. Of the exterior Sensitive Organs of human Creatures
X. Of the Rational parts of the human Organs
XI. Of the difference between the human Conception, and Perception
XII. Of the several varieties of Actions of human Creatures
XIII. Of the manner of information between the Rational and Sensitive parts
XIV. Of irregularities and regularities of the Restoring-parts of human Creatures
XV. Of the agreeing and disagreeing of the Sensitive and Rational parts of human Creatures
XVI. Of the power of the Rational; or rather, of the indulgency of the Sensitive
XVII. Of human Appetites and Passions
XVIII. Of the Rational actions of the Head and Heart of human Creatures
XIX. Of Passions and Imaginations
XX. That Associations, Divisions, and Alterations, cause several Effects
XXI. Of the differences between Self-love, and Passionate love
The Sixth Part.
I. Of the Motions of some parts of the Mind, and of Forrein Objects
II. Of the Motions of some parts of the Mind
III. Of the Motions of human Passions and Appetites; as also, of the Motions of the Rational and Sensitive parts, towards Forrein Objects
IV. Of the Repetitions of the Sensitive and Rational actions
V. Of the passionate Love, and sympathetical Endeavours, amongst the Associate parts of a human Creature
VI. Of Acquaintance
VII. Of the Effects of Forrein Objects of the Sensitive Body; and of the Rational Mind of a human Creature
VIII. Of the advantage and disadvantage of the Encounters of several Creatures
IX. That all human Creatures have the like kind and sorts of properties
X. Of the Irregularity of the Sensitive, and of the Rational Corporeal Motions
XI. Of the Knowledg between the Sensitive Organs of a human Creature
XII. Of human perception, or defects of a human Creature
XIII. Of Natural Fools
The Seventh Part.
I. Of the Sensitive actions of Sleeping and Waking
II. Of Sleeping
III. Of human Dreams
IV. Of the actions of Dreams
V. Whether the interior parts of a human Creature, do sleep
VI. Whether all the Creatures in Nature, have sleeping and waking-actions
VII. Of human Death
VIII. Of the Heat of human Life, and the Cold of human Death
IX. Of the last act of human Life, ibid.
X. Whether a human Creature hath knowledg in death, or not
XI. Whether a Creature may be new formed after a general dissolution
XII. Of Foreknowledg
The Eighth Part.
I. Of the irregularity of Nature’s parts
II. Of the human parts of a human Creature
III. Of human Humors
IV. Of Blood, ibid.
V. Of the Radical humors, or parts
VI. Of expelling malignant disorders in a human Creature
VII. Of human Digestions and Evacuations
VIII. Of Diseases in general
IX. Of the Fundamental Diseases
The Ninth Part.
I. Of Sickness
II. Of Pain
III. Of Dizziness
IV. Of the Brain seeming to turn round in the head
V. Of Weakness
VI. Of Swooning, ibid.
VII. Of Numb and Dead Palsies, or Gangren’s
VIII. Of Madness
IX. The Sensitive and Rational parts may be distinctly mad
X. The parts of the head are not only subject to madness; but also, the other parts of the body
XI. The Rational and Sensitive parts of a human Creature, are apt to disturb each other
XII. Of Diseases produced by conceit
The Tenth Part.
I. Of Fevers
II. Of the Plague
III. Of the Small-Pox and Measles
IV. Of the intermission of Fevers, or Agues
V. Of Consumptions
VI. Of Dropsies, ibid.
VII. Of Sweating
VIII. Of Coughs
IX. Of Gangren’s
X. Of Cancers and Fistula’s
XI. Of the Gout, ib.
XII. Of the Stone
XII. Of Apoplexies and Lethargies
XIII. Of Epilepsies
XIV. Of Convulsions and Cramps
XV. Of Cholicks, ibid.
XVI. Of Shaking-Palsies
XVII. Of the Muther, Spleen, and Scurvy
XVIII. Of Food or Digestions, ibid.
XIX. Of Surfeits
XX. Of natural Evacuations and Purgings
XXI. Of Purging-Drugs
XXII. Of the various humors of Drugs
XXIII. Of Cordials
XXIV. Of the different actions of the several Sensitive Parts of a human Creature.
XXV. Of the Antipathy of some human Creatures, to some Forrein Objects
XXVI. Of the Effects of Forrein Objects, on the human Mind, ib.
XXVII. Of Contemplation
XXVIII. Of injecting the Blood of one Animal, into the Veins of another Animal
The Eleventh Part.
I. Of the different Knowledges in different kinds and sorts of Creatures
II. Of the variety of self-actions in particular Creatures
III. Of the variety of Corporeal Motions of one and the same sort and kind of Motion
IV. Of the variety of particular Creatures, ibid.
V. Of dividing, and rejoyning, or altering exterior figurative Motions
VI. Of different figurative Motions in particular Creatures
VII. Of the alterations of exterior and innate figurative Motions of several sorts of Creatures
VIII. Of Local Motion
IX. Of several manners or ways of Advantages or Disadvantages
X. Of the actions of some sorts of Creatures, over others
XI. Of Glassie-Bodies
XII. Of Metamorphoses, or Transformations of Animals and Vegetables,
XIII. Of the Life and Death of several Creatures
XIV. Of Circles
XV. Human Creatures cannot so probably treat of other sorts of Creatures, as of their own
The Twelfth Part.
I. Of the equality of Elements
II. Of several Tempers
III. Of the change and rechange; and of dividing of the parts of the Elements
IV. Of the innate figurative Motions of Earth
V. Of the figurative Motions of Air, ibid.
VI. Of the innate figurative Motions of Fire
VII. Of the productions of Elemental Fire
VIII. Of Flame
IX. Of the two sorts of Fire most different, ibid.
X. Of Dead or Dull Fires
XI. Of the occasional Actions of Fire
XII. Fire hath not the property to change and rechange
XIII. Of the innate figurative Motions of Water
XIV. The nature or property of Water
XV. Of the alteration of the exterior figurative motion of Water
XVI. Of Oyl of Vitriol, ibid.
XVII. Of Mineral and Sulphurous Waters
XVIII. The cause of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea
XIX. Of Overflows
XX. Of the Figure of Ice and Snow
XXI. Of the change and rechange of Water
XXII. Of Water quenching Fire, and Fire evaporating Water
XXIII. Of inflamable Liquors
XXIV. Of Thunder
XXV. Of Vapour, Smoak, Wind and Clouds
XXVI. Of Wind
XXVII. Of Light
XXVIII. Of Darkness
XXIX. Of Colours
XXX. Of the Exterior Motions of the Planets
XXXI. Of the Sun, and Planets, and Seasons
XXXII. Of Air corrupting dead Bodies.
The Thirteenth Part.
I. Of the innate figurative Motions of Metal
II. Of the melting of Metals
III. Of Burning, Melting, Boyling, and Evaporating
IV. Of Stone
V. Of the Loadstone
VI. Of Bodies apt to ascend, or descend
VII. Why heavy Bodies descend more forcibly than leight Bodies ascend, 227
VIII. Of several sorts of Densities and Rarities, Gravities, and Levities
IX. Of Vegetables
X. Of the production of Vegetables
XI. Of replanting Vegetables
APPENDIX.
The First Part.
I. Whether there can be a Substance that is not a Body
II. Of an Immaterial
III. Whether an Immaterial be perceivable
IV. Of the Difference between GOD and Nature
V. All the Parts of Nature, worship GOD, ibid.
VI. Whether GOD’s Decrees are limited
VII. Of GOD’s Decrees concerning the particular Parts of Nature
VIII. Of the Ten Commandments
IX. Of several Religions
X. Of Rules and Prescriptions
XI. Sins and Punishments are material
XII. Of human Conscience
The Second Part.
I. Whether it is possible there could be Worlds consisting only of the Rational parts, and others only of the Sensitive parts
II. Of Irregular and Regular Worlds
III. Whether there be Egress and Regress between the Parts of several Worlds
IV. Whether the Parts of one and the same Society, could (after their dissolution, meet and unite
V. Whether, if a Creature being dissolved, if it could unite again, would be the same
VI. Of the Resurrection of Human-kind
VII. Of the dissolution of a World
VIII. Of a new Heaven, and a new Earth
IX. Whether there shall be a Material Heaven and Hell, ibid.
X. Concerning the Joys or Torments of the Blessed and Cursed, after they are in Heaven or Hell
The Third Part.
The Preamble.
I. Of the Happy and Miserable Worlds
II. Whether there be such kinds and sorts of Creatures in the Happy and Blessed World, as in this World
III. Of the Births and Deaths of the Heavenly World, ibid.
IV. Whether those Creatures could be named Blessed, that are subject to dye
V. Of the Productions of the Creatures of the Regular World
VI. Whether the Creatures in the Blessed World, do feed and evacuate
VII. Of the Animals, and of the food of the Humans of the Happy World
VIII. Whether it is not irregular for one Creature to feed on another
IX. Of the continuance of life in the Regular World
X. Of the Excellency and Happiness of the Creatures of the Regular World
XI. Of Human Creatures in the Regular World
XII. Of the happiness of human Creatures in the Material World, ibid.
The Fourth Part.
I. Of the Irregular World
II. Of the Productions and Dissolutions of the Creatures of the irregular World
III. Of Animals, and of Humans in the irregular World
IV. Of Objects and Perceptions
V. The Description of the Globe of the irregular World, ibid.
VI. Of the Elemental Air, and Light of the irregular World
VII. Of Storms and Tempests in the irregular World
VIII. Of the several Seasons; or rather, of the several Tempers in the irregular World, ibid.
IX. The Conclusion of the irregular and unhappy, or cursed World
The Fifth Part.
Fifteen Sections concerning Restoring-Beds, or Wombs
The Conclusion
The First Part
Chap. I. Of Matter
Matter is that we name Body; which Matter cannot be less, or more, than Body: Yet some Learned Persons are of opinion, That there are Substances that are not Material Bodies. But how they can prove any sort of Substance to be no Body, I cannot tell: neither can any of Nature’s Parts express it, because a Corporeal Part cannot have an Incorporeal Perception. But as for Matter, there may be degrees, as, more pure, or less pure; but there cannot be any Substances in Nature, that are between Body, and no Body: Also, Matter cannot be figureless, neither can Matter be without Parts. Likewise, there cannot be Matter without Place, nor Place without Matter; so that Matter, Figure, or Place, is but one thing: for, it is as impossible for One Body to have Two Places, as for One Place to have Two Bodies; neither can there be Place, without Body.
Chap. II. Of Motion
Though Matter might be without Motion, yet Motion cannot be without Matter; for it is impossible (in my opinion) that there should be an Immaterial Motion in Nature: and if Motion is corporeal, then Matter, Figure, Place, and Motion, is but one thing, viz. a corporeal figurative Motion. As for a First Motion, I cannot conceive how it can be, or what that First Motion should be: for, an Immaterial cannot have a Material Motion; or, so strong a Motion, as to set all the Material Parts in Nature, or this World, a-moving; but (in my opinion) every particular part moves by its own Motion: If so, then all the Actions in Nature are self-corporeal, figurative Motions. But this is to be noted, That as there is but one Matter, so there is but one Motion; and as there are several Parts of Matter, so there are several Changes of Motion: for, as Matter, of what degree soever it is, or can be, is but Matter; so Motion, although it make Infinite Changes, can be but Motion.
Chap. III. Of the Degrees of Matter
Though Matter can be neither more nor less than Matter; yet there may be degrees of Matter, as more pure, or less pure; and yet the purest Parts are as much material, in relation to the nature of Matter, as the grossest: Neither can there be more than two sorts of Matter, namely, that sort which is Self-moving, and that which is not Self-moving. Also, there can be but two sorts of the Self-moving Parts; as, that sort that moves intirely without Burdens, and that sort that moves with the Burdens of those Parts that are not Self-moving: So that there can be but these three sorts; Those parts that are not moving, those that move free, and those that move with those parts that are not moving of themselves: Which degrees are (in my opinion) the Rational Parts, the Sensitive Parts, and the Inanimate Parts; which three sorts of Parts are so join’d, that they are but as one Body; for, it is impossible that those three sorts of Parts should subsist single, by reason Nature is but one united material Body.
Chap. IV. Of Vacuum
In my opinion, there cannot possibly be any Vacuum: for, though Nature, as being material, is divisible and compoundable; and, having Self-motion, is in perpetual action: yet Nature cannot divide or compose from her self, although she may move, divide, and compose in her self: But, were it possible Nature’s Parts could wander and stray in, and out of Vacuum, there would be a Confusion; for, where Unity is not, Order cannot be: Wherefore, by the Order and Method of Nature’s corporeal Actions, we may perceive, there is no Vacuum: For, what needs a Vacuum, when as Body and Place is but one thing; and as the Body alters, so doth the Place?
Chap. V. The Difference of the Two Self-moving Parts of Matter
The Self-moving Parts of Nature seem to be of two sorts, or degrees; one being purer, and so more agil and free than the other; which (in my opinion) are the Rational Parts of Nature. The other sort is not so pure; and are the Architectonical Parts, which are the Labouring Parts, bearing the grosser Materials about them, which are the Inanimate Parts; and this sort (in my opinion) are the Sensitive Parts of Nature; which form, build, or compose themselves with the Inanimate Parts, into all kinds and sorts of Creatures, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, or what Creatures soever there are in Nature: Whereas the Rational are so pure, that they cannot be so strong Labourers, as to move with Burdens of Inanimate Parts, but move freely without Burdens: for, though the Rational and Sensitive, with the Inanimate, move together as one Body; yet the Rational and Sensitive, do not move as one Part, as the sensitive doth with the Inanimate. But, pray mistake me not, when I say, the Inanimate Parts are grosser; as if I meant, they were like some densed Creature; for, those are but Effects, and not Causes: but, I mean gross, dull, heavy Parts, as, that they are not Self-moving; nor do I mean by Purity, Rarity; but Agility: for, Rare or Dense Parts, are Effects, and not Causes: And therefore, if any should ask, Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts were Rare, or Dense; I answer, They may be Rare or Dense, according as they contract, or dilate their Parts; for there is no such thing as a Single Part in Nature: for Matter, or Body, cannot be so divided, but that it will remain Matter, which is divisible.
Chap. VI. Of Dividing and Uniting of Parts
Though every Self-moving Part, or Corporeal Motion, have free-will to move after what manner they please; yet, by reason there can be no Single Parts, several Parts unite in one Action, and so there must be united Actions: for, though every particular Part may divide from particular Parts; yet those that divide from some, are necessitated to join with other Parts, at the same point of time of division; and at that very same time, is their uniting or joining: so that Division, and Composition or Joining, is as one and the same act. Also, every altered Action, is an altered figurative Place, by reason Matter, Figure, Motion, and Place, is but one thing; and, by reason Nature is a perpetual motion, she must of necessity cause infinite Varieties.
Chap. VII. Of Life and Knowledg
All the Parts of Nature have Life and Knowledg; but, all the Parts have not Active Life, and a perceptive Knowledg, but onely the Rational and Sensitive: And this is to be noted, That the variousness, or variety of Actions, causes varieties of 7] Lives and Knowledges: For, as the Self-moving parts alter, or vary their Actions; so they alter and vary their Lives and Knowledges; but there cannot be an Infinite particular Knowledg, nor an Infinite particular Life; because Matter is divisible and compoundable.
Chap. VIII. Of Nature’s Knowledg and Perception
If Nature were not Self-knowing, Self-living, and also Perceptive, she would run into Confusion: for, there could be neither Order, nor Method, in Ignorant motion; neither would there be distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor such exact and methodical Varieties as there are: for, it is impossible to make orderly and methodical Distinctions, or distinct Orders, by Chances: Wherefore, Nature being so exact (as she is) must needs be Self-knowing and Perceptive: And though all her Parts, even the Inanimate Parts, are Self-knowing, and Self-living; yet, onely her Self-moving Parts have an active Life, and a perceptive Knowledg.
Chap. IX. Of Perception in General
Perception is a sort of Knowledg, that hath reference to Objects; that is, Some Parts to know other Parts: But yet Objects are not the cause of Perception; for the cause of Perception is Self-motion. But some would say, If there were no Object, there could be no Perception. I answer: It is true; for, that cannot be perceived, that is not: but yet, corporeal motions cannot be without Parts, and so not without Perception. But, put an impossible case, as, That there could be a single Corporeal Motion, and no more in Nature; that Corporeal Motion may make several Changes, somewhat like Conceptions, although not Perceptions: but, Nature being Corporeal, is composed of Parts, and therefore there cannot be a want of Objects. But there are Infinite several manners and ways of Perception; which proves, That the Objects are not the Cause: for, every several kind and sort of Creatures, have several kinds and sorts of Perception, according to the nature and property of such a kind or sort of Composition, as makes such a kind or sort of Creature; as I shall treat of, more fully, in the following Parts of this Book.
CHAP. X. Of Double PERCEPTION.
There is a Double Perception in Nature, the Rational Perception, and the Sensitive: The Rational Perception is more subtil and penetrating than the Sensitive; also, it is more generally perceptive than the Sensitive; also, it is a more agil Perception than the Sensitive: All which is occasioned not onely through the purity of the Rational parts, but through the liberty of the Rational parts; whereas the Sensitive being incumbred with the Inanimate parts, is obstructed and retarded. Yet all Perceptions, both Sensitive and Rational, are in parts; but, by reason the Rational is freer, (being not a painful Labourer) can more easily make an united Perception, than the Sensitive; which is the reason the Rational parts can make a Whole Perception of a Whole Object: Whereas the Sensitive makes but Perceptions in part, of one and the same Object.
Chap. XI. Whether the Triumphant Parts Can Be Perceived Distinctly From Each Other
Some may make this Question, Whether the Three sorts of Parts, the Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, may be singly perceived? I answer, Not unless there were single Parts in Nature; but, though they cannot be singly perceived, yet they singly perceive; because, every Part hath its own motion, and so its own perception. And though those Parts, that have not self-motion, have not perception; yet, being joined, as one Body, to the Sensitive, they may by the Sensitive Motion, have some different sorts of Self-knowledg, caused by the different actions of the Sensitive parts; but that is not Perception. But, as I said, the Triumphant Parts cannot be perceived distinctly asunder, though their Actions may be different: for, the joining, or intermixing of Parts, hinders not the several Actions; as for example, A Man is composed of several Parts, or, (as the Learned term them) Corporeal Motions; yet, not any of those different Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are a hindrance to each other: The same between the Sensitive and Rational Parts.
Chap. XII. Whether Nature Can Know Her Self, or Have an Absolute Power of Her Self, or Have an Exact Figure
I was of an opinion, That Nature, because Infinite, could not know her Self; because Infinite hath no limit. Also, That Nature could not have an Absolute Power over her own Parts, because she had Infinite Parts; and, that the Infiniteness did hinder the Absoluteness: But since I have consider’d, That the Infinite Parts must of necessity be Self-knowing; and that those Infinite Self-knowing Parts are united in one Infinite Body, by which Nature must have both an United Knowledg, and an United Power. Also, I questioned, Whether Nature could have an Exact Figure, (but, mistake me not; for I do not mean the Figure of Matter, but a composed Figure of Parts) because Nature was composed of Infinite Variety of Figurative Parts: But considering, that those Infinite Varieties of Infinite Figurative Parts, were united into one Body; I did conclude, That she must needs have an Exact Figure, though she be Infinite: As for example, This World is composed of numerous and several Figurative parts, and yet the World hath an exact Form and Frame, the same which it would have if it were Infinite. But, as for Self-knowledg, and Power, certainly God hath given them to Nature, though her Power be limited: for, she cannot move beyond her Nature; nor hath she power to make her self any otherwise than what she is, since she cannot create, or annihilate any part, or particle: nor can she make any of her Parts, Immaterial; or any Immaterial, Corporeal: Nor can she give to one part, the Nature (viz. the Knowledg, Life, Motion, or Perception) of another part; which is the reason one Creature cannot have the properties, or faculties of another; they may have the like, but not the same.
Chap. XIII. Nature Cannot Judg Her Self
Although Nature knows her self, and hath a free power of her self; (I mean, a natural Knowledg and Power) yet, Nature cannot be an upright, and just Judg of her self, and so not of any of her Parts; because every particular part is a part of her self. Besides, as she is Self-moving, she is Self-changeing, and so she is alterable: Wherefore, nothing can be a perfect, and a just Judg, but something that is Individable, and Unalterable, which is the Infinite GOD, who is Unmoving, Immutable, and so Unalterable; who is the Judg of the Infinite Corporeal Actions of his Servant Nature. And this is the reason that all Nature’s Parts appeal to God, as being the only Judg.
Chap. XIV. Nature Poyses, or Balances Her Actions
Although Nature be Infinite, yet all her Actions seem to be poysed, or balanced, by Opposition; as for example, As Nature hath dividing, so composing actions: Also, as Nature hath regular, so irregular actions; as Nature hath dilating, so contracting actions: In short, we may perceive amongst the Creatures, or Parts of this World, slow, swift, thick, thin, heavy, leight, rare, dense, little, big, low, high, broad, narrow, light, dark, hot, cold, productions, dissolutions, peace, warr, mirth, sadness, and that we name Life, and Death; and infinite the like; as also, infinite varieties in every several kind and sort of actions: but, the infinite varieties are made by the Self-moving parts of Nature, which are the Corporeal Figurative Motions of Nature.
Chap. XV. Whether There Be Degrees of Corporeal Strength
As I have declared, there are (in my Opinion) Two sorts of Self-moving Parts; the one Sensitive, the other Rational. The Rational parts of my Mind, moving in the manner of Conception, or Inspection, did occasion some Disputes, or Arguments, amongst those parts of my Mind. The Arguments were these: Whether there were degrees of Strength, as there was of Purity, between their own sort, as, the Rational and the Sensitive? The Major part of the Argument was, That Self-motion could be but Self-motion: for, not any part of Nature could move beyond its power of Self-motion. But the Minor part argued, That the Self-motion of the Rational, might be stronger than the Self-motion of the Sensitive. But the Major part was of the opinion, That there could be no degrees of the Power of Nature, or the Nature of Nature: for Matter, which was Nature, could be but Self-moving, or not Self-moving; or partly Self-moving, or not Self-moving. But the Minor argued, That it was not against the nature of Matter to have degrees of Corporeal Strength, as well as degrees of Purity: for, though there could not be degrees of Purity amongst the Parts of the same sort, as amongst the Parts of the Rational, or amongst the Parts of the Sensitive; yet, if there were degrees of the Rational and Sensitive Parts, there might be degrees of Strength. The Major part said, That if there were degrees of Strength, it would make a Confusion, by reason there would be no Agreement; for, the Strongest would be Tyrants to the Weakest, in so much as they would never suffer those Parts to act methodically or regularly. But the Minor part said, that they had observed, That there was degrees of Strength amongst the Sensitive Parts. The Major part argued, That they had not degrees of Strength by Nature; but, that the greater Number of Parts were stronger than a less Number of Parts. Also, there were some sorts of Actions, that had advantage of other sorts. Also, some sorts of Compositions are stronger than other; not through the degrees of innate Strength, nor through the number of Parts; but, through the manner and form of their Compositions, or Productions. Thus my Thoughts argued; but, after many Debates and Disputes, at last my Rational Parts agreed, That, If there were degrees of Strength, it could not be between the Parts of the same degree, or sort; but, between the Rational and Sensitive; and if so, the Sensitive was Stronger, being less pure; and the Rational was more Agil, being more pure.
Chap. XVI. Of Effects, and Cause
To treat of Infinite Effects, produced from an an Infinite Cause, is an endless Work, and impossible to be performed, or effected; only this may be said, That the Effects, though Infinite, are so united to the material Cause, as that not any single effect can be, nor no Effect can be annihilated; by reason all Effects are in the power of the Cause. But this is to be noted, That some Effects producing other Effects, are, in some sort or manner, a Cause.
Chap. XVII. Of Influence
An Influence is this; When as the Corporeal Figurative Motions, in different kinds, and sorts of Creatures, or in one and the same sorts, or kinds, move sympathetically: And though there be antipathetical Motions, as well as sympathetical; yet, all the Infinite parts of Matter, are agreeable in their nature, as being all Material, and Self-moving; and by reason there is no Vacuum, there must of necessity be an Influence amongst all the Parts of Nature.
Chap. XVIII. Of Fortune and Chance
Fortune, is only various Corporeal Motions of several Creatures, design’d to one Creature, or more Creatures; either to that Creature, or those Creatures Advantage, or Disadvantage: If Advantage, Man names it Good Fortune; if Disadvantage, Man names it Ill Fortune. As for Chance, it is the visible Effects of some hidden Cause; and Fortune, a sufficient Cause to produce such Effects: for, the conjunction of sufficient Causes, doth produce such or such Effects; which Effects could not be produced, if any of those Causes were wanting: So that, Chances are but the Effects of Fortune.
Chap. XIX. Of Time and Eternity
Time is not a Thing by it self; nor is Time Immaterial: for, Time is only the variations of Corporeal Motions; but Eternity depends not on Motion, but of a Being without Beginning, or Ending.
The Second Part
Chap. I. Of Creatures
All Creatures are Composed-Figures, by the consent of Associating Parts; by which Association, they joyn into such, or such a figured Creature: And though every Corporeal Motion, or Self-moving Part, hath its own motion; yet, by their Association, they all agree in proper actions, as actions proper to their Compositions: and, if every particular Part, hath not a perception of all the Parts of their Association; yet, every Part knows its own Work.
Chap. II. Of Knowledg and Perception of Different Kinds and Sorts of Creatures
There is not any Creature in Nature, that is not composed of Self-moving Parts, (viz. both of Rational and Sensitive) as also of the Inanimate Parts, which are Self-knowing: so that all Creatures, being composed of these sorts of Parts, must have a Sensitive, and Rational Knowledg and Perception, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, or what else there is in Nature: But several kinds, and several sorts in these kinds of Creatures, being composed after different manners, and ways, must needs have different Lives, Knowledges, and Perceptions: and not only every several kind, and sort, have such differences; but, every particular Creature, through the variations of their Self-moving Parts, have varieties of Lives, Knowledges, Perceptions, Conceptions, and the like; and not only so, but every particular part of one and the same Creature, have varieties of Knowledges, and Perceptions, because they have varieties of Actions. But, (as I have declared) there is not any different kind of Creature, that can have the like Life, Knowledg, and Perception; not only because they have different Productions, and different Forms; but, different Natures, as being of different kinds.
Chap. III. Of Perception of Parts, and United Perception
All the Self-moving Parts are perceptive; and, all Perception is in Parts, and is dividable, and compoundable, as being Material; also, Alterable, as being Self-moving: Wherefore, no Creature that is composed, or consists of many several sorts of Corporeal Figurative Motions, but must have many sorts of Perception; which is the reason that one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive another Man any otherwise but in Parts: for, the Rational, and Sensitive; nay, all the Parts of one and the same Creature, perceive their Adjoining Parts, as they perceive Foreign Parts; only, by their close conjunction and near relation, they unite in one and the same actions. I do not say, they always agree: for, when they move irregularly, they disagree: And some of those United Parts, will move after one manner, and some after another; but, when they move regularly, then they move to one and the same Design, or one and the same United Action. So, although a Creature is composed of several sorts of Corporeal Motions; yet, these several sorts, being properly united in one Creature, move all agreeably to the Property and Nature of the whole Creature; that is, the particular Parts move according to the property of the whole Creature; because the particular Parts, by conjunction, make the Whole: So that, the several Parts make one Whole; by which, a Whole Creature hath both a general Knowledg, and a Knowledg of Parts; whereas, the Perceptions of Foreign Objects, are but in the Parts: and this is the reason why one Creature perceives not the Whole of another Creature, but only some Parts. Yet this is to be noted, That not any Part hath another Part’s Nature, or Motion, nor therefore, their Knowledg, or Perception; but, by agreement, and unity of Parts, there is composed Perceptions.
Chap. IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts Have a Perception of Each Other
Some may ask the Question, Whether the Rational and Sensitive, have Perception of each other? I answer: In my Opinion, they have. For, though the Rational and Sensitive Parts, be of two sorts; yet, both sorts have Self-motion; so that they are but as one, as, that they are both Corporeal Motions; and, had not the Sensitive Parts incumbrances, they would be, in a degree, as agil, and as free as the Rational. But, though each sort hath perception of each other, and some may have the like; yet they have not the same: for, not any Part can have another’s Perception, or Knowledg; but, by reason the Rational and Sensitive, are both Corporeal Motions, there is a strong sympathy between those sorts, in one Conjunction, or Creature. Indeed, the Rational Parts are the Designing Parts; and the Sensitive, the Labouring Parts; and the Inanimate are as the Material Parts: not but all the three sorts are Material Parts; but the Inanimate, being not Self-moving, are the Burdensome Parts.
Chap. V. Of Thoughts, and the Whole Mind of a Creature
As for Thoughts, though they are several Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts; yet, being united, by Conjunction in one Creature, into one whole Mind, cannot be perceived by some Parts of another Creature, nor by the same sort of Creature, as by another Man. But some may ask, Whether the whole Mind of one Creature, as the whole Mind of one Man, may not perceive the whole Mind of another Man? I answer, That if the Mind was not joyn’d and mix’d with the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, and had not interior, as well as exterior Parts, the whole Mind of one Man, might perceive the whole Mind of another Man; but, that being not possible, one whole Mind cannot perceive another whole Mind: By which Observation we may perceive, there are no Platonick Lovers in Nature. But some may ask, Whether the Sensitive Parts can perceive the Rational, in one and the same Creature? I answer, They do; for if they did not, it were impossible for the Sensitive Parts to execute the Rational Designs; so that, what the Mind designs, the Sensitive Body doth put in execution, as far as they have Power: But if, through Irregularities, the Body be sick, and weak, or hath some Infirmities, they cannot execute the Designs of the Mind.
Chap. VI. Whether the Mind of One Creature, Can Perceive the Mind of Another Creature
Some may ask the reason, Why one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive the Thoughts of another Man, as well as he perceives his exterior Sensitive Parts? I answer, That the Rational Parts of one Man, perceive as much of the Rational Parts of another Man, as the Sensitive Parts of that Man doth of the Sensitive Parts of the other Man; that is, as much as is presented to his Perception: for, all Creatures, and every part and particle, have those three sorts of Matter; and therefore, every part of a Creature is perceiving, and perceived. But, by reason all Creatures are composed of Parts, (viz. both of the Rational and Sensitive) all Perceptions are in parts, as well the Rational, as the Sensitive Perception: yet, neither the Rational, nor the Sensitive, can perceive all the Interior Parts or Corporeal Motions, unless they were presented to their perception: Neither can one Part know the Knowledg and Perception of another Part: but, what Parts of one Creature are subject to the perception of another Creature, those are perceived.
Chap. VII. Of Perception, and Conception
Although the Exterior Parts of one Creature, can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Creature; yet, the Rational can make Conceptions of the Interior Parts, but not Perception: for, neither the Sense, nor Reason, can perceive what is not present, but by rote, as after the manner of Conceptions, or Remembrances, as I shall in my following Chapters declare: So that, the Exterior Rational Parts, that are with the Exterior Sensitive Parts of an Object, are as much perceived, the one, as the other: but, those Exterior Parts of an Object, not moving in particular Parties, as in the whole Creature, is the cause that some Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Composition or Frame of another Creature: that is, some of the Rational Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Mind of another Creature. The like of the Sensitive Parts.
Chap. VIII. Of Human Suppositions
Although Nature hath an Infinite Knowledg and Perception; yet, being a Body, and therefore divisible and compoundable; and having, also, Self-motion, to divide and compound her Infinite Parts, after infinite several manners; is the reason that her finite Parts, or particular Creatures, cannot have a general or infinite Knowledg, being limited, by being finite, to finite Perceptions, or perceptive Knowledg; which is the cause of Suppositions, or Imaginations, concerning Forrein Objects: As for example, A Man can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Man, or any other Creature, that is subject to Human Perception; yet, his Rational Parts may suppose, or presuppose, what another Man thinks, or what he will act: and for other Creatures, a Man may suppose or imagine what the innate nature of such a Vegetable, or Mineral, or Element is; and may imagine or suppose the Moon to be another World, and that all the fixed Starrs are Sunns; which Suppositions, Man names Conjectures.
Chap. IX. Of Information Between Several Creatures
No question but there is Information between all Creatures: but, several sorts of Creatures, having several sorts of Informations, it is impossible for any particular sort to know, or have perceptions of the Infinite, or Numberless Informations, between the Infinite and Numberless Parts, or Creatures of Nature: Nay, there are so many several Informations amongst one sort (as of Mankind) that it is impossible for one Man to perceive them all; no, nor can one Man generally perceive the particular Informations that are between the particular Parts of his Sensitive Body; or between the particular Informations of his Rational Body; or between the particular Rational and Sensitive Parts: much less can Man perceive, or know the several Informations of other Creatures.
Chap. X. The Reason of Several Kinds and Sorts of Creatures
Some may ask, Why there are such sorts of Creatures, as we perceive there are, and not other sorts? I answer, That, ’tis probable, we do not perceive all the several kinds and sorts of Creatures in Nature: In truth, it is impossible (if Nature be Infinite) for a Finite to perceive the Infinite varieties of Nature. Also they may ask, Why the Planets are of a Spherical Shape, and Human Creatures are of an Upright shape, and Beasts of a Bending and stooping shape? Also, Why Birds are made to flye, and not Beasts? And for what Cause, or Design, have Animals such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And Vegetables such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And so of Minerals and Elements? I answer; That several sorts, kinds, and differences of Particulars, causes Order, by reason it causes Distinctions: for, if all Creatures were alike, it would cause a Confusion.
Chap. XI. Of the Several Properties of Several Kinds and Sorts of Creatures
As I have said, There are several kinds, and several sorts, and several particular Creatures of several kinds and sorts; whereof there are some Creatures of a mixt kind, and some of a mixt sort, and some of a mixture of some particulars. Also, there are some kind of Creatures, and sorts of Creatures; as also Particulars of a Dense Nature, others of a Rate Nature; some of a Leight Nature, some of a Heavy Nature; some of a Bright Nature, some of a Dark Nature; some of an Ascending Nature, some of a Descending Nature; some of a Hard Nature, some of a Soft Nature; some of a Loose Nature, and some of a Fixt Nature; some of an Agil Nature, and some of a Slow Nature; some of a Consistent Nature, and some of a Dissolving Nature: All which is according to the Frame and Form of their Society, or Composition.