Chapter III The Architectonic of Pure Reason1743
Adickes1744 very justly remarks that “this is a section after Kant’s own heart, in which there is presented, almost unsought, the opportunity, which he elsewhere so frequently creates for himself, of indulging in his favourite hobby.” The section is of slight scientific importance, and is chiefly of interest for the light which it casts upon Kant’s personality. Moreover the distinctions which Kant here draws are for the most part not his own philosophical property, but are taken over from the Wolffian system.
The distinctions may be exhibited in tabular form as follows:1745
Kant further distinguishes between the “scholastic” and the “universal” or traditional meaning of the term philosophy.1749 In the former sense philosophy is viewed from the point of view of its logical perfection, and the philosopher appears as an artist of Reason.1750 Philosophy in the broader and higher sense is “the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human Reason.”1751 The philosopher then appears as the lawgiver of human Reason. Of the essential ends, the ultimate end is man’s moral destiny; to this the other essential ends of human Reason are subordinate means. For though the legislation of human Reason concerns nature as well as freedom, and has therefore to be dealt with by a philosophy of nature, i.e. of all that is, as well as by a philosophy of morals, i.e. of that which ought to be, the former is subordinate to the latter in the same degree in which in human life knowledge is subordinate to moral action. Whereas speculative metaphysics serves rather to ward off errors than to extend knowledge,1752 in the metaphysics of morals “all culture [Kultur] of human Reason”1753 finds its indispensable completion.
Empirical psychology is excluded from the domain of metaphysics. It is destined to form part of a complete system of anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.1754