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‹Better GutenbergRace Distinctions in American LawChapter XI — Suffrage · 12 of 14Contents›

Race Distinctions in American Law

by Gilbert Thomas Stephenson

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Chapter XI Suffrage

The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, ratified on March 30, 1870, reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” In the face of this unequivocal constitutional provision, it would seem impossible to have a legal race distinction in the matter of suffrage. It is plain that, if a State or the United States makes a law that in any way denies or abridges the right of a citizen to vote on account of his race, such an enactment is in violation of the Amendment. The only State or Federal statute or State constitutional provision involving a race distinction that would be valid under the Fifteenth Amendment would be one that did not amount to a denial or abridgment of the right to vote. For instance, a State might require white and Negro electors to cast their ballots in different boxes, or in different parts of the booth, or even in different booths; or it might require them to register on different days, or before different registrars. If the Negro was given the same opportunity to register and vote as the white man, the requirements of separate registering and balloting would be race distinctions in the matter of suffrage, but they would not be denials or abridgments of the right to vote and, hence, might be supported under the Fifteenth Amendment. Any such requirements have not been found in the State Constitutions or statutes; they are only suggested as possible race distinctions which might be permissible.

It follows, therefore, that the race distinctions to be considered in this chapter exist, not in conformity to law, as in the case of separate schools and public conveyances, but in defiance of law or by legal subterfuges, and are properly called discriminations.

Negro Suffrage Before 1865

The suffrage requirements as to race up to 1865 serve as a background for the events after that date. A review661 of the acts of territorial government and State Constitutions of the Territories and States of the United States reveals the following facts: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont appear not to have had any race distinctions in suffrage. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia never permitted any but white males to vote at any time between the Revolution and 1865. The Constitutions of Kansas662 of 1855 and of Minnesota663 of 1857 permitted civilized Indians to vote, though the same privilege was not extended to Negroes. Kentucky,664 in 1799, gave the suffrage to “free” persons, but expressly excepted Negroes, mulattoes, and Indians. Texas,665 in 1845, gave the right to vote to free male persons but excepted Indians not taxed, Africans, and descendants of Africans.

Besides the above-named States which either made no race distinctions at all or else always made distinctions as to Negroes, several States, at one time or another, extended a limited suffrage to Negroes. The Constitution of New York666 of 1821, giving the right to vote to male citizens, had the provision that “no man of color, unless he shall have been for three years a citizen of this State, and for one year next preceding any election shall be seized and possessed of a freehold estate of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars, over and above all debts and incumbrances charged thereon, and shall have been actually rated and paid a tax thereon, shall be entitled to vote at any such election.” There was no property test for white voters. The Constitution667 of 1846 had the same provision about Negro voters. The question of equal suffrage to Negroes was submitted668 separately in 1846, and rejected by a vote of 85,306 to 223,834. It was again submitted in 1860, with like result, the vote being 197,503 to 337,984.

The Constitution of North Carolina669 of 1835, as amended, provided that no free Negro, free mulatto, or free person of mixed blood, descended from Negro ancestors to the fourth generation inclusive, though one ancestor in each generation might have been a white person, should vote for members of the “senate or house of commons” of the State. Negroes who paid a certain poll tax were allowed to vote until this Amendment went into effect. Governor W. W. Kitchin,670 of that State, says: “There were 21,000 free Negroes in North Carolina in 1835, 4,000 of whom were entitled then to vote.” After 1835 Negroes were not allowed to vote there again until after the War.

The Constitution of Tennessee671 of 1834 provided that no person should be disqualified from voting in any election who was then by the laws of the State a competent witness in a court of justice against a white person. One cannot tell how many Negroes were qualified to vote under this provision. The Constitution of Wisconsin672 of 1848 limited the privilege of voting to white persons, but the Supreme Court673 of that State held in 1866 that suffrage had been extended to Negroes by a vote of the people at the general election on November 6, 1849.

Several States which at first allowed Negro freemen to vote later withdrew the privilege. Until the Revolution, they were allowed to vote in every State except Georgia and South Carolina. Between 1792 and 1834, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky denied the suffrage to Negroes. As has been seen, North Carolina permitted a restricted Negro suffrage until 1835. New Jersey took the suffrage from the Negro in 1807, Connecticut in 1814, and Pennsylvania in 1838; and Tennessee, in 1834, limited the right to those Negroes who were competent as witnesses against white persons. New York, in 1821, required a very high property qualification not required of white persons.674 Wisconsin alone changed its law so as to allow Negroes to vote on equality with white persons. New York tried twice to do so, but failed each time.

In each of the acts of territorial government drawn up by Congress, suffrage was restricted to free white persons. This fact, together with the fact that the West Virginia Constitution of 1861–63 also restricted the suffrage to white persons, tends to show the attitude of the National Government in the early days toward Negro suffrage.

Suffrage Between 1865 and 1870

In 1865, the only States that permitted Negroes to vote on the same footing as white persons were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. New York and Tennessee permitted a restricted Negro suffrage.

The changes in the suffrage laws between 1865 and 1870 indicate what might have taken place had not the United States interfered with the Fifteenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Constitutions675 of the Southern States in 1868 and 1869 extended the suffrage to Negroes. These Constitutions, however, did not express the will of the Southern white people at the time in regard to suffrage. The Constitution of Maryland,676 of 1867, permitted only white persons to vote; and that of Nebraska,677 of 1866–67, under which it sought admission to the Union, did not give the suffrage to Negroes.

Negro suffrage was voted down in New York678 in 1868, as it had been in 1846 and 1860, by a vote of 282,403 to 249,802. By the act of territorial government of Colorado, of 1861, suffrage was restricted to white persons. But an act of the legislature679 of that Territory, enacted in November, 1861, seemed to extend the right to vote to Negroes. This was amended,680 however, in 1864, by expressly excluding Negroes and mulattoes from the suffrage. The legislature of Connecticut681 of 1865 proposed an amendment to the Constitution whereby Negroes would be given the right to vote, the same to be submitted to the people for their ratification. Minnesota682 and Wisconsin,683 in 1865, submitted constitutional amendments providing for Negro suffrage. According to Representative Hardwick,684 of Georgia, “Negro suffrage was rejected by decisive majorities.” It was after the 1865 Amendment had been defeated at the polls in Wisconsin that the Supreme Court of that State, as has been seen, held that Negroes had been given the right to vote by a law of 1849.

The word “white” was stricken from the Constitution of Iowa685 by the legislature of 1867–68, and this action was ratified by a vote of 105,384 to 81,384. Minnesota686 amended its Constitution in 1868 so as to extend suffrage to Negroes. On December 30, 1867, the word “white” was stricken from the election laws of Dakota Territory.687

On June 8, 1867, Congress passed, over the President’s veto, a bill first introduced in 1865 establishing Negro suffrage in the District of Columbia. Before its passage, provision had been made by Congress to submit the question to a vote of the people. The extension of suffrage to Negroes was rejected by a vote of 6,521 to 35 in Washington City and 812 to 1 in Georgetown. In spite of this vote the Thirty-ninth Congress ordained Negro suffrage for the District. After four years, the government of the District was so changed that suffrage was taken from all the residents. In 1866, Congress established Negro suffrage in all the Territories of the United States.688

The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, proposed June 16, 1866, and declared in force June 28, 1868, reads: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.” The Amendment did not prohibit the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color, but provided that, if such right was denied or abridged, the State must suffer the consequence of having its representation in Congress reduced. One feels safe in saying that the purpose of the National Government in adopting this section of the Fourteenth Amendment was to induce the States, particularly the Southern States, to extend suffrage to the Negro. With the possible exception of Minnesota, no State appears to have heeded the warning between 1868 and 1870.

One cannot say what would have been the result had the National Government rested there—whether or not of their own accord the various States would have extended the suffrage to Negroes—because, within less than two years, the Fifteenth Amendment had deprived the States of any choice in the matter by providing that they must not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color.

Suffrage Between 1870 and 1890

At the time of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, in 1870, the following States still restricted the suffrage to white persons: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Illinois689 adopted a new Constitution in 1870 which omitted the word “white.” Missouri690 amended its Constitution on November 8, 1870, after the Fifteenth Amendment went into effect, by erasing the word “white,” and Virginia,691 in its Constitution of 1870, extended the suffrage to “male citizens.” It is needless to say that all the Constitutions adopted since 1870 have omitted the word “white” from the suffrage qualifications, so it is not worth while to note the various Constitutions and Amendments that have been adopted since that date. But in some State Constitutions which have not been changed within the last forty years, one still finds the provision that only “white male citizens” are electors. This is true of Maryland.692 Attempts have been made to amend the Constitution by erasing the word “white,” but the objection has been made that it is null and void693 anyway by the Fifteenth Amendment, and that it would be too expensive to call a constitutional convention or hold an election solely for the purpose of erasing a “dead” word.

The history of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment—the opposition it provoked and the means that had to be adopted to procure its ratification by the Southern States—is found in the records of Congress, newspapers, and political discussions of that day. Very little of it has been preserved in the laws of the States. In the following resolution by the legislature of Oregon694 is found one of the few traces of the opposition to the Amendment occurring in the laws of a State outside the South:

“Whereas, the State of Oregon was, on the fourteenth day of February, A.D., 1859, admitted into the Federal Union, vested with the right to declare what persons should be entitled to vote within her boundaries; and until she, by her voluntary act, surrenders that right, the Congress of the United States has no authority to interfere with the conditions of suffrage within the boundaries of the State of Oregon: and

“Whereas, the Congress of the United States, by means of an arbitrary majority of votes acquired by the power of the bayonet, has sought to force upon the several States the so-called Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in direct violation of the terms under which the State of Oregon was admitted into the Sisterhood of States; therefore

“Be it resolved by the Senate, the House concurring:

“That the so-called Fifteenth Amendment is an infringement upon the popular rights, and a direct falsification of the pledges made to the State of Oregon by the Federal Government.

“Resolved, that the said Fifteenth Amendment be and the same is hereby rejected.

“Resolved, that the Governor be requested to transmit copies of this resolution to the Secretary of State of the United States and to the Senators and Representatives from the State of Oregon in the Congress of the United States.”

The probable explanation of this opposition of Oregon to the Fifteenth Amendment lies in its unwillingness to give the ballot to the Japanese, Chinese, and Indians in the State.

The feeling of New York695 toward Negro suffrage in 1870 appears to be different from that of Oregon. A statute was passed prohibiting any registrar or inspector of elections to demand any oath or ask any questions of a Negro different from what was demanded of white persons, or to reject the name of any colored person from registry except for the same causes as would make it his duty to reject the name of a white person. The violation of this statute was a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment for six months.

In order to make the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment effective, on May 31, 1870, two months after the ratification of the Amendment, Congress passed an Act,696 the first section of which reads: “All citizens of the United States, who are or shall be otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial division, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation in any State, Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The fourth section of the “Enforcement Act,” as the Act of 1870 was called, provided for the punishment of any person who should, by force, bribery, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinder, delay, or combine with others to hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any election.

In 1875, two inspectors of a municipal election in Kentucky were indicted for refusing to receive and count the vote of a Negro. The Supreme Court697 of the United States, to which the case came by reason of a division of opinion of the Circuit Court, held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not confer the right of suffrage, but rather invested citizens with the right of exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The fourth section of the Act of 1870, by its language, did not confine its operation to unlawful discrimination on account of race or color and was, therefore, unconstitutional. The “Enforcement Act” of 1870, like the Civil Rights Bill of 1875, failed in its desired effect because it was too far-reaching in its scope. Had the Act of 1870 been upheld, the Federal authorities would have taken complete control of all elections, State as well as Federal.

The years between 1870 and 1890 are known for the actual race distinctions in suffrage. Between 1870 and 1877, the white people of the South were largely disfranchised, not because of their race, but because of their participation in the War. After 1877, the Negroes were largely disfranchised by unlawful methods adopted by the white people of the South. If this were a history of the actual race distinctions in suffrage, it would be necessary to consider at length the “tissue ballots,” the stuffing of ballot boxes, the intimidation of Negroes by the Ku Klux Klan and other bodies of white men, and other election devices and practices in the South at that time. But this study, as has been said before, is confined to the race distinctions in the law, not those in defiance of the law. Out of all the suffrage irregularities of the period very little suffrage law was evolved. Few judicial decisions and no statutes bearing directly on the relation of race to suffrage have been found.

Some cases of intimidation of Negroes at the polls reached the courts of record. In Lawrence County, Ohio, in 1870, for instance, two white men by threats of violence kept three Negroes from voting. One of the white men was convicted in the Federal court698 under the Act of 1870, and imprisoned six months; the other was acquitted because he had not been heard to use threatening language. In 1871 a white man in South Carolina was convicted in the Federal court699 for conspiring to keep a Negro from voting at a congressional election. The same year, in a contested election for mayor of Leavenworth, Kansas, the defeated candidate claimed that he would have been elected had not a number of Negroes been improperly kept from voting. He did not show that they had been in the ward thirty days as required by the election law of the State, and the court700 held that Negroes must satisfy the same requirements as to residence as other voters. In a State election in Louisiana, in 1872, it was claimed, upon the affidavits of four thousand voters, that the votes of ten thousand Negroes had been suppressed because of their race and color.701 A tax collector in Delaware, in 1873, refused or failed to collect taxes from Negroes when the payment of taxes was a prerequisite to voting. The Federal court702 held that it had jurisdiction because the tax collector was a State officer and, thus, it was the State denying and abridging the right to vote on account of race. Over one hundred men were indicted in the Federal court of Louisiana in 1874 for intimidating Negroes at the polls.703 The same year the judges of the municipal election of Petersburg, Virginia, were indicted for refusing to allow a number of Negroes to vote.704 In 1878, a Negro in Illinois who was denied the right to vote at a school election sued and recovered a hundred dollars damages.705 In Georgia, in 1844, several white men were convicted in the circuit court of the United States for intimidating, beating, and maltreating Negroes to keep them from voting. The Supreme Court706 held that Congress had power to regulate Federal elections and could prevent such intimidation.

It will be noticed that nearly all of the cases cited above are along the same line—intimidation of Negroes to keep them from voting. Several constitutional principles, however, relating to suffrage were evolved out of the cases decided during this period. In some of these cases a Negro was not a party at all. It was thought at first, for instance, that suffrage was a right of citizenship and that the Fourteenth Amendment entitled every citizen to vote. Consequently, a proceeding was started in the courts of Kentucky in 1874 to establish the right of a woman to vote. The case went up to the Supreme Court707 of the United States which held that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone. Next, it was thought that the Fifteenth Amendment conferred the right to vote upon Negroes, but the case of United States v. Reese settled this point by deciding that the Amendment did not confer upon Negroes the right to vote, but the right not to be discriminated in voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.708 Despite the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the principle remains that the individual States retain the right to prescribe the qualifications for voting so long as they do not discriminate against persons on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Southern Suffrage Amendments Since 1890

In 1890, a distinct departure was made in the development of the law of suffrage. For thirteen years, roughly speaking, the Negroes had been in a great measure disfranchised by the illegal means already referred to. According to the Constitutions and laws of the Southern States, the Negro had precisely the same right to vote as the white person. Yet he did not vote, or, if he voted, his ballot came to naught. The Southern white people, wearied of using underhand methods of eliminating the effect of Negro suffrage, turned to seek a method under the law to accomplish the same result. The Fifteenth Amendment seemed to offer an insuperable obstacle. The problem was how to evade this constitutional provision. Speaking of this difficulty, the Supreme Court of Mississippi709 said: “Within the field of permissible action under the limitations proposed by the Federal Constitution, the Convention [the Constitutional Convention of Mississippi, 1890] swept the field of expedients to obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the Negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude and dependency, this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, or temperament, and of character, which clearly distinguished it as a race from the whites. A patient, docile people; but careless, landless, migratory within certain limits, without forethought; and its criminal members given to furtive offences rather than the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the Federal Constitution from discriminating against the Negro race, the Convention discriminated against its characteristics and the offences to which its criminal members are prone.”

Beginning in 1890 the Southern States have, one by one, adopted new Constitutions or amended their old ones so as to change considerably the qualifications of voters. Suffrage amendments have been adopted by the Southern States in the following order: Mississippi,710 1890; South Carolina,711 1895; Louisiana,712 1898; North Carolina,713 1900; Alabama,714 1901; Virginia,715 1901; and Georgia,716 1908. Maryland717 has made two separate attempts, one in 1905 and the other in 1909, to amend its Constitution, but has failed in both instances. Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas have not made any constitutional changes in the matter of suffrage which might be called “Suffrage Amendments.”

The phrase, “the Suffrage Amendments in the South,” has been used so often that the idea prevails among those unfamiliar with the laws on the subject that suffrage qualifications in the Southern States are fundamentally different from those in other States. With the hope of making plain wherein suffrage laws in the South are similar to and wherein they differ from the corresponding laws of other States, a table of the qualifications of electors in all the States and Territories of the United States, including Alaska, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, is given (see pp. 322–339). The requirements for voters will be taken in the order given in the tables and considered with reference to the ways in which they lend themselves to race distinctions and discriminations.

Citizenship

In order to vote, one must be a citizen of the United States or an alien who has taken the formal step toward naturalization of declaring his intention to become a citizen, with the exception that, in a few States, an Indian who has severed his tribal relationship may vote. This suffrage qualification does not easily lend itself to race distinction or discrimination. It lies within the power of the United States, not of the States, to say what alien residents may become citizens.718 If Congress says, as it does in the Chinese Exclusion Act,719 that Chinese not natives of this country cannot become citizens, it follows that they cannot demand of a State the privilege of voting. At present, a statute720 specially provides for the naturalization of aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent, requiring that the same rules shall apply to them as to free white persons.

The only case that has been found involving the citizenship of a Negro arose in Michigan in 1872.721 A Negro, born in Canada of parents who had been slaves in Virginia but who had gone to Canada in 1834, went to Michigan at the age of twenty. The question was whether he was a citizen of the United States and, so, entitled to registration as a voter. The Supreme Court of the State held that, when his parents went to Canada, they were no longer under the jurisdiction of this country. The son was not born of citizens of the United States, nor was he born under the jurisdiction of the United States, and, therefore, was not a citizen of the United States.

The citizenship requirement in the Southern States is essentially the same as that in other States and cannot be said, in any way, to involve a race distinction.

Age

In all of the States and organized Territories an elector must be twenty-one years of age or over. In the Philippines the age limit is twenty-three. There seems to be no possible race distinction in the age requirement. It may be that, because of the less careful record of dates of birth among Negroes, more of that race are unable to prove that they are twenty-one years old; but this is only a question of evidence.

Sex

All except four of the States limit the suffrage to males. This requirement cannot possibly involve a race distinction.

Residence

All States and Territories require that the voter shall have resided for a certain length of time previous to the election in the particular State or Territory, in the County, and in the precinct, ward, town, or other political division in which he offers to vote. The residence in the State varies from three months to two years, in the County or its corresponding division from thirty days to one year, and in the precinct, ward, or town from ten days to one year. It is noticeable that in the Southern States the required residence is, as a rule, somewhat longer than in the other States. Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia all require a residence of two years in the State, while Rhode Island is the only State outside the South that requires a State residence of that length. Mississippi is the only State that requires a voter to be a resident of the precinct one year. Louisiana requires six months in the precinct, while thirty days is the favorite residence with the other States.

The greater term of residence required in the South may lend itself to race distinction in case one race is more migratory than the other. If, for instance, the Negro is more apt to move about from place to place than the white person, more Negroes than whites will be unable to satisfy the residence qualification.

Payment of Taxes

The following States require the payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Of these Alabama, Arkansas, and North Carolina require the payment of the poll tax for only one year preceding the election; Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, for two years preceding; and Virginia, for three years preceding the election. Some States require payment of both property and poll taxes; and some, only the latter. The law of Delaware is that the voter must have paid a county tax within two years, assessed six months before the election, not specifying whether it is a poll or property tax. Georgia provides that all taxes legally required since 1877 must have been paid six months before the election. Pennsylvania requires the payment of a State or county tax within two years to be assessed two months and paid one month before the election. South Carolina demands, not only the payment of the poll tax, but of all taxes for the preceding year. In the Philippines, the elector must satisfy other tests or show payment of an annual tax of fifteen dollars.

The payment of taxes as a prerequisite to voting is not peculiar to the Southern States, such a requirement being found in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and the Philippines as well. The poll tax and the requirement of payment for more than the year next preceding the election are found mostly in the Southern States. In the Philippines alone, it appears, the payment of taxes is an alternative requirement; that is, if one cannot satisfy this qualification, he may, nevertheless, qualify under other tests; but in the States, he must not only show his payment of taxes but be qualified as well in other respects.

In two ways this qualification lends itself to race distinctions. In the first place, if Negroes are more shiftless and less inclined to pay their taxes than white people, more of them will be unable to satisfy this test. Secondly, if they are careless about preserving their tax receipts for one, two, or three successive years, they will be unable to prove the payment of taxes and, thereby, be disqualified to vote.

Ownership of Property

The next qualification may be said to be in a sense peculiar to the Southern States, yet not entirely so. In Rhode Island, one must own property worth one hundred and thirty-four dollars on which taxes of the preceding year have been paid or must pay an annual rental of seven dollars to be entitled to vote for city councillors and to vote on questions of finances. In Alaska, to be entitled to vote in municipal elections, one must be the owner of substantial property interests in the municipality. In the Philippines, the voter must be able to satisfy other tests or else be the owner of property assessed at two hundred and fifty dollars.

The property test in the Southern States is an alternative of the educational tests. That is, if the applicant cannot satisfy the educational test but can satisfy the property test, he may register and vote; or he may do so if he can satisfy the education but not the property test. Unless special mention is made at the time, this will be understood in the following discussion of these two qualifications. When it is said that such and such property or educational qualification is required, it is meant only that it is required in case its alternative cannot be satisfied.

In Alabama, the property requirement is that the applicant for registration be the owner or the husband of the owner of forty acres of land in the State in which they reside or of real or personal property worth three hundred dollars upon which taxes for the preceding year have been paid. In Georgia the requirement is forty acres of land in the State or five hundred dollars worth of property in the State. In Louisiana, the requirement is three hundred dollars worth of property and payment of the personal taxes. South Carolina prescribes three hundred dollars worth of property on which the taxes for the preceding year have been paid. Of the Southern States which have altered their suffrage laws since 1890, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia have not provided any permanent property test.

The property qualifications cause the disfranchisement of more of one race than of the other only in so far as the first is more shiftless and more delinquent in the payment of taxes than the other. If the Negro is given the same opportunity as the white to acquire property, he has an equal opportunity to register under the property clause of the suffrage laws.

Educational Test

In no sense is the educational qualification peculiar to the Southern States. As early as 1855, Connecticut required of voters ability to read the State Constitution. The present requirement, as amended in 1897, is ability to read the Constitution and statutes of the State in English. In 1857, Massachusetts added as a prerequisite to voting ability to read the Constitution of the State in English and write one’s name. The Constitution of Wyoming of 1889 provides that the applicant for registration must be able to read the Constitution of the State. California, in 1894, required ability to read the Constitution in English and write one’s name. Similar requirements were made in Maine in 1893 and in Delaware in 1900. In the territorial possessions of the United States, a Hawaiian elector must read, speak, and write English or Hawaiian, and a Filipino must speak, read, and write English or Spanish. In the Philippines this qualification is an alternative of the ownership of property; in Hawaii and the States mentioned above the educational qualification is absolute.

In the Southern States now to be considered, it is to be remembered that the applicant must satisfy either the education or the property test, not both. In Alabama he must be able to read and write the Constitution of the United States in English unless physically disabled. In Georgia he must be able to read and write in English the Constitution of the United States or of Georgia, or if physically disabled from reading and writing, to “understand and give a reasonable interpretation” of the Constitution of the United States or of Georgia, when read to him. In Louisiana he must be able to read and write and must make his application for registration in his own handwriting. Mississippi requires that the applicant must be able to read or understand or reasonably interpret any part of the Constitution of the State. North Carolina requires ability to read and write the State Constitution in English; South Carolina requires also an ability to read and write the Constitution, but does not specify that the test must be in English. Virginia does not declare that the applicant must be able to read and write, but requires him to make his application for registration in his own handwriting, and prepare and deposit his ballot without aid. This does not apply to those registering under the “Grandfather Clause” to be considered later.

All States722 and Territories, except Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and New Mexico have adopted a blanket official ballot which is, in effect, the requirement of an educational qualification for voting. By this system the State provides a uniform ballot containing the names of all persons of all parties to be voted for, and requires the voter to mark and deposit his own ballot. Where no party emblem—as the elephant, cock, or anvil—heads the list of candidates of a particular party, it is wellnigh impossible for one to mark his ballot properly unless he is able both to read and write.

The Southern States are more lenient in their educational tests than other States in allowing a person otherwise qualified to vote if he has either education or property; while in the latter he must have a certain amount of education no matter how much property he owns.

Educational qualifications easily permit race distinctions in several ways. In the first place, registration officers may give a difficult passage of the Constitution to a Negro, and a very easy passage to a white person, or vice versa. He may permit halting reading by one and require fluent reading by the other. He may let illegible scratching on paper suffice for the signature of one and require of the other a legible handwriting. But race discriminations in such cases rest with the officers; they do not have their basis in the law itself.

The educational clause of the proposed Maryland suffrage amendment, recently defeated at the polls by the voters of that State, restricted the right to vote to a “person who, in the presence of the officers of registration, shall, in his own handwriting, with pen and ink, without any aid, suggestion, or memorandum whatever addressed to him by any of the officers of registration, make application to register correctly, stating in such application his name, age, date, and place of birth; residence and occupation at the time and for the two years next preceding; the name or names of his employer or employers, if any, at the time and for the two years next preceding; and whether he has previously voted, and, if so, the State, county, city, and district, or precinct in which he voted last. Also the name in full of the President of the United States, of one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of the Governor of Maryland, of one of the Judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and of the Mayor of Baltimore City, if the applicant resides in Baltimore City, or of one of the County Commissioners of the County in which the applicant resides.” It is easy to see how race discriminations could have been made under this proposed amendment, but it need not be discussed inasmuch as it failed to become law.

“Grandfather Clauses”

The “Grandfather Clauses” are, in a real sense, peculiar to the Southern States, though there are a few somewhat similar provisions in other States. For instance, Illinois, by its Constitution of 1870, allowed those to vote who had the right to vote on April 1, 1848, provided, of course, they satisfied the age, sex, and residence qualifications. When Maine added its educational requirement in 1893, it provided that this qualification should not apply to anyone who had the right to vote in January, 1893, or to anyone sixty years of age at that time. Massachusetts had made a similar provision in 1857. The Constitution of Wyoming of 1889 had said that nothing in it, except the provisions about idiots, lunatics, and convicts, should be construed to deprive any one of the right to vote who had that right at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. New Hampshire does not allow paupers to vote, but it provides that one who served in the Rebellion and was honorably discharged shall not be disfranchised because he has received aid from the public. In the Philippines, one unable to satisfy the educational or property test, may, nevertheless, vote if he held a substantial office under the Spanish régime.

The principle of the “Grandfather Clause,” in short, is that one who is not able to satisfy either the educational or property tests may, nevertheless, continue to be a voter for life if he was a voter in 1867 or is an old soldier or the lineal descendant of such voter or soldier, provided he registers prior to a fixed date. Alabama permits all who served honorably in the forces of the United States in the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, any war with Indians, the War between the States, the War with Spain, or in the forces of the Confederate States or of the State during the War between the States and the lawful descendants of those and all who are of good character and who understand the duties and obligations of citizens under a republican form of government, to register before December 20, 1902. The clause in the Georgia Constitution is like that of Alabama, except that the privilege is extended to veterans of the Revolutionary War and their descendants, and the character and understanding clause is permanent. To take advantage of the “Grandfather Clause” in Georgia one must register before January 1, 1915. Louisiana provided that one entitled to vote in any State January 1, 1867, son or grandson of such a one twenty-one years old or over in 1898, or a foreigner naturalized before January 1, 1898, who had resided in the State five years preceding his application for registration, might register before September 1, 1898. North Carolina allowed one who had the right to vote on January 1, 1867, and the lineal descendant of such a one to be registered prior to December 1, 1908. Before January 1, 1898, one could register in South Carolina who could read the Constitution of the State or understand and explain it. In Virginia one might register up to 1904 who, before 1902, served in the army or navy of the United States or of the Confederate States or of Virginia or who was the son of such a one, or who owned property on which the State tax was one dollar, or who was able to read and explain or to understand and explain the Constitution of the State. Mississippi has no “Grandfather Clause.”

In Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia, the fact that one was a soldier enabled him to register under the “Grandfather Clause”; in Louisiana and North Carolina, that he was a voter in 1867. In each State the lineal descendants of such soldiers or voters in 1867 might register under the “Grandfather Clause.” In Alabama one might register, though he was not an old soldier or descendant of one, if he understood the duties and obligations of citizenship and was of good character. In Virginia and South Carolina, one could register under the “Grandfather Clause” if he could understand and explain the Constitution when read to him; and, in Virginia, if he owned property taxed as much as one dollar a year.

The “Grandfather Clauses” are all temporary. Those classes of men covered by the clauses are given a certain time within which to have their names entered on a permanent registry. If they are once entered on the permanent register, they are voters for life unless excluded because of some crime or because they become public charges. If they fail, however, to register within the limited time, and still wish to become electors, they must satisfy the same tests as other applicants for registration. For instance, one who could vote in North Carolina in 1867 might have his name entered on the permanent register prior to December 1, 1908, and thereby become a voter for life, though he had neither property nor literacy; if he failed to register by that date, he had to satisfy the educational test as any other applicant would have to do. The length of duration of the “Grandfather Clauses” varies from a few months to several years. Thus, the “Grandfather Clause” of South Carolina was of avail from 1895 to 1898; of Louisiana, from May 16, 1898, to September 1, 1898; of North Carolina, from July 1, 1900, to December 1, 1908; of Alabama, from 1901 to 1903; Virginia, from 1902 to 1904; and in Georgia, it extends from 1908 to 1915. It will be seen that Georgia is the only State in which the “Grandfather Clause” is still in force. All who registered within the dates given above are still electors and will continue to be as long as they live unless excluded from the suffrage because of crime or the like; those who have not registered under the “Grandfather Clauses” cannot do so now, except in Georgia.

The “Grandfather Clauses” are more nearly race distinctions than any other sections of the suffrage laws for the reason that so many white men in the Southern States and so few Negroes are either old soldiers or descendants of old soldiers or had the right to vote in 1867. Yet they are not, technically speaking, race distinctions because, if one was a veteran or son of one, he might register regardless of his race or color. As a matter of fact, a considerable number of Negroes in the Southern States, who were Federal soldiers in the Civil War, have registered under the “Grandfather Clauses.”

“Understanding and Character Clauses”

The “Understanding Clauses” do not have as large a place in the suffrage laws of the Southern States as is commonly believed. In only two States—Georgia and Mississippi—is the “Understanding Clause” permanent. In Georgia, one may register if he is of good character and understands the duties and obligations of citizens under a republican form of government, although he has neither education nor property. In Mississippi, one who cannot read may register if he can understand and reasonably interpret the Constitution when read to him. A distinction must be made between these two “Understanding Clauses.” In Georgia the requirement is the understanding of the duties of citizens of a republican form of government; in Mississippi it is understanding the State Constitution when read. In three other States—Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia—the “Understanding Clause” of the Mississippi type is part of the “Grandfather” section, and became inoperative with the “Grandfather Clauses.” The Georgia provision which allows one to register, regardless of education or property, if he is of good moral character has a prototype in the Constitution of Connecticut which requires all electors to be of good moral character, and the Constitution of Vermont which requires the electors to be of quiet and peaceable behavior.

It cannot be doubted that the permanent “Understanding Clauses” of Mississippi and Georgia lend themselves to race discrimination. The Constitution of Mississippi provides that the applicant for registration must be able either to read or understand and reasonably interpret the Constitution. The registrar who so desires may easily disqualify members of one race by asking them to explain more difficult passages of the Constitution or by requiring of them a more scholarly interpretation of such passages than he demands of members of the other race whom he desires to have qualify as electors. In Georgia the registrar who passes upon an applicant’s understanding of the duties and obligations of citizens under a republican form of government may set a higher standard for one race than for the other.

Persons Excluded From Suffrage

Certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise because they are considered incapable or unfit to take a hand in governmental matters. The classes excluded are practically the same in all the States, and there is slight evidence of any race distinction in such cases. The following States do not allow paupers to vote: Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Other States, including Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, exclude the inmates of public institutions of charity, Louisiana and Oklahoma making an exception of Soldiers’ Homes. Practically all the States exclude idiots and insane persons from the suffrage. Other classes, though not excluded from the suffrage, are not allowed to get the required residence to become electors. Thus, in a number of States, students in schools, unless self-supporting, do not get the required residence by living at the school. In a great majority of the States, soldiers and sailors in service do not gain an electoral residence in a State, county, or precinct by being stationed therein. California, Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon exclude all but American-born Chinese. Where the Chinese, because of the Federal naturalization laws, are incapable of becoming citizens, they cannot be electors, because all the States require the electors to be either citizens or persons who have formally declared their intention to become citizens. Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin exclude tribal Indians, or, what is perhaps the same, Indians not taxed.

All States exclude from the suffrage those who have been convicted of certain crimes; that is, those who may have served out their terms of imprisonment, but who have not been restored to their civil rights by the executive department of the State. Treason and felonies like embezzlement and bribery are the crimes most frequently mentioned. One finds here a possible race distinction. The Southern States have greatly added to the list of crimes which operate as an exclusion from the suffrage. By the Constitution of Alabama of 1875, for instance, the following were excluded from suffrage: Those convicted of treason, embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The last Constitution of Alabama is more specific; it mentions the following crimes as having the effect of excluding from the suffrage those convicted of them: Treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crimes involving moral turpitude; also any person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of making or offering to make false return in any election by the people or in any primary election to procure the nomination or election of any person to any office, or of suborning any witness or registrar to secure the registration of any person as an elector. Delaware and several other States, on the other hand, exclude only those who have been convicted of a felony. If, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi said, the Negro is more given to furtive offences than to the robust crimes of the whites, the exclusions of the Alabama law would seem to be directed toward these offences. If more Negroes than whites are guilty of such crimes as larceny and wife-beating, and of sexual irregularities, then the law operates to disqualify for the suffrage more Negroes than whites.

Suffrage in Insular Possessions of United States

The suffrage qualifications in the insular possessions of the United States are particularly significant in that they tend to show the present attitude of Congress toward the elective franchise. The Act of April 30, 1900, providing a government for the Territory of Hawaii, restricts suffrage to those who can speak, read, and write the English or Hawaiian language—a strict educational test. In the Philippines to be an elector one must be a native of the Philippines, twenty-three years of age or over, and must have paid an annual tax of fifteen dollars, or be the owner of property assessed at two hundred and fifty dollars, or be able to speak, read, and write English or Spanish, or have held substantial office under the Spanish régime. It will be noticed that the tax payment, educational, property, and office-holding tests are alternatives, so the satisfaction of any one of the four is sufficient. Manhood suffrage, as provided by the “Foraker Act”723 of 1900, is still in force in Porto Rico. But this seems destined soon to give way to a restricted suffrage. Secretary of War Dickinson has recently issued a report on the conditions in Porto Rico in which he suggests an amendment of the suffrage laws to the effect that, after the general election of 1910, the qualified voters for any election shall consist only of citizens of the United States, who, with such other qualifications as are required by the laws of Porto Rico, “are able to read and write; or on the day of registration shall own taxable real estate in their own right and name; or who are on said day bona fide members of a firm or corporation which shall own taxable real estate in the name of such firm or corporation; or on the day of registration shall possess and produce to the Board of Registration tax receipts showing the payment of any kind of taxes for the last six months of the year in which the election is held.” President Taft, in transmitting the report to Congress, indorsed Secretary Dickinson’s suggestions, saying723: “It is much better in the interests of the people of the island that the suffrage should be limited by an educational and property qualification.” The above suffrage qualifications for the insular possessions of the United States is evidence that the attitude of Congress toward universal suffrage has been considerably modified within recent years.

Constitutionality of Suffrage Amendments

The first “Suffrage Amendment” of the Southern States, that of Mississippi, was adopted twenty years ago, and yet no case involving the constitutionality of these laws has been squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the United States. The one most nearly in point was Williams v. Mississippi724 in 1898. Williams, a Negro, had been indicted by a jury composed wholly of white men. The law required that a juror should be an elector. Williams contended that the provisions of the Constitution about suffrage were a scheme to discriminate against Negroes, that the discrimination was effected, not by the wording of the law, but by the powers vested in the administrative officers. The United States Supreme Court refused to interfere, saying that the laws did not, on their face, discriminate against the races, and that it “had not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.”

Several suits725 have been brought, the purpose of which has been to test the constitutionality of these laws, but they have all been decided on points of procedure or on technical grounds.

At present, the suffrage laws of the Southern States stand judicially unimpugned in the light of the Fifteenth Amendment. Mr. John Mabry Mathews726 says that the Supreme Court has shown an “apparent desire to shift the duty of redressing such wrongs [those arising under the suffrage laws] upon the political department of the Government. So far as Congress has given any indication of its attitude upon the subject, it has intimated that the matter is one for judicial settlement. But the absence of congressional legislation would in any case hamper the efficiency of the courts in securing the practical enforcement of the Amendment. The real reason behind the attitude of both Congress and the courts is the apathetic tone of public opinion, which is the final arbiter of the question. In the technical sense, the Amendment is still a part of the supreme law of the land. But as a phenomenon of the social consciousness, a rule of conduct, no matter how authoritatively promulgated by the nation, if not supported by the force of public opinion, is already in process of repeal.”

It cannot be safely conjectured what the Supreme Court will say when it squarely faces the suffrage laws of the South in their relation to the Fifteenth Amendment. Until then, each is entitled to his opinion. That the citizenship, age, sex, and residence qualifications are in perfect conformity to the Amendment there is no doubt. The qualifications of tax payment, property, and education existed long before the Fifteenth Amendment in the States of the men most active in securing the adoption of that Amendment. It is hardly to be supposed that the Senators and Representatives from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania understood the Amendment they were advocating to be nullifying the suffrage laws of their respective States. Moreover, a property or educational test is not an abridgment or denial of the right to vote, because it lies within the power of everyone, regardless of race, to accumulate property and acquire literacy.

The “Grandfather Clauses” are the most doubtful parts of the suffrage laws. In one sense, they are not at all a denial or an abridgment of the right to vote. Granting that the property and educational tests are constitutional, the “Grandfather Clause,” instead of abridging or denying, enlarges the right to vote by giving the suffrage to those who would be disqualified under the property or educational tests. Be that as it may, the Southern States are more uneasy about the constitutionality of these provisions than of any others. For instance, at the last two sessions of the legislature of North Carolina bills were introduced to extend the “Grandfather Clause” of that State to 1812 and 1816 respectively. In each case the bill was defeated, the argument against it being that it was unwise to open up the suffrage question again, lest the amendment be brought into court.727

A leading thinker on constitutional law has given the unpublished opinion that the “Grandfather Clauses” are in violation of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, which says that no State shall grant any title of nobility. His idea is that an order of nobility is created whenever a class of persons is granted exceptional political privileges, that the old soldiers and lineal descendants constitute such a class, and that the title of nobility is “Elector,” whether expressed or not.

If the “Grandfather Clause” should be declared unconstitutional on the ground just suggested or on any other ground, the next question would be whether that would nullify the other sections of the suffrage laws, such as the educational and property tests. This depends upon whether the different sections of the laws are separable, whether the legislature or the people would have adopted the educational and property tests, etc., if they had thought the “Grandfather Clause” unenforceable.728 North Carolina prepared for just such a contingency by inserting the following section in its Suffrage Amendment: “That this amendment to the Constitution is presented and adopted as one indivisible plan for the regulation of the suffrage, with the intent and purpose to so connect the different parts, and to make them so dependent upon each other that the whole shall stand or fall together.”

Maryland and Fifteenth Amendment

In the preceding section it has been assumed that the Fifteenth Amendment is an integral part of the Constitution of the United States. Whether or not this assumption is warranted is brought into question by a recent action of the legislature of Maryland.

As has been said earlier in this chapter, Maryland has made two unsuccessful attempts to amend its suffrage laws in such a way as would disfranchise a large number of the present Negro voters in that State. The letter of the Constitution of Maryland at present restricts suffrage to white male citizens; but it has been taken for granted that the word “white” became inoperative under the Fifteenth Amendment.

Out of the discussion of Negro suffrage in Maryland has arisen the question whether or not the Fifteenth Amendment itself is valid. At the last session of the legislature of that State, that of 1910, the so-called Digges Bills were introduced and passed by both houses. The purpose of these bills was to disfranchise all Negroes who have not owned five hundred dollars’ worth of property for two years before their application for registration, upon which all taxes have been paid during those two years. This disfranchisement applied only to State and municipal elections. The bills failed to become laws only because they were vetoed by the Governor of the State.

Upon the failure of the Digges Bills to be passed, a constitutional amendment729 was drafted and approved by the required three-fifths of all the members of both houses of the legislature, which embodied the same features as the Digges Bills. This amendment is to be voted upon by the people at the general election in November, 1911. This amendment provides for the Australian ballot and for uniform election laws throughout the State. In the event of the amendment being declared unconstitutional, the laws now in force in Maryland are to be revived automatically.

The validity of the proposed Maryland amendment is directly dependent upon the invalidity of the Fifteenth Amendment. Under the proposed amendment, no property qualification whatever is required of white male citizens applying for registration, while a heavy property qualification is required of every other male citizen—and this must include Negroes—applying for registration. Thus, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right of citizens of the United States to vote would be denied or abridged by the State of Maryland on account of race or color.

The validity of the Fifteenth Amendment is questioned on the following grounds, among others: (1) The fifth article of the Federal Constitution provides that Congress, “whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,” shall propose amendments to the Constitution. It is claimed that only thirty-nine of the sixty-six members of the Senate, less than two-thirds, voted to submit the Fifteenth Amendment to the States for their ratification. (2) Maryland was one of the two States—the other being Delaware—that refused to ratify either the Thirteenth, Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. It is claimed, therefore, that Maryland is not bound by the Fifteenth Amendment, which it did not ratify. (3) The fifth article of the Constitution, after providing the two ways in which the Constitution may be amended, adds that “no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.” Upon this last clause, Mr. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., in a recent article in The Harvard Law Review,730 has founded an ingenious argument that the Fifteenth Amendment is void. His reasoning on this point is, in brief, that the State meant here is the citizens or voters or the government of the State, and not the territory. By the enfranchisement of the Negroes after the War, the composition of the State was changed, a body of persons became part of the State who were not a part of it before, and thus the State was deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. Mr. Machen says: “The Fifteenth Amendment amounts to a compulsory annexation to each State that refused to ratify it of a black San Domingo within its borders. It is no less objectionable than the annexation of the San Domingo in the Spanish main.”

Whether or not any or all of the above objections and the others that are urged against the Fifteenth Amendment are valid cannot now be answered, because the validity of the Amendment has been assumed by the courts rather than decided upon after argument. Until after the election of November, 1911, attention will be centered upon Maryland. If the proposed amendment to the State Constitution is ratified by the people, then haste will no doubt be made to have its constitutionality tested, in which case the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment will be directly raised. The Southern States, as a rule, deplore this action on the part of Maryland because they fear that it will open up the whole suffrage question. It is deplored by people over the country as a whole because they fear that it will revive the ill feeling among the sections occasioned by Reconstruction.

Extent of Actual Disfranchisement

It is impossible to say how many persons have been disfranchised under the suffrage laws. No doubt many who are capable of satisfying the qualifications do not register, or, if they register, do not vote. This is probably due to the one-party system in the South. The following figures show either the extent of actual disfranchisement or the political apathy in the Southern States: In one county in Mississippi, with a population of about 8,000 whites and 11,700 Negroes in 1900, there were only twenty-five or thirty qualified Negro voters in 1908, the rest being disqualified, it is said, on the educational test. In another county, with 30,000 Negroes, only about 175 were registered voters. In still another county of Mississippi, with 8,000 whites and 12,000 Negroes, only 400 white men and about 30 Negroes are qualified electors. The clerk of court of a county in North Carolina, with a population of 5,700 whites and 6,700 Negroes, writes that a Negro has never voted in the County. As a general rule, taking the country at large, about one person in five is a male of voting age. In Iowa four out of five possible voters have actually voted in the last four elections; in Georgia, a State of nearly the same population, the proportion is one to six. In Mississippi, in 1906, only one out of eighteen males of voting age actually voted; in Georgia, one out of fifteen. In a district in Mississippi with a population of 190,885, 2,091 votes were cast for the Representative, John Sharp Williams, in 1906; in a district in Connecticut with a population of 247,875, 46,425 votes were cast for Representative Litchfield. These figures show that the ratio of actual voters to total population in the Southern States is astoundingly smaller than in other States.731

Qualifications for Voting in the United States

State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Alabama714Citizen of U. S. or alien who had declared intention by Nov. 28, 1901.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.1 yr.3 mo.Poll taxes for preceding year paid by Feb. 1, before election.Owner or husband of owner of 40 acres of land in State upon which he resides or of personal property worth $300 upon which taxes for preceding year have been paid.Able to read and write Constitution of U. S. in English, unless physically disabled.
Arkansas732Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.1 mo.Poll tax for preceding year paid.
California733Citizen of U. S. for 90 days before election.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.90 da.30 da.Able to read Constitution in English and write name.
Colorado734Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention 4 mo. before election.21 yrs.Male or female.1 yr.90 da., 30 da. in city or town.10 da.
Connecticut735Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.6 mo. in town.Able to read Constitution or Statutes of State in English.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Alabama714One might permanently register before Dec. 20, 1902 (1) if he had honorably served in the forces of the U. S. in the War of 1812, War with Mexico, any war with Indians, war between the States, war with Spain, or in the forces of the Confederate States or of Ala. during the war between the States, or (2) if he was the lawful descendant of one of the above.One might permanently register before Dec. 20, 1902, if he was of good character and understood the duties and obligations of citizens under a republican form of government.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
Arkansas732Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts of felonies.
California733Educational test did not apply to men 60 years old when amendment took effect.Idiots and insane.Embezzlers of public moneys. Convicts of infamous crimes.Natives of China.
Colorado734Insane and non compos mentis.Convicts in prison.
Connecticut735Voter must have good moral character.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts of heinous crimes.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Delaware736Citizen of U. S.22 yrs.Male.1 yr.3 mo.30 da.Paid county tax within 2 years, assessed 6 mo. before election.Able to read Constitution in English or write name.
Florida737Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.Poll tax for 2 years preceding paid.
Georgia718Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.All taxes legally required since 1877 paid 6 mo. before election.Owner of 40 acres of land in State on which he resides or of personal property in State worth $500.Able to read and write in English Constitution of U.S. or of Ga., unless physically disabled.
Idaho738Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male or female.6 mo.30 da.
Illinois739Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.90 da.30 da.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Delaware736Paupers.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts of felonies.
Florida737Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
Georgia716One may permanently register before Jan. 1, 1915 (1) if he has honorably served in forces of U.S. in Revolutionary War, War of 1812, War with Mexico, any war with Indians, war between the States, war with Spain, or in forces of Confederate States or of Ga. in war between the States, or (2) if he is lawful descendant of one of above.One without property or education may vote, if he is of good moral character and understands the duties and obligations of citizens under a republican form of government.One physically disabled from reading and writing may vote if he can understand and reasonably interpret the Constitution of U.S. or of Ga. when read to him.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
Idaho738Idiots, insane, and persons under guardianship.Convicts of felony, bigamy, polygamy, and inmates of houses of ill-fame.Tribal Indians not taxed.Natives of China.
Illinois739One who was an elector April 1, 1848, continued to be elector under new Constitution.Unrestored convicts of felony or election bribery.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Indiana740Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention if resident in U. S. 1 yr. before election.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.60 da. in town.30 da.
Iowa741Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.60 da.
Kansas742Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.30 da.
Kentucky743Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.60 da.
Louisiana712Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.1 yr.6 mo.Poll tax for 2 years preceding election paid, unless voter is 60 yrs. old.Owner of property worth $300, on which, if personal, taxes paid.Able to read and write and make application for registration in his own handwriting.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Indiana740Convicts of infamous crime during term fixed by court.
Iowa741Idiots and insane.Convicts of infamous crime.
Kansas742Insane and persons under guardianship.Unrestored convicts of treason, felony, bribery, embezzlement.
Kentucky743Idiots and insane.Convicts of treason, felony, and bribery.
Louisiana712One might permanently register before Sept. 1, 1898, (1) if he was entitled to vote in any State, Jan. 1, 1867,(2) son or grandson of such a one and 21 years old or over in 1898, or (3) a foreigner naturalized before Jan. 1, 1898, resident in State 5 years before application for registration.Inmates of charitable institutions, except soldiers’ homes.Idiots and insane.Felons under indictment.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Maine744Citizen of U.S.21 yrs.Male.3 mo.Able to read Constitution in English and write name.
Maryland745Citizen of U.S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.
Massachusetts746Citizen of U.S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.6 mo.Able to read Constitution in English and write name.
Michigan747Citizen of U.S. or alien who has declared intention before May 8, 1892.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.20 da.20 da.
Minnesota748Citizen of U.S. 3 mo. before election.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.30 da.30 da.
Mississippi710Citizen of U.S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.1 yr.1 yr.All taxes for 2 preceding years paid.Able to read Constitution of State.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Maine744Educational test did not apply to men who were entitled to vote when amendment took effect in 1893 or to men 60 years old at that time.Paupers.Persons under guardianship.Indians not taxed.
Maryland745Lunatics, non compos mentis.Unpardoned convicts of felony and bribery.
Massachusetts746Educational test did not apply to men who were entitled to vote when amendment went into effect in 1857 or to men 60 years old at that time.Paupers.Persons under guardianship.
Michigan747Duelists and accessories.Tribal Indians.
Minnesota748Insane and persons under guardianship.Unpardoned convicts of treason and felony.Tribal Indians.
Mississippi710One without ability to read may vote if he can understand or reasonably interpret the Constitution.Idiots and insane.Convicts of felony and bigamy.Indians not taxed.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Missouri749Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention not less than 1 nor more than 5 years before election.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.60 da.20 da.
Montana750Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.30 da.30 da.
Nebraska751Citizen of U.S. or alien who has declared intention 30 days before election.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.40 da.10 da.
Nevada752Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.30 da.30 da.
New Hampshire753Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.6 mo.6 mo.
New Jersey754Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.5 mo.
New York755Citizen of U. S. 90 days before election.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.4 mo.30 da.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Missouri749Inmates of poorhouses or asylums at public expense.Unpardoned convicts of infamous crimes.
Montana750Inmates of public institutions.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned felons.Indians.
Nebraska751Non compos mentis.Unrestored convicts of treason and felony.
Nevada752Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.Indians.Natives of China.
New Hampshire753One who served in the Rebellion and has been honorably discharged is not disfranchised because he has received help from the public.Paupers.
New Jersey754Paupers.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned or unrestored convicts.
New York755Unrestored convicts of crimes against suffrage.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
North Carolina713Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.6 mo.4 mo.Poll tax for preceding year paid.Able to read and write Constitution in English.
North Dakota756Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.90 da.
Ohio757Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.30 da.20 da.
Oklahoma758Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.30 da.
Oregon759Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention 1 year before election.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.
Pennsylvania760Citizen of U. S. 1 month before election.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.2 mo.2 mo.State or county tax paid within 2 years, and 1 mo. before election.
Rhode Island761Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.6 mo. in town.Owner of property worth $134 on which taxes of preceding year paid, or payer of a rental of $7 a year to vote for city councillors or on finances.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
North Carolina713One might be permanently registered before Dec. 1, 1908 (1) if he was entitled to vote Jan. 1, 1867, or (2) the lineal descendant of such a one.Idiots and lunatics.Unrestored convicts of felony and infamous crimes.
North Dakota756Insane, non compos mentis, under guardianship.Unrestored convicts of treason and felony.Tribal Indians.
Ohio757Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
Oklahoma758Inmates of poorhouses and asylums, except soldiers’ homes.Idiots and insane.Convicts of felony.Tribal Indians.
Oregon759Idiots and insane.Convicts of felony.Natives of China.
Pennsylvania760Convicts of crimes against suffrage.
Rhode Island761Paupers.Insane, non compos mentis, under guardianship.Unrestored convicts.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
South Carolina711Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.1 yr.4 mo.All taxes for preceding year paid. Poll tax paid 6 mo. before election.Owner of property worth $300 upon which taxes for preceding year paid.Able to read and write Constitution.
South Dakota762Citizen of U. S. resident in U. S. 1 year, or alien who has declared intention.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.30 da.
Tennessee763Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.Poll tax for preceding year paid.
Texas764Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention 6 mo. before election.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo.Poll tax paid by Feb. 1, before election.
Utah765Citizen of U. S. 90 da. before election.21 yrs.Male or female.1 yr.4 mo.60 da.
Vermont766Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.3 mo.3 mo.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
South Carolina721One might permanently register before Jan. 1, 1898, if he could read the Constitution or understand and explain it.One without ability to read might register before Jan. 1, 1898, if he could understand and explain the Constitution.Paupers persons in public institutions.Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
South Dakota762Idiots, non compos mentis, under guardianship.Unpardoned convicts.
Tennessee763Unpardoned convicts.
Texas764Paupers.Idiots and lunatics.Unpardoned or unrestored convicts.
Utah765Idiots and insane.Unpardoned convicts.
Vermont766Voter must be of “quiet and peaceable behavior.”Unpardoned convicts.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Virginia725Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.2 yrs.1 yr.30 da.State poll tax for 3 years preceding election paid, unless an old soldier.One might be permanently registered before 1904 if he was the owner of property on which the State tax was $1.Able to make application for registration in his own handwriting, and to prepare and deposit ballot without aid.
Washington767Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.90 da.30 da.
West Virginia768Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.60 da.Actual and bona fide resident.
Wisconsin769Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.10 da.10 da.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Virginia715One might be permanently registered before 1904 (1) if, before 1902, he served in the army or navy of the U. S. or of the Confederate States or (2) if he was the son of such a one, or if he was the owner of property on which the State tax was $1, or (3) if he was able to read and explain or understand and explain the Constitution of Va.One without ability to read might be permanently registered before 1904, if he could understand and explain the Constitution of Va.Paupers.Idiots and insane.Unrestored convicts and duellists.
Washington767One who was entitled to vote in 1889 continued to be a voter under the State Constitution.Idiots and insane.Unrestored convicts.Indians not taxed.
West Virginia768Paupers.Idiots and lunatics.Convicts of treason, felony, and bribery in elections.
Wisconsin769Insane, under guardianship.Convicts.Tribal Indians.
State or Territory.Citizenship.Age.Sex.Previous Residence in—Payment of Taxes.Ownership of Property.Educational Test.
State.County.Precinct.
Wyoming770Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male or female.1 yr.60 da.10 da.Able to read Constitution of State in English.
Alaska771Citizen of U. S. or alien who has declared intention.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.6 mo. in corporation.To be voter in municipal election, one must own substantial property interests in the municipality.
Arizona772Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.30 da.30 da.
Hawaii773Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.3 mo. in representative district.Able to speak, read and write English or Hawaiian.
New Mexico774Citizen of U. S.21 yrs.Male.6 mo.3 mo.3 mo.
Philippines775Native of Philippines.23 yrs.Male.6 mo. in district.Annual tax of $15 paid.Owner of property assets at $250.Able to speak, read and write English or Spanish.
Porto Rico723Citizen of Porto Rico.21 yrs.Male.1 yr.
State or Territory.“Grandfather Clause.”“Character Clause.”“Understanding Clause.”Persons Excluded from Suffrage.
Paupers.Insane.Criminals.Indians.Chinese.
Wyoming770One entitled to vote under old Constitution might continue to vote under new Constitution of 1889.Idiots and insane.Convicts of felony.
Alaska771
Arizona772Idiots, insane under guardianship.Convicts of felony.
Hawaii773Idiots and insane.Unrestored convicts.
New Mexico774Unpardoned convicts.Indians, until disabilities removed by Congress.
Philippines775One may vote if he held substantial office under the Spanish régime.
Porto Rico723Insane.Unpardoned felons.

Notes

661. The following table, giving the dates of the Constitutions of the various States and the Organic Laws of the Territories with the sections referring to suffrage, up to and including 1865, indicates the extent to which suffrage was restricted to white people before and at that date. “White,” “white freeman,” “free white,” etc., mean that only white persons or white freemen or free white persons had the elective franchise. Where the suffrage is given to male “citizens” or “inhabitants” whether Negroes were included depends upon whether they were treated in those States as “citizens” or “inhabitants.”

Alabama,Const.,1819,art.III,sec.5White.
Const.,1865,art.VIII,sec.1White.
Arkansas,Const.,1836,art.IV,sec.2Free white.
Const.,1864,art.IV,sec.2Free white.
California,Const.,1849,art.II,sec.2White.
Colorado,Ter. Govt.,1861,sec.5Free white.
Connecticut,Const.,1818,art.VI,sec.2White.
Amend.,1845,art.VIII,sec.
Delaware,Const.,1792,art.IV,sec.1Free white.
Const.,1831,art.IV,sec.1Free white.
Florida,Ter. Govt.,1822,sec.11Free white.
Const.,1838,art.VI,sec.1Free white.
Const.,1865,art.VI,sec.1Free white.
Georgia,Const.,1777,art.IX,White.
Const.,1789,art.IV,sec.1Citizens and inhabitants.
Const.,1798,art.IV,sec.1Citizens and inhabitants.
Const.,1865,art.V,sec.1Free white.
Illinois,Const.,1818,art.II,sec.27White.
Const.,1848,art.VI,sec.1White.
Indiana,Const.,1816,art.VI,sec.1White.
Const.,1851,art.II,sec.2White.
Iowa,Ter. Govt.,1838,sec.5Free white.
Const.,1846,art.II,sec.1White.
Const.,1857,art.II,sec.1White.
Kansas,Ter. Govt.,1854,sec.5Free white.
Const.,1855,art.II,sec.2White.
Const.,1857,art.VIII,sec.1Citizens.
Const.,1858,art.II,sec.1Citizens.
Const.,1859,art.V,sec.1White.
Kentucky,Const.,1792,art.III,Free citizens.
Const.,1799,art.II,sec.8Free citizens.
Const.,1850,art.II,sec.8Free white.
Louisiana,Const.,1812,art.II,sec.8Free white.
Const.,1845,tit.II,art.10Free white.
Const.,1852,tit.II,art.10Free white.
Const.,1864,tit.III,art.14White.
Maine,Const.,1820,art.II,sec.1Citizens.
Maryland,Const.,1776,art.II,Free men.
Amend.,1810,art.XIV,Free white.
Const.,1851,art.I,sec.1Free white.
Const.,1864,art.I,sec.1White.
Massachusetts,Const.,1780,chap.I,art.4Freeholders.
Amend.,1822,art.III,Citizens.
Michigan,Const.,1835,art.II,sec.1White.
Const.,1850,art.VII,sec.1White.
Minnesota,Ter. Govt.,1849,sec.5Free white.
Const.,1857,art.VII,sec.1White.
Mississippi,Ter. Govt.,1808,sec.1Free white.
Const.,1817,art.III,sec.1Free white.
Const.,1832,art.III,sec.1Free white.
Missouri,Ter. Govt.,1812,sec.11Free white.
Const.,1820,art.III,sec.10Free white.
Const.,1865,art.II,sec.18White.
Nevada,Ter. Govt.,1850,sec.5Free white.
Ter. Govt.,1861,sec.5Free white.
Const.,1864,art.II,sec.1White.
New Hampshire,Const.,1784,partII,Inhabitants.
Const.,1792,partII,sec.28Inhabitants.
New Jersey,Const.,1776,art.IV,Inhabitants.
Const.,1844,art.II,sec.1White.
New York,Const.,1777,art.VII,Inhabitants.
Const.,1821,art.II,sec.1Citizens.
Const.,1846,art.II,sec.1Citizens.
North Carolina,Const.,1776,art.VII,sec.Freemen.
Amend.,1835,art.I,sec.3Freemen. (Negroes excepted).
Amend.,1854,Free white.
Ohio,Const.,1802,art.IV,sec.1White.
Const.,1851,art.V,sec.1White.
Oregon,Ter. Govt.,1848,sec.5White.
Const.,1857,art.II,sec.2White. (Negroes excepted).
Pennsylvania,Const.,1776,art.II,sec.6Freemen.
Const.,1790,art.III,sec.1Freemen.
Const.,1838,art.III,sec.1White freemen.
Rhode Island,Const.,1842,art.II,sec.1Citizens.
South Carolina,Const.,1776,res.XI,“As required by law.”
Const.,1778,res.XIII,sec.Free white.
Const.,1790,art.I,sec.4Free white.
Amend.,1810,Free white.
Tennessee,Const.,1796,art.III,sec.1Freemen.
Const.,1834,art.IV,sec.1Free white.
Texas,Const.,1836,art.VI,sec.11Citizens.
Const.,1845,art.III,Free (Negroes excepted).
Vermont,Const.,1777,chap.II,sec.6Men of quiet and peaceable behavior.
Const.,1786,chap.I,sec.9Men of quiet and peaceable behavior.
Const.,1793,chap.II,sec.21Men of quiet and peaceable behavior.
Virginia,Const.,1830,art.III,sec.14White.
Const.,1850,art.III,sec.1White.
Const.,1864,art.III,sec.1White.
West Virginia,Const.,1861–63,art.III,sec.1White.
Wisconsin,Ter. Govt.,1836,sec.5Free white.
Const.,1848,art.III,sec.1White.

662. Art. II, sec. 2.

663. Art. VII, sec. 1.

664. Const., 1799, art. III.

665. Const., 1845, art. III.

666. Art. II, sec. 1.

667. Art. III, sec. 1.

668. B. P. Poore: “Charters and Constitutions,” II, p. 1353.

669. Amends. to Const. of 1776, art. I, sec. 3, par. 3.

670. Congressional Record, vol. 33, part 8, app. pp. 297, et seq.

671. Art. IV, sec. 1.

672. Art. III, sec. 1.

673. Gillespie v. Palmer, 1866, 20 Wis. 544; Laws of Wis. 1849, p. 85.

674. Albert Bushnell Hart: “Slavery and Abolition,” p. 83; “The Realities of Negro Suffrage” in the Proceedings of the American Political Science Association for 1906.

675. Ala., 1867, art. VII, sec. 1; Ark, 1868, art. VIII, sec. 2; Fla., 1868, art. XV, sec. 1; Ga., 1868, art. II, sec. 2; La., 1868, tit. VI, art. 98; Miss., 1868, art. VII, sec. 2; N. C., 1868, art. VI, sec. 1; S. C. 1868, art. VIII, sec. 1; and Texas, 1868, art. III, sec. 1.

676. Art. III, sec. 1.

677. Art. II, sec. 2.

678. B. P. Poore: “Charters and Constitutions,” II, p. 1353.

679. Laws of Colo., 1861, pp. 71–72.

680. Ibid., 1864, pp. 79–80.

681. Pub. Acts of Conn., 1865, pp. 94–95.

682. Laws of Minn., 1865, pp. 118–19.

683. Laws of Wis., 1865, pp. 517–18.

684. Congressional Record, vol. 35, part 2, pp. 1270 et seq.

685. Laws of Ia., 1868, pp. 290–91.

686. Art. VII.

687. Laws of Dak. Ty., 1867–68, p. 255.

688. Congressional Record, vol. 35, part 2, pp. 1270 et seq.

689. Art. VII, sec. 1.

690. Amend., 1870, art II, sec. 1.

691. Art. III, sec. 1.

692. Const., 1867, art. I, sec. 1.

693. Neal v. Del., 1880, 103 U. S. 370.

694. Laws of Ore., 1870, pp. 190–91.

695. Laws of N. Y., 1870, I, p. 922.

696. 16 Stat. L., 140–46, chap. 94.

697. U. S. v. Reese, 1875, 92 U. S. 214.

698. U. S. v. Canter, 1870, Fed. Case No. 14,719.

699. U. S. v. Crosby, 1871, Fed. Case No. 14,893.

700. Anthony v. Halderman, 1871, 7 Kan. 50.

701. Kellogg v. Warmouth, 1872, Fed. Case No. 7,667.

702. U. S. v. Given, 1873, Fed. Case Nos. 15,210 and 15,211.

703. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1874, Fed. Case No. 14,897; 92 U. S. 542 (1875).

704. U. S. v. Petersburg (Va.) Judges of Election, 1874, Fed. Case No. 16,036.

705. Bernier v. Russell, 1878, 89 Ill. 60.

706. Ex parte Yarborough, 1884, 110 U. S. 651.

707. Minor v. Happersett, 1874, 21 Wall. 162.

708. 92 U. S. 214 (1875).

709. Ratliff v. Beale, 1896, 20 S. 865.

710. Const., 1890, art. XII, secs. 241 et seq.

711. Const., 1895, art. II.

712. Const., 1898, arts. 197, 198, and 202.

713. Revised Stat., 1905, secs. 4315–17; Const., 1875, as amended 1900, art. VI.

714. Const., 1902, secs. 177–82.

715. Const., 1902, art. II, secs. 18 et seq.

716. Laws of Ga., 1908, pp. 27–31.

717. W. P. Pickett: “The Negro Problem,” 1909, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, p. 250; Laws of Md., 1908, pp. 301–04.

718. Const. of U. S., art. I, sec. 8, par. 4.

719. 22 Stat. L., 61.

720. Federal Stat., annotated, vol. 5, pp. 207–08.

721. Hedgman v. Bd. of Registration, 1872, 26 Mich. 51.

722. The American Political Science Review, vol. 4, p. 63 (Feb., 1910).

723. 31 Stat. L., 82–83, chap. 191; Sixty-first Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 615; Congressional Record, vol. 45, p. 1199.

724. Williams v. Miss., 1898, 170 U. S. 213, at p. 225.

725. Mills v. Green, 1895, 159 U. S. 651; Jones v. Montague, 1904, 194 U. S. 147; Selden v. Montague, 1904, 194 U. S. 153; Giles v. Teasley, 1904, 136 Ala. 164, and 193 U. S. 146; Giles v. Harris, 1903, 189 U. S. 475. For discussions of the constitutionality of the suffrage laws of the South see The American Political Science Review, vol. I, pp. 17, et seq., and John Mabry Mathews: “History of the Fifteenth Amendment,” 1909, The Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 97–127.

726. Mathews: History of the Fifteenth Amendment, pp. 125–26.

727. Raleigh, N. C., News and Observer, Nov. 9, 1907; Feb. 24, 25, and 28, 1909.

728. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 1884, 114 U. S. 270, at p. 304; and Spraigue v. Thompson, 1886, 118 U. S. 90, at p. 95.

729. Laws of Md., 1910, chap. 253.

730. The Harvard Law Review, vol. XXIII, p. 169.

731. W. P. Pickett: The Negro Problem, pp. 259–84.

732. Kirby’s Digest, 1904, sec. 2767.

733. Const., 1880, art. II, sec. 1, as amended 1894.

734. Const., 1876, art. VII, sec. 1, as amended 1893; Revised Stat., 1908, secs. 2027 and 2146–50.

735. Const., 1818, art. VI, secs. 2 and 3, as amended 1897; General Stat., 1902, secs. 1593–94.

736. Const., 1831, art. IV, sec. 1.

737. Const., 1887, art. VI, sec. 1; General Stat., 1906, sec. 170.

738. Const., 1889, art. VI, sec. 2.

739. Const., 1870, art. VII, sec. 1.

740. Const., 1851, art. II, secs. 84–85; Burns’s Stat., 1908, II, sec. 6877.

741. Const., 1881, art. II.

742. Const., 1859, art. V.

743. Const., 1891, sec. 145.

744. Const., 1819, art. II, as amended 1893.

745. Const., 1867, art. I, secs. 1–3.

746. Const., 1780, as amended 1821 and 1857.

747. Const., 1850, art. VII, secs. 1 and 8.

748. Const., 1858, art. VII.

749. Const., 1875, art. VIII, secs. 2, 8, 10, and 11.

750. Const., 1889, art. IX.

751. Const., 1866, art. VII.

752. Const., 1864, art. II.

753. Public Stat., 1901, pp. 136–37.

754. Const., 1864, art. II.

755. Const., 1894, art. II.

756. Const., 1889, as amended, sec. 121.

757. Const., 1851, art. V.

758. Const., 1907, art. III.

759. Const., 1859, art. II.

760. Const., 1874, art. VIII.

761. Const., 1842, as amended 1888, art. II.

762. Const., 1889, art. VII.

763. Const., 1870, art. IV.

764. Herron’s Sup. to Sayles’s Civil Stat., 1906, p. 165.

765. Const., 1895, art. IV.

766. Statutes, 1906, p. 104.

767. Const., 1889, art. VI.

768. Const., 1872, art. IV, sec. 1.

769. Const., 1848, art. III.

770. Const., 1889, art. VI.

771. Code, 1907, part V, sec. 199.

772. Revised Stat., 1901, sec. 2282.

773. Revised Laws, 1901, secs. 18, 60, and 63.

774. Organic Act, 1850, sec. 6; Compiled Laws, 1897, secs. 1647, 1672, and 1677–78.

775. The Outlook, vol. 91, p. 78.

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