Appendix IV
The following pages will give some idea as to the real state of the Fortress as regards Supplies, Munitions of War, and Men, when the surrender took place.
Supplies.
This table, drawn up by the Fortress Intendant, shows the amount of food in the supply depôts exclusive of what was in possession of private firms:
To the Commandant of the Fortress.
TABLE SHOWING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPLIES IN THE PORT ARTHUR SUPPLY DEPÔTS ON DECEMBER 31, 1904.
| Supplies. | Depôts. | Total. | Number Of Rations | Men, 32,213; Horses, 3,258. Amount of Rations in Days. | |||
| 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | ||||
| lbs. | lbs. | lbs. | lbs. | lbs. | Days. | ||
| Flour | 784,320 | — | 40,680 | — | 825,000 | 437,569 | 13½54 |
| Groats and rice | 145,720 | — | 77,360 | — | 223,080} | ||
| Do., broken | — | — | 5,600 | — | 5,600} | 693,120 | 21½ |
| Millet | — | — | 2,360 | — | 2,360} | ||
| Tea | — | — | 86,720 | — | 86,720 | 5,550,080 | 172-1/8 |
| Sugar | 48,960 | — | — | — | 48,960 | 391,680 | 12 |
| Biscuits | — | — | 866,280 | — | 866,280 | 495,017 | 15 |
| Dried vegetables | — | — | 124,000 | — | 124,000 | 2,976,000 | 92 |
| Salt | 652,040 | — | 13,040 | — | 665,080 | 5,804,335 | 180 |
| Preserves | — | — | 154,120 | — | 154,120 | — | — |
| Oats | — | 127,280 | — | — | 127,280} | 114,406 | 35 |
| Beans | — | 1,245,600 | — | — | 1,245,600} | ||
| Cattle, 3. | |||||||
| Sheep and goats, 9. | |||||||
(Signed) Captain Dostavaloff,
Fortress Intendant.
No. 9,953.
Port Arthur.
December 31, 1904.
Munitions of War.
As regards the stores in the Fortress, the following extracts from a letter from Major-General Biely, Commanding the Fortress Artillery, to Major-General Reintal, Inspector-General of Artillery, shows the true state of affairs:
‘The unexpectedness of the surrender of the Fortress, and the rapidity with which we were all sent into imprisonment in Japan, prevented me from finishing a detailed report of the work done by the artillery in the Fortress during the siege, and sending it, as I intended, to the Artillery Department. The conditions of my imprisonment stopped my doing so afterwards. Up till now not a single artillery commanding officer who knows the actual state of the artillery in the Fortress on the day of the surrender, and can report the true state of affairs, has returned to Russia. Meanwhile, however, a Royal Commission has been appointed to investigate all the circumstances of the capitulation. The details furnished to this Commission about the artillery which I have happened to read in the papers, and in particular those communicated by such a witness as Major-General Reuss, are on the whole highly coloured, presumably with a view to belittling the artillery service generally and showing an insufficiency of reserve stores. Judging from this and from what he has said to correspondents, General Reuss apparently has some other object in view than that of informing the public of the true state of affairs in the Fortress. It is not my intention to join issue with him in the columns of a daily paper, but if such evidence is believed, without proper inquiries being made of those who had to do with these matters, a false impression will be gained. At the Council of War convened by General Stössel on the afternoon of December 29, 1904, at which twenty-five commanders and officers were present, some members expressed the opinion that the defence could not be continued, basing their arguments on the absence of necessary artillery stores. At the time I protested against the matter being represented in such a wrong light, and I did not conceal my surprise that members should dare to assert things in my presence of which they apparently either had no knowledge or which they were purposely perverting. I based my statement on figures which I had in my hand at the time, and I insisted on my opinion, which was entirely opposed to that which had just been expressed. I pointed out that, in regard to artillery stores, the Fortress had a sufficient quantity for the struggle, and was in a state to be able to repulse another two assaults—perhaps more—and that if there were also sufficient food-supplies, then, in my opinion, the defence ought to be continued till they were exhausted. No one attempted to contradict me. On the contrary, I was supported by all the artillerymen, by my senior assistants at the Council (Irman, Mekhmandaroff), and by the Intendant of the Fortress, and a general conclusion was come to that the defence was to be continued, a portion of the defence line alone being reduced....
‘During the last days, up to January 1, when we were informed that a proposal for surrender had been sent to the enemy, things were in much the same state, especially with regard to munitions of war. If we look at the figures, we find that there were, counting the naval reserves, as many as 180,000 shells. Of these there were about 1,000 rounds of 9-inch, bigger calibre, and howitzer; 6,800 rounds of 6-inch and forty-two line. Of light and 57-millimetre coast quick-firing (put ashore) there were 1,800. Of 57-millimetre, about 2,000. Of 75, 57, 47, and 37 millimetre (for the naval guns mounted on the batteries) there were about 150,000. For 3-inch quick-firing field artillery, about 4,000. In round numbers, not counting the 3-inch quick-firing field-guns, there were about 14,000 rounds of shrapnel and 10,000 rounds of common.
‘Although the guns were less in number and worse in condition than they had been, yet they were quite serviceable. The casting of shell for 6-inch and 42-line guns, the preparation of fuses, of pyroxyline shells, and the fusing of shell, were in full swing; we were turning out 100 shells a day, and hoped to do more.
‘I consider generally that the tales in the papers about the deficiency of shrapnel, the unserviceability of the shells and guns, of the lack of fuses, etc., are exaggerations, told on purpose to put things in a light to justify the defence being cut short. The question of surrender was one for the decision of the highest authorities, but I imagine they did not lack for irrelevant and incorrect reports. The papers can, of course, say what they like, but at a formal investigation official reports and more responsible and competent evidence will, it is hoped, be taken, and not that of those who allow themselves to be interviewed....
‘To get at the true position of affairs as regards the artillery in Port Arthur, it is not sufficient to look merely at figures; it is necessary to understand them. In this respect General Reuss is quite at sea, and it would have been better if he had not meddled with that of which he knows nothing and understands less. It is true that the want of powder, quick-firing fuses, and range-finders was felt; that naval shells were spoilt and had to be remade; that naval common shell burst badly, etc.; but steps were taken to cope with all this, and the artillery service did splendid work....’
Garrison.
As regards the garrison of the Fortress, General Smirnoff, its Commandant, gives the following details:
‘The strength of our troops on the day of the surrender was as follows:
‘On the defences of the Fortress:
| ‘Bayonets (infantry and sailors) | 12,500 |
| ‘Artillery | 5,000 |
| ‘Engineers | 500 |
| ‘Non-combatants in army | 1,000 |
| ——— | |
| ‘Total | 19,000’ |
There were 15,000 sick and wounded in the permanent, 5,500 in the extemporized hospitals. Total, 20,500 sick. As 24,000 men marched to the village of Chilindzui as prisoners, 5,000 of these must have been able to walk.
This led to a curious contretemps, for in the terms of surrender it had been stipulated that not more than 9,000 men would march out. The Japanese had accordingly made arrangements to handle and ration that number, and were quite nonplussed when they found that the 9,000 had increased to 24,000. While they were making the necessary arrangements to deal with these 15,000 extra mouths the exodus was stopped, and Smirnoff spent these last three days in his old quarters.
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WORKS OF THE LATE MRS BISHOP.
Notes
54 In addition to this, 422,000 pounds of flour and 1,201,600 pounds which arrived in the King Arthur are still in hand.