Naval Strategy Considered as a Question of Passage and Communication
By “Naval Strategy” we mean the art of conducting the operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object “passage and communication”; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.
PROOF I.—Deductive.—We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb’s theory of “conquest of water territory,” therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the “command of the sea” means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned.
COROLLARY.—The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.
PROOF II.—Inductive, from history or past experience.—History shows that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold.
1. The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e., deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).
EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.
In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.
2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.
NOTE.—The above is the best working “Definition of Naval Strategy,” as emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy.
These functions may be discharged in two ways:—
(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).
(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
NOTE.—The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to the first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.
But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval Strategy.)
EXAMPLE.—Rooke’s capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
Command of the Sea
Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.
Various Conditions of Command
1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.
(a) General command is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.
This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.
NOTE.—Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot seriously interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our will upon him.
(b) Local command implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.
2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.
(a) Temporary command is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (i.e., the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo’s first action.
(b) Permanent command is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, i.e., when the possibility of the enemy’s recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.
3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different states:—
(a) With us.
(b) With the enemy.
(c) In dispute.
If in dispute, it may be that:—
(1) We have preponderance.
(2) Our enemy has preponderance.
(3) Neither side preponderates.
Command in Dispute
The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.
The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, i.e., till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.
It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.
The truth of this appears from the fact that general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations.
In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.
Rule 1. So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.
Rule 2. In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.
EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.
Should Command of the Sea Always Be the Primary Object?
When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (i.e., leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy’s fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision.
From the above it will appear “command of the sea” is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be substituted “control of passage and communication.”
The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not “Have we the command of the sea?” but “Can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?”
Methods of Securing Control
1. Permanent general control can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy’s fleet by successful actions.
2. Local and temporary control may be secured by:—
(a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).
(b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).
(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy’s force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).
Blockade
Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object may be:—
(d) Blockade.
i. Close blockade to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object being usually to secure local or temporary control.
ii. Observation blockade, to force the enemy to put to sea by occupying the common lines of communications (see below). In this case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.
Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy’s line and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.
General Rules for Conducting Blockades
In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.
In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.
Examples:—Case (1): First stage of Togo’s blockade of Port Arthur.
Case (2): Nelson off Toulon.
Confusion of the two: Sampson’s attempt to close Santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.
The Peculiarity of Maritime Communications
Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.
Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.
At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.
Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.
This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.
This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare. Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.
It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and operations against them in each case.
On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy’s communications at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.
At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy’s.
Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.
EXAMPLE.—This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.
Hence the maxim “that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy’s coast,” “the enemy’s coast is our true frontier,” and the like.
But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo’s strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.
Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy’s fleet and destroy it.
Here again Togo’s practice was the reverse of the maxim.
The true maxim is “The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy’s fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action.”
The enemy’s fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
EXAMPLE.—Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.—Chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke’s official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened our communications.
RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.
But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy’s fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:—
(a) Because for us general permanent command is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy’s fleet.
(b) Because usually the enemy’s fleet opens with an attempt to control the common communications.
(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (i.e., the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the difficulties; e.g., Sir Palmes Fairborne’s solution of the problem in 1703 (England in the Mediterranean, Vol. II., p. 234).
Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of “seeking out the enemy’s fleet” (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.
This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).
Compare Togo’s strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.
Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy’s fleet, e.g., Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.
Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.
Final Note
In applying the maxim of “seeking out the enemy’s fleet” it should be borne in mind:—
(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.
(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is prima facie better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.