Chapter XII
The author severely wounded—Final assault and capture of 203 Metre Hill on December 5—The hospitals—Death of General Kondratenko, December 15—Retreat from Interval Hill, December 25—Evacuation of Fort Erh-lung and part of the Chinese Wall, December 28—Japanese attack on the Chinese Wall, December 30—Destruction of Fort Sung-shu, December 31—Capture of Wang-tai, December 31—Surrender of the fortress, January 2, 1905.
Having finished tea and exhausted our conversation, we decided to have a rest, but shouting and firing quickly brought us out of the bomb-proof. It turned out to be a false alarm. I climbed into the connecting trench and made sure that all was right, though the men seemed to be in a restless condition and were obviously anticipating serious fighting. I went back to the road and joined a group of officers there.
We all of us noticed how the Japanese batteries at Shui-shih-ying were sweeping the whole of our rear. Just as I was ruminating over this ominous fact there was a tremendous roar.... I felt a fearful blow on the left side of my head, and was thrown into the ditch.
Dazed and all but unconscious, I was unable to struggle to my feet again. However, I was happy in the thought that I had not been killed outright. Some one assisted me to my feet and held me up, and I then saw Major Veselovski and several other officers lying dead near me, the former having half his head blown away. To my left, most of the men of the dressing station were lying piled one on another, and the remainder were already at work among their fallen comrades. Lieutenant Rofalovski, a very brave fellow, who had formerly been my orderly officer, suddenly appeared on the scene and helped to carry me below. I thought that I could walk, but was hardly in a fit state to judge.
So I was carried down to the lower dressing station, feeling a stream of warm blood trickling down my neck, and on arrival there my head was bandaged. Of what happened after that, I have not much recollection, but I remember people talking from time to time as I lay in a semi-conscious condition. Finally I lost all consciousness, until I heard some one say: “That is Colonel Tretyakov.” I then opened my eyes, and at the same moment felt a sharp, stabbing pain on the left side of my face and head. I was being carried along on a stretcher. Some one was riding behind me, and the sound of hoofs on the hard road beat painfully into my head. “Who is riding?” I asked. They told me I heard my own chargers, which were always kept under shelter near the kitchens when I was on the hill. By the time we reached the town, consciousness had completely returned, but the pain in my head and neck increased, and one of my eyes throbbed badly. I thought that it must have been put out, and touched it with my hand, but it seemed to be all right. I could not see with it, because my head and that side of my face were covered with bandages.
A few minutes afterwards, my stretcher was put down, and a doctor bent over me. “How do you feel?” he asked. “My head is very painful.” The doctor examined me and said that I was going on well. Feeling somewhat encouraged by this, I sat up on the stretcher, but my head ached terribly and I felt dizzy. I heard some one say in a whisper: “Well, there’s no hope; the brain is severely lacerated.”
I involuntarily felt my head, but it seemed to me to be all right. Then it dawned upon me that they were referring to the unfortunate commandant, Veselovski. Soon afterwards, I was taken to the Red Cross Hospital and comfortably installed there.
On examination the surgeons found a number of small splinters in my head and neck, as well as a very large one in my eye, which they removed at once. There was one big splinter in my neck, which had lodged near the spinal column and prevented me from turning my head. I could even feel it with my hand. Then they applied the X-rays and extracted it, but a bit of splintered bone was left, which I can feel even now.
For three days I lay racked with pain, but after that the pain grew less and I began to take an interest in what was going on around me.
But I am going on too fast.
Lieutenant-Colonel Saifoolin took my place on the hill, but he was wounded in the same arm, and almost in the same part, in which, during the battle of Nan Shan, he had been wounded before.
On the evening of December 6 I heard a rumour that 203 Metre Hill had been captured, and on the 7th my adjutant arrived and confirmed this disastrous intelligence.
On the fall of 203 Metre Hill we abandoned Akasaka Yama, as well as Division and False Hills. Division Hill was an irreparable loss to us, as it was not only capable of being defended step by step, but, moreover, it protected Ta-an-tzu Shan Fort. Without doubt, the defenders could have held out for some time longer. Colonel Irman himself tried to recapture it, but was unable to collect sufficient men for the purpose. I also heard that the following men remained in the commandant’s bomb-proof: Lossev, a telephonist, Second-Lieutenant Goudkov, the wounded commander of our 6th Company, and part of our 1st Scout Detachment, who refused to leave the hill and remained at their post in the right breastwork.
With these men in the work it might have been possible to drive out the Japanese once again, but apparently General Kondratenko considered it inexpedient to continue holding the hill at a possible cost of 500 men per day, and this, perhaps, was a sufficient reason for evacuating it. Colonel Irman had to send several men to the breastwork with direct orders to the 1st Scout Detachment to leave the hill, before they would forsake their post.
The following is the account of the final struggle for 203 Metre Hill as I heard it from Captain Sirotko.
About 1 p.m. on December 5 the 9th Company122 was moved from the staff headquarters to 203 Metre Hill. Thirty-six men of the Medical Corps had just been added to it, so that it now consisted of one company officer, two acting ensigns, and 102 rank and file. General Kondratenko in person gave the company an order to reach the hill as quickly as possible.
Under a heavy rifle fire, which caused several casualties, the company reached the foot of 203 Metre Hill about 2 p.m. Just as it reached the hill, the Japanese captured the whole of the crest-line and began sweeping the road in rear with rifle fire and throwing down stones and hand grenades. Our 6th Company, posted on the reverse slopes, suffered heavily from these missiles.
The trench above the road was full of riflemen of various companies and units, but they could not be induced to leave their cover.
Therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Saifoolin ordered the 9th Company to advance across the open to the left of the trench. Under a hail of bullets, stones, and grenades, the company charged up with the bayonet and drove the enemy out of the ruined trench on the crest-line. Then the remainder of the men, encouraged by their comrades’ success, made a rush for the summit.
The company, with Captain Sirotko, Acting Ensigns Lesenkov and Grouzdev, and the squad and section commanders at its head, then rushed out of the position it had just taken, and charged over the crest, supported on its right flank by the 6th Company under Captain Sazonov and Second-Lieutenant Goudkov. They were, however, met by such a storm of bullets, shrapnel, and grenades, that in a few moments they lost half their men, Second-Lieutenant Goudkov being very severely wounded.
Captain Sirotko was badly wounded in the head and arm, and, losing consciousness, fell backwards down the hill. When he came to himself, all the men had again retreated into the trench, which was wreathed in flames on its left flank where the telephone bomb-proof stood. All the officers were now hors de combat, except on the right flank, where Lieutenant-Colonel Pokrovski, who had replaced Lieutenant-Colonel Saifoolin, badly wounded while commandant of the hill, was still unhurt. Two more attacks—one led by Lieutenant-Colonel Pokrovski, the other by Colonel Irman—were equally unsuccessful, and cost us dear. Nevertheless, our men still clung to the rear slopes of the hill.
About midnight, when Captain Sirotko had been attended to and had somewhat recovered, General Kondratenko, who was at the staff headquarters, sent him four midshipmen and an acting ensign of the 27th Regiment, under whom another attack on the Japanese above might be made. By this time, however, the enemy had succeeded in dragging some machine guns to the top of the hill, which was now strongly held. Realizing this, and that enormous losses would be incurred in any further attacks, Colonel Irman decided to evacuate the hill, and gave the order for a general retreat.
It is a pity that we did not adopt the Japanese tactics, of overwhelming the enemy with gun fire and then seizing the hill without loss.
During this fighting the 9th Company lost all its officers, and 60 per cent. of its men were killed or wounded. From September 6 to December 22 this company lost 253 men killed and wounded, i.e. 60 per cent. in excess of its actual war strength of 155 men. It had performed the following duties: covering the retreat from Namako Yama; three bayonet attacks on the enemy occupying the trenches on the left flank of Akasaka Yama—all of them successful; the repulse of numerous attacks on the left flank of Akasaka Yama; and the three last gallant, though unsuccessful, attempts to recapture 203 Metre Hill.
The Red Cross Hospital was abundantly supplied with everything necessary for such an institution in a besieged fortress.
Thanks to the number of nurses, and their tender care of the wounded, the hospital was more or less like one’s own home, and the patients felt themselves very comfortable there after life in the trenches.
In the evening numbers of officers came in from the fighting lines to have their wounds dressed, and they had much interesting news to tell us. The stories I heard from them, and from those who were lying there wounded, were so interesting and so detailed, that if it had been possible to write them down, I could have compiled a full and instructive account of the whole siege. But, as it was, I was too weak to attempt the task.
What depressed me and every one else was the thought that we were being beaten without being able to defend ourselves.
Taking into consideration the enormous superiority of the enemy in guns, and the scurvy that was raging in the fortress, one could almost with certainty fix the period within which the final stand must be made. In my own mind I allowed about two months. News from the Manchurian Army was far from reassuring, and gave us no hope of relief.
For three days after the fall of 203 Metre Hill the Japanese bombarded our ships. The naval men who came in said that the fleet was now doomed. It would soon be at the bottom of the sea, and without it the squadron coming from home would be useless in view of the enemy’s strength.
I cannot understand how any of us could have buoyed ourselves up with the hope that our Far Eastern Fleet was a match for the Japanese.
Was it, indeed, impossible to have foreseen that they would sooner or later protect their own interests? Had we realized the situation and sent three or four more battleships123 to the Far East, there would have been no war and above all no triumph for the Japanese.
To our own mistakes, to our own blindness, and not to the enemy’s valour, I attribute our débâcle. When we have made good our shortcomings, victory will be ours. Of this I am assured, for I know the characteristics of the Japanese, I know their army, and I know their men.
I did not notice any despondency among our officers, but good ones were becoming scarce.
An officer from Fort Chi-kuan told us that the Japanese had for some time been masters of the ditch, but, fearing to attack us, remained on that side of the parapet.
Our men were rolling 10-lb. naval mines into the ditch, and I can imagine the effect of the explosion of these implements of destruction. The Japanese tried to drive us out of the caponier of this fort by burning in it material soaked in arsenic. Our men were stifled by the fumes, and the sentries in the casemates had to be relieved every few minutes. Fort Erh-lung was in a similar plight.
On the evening of December 16 a report reached us that General Kondratenko had been killed. I refused to believe it, but a few minutes afterwards some wounded eye-witnesses were carried in—a young artillery officer, and an ensign of a Reserve Engineer Company, named Schmidt—who verified the rumour.
It seems that about 8 p.m. on the 15th, General Kondratenko went to Fort Chi-kuan, nearly all the senior officers of that section of the defence being already there, amongst others Lieutenant-Colonel Rashevski, Major Zedginidzi, and Lieutenant-Colonel Naoomenko. They had been summoned to discuss the question of further defensive measures at that point, as the defenders were in desperate straits from the poisonous gases they encountered during mining operations.
The casemate where the conference took place having been struck more than once by 11-inch shells, the ruined part had been shut off by a stout partition made of baulks, and a hole, made by a shell, in the vaulted roof had been filled up with loose stones, resting on a pile of mortar and heavy fragments of beams, with which the interior of the casemate was strewn. This I had myself noticed during occasional visits to this ill-omened fort.
General Kondratenko sat at the table with his back to the partition, while other officers were seated on forms. The rest were standing near the entrance to the casemate. Suddenly there was a terrific explosion, and the latter, who were the only ones that escaped alive, were blown through the entrance, while the whole of the interior fell in. When they recovered their senses, soldiers were already in the casemate removing the dead. With the General perished the flower of the officers of that section.124
The death of General Kondratenko made a lasting impression on the garrison; every one lost heart, since we knew there was none to take his place.
A few days afterwards, our fleet ceased to exist, and although the ships’ companies went to swell the numbers of our reserves, from that moment misfortune dogged us.
On December 18 the Japanese exploded a mine under the parapet of Fort Chi-kuan. It did not make a very large breach, and the garrison retreated from the parapet to the retrenchment behind, and thus prevented the enemy from seizing the former; but in spite of this, at 11 p.m. we evacuated the fort. Captain Kvatz, the commandant, told me when he came into hospital that he had withdrawn his men in pursuance of General Fock’s orders, and that he himself considered that further resistance was not justified. Although, according to him, 100 lives were sacrificed daily in the effort to hold this position, nevertheless I could not accept his conclusion, since there was still one casemate in the fort which was absolutely untouched. However, the loss of this fort was not so very serious, because it was on a very low site, and behind and above it was the Chinese Wall, which had already rendered us great service during innumerable attacks.
By December 24 I had quite recovered, and my eye no longer pained me. Dr. Mirotvoretz had operated successfully, and removed a splinter from my neck.
Everything had been quiet in my section during my illness, as the Japanese were concentrating against the eastern front and taking no further action against us.
I was discharged from hospital on December 25. On reaching my section, I found that the staff headquarters had been moved, and was now placed behind the crest of a hill, near Battery No. 4, where it was completely protected. With Colonel Irman’s staff I found many of the town officials, among them Colonel Vershinin, the head of the Kuan-tung Peninsula district. Messing arrangements had been made, and there was plenty of everything, but as the charges were exceedingly high, our officers preferred to dine separately. I felt very well during the evening, but the wound in my neck became so painful that night, that in the morning I had fever, and had to return to hospital for three days.
Having had my wound disinfected, I again rejoined my regiment.
During this time the Japanese had attacked Interval Hill, where our 2nd and 3rd Companies, under Lieutenant Ivanov, were posted. The attacks began at 2 a.m. on December 25, but they were all repulsed by our fire from the trenches and from a lunette occupied by the 7th Company. About ten of the enemy, however, succeeded in climbing up a hill somewhere in rear, where they dug themselves in. Lieutenant Ivanov reported this to Colonel Irman, and said that he would turn them out. This was quite unnecessary, as they would probably have retreated later of their own accord; nevertheless, Colonel Irman ordered the companies to leave Interval Hill and take up a position behind our line, in touch with our 11th Company.
On December 26 we evacuated Solovev Hill, near Pigeon Bay.
The 5th Regiment was now concentrated on our main inner position and occupied the space between two permanent forts, presenting a considerably stronger front than before; it had also been brought up, for the third time, to its full complement. The Japanese were now faced with a problem similar to that previously presented by 174 Metre Hill, but rendered additionally difficult by the existence of permanent fortifications.
They wisely decided not to repeat their rash attacks of the past, and contented themselves with remaining in the positions they had occupied. Thus everything was fairly peaceful, and I availed myself fully of this interval of quiet, feeling that it was safe to leave the staff headquarters occasionally.
First of all, I went to see Colonel Grigorenko, but, being unable to find his house, I went on to the commandant’s. There I met Colonel Khvostov, who had just arrived with a report. We had a long talk about the situation, and I carried away with me the impression that no disaster was threatening us for some time to come.
It seemed that, in the event of the capture of Fort Erh-lung, the commandant had a second line of defence, which we could hope to hold against the enemy for a considerable time.
One would have thought that the rocky ground would have prevented the enemy from mining beneath Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu, but nevertheless by now they were making rapid progress there. We could not make a very stubborn resistance at these points because we had no miners, and, consequently, no system of counter-mining. The counterscarp galleries were merely blocked with stones and cement, which became so solid that it would have taken about three days to destroy, as proved to be the case at Fort Chi-kuan.
Some time before this, General Kondratenko had asked me to come and make an investigation. One night (I do not remember the date) I went with Colonel Grigorenko to Fort Erh-lung, where I found General Kondratenko in the counterscarp gallery. After listening attentively to the Japanese working on the other side, we came to the conclusion that they were tunnelling in three separate parts of the outside wall of the gallery. They evidently wished to make breaches in this wall by exploding several small charges, and thus get through into the gallery. As we could only offer a passive resistance, we determined to block the gallery with a large boulder and cement it hard against those portions of the wall where the Japanese was working. This plan was carried into effect at once.
All this took place some time before, and the enemy were now right under the breastwork of the fort and ready to explode several charges. In anticipation of this the fort was evacuated except for sentries on the parapets. Imagine the frame of mind of a sentry who knows that at any moment he may be blown to atoms! The commandant, having made arrangements for further resistance in case of the destruction of the fort and subsequent Japanese attack, was quietly awaiting events.
Having breakfasted with the commandant, and heard a full account of the state of our defences, I returned to the headquarters of the regiment. The Japanese were directing a somewhat heavy fire towards the road along the shore, but the shells mostly fell into the water beyond.
On December 28 I again rode into the town. While crossing the bridge over the Lun-ho, I felt the earth tremble slightly and then heard a loud rumble in the distance. Looking up, I saw a huge column of black smoke hanging over Fort Erh-lung. “Well,” I thought to myself, “the fort is blown up, and possibly taken, but there is not much harm done, as the Chinese Wall is behind it.”
When I reached the staff, all the details were known. It turned out that the explosion had not been entirely successful, as we were still masters of the retrenchment, but we had lost heavily owing to the rain of shells into the fort. Rumour said that the Japanese themselves had suffered heavy losses from the explosion, that the whole of the trench nearest the fort had been wrecked, and that the men of the attacking party, who were waiting in it, had perished in the ruins.125
In my section everything was quiet, and we spent the evening quite happily, congratulating ourselves that the Japanese had not broken down the defence of the fort, which they could have done if they had exploded their 150-lb. pyroxylin charges under the parapets.
But our joy was premature. The following day we learnt that Fort Ehr-lung had been evacuated in the night; all matériel, cartridges, and shells had been removed beforehand. Besides the fort, we had also abandoned that part of the Chinese Wall which ran straight to the rear from both flanks, and had occupied a position on a rocky crest-line behind, and on a height to the left of it.
Our perilous situation in the centre of the line, the deadly artillery fire, the constantly repeated attacks, and the endless vigil wore out our men, and their spirits began to flag in a marked degree.
In a great battle, soldiers may make a stubborn fight, especially if victory may yet be snatched or some great prize won for the Fatherland. But if after constant fighting there is no apparent gain; if they are, each moment, exposed to deadly peril; if from each individual heroic effort is demanded, not for one soul-stirring moment alone, but ceaselessly, with certain death the only reward,—it is pardonable if hearts grow faint, if men are at times found wanting in energy and slow to carry out orders.
Then is the time for reliefs; but for us there were none available.
Scurvy, moreover, claimed its victims, bringing in its train suffering and weakness. Nourishing diet was necessary, and I do not know why we spared the artillery horses. Long ago we had lost all hope of any offensive action, so ere this the gun horses might well have furnished the men with meat once a day. They may perhaps have been utilized in other ways, though the fact remains that by this means we might have kept, fit and well in the trenches, more than another thousand men!
On December 30 we were dining peacefully, when suddenly tremendous firing burst forth from all our batteries, and the rattle of musketry along the front told us that the Japanese were making a determined attack.
We all rushed up on to the hill, but nothing was visible save the smoke from our own batteries and from bursting shrapnel. All our forts were smothered with shell, though we could not see the enemy’s infantry. I tried to get some news through the telephone, but it was already overtaxed and continuously in use.
Only in the evening did we learn that the Japanese had made a fierce attack on the Chinese Wall and Naval Ridge beyond. This attack had been repulsed with enormous loss to the enemy, who had, however, succeeded in fortifying themselves at the foot of Naval Ridge, and thus enfiladed the Chinese Wall. Still, even that was not of supreme importance, since the Chinese Wall had a number of traverses and splinter-proofs along it.
In my section all was quiet. We had not a single man in reserve, but even so we believed we could beat back every attack. This was not the case, however, on Lao-tieh Shan, where Major Romanovski had practically only our mounted Scout Detachments. The enemy constantly attacked them, and captured another hill near Pigeon Bay. This was decidedly serious, as now the Japanese had nothing but these scouts between them and the other half of the western front, where there was but a remnant of the 27th Regiment, the main portion of it being required on the front attacked, which was held by only a few men.
Fortunately, the Japanese seemed content with the success already gained, and settled down for their usual long rest, or, possibly, their men were also required on the front of attack.
On December 31, after tea, we received news of a further disaster. Yet once again in this disastrous war had fortune favoured the Japanese. Fort Sung-shu had been blown up, and, what was worse, in one stroke the whole garrison had been annihilated. This is what had happened: About a thousand hand grenades had been stored in an excavation which the garrison also used as a shelter. A Japanese shell burst, detonating these grenades, and the whole place collapsed on the garrison. This was a fearful blow to us, and we deeply lamented the death of our gallant comrades and their commandant.126
Fate had indeed played us a sorry trick!
We were all dispirited, and few cared to partake of dinner that night.
On the evening of the 31st we evacuated the Chinese Wall127 and took up positions at Wang-tai and on the Mitrofanievski, Vladimirski, and Laperovski Hills.128 It now became very difficult for us to hold out on the front exposed to attack. We ought to have begun fortifying the New Town on the side facing the Old Town, but no orders were received to that effect. What were our commanders doing?
That night we were all very depressed. Every one discussed plans for continuing the defence, if only till the new year.129 This was the universal wish, and could certainly have been realized. We dispersed at a late hour, to be aroused in the morning by heavy firing. On climbing the hill, we saw Wang-tai literally swept with shell, and so covered with smoke that it was impossible to see its summit. The bombardment continued for a long time. We could not follow exactly what was taking place, but learnt in the evening that the Japanese had captured it. Our reserves had at first quickly driven back the enemy, afterwards repulsing five further attacks, but towards evening, when there were only three or four of the defenders left, the sixth assault was successful.
That evening, by General Fock’s order, the whole of our front from Wang-tai to Chi-kuan Battery was evacuated.
The same night the Japanese attacked Signal Hill, near Takhe Bay, but were repulsed.
On January 2, 1905, the majority of the officers were collected at the staff headquarters to hear the latest reports. Suddenly an officer came galloping out of the town and informed us that he had himself seen two officers riding out beyond our lines with a white flag.
My heart froze at this news. We all remained silent for some time, seeking to hide our discomfiture.
“Can that mean surrender?” said some one at last.
“Doubtless,” answered another.
After a full minute’s silence conversation broke out noisily on all sides. Every one asked what was to be done under the circumstances, and as they were all talking at once, it was impossible to understand anything. But general indignation against General Fock was apparent, and every kind of accusation was heaped upon his head. I do not remember how long this continued, but I know that we had not yet sat down to dinner, when we received the fateful news by telephone: “Arthur surrendered. The officers are allowed to keep their swords and return to Russia after giving their parole not to take any further part in the present war.”
There was a tremendous commotion at the receipt of this news. The majority had no wish to surrender, and vehemently attacked our seniors for surrendering the fortress without the consent of all the officers. Some of them wanted to set out immediately for Lao-tieh Shan and continue the defence there; others proposed to hire Chinese junks and leave the fortress, so as not to become prisoners of war; only a few decided to bow to the will of their commanders. As each one insisted on his opinion being accepted, the discussion soon became very heated, and there was a danger of untoward results.
Eventually those who wished to defend themselves on Lao-tieh Shan gave up the idea, as owing to the lack of water and fortifications of any kind it would be impossible to hold that position. Those who had thought of escaping in junks could not do so, owing to contrary winds.
How long this stormy scene lasted I do not remember, but at its very height some one rode up and told us that the senior officers had sent a telegram to the Tsar asking whether the exemptions obtained by the authorities for the officers were to be accepted or not. This news seemed to have a quieting effect, but with one accord every one determined to express his disapproval of the action of the authorities by an absolute refusal of all exemptions that had been granted as the price of the capitulation of the fortress. All were resolved to share the fate of the men and endure with them the humiliation of becoming prisoners of war. It was a praiseworthy decision, and I expressed my approval, but at the same time several arguments against it presented themselves. Many of these were unheard, as there was much loud discussion. The two chief points advanced were:
(1) As prisoners of war, the rank and file would be separated from their officers and distributed in various places throughout Japan, hence the presence of the latter would be of no help to them, nor would it lessen their hardships.
(2) As an enormous number of officers had been withdrawn from Russia in order to make good the losses sustained in Manchuria, the need of them at home was a very urgent one, and in the event of war in Turkestan, which was more than probable, we should find ourselves in a most critical position. Even without war the want of officers would jeopardize the efficiency of those regiments and reserve battalions that were left. Some 500 officers were in question, and these in Japanese prisons could render no service to their country in her hour of need.
Besides all this I added: “Gentlemen, people in Russia might think that we officers became prisoners of war in order to spend a pleasant time in beautiful Japan, free from all duty and hardship, at a time when disturbances are taking place in the centre of our own country, and she has great need of all those who are anxious for her welfare.”
The officers of my regiment agreed with me and decided to return to Russia, and I can add now that they were far from being of no use here at home, as the regiments in the south were almost without officers, a deficiency which led, as is well known, to serious disorders in the reserve battalions; so that their arrival was most timely.
When the surrender of Port Arthur became an acknowledged fact, we had great difficulty in preserving order in the fortress.
The soldiers felt that something beyond belief had happened, something savouring of disgrace to the brave Russian Army and the Russian Empire as a whole.
“Have we got to surrender, sir?” cried my men when I inspected the companies for the last time.
“Yes, my lads,” I answered. “We have been ordered to surrender; but no blame attaches to the 5th Regiment, and you can with a clear conscience tell each and every one that the 5th Regiment has always looked death bravely in the face and has been ready to die without question for its Tsar and its Country. Every one knows this, and no one will dare to cast a word of reproach at you. As you have always been, so you remain, true heroes, known to the Japanese, to our great and dear Fatherland, and to the whole world. Your conscience is as clear as the sky above you.”
Many of them burst into tears, and I could hardly speak for the sobs that choked me.
A wrinkled old man who was standing near me, and was the sole witness of our emotion, snatched his cap off his head, and, waving it triumphantly in the air, shouted: “To the honour of the 5th Regiment, hurrah!” But there was no one to follow his lead.
Even now I feel overcome as I recall these sorrowful moments, and I can dwell no longer on a scene so heartbreaking.
Notes
No. 1
ORGANIZATION OF AN EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE REGIMENT
Each regiment consists nominally of four battalions.
Each battalion consists of four companies, the war strength of each of which is 240 N.C.O.’s and men.
The war strength of a rifle regiment of four battalions is:
| Officers | 79 | |
| Officials | 7 | |
| N.C.O.’s and men (combatant) | 3,855 | |
| Non-combatants | 442 | |
| —— | ||
| Total | 4,383 | all ranks. |
| —— |
No. 2
GENERAL REFERENCE OF NAMES OF COMMANDERS AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN (pp. 41–61)
Commanding 5th Regiment: Col. Tretyakov.
„1st Battalion: Lieut.-Col. Saifoolin.
„2nd Battalion: Lieut.-Col. Bielozor (killed); replaced by Major Stempnevski (jun.).
„3rd Battalion: Lieut.-Col. Dounin.
Company Commanders
No.4. Capt. Shastin.
„6. Major Gomsiakov (killed); Capt. Sichev (superseded); Lieut. Popov.
„7. Major Stempnevski (jun.).
„8. Capt. Makoveiev (killed); Capt. Sakarov.
„9. Major Sokolov.
„10. Major Goosov; Half-Company, Second-Lieut. Merkoulev.
„11. Capt. Boochatski.
Scout Detachments
No. 1. Lieut. Vaseeliev.
„3. Capt. Koudriavtsev and Lieut. Choulkov.
Mounted Detachment: Capt. Andreievski and Lieut. Sietchko.
Guns
Field Batteries: Lieut.-Cols. Romanovski and Petrov.
Machine Guns: Second-Lieut. Lobyrev.
Naval Guns: Midshipmen Shimanski and Doudkin.
Mountain Guns: Lieut. Naoomov.
Bullock Battery: Second-Lieut. Sadykov.
13th Regiment
1 Company (not numbered): Capt. Lubeemov; Capt. Teemoshenko.
No. 2 Company: Capt. Rotaiski.
Scout Detachment: Lieut. Bandaletov.
14th Regiment
No. 3 Company: Capt. Ushakov.
1 Company (not numbered): Capt. Kousmin.
Scout Detachment: Lieut. Roosoi.
According to our Official History none of the Japanese divisions landed near Terminal Point itself, but in the first place made use of Pi-tzu-wo and Hou-ta-shih, and afterwards Dalny. There are two Ta-scha rivers, 15 miles apart, the most northerly one being that indicated in the text.
The Japanese went down into the water on the right flank as the tide receded, and sat or lay there until ready for their final attack. Their opponents apparently thought them dead, and later were surprised by an attack from that quarter.
To see detail, click on map to display a larger version.
Footnotes
1 Somewhat less than £8 at the rate of exchange of 9·5 roubles to the pound sterling.
2 The term “scout detachment” is used in all official accounts, and will be used throughout this work, to denote a detachment, either mounted or on foot, composed of volunteers (“okhotnik”) and attached to various regiments. All Russian volunteers were thus organized.
3 Accounts received on the Nan Shan position were probably greatly exaggerated, as something of the nature of a panic ensued upon the first Japanese torpedo attack (see Official History, Part III., pp. 10 et seq.). Two battleships and one cruiser were injured in this attack.
4 This company formed part of the Legation Guard at Pekin.
5 An “Acting Ensign” is a senior non-commissioned officer who has done his service with the colours, and ranks next to an Ensign in the Reserve, and, like him, wears officer’s uniform.
6 Though the rank of Major does not exist in the Russian Army, it is used in this translation to denote the Captain Commanding a Battery, Company, or Squadron, in contradistinction to Captain, which term must be understood as applying to a Russian Staff Captain, a rank corresponding to the rank of Second-Captain formerly existing in the British Royal Artillery.
7 Sixty versts is roughly forty miles, one verst being equal to 1,166 yards.
8 This refers to the Boxer rising (see Official History, Part II., p. 16).
9 This seems to be underestimated, as the Official History gives 4,400 yards as the breadth of the position. The author evidently means that at low water the whole breadth of the peninsula was 8 versts, which agrees with other accounts.
10 On the Pi-tzu-wo road, but not shown on map.
11 Official accounts state that as many as 5,000 Chinese coolies were employed.
12 As a fact the armour of the Japanese ships built in England was as good as any of its date, all of it being hardened in accordance with modern processes.
13 General Tretyakov was evidently still under the impression that three Russian battleships had been blown up. The Russians had in reality four first-class battleships still unharmed—Petropavlovsk, Pobieda, Poltava, and Peresviet.
14 The 13th, 14th, and 15th Regiments were actually posted in rear of the 5th during the battle, but did little to support it.
16 See Official History, Part II., p. 11. This news must have come from some of Colonel Rantsov’s cossacks.
17 It seems unlikely that any of these marauding bands were assisting the Japanese. It must be remembered that the Russians had no good word for the Japanese at this time.
18 The Russian soldiers invariably sing on the march, when the band is not playing.
19 Battery No. 13 is situated in rear of the centre of the Nan Shan position.
20 In our Official History (Part II.) this action is briefly described as an engagement with General Nadyein’s rearguard, but it is evident that two separate reconnaissances were made on May 8 and 16 respectively, and that no rearguard was left as indicated in that report.
21 In Part II. of the Official History (p. 43, par. 2) the estimated losses were 150 officers and men killed and wounded. For the Russian estimate, see following page.
[22] The Official History gives General Nadyein as the commander during the battle, but General Fock himself conducted the action, General Nadyein being in command of the left flank.
23 The attack on Chin-chou here mentioned as taking place on May 22 is not given in any of the official accounts, the first mentioned being that of May 25, which is also described here. These two may, however, be one and the same, owing to confusion of dates.
24 See Official History (Part II., p. 20).
26 A footnote in the Official History states that half the 10th Company was cut off by the Japanese, but evidently this was not so.
27 See Note No. 4 at end of book.
28 Usual form of address to the dead.
29 It is not stated what happened to the other company of the 13th Regiment, which was in reserve. A reference to the Official History will show that only one company out of these two is mentioned there also.
30 At this stage the Japanese were clothed in khaki.
31 General Tretyakov appears to have been under the impression that the Japanese were giving no quarter.
33 1 pood = 38 lb.
34 The inhabitants of Dalny received the news of the battle of Nan Shan on the evening of the 26th, and were ordered to proceed to Port Arthur at eleven that night (see Official History, Part III., p. 12).
35 That between Triple Peak and An-tzu Ling (see Map VI.).
36 Better known as Orphan Hill; shown on British official maps as Kan-ta Shan, that being its Chinese name.
37 Called by the Russians the Green Hills.
38 Known by the Russians as the Wolf Hills.
39 The Russian name is Bokovi (Side) Hill.
40 Near Lieh-shu-fang.
41 As its name implies, the station 11 versts from Port Arthur.
42 Our Official History states that only three companies of the 5th Regiment were allotted to this section, but adds later that the 5th and 6th Companies were brought up and absorbed in the fighting line. They are here given as being in reserve.
43 A village 1½ miles north-east of Hou-chia-tun.
44 Ta-po Shan had actually been captured by the Japanese the previous evening about ten o’clock, two counter-attacks afterwards failing.
45 Not to be confused with a hill of the same name on the Western Front of the Port Arthur defences.
46 Probably a hill between Vodymin and Hou-chia-tun.
47 A village midway between Vodymin and 11th Verst station.
49 Millet.
50 “The flatter the trajectory, the better.”
51 These two forts were on the Eastern Front. The author probably refers to these here as being the only two points in advance of the main defensive line now left in Russian hands.
52 A forceful example of the consequences of a badly worded order.
53 Situated at the extreme left flank of the “Position of the Passes.”
54 This plea of utter prostration from constant fighting seems to be a poor excuse for the capture of the forts by the Japanese. The resistance was, in reality, most stubborn.
55 It may be noticed that General Tretyakov makes no mention of the disastrous sortie made by the Russian fleet on August 10.
56 The Russian name for a knoll at the northern end of Headquarter Hill. Subsequent reference will be by the name of Advanced Hill.
57 General Tretyakov’s immediate superior.
58 Our Official History (Part III.) states that Headquarter Hill was captured on the 13th, and Height 426 (Bokovy) on the 15th. From this account it is evident that the former also was not occupied until the 15th.
59 The Russian name for Headquarter Hill.
60 The Russian name for Height 426.
61 Commander of the Fortress Artillery.
62 Our Official History states that “mist and rain prevented an effectual bombardment on this day,” and no real assault took place. The bombardment of 174 Metre Hill on the 15th was evidently only done to cover the attack on Height 426 (described in the last chapter), as no serious attack was made on 174 Metre Hill till the 19th.
63 This company was on Connecting Ridge and had been sent to reinforce the 5th and 9th Companies on 174 Metre Hill.
64 Meaning “Extinct Volcano”; situated about midway between 174 Metre and Division Hills.
65 A blindage is a covered trench with a roofing at least sufficiently strong to afford protection against rifle and shrapnel bullets.
66 Sent up from Namako Yama to reinforce 174 Metre Hill.
67 Officials in Government employ in Russia have civil “rank” just as officers in the army have military rank. Hence the term “general” here.
68 Consisting of 101 men.
69 These shells must have come either from Golden Hill Battery or No. 7 Battery on the Tiger Peninsula, each of which had 11-inch howitzers. (See Map III.)
70 The average Russian soldier of the infantry of the line, with his loose jacket, loose breeches, battered peaked cap, and invariable slouch, does not look what we call smart, and this is what General Tretyakov is probably referring to.
71 Meaning Red Hill; situated right in the rear of 203 Metre Hill.
72 Compare with Official History, Part III., p. 31.
73 Meaning False Hill (south-east of and closely adjoining 203 Metre Hill).
74 This refers to the north-eastern section of the defence. The Japanese captured the East and West Pan-lung Redoubts, but obtained no other advantage for a total loss of 15,000 men. Hence the “successfully defended.” (See Map III.)
75 Rear part of work.
76 A sagene is about 7 feet.
77 Chiefly directed against the East and West Pan-lung Redoubts. (See Map III.)
78 These guns were taken from the ships of the fleet, and were manned by naval gunners.
79 See p. 136.
80 Namako Yama was defended by two tiers of trenches, an upper and a lower, and this was part of the lower line that had been captured (see p. 174, where the upper tier is mentioned).
81 Probably the author means that to effect anything an assault would be necessary, as the defenders, safely ensconced in their now well-constructed trenches, had nothing to fear from a mere bombardment.
82 In future references the term “Saddle Hill” will be used. This position is the saddle joining the southern extremity of 203 Metre Hill to Connecting Ridge.
83 No mention of any attack is made on this date (19th) in our Official History; this was probably a preliminary movement to the main assault fixed for the next day.
84 The numbers here given again differ widely from those given in our Official History. Here 500 is about the total, and the Official History gives 1,500 (Official History, Part III., p. 61)—a considerable difference. Note the numbers on p. 181. Assuming that companies were at this time about 140 strong only, the total of these five comes to 714 (700 + 2 + 6 + 6), which, with gunners, gives a total of 764.
85 All this preliminary fighting is not described in our Official History, but the lodgment effected by the Japanese on the 20th in the Russian bomb-proof is mentioned.
86 See p. 180.
87 He had apparently failed to keep his previous promise (see par. 2, p. 181).
88 Staff Officer to Colonel Irman.
89 Orderly Officer to Colonel Tretyakov.
90 This refers to the Japanese attacks and capture of the Waterworks and Temple Redoubts. (See Map III.)
91 Official History affirms that this was done with 15-lb. charges, but according to our narrative the heavier charges failed.
92 The Japanese casualties amounted to about 2,500.
93 The author is referring to men of his own regiment, two companies of which comprised part of the garrison of 203 Metre Hill.
94 The north-eastern section. This refers to the preliminary movements of the Japanese against Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu. (See Map III.)
95 Tea-urns.
96 The “trace” or “outline” of a work is its general shape in plan.
97 The usual rate of advance of a sap is from 2 to 4 feet per hour, depending on the nature of the soil and the amount of excavation necessary. The latter must, of course, depend on due cover for the party being provided. The Official History states that breastworks, or, more correctly speaking, “parapets” had to be built up, 5 feet high and 4 feet thick, with sand-bags, as ordinary digging was impossible in the rocky formation of 203 Metre Hill. This accounts for the slow rate of progress. Though it is not clear from the narrative, the type of sap was probably that known as “double.”
98 It will be remembered that regular rifle clamps were used during the South African War for firing at night.
99 The linia is a Russian unit of measurement, and equals 1/10 inch; hence the calibre of the gun was 4·2 inches.
100 General Fock wrote a number of “Notes” during the siege, which were published from time to time and distributed throughout the garrison. As many of them contained severe criticisms of commanders of regiments (which were read by junior officers), General Fock was charged at the court-martial, held in St. Petersburg, in 1908, with conduct to the prejudice of military discipline, and General Stessel was also blamed for allowing them to be published. Compare Official History, Part III., p. 144 (3).
102 This refers to the repulse of the Japanese second general assault (October 26–31).
103 The last direct attack on this fort had been repulsed on October 31, since when mining operations had continued.
104 Commanding the Engineers.
105 Only 40 yards now separated the assailants (see Official History, chap. xix., p. 81).
106 About £30.
107 The third Japanese general assault, mainly directed against Chi-kuan, Ehr-lung, and Sung-shu forts. (See Map III.)
108 This must refer to the missiles from the wooden mortars used by the Japanese. These Japanese wooden 5-inch and 7-inch mortars threw “mines” (really large hand grenades), weighing 4½ and 16½ lb. respectively.
109 There is in every regiment a certain number of men not armed with rifles—transport drivers, joiners, carpenters, clerks, harness-makers, wheelers, and shoeing-smiths—and to these are added assistant-surgeons and hospital orderlies under battalion and regimental doctors. The company thus formed is commanded by the regimental Quarter-Master.
For inspection purposes these men are formed into one company, but on service the clerks and medical assistants form two separate companies and act independently, the former under the command of the Adjutant, and the latter under one who has passed the “Okolodok” (i.e. the lower standard in the Medical School of Instruction), so that the Quarter-Master has the transport drivers and joiners, etc., left in his charge.
All the men of the non-combatant companies are armed with revolvers, with the exception of the transport drivers, who are unarmed, but have to go through a course of rifle practice and instruction.
110 The operations here described were evidently preliminary to the main assault, which, according to our Official History, opened at 8.30 a.m. on November 28.
111 General Tretyakov speaks of “redoubts,” but according to our Official History the works on 203 Metre Hill were really of the less formidable nature of “breastworks,” which term is, therefore, substituted in this translation.
112 Our Official History (Part III., p. 96) states that the Japanese held the summit (of the southern peak) for some time, but were driven back at 3 p.m. From the present narrative it is evident that some at least remained there till after nightfall.
113 A Russian officer always addresses his men on parade by using two words which mean “Good morning, men”; and the men answer all together in two words signifying “We are glad to be able to serve you.”
114 The Japanese eventually had six batteries firing from the neighbourhood of this village at the rear slopes of 203 Metre Hill and Akasaka Yama. (See Map III.)
115 Grenades were made in three factories, capable of turning out about 1,000 daily, working the usual hours, and about 2,500, working day and night. (A. Bortnovski, Voenny Sbornik, Jan., 1910.)
116 December 3.
117 This name was probably borrowed from the sailors, who called the 12-inch shell of the Japanese battleships “portmanteaus.” (See the “Battle of Tsu-Shima,” by Semenov.)
118 Our Official History states “about 3,000,” but the author ought to be in a better position to give the correct number.
119 Situated in the centre of the right breastwork. (See Map. V.)
120 The Russians always drink tea out of glasses.
121 Of Akasaka Yama.
122 This company had been withdrawn to the reserve at 2 p.m. on the 4th. See preceding chapter.
[123] Admiral Wirenius, with a squadron of one battleship and two cruisers, was actually on his way to Port Arthur when war broke out.
124 Seven were killed on the spot, and seven more wounded.
125 This proved to be an exaggeration. The storming parties were protected by roofs of boards and scantling, and only a few casualties occurred (see Official History, Part III., p. 116).
126 Mention of this incident is made in Official History (Part III., p. 119), where it appears that the Japanese had actually sprung their mines before this accidental explosion took place.
127 Attacked by the 6th Brigade under General Ichinohe. (See Map III.)
128 Eminences flanking the Wang-tai position, probably named after the officers charged with their defence.
129 The corresponding Russian date was December 18.
“Bokovi (Side) Hill”, “BOKOVY HILL (SIDE HILL)”, “Height 426 (Bokovy)”
Footnotes
Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together into a new “FOOTNOTES” section that follows the Index.