Appendix
Letters of General Robert E. Lee and General Longstreet
I.
Lee to Anderson on Conduct of the First Corps.
August 26, 1864.
Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson,
Commanding Longstreet’s Corps:
General,—I take great pleasure in presenting to you my congratulations upon the conduct of the men of your corps. I believe that they will carry anything they are put against. We tried very hard to stop Pickett’s men from capturing the breastworks of the enemy, but could not do it. I hope his loss has been small.
I am, with respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee,
General.
II.
Lee to Longstreet congratulating him on his Convalescence and anticipating Return.
Camp Petersburg, August 29, 1864.
General J. Longstreet:
My dear General,—I received yesterday your letter of the 23d, and am much gratified at your improvement. You will soon be as well as ever, and we shall all be rejoiced at your return. You must not, however, become impatient at the gradual progress you must necessarily make, but be content with the steady advance you are making to health and strength. Your progress will be the more certain and your recovery more confirmed. Do not let Sherman capture you, and I will endeavor to hold Grant till you come. I am glad to hear such good accounts of my little namesake. Good lungs are a great blessing, and nothing expands them better than a full, hearty yell. I hope Mrs. Longstreet is well, and that she is enjoying the good peaches and melons of Georgia. We have but little enjoyment here. Our enemy is very cautious, and he has become so proficient in intrenching that he seems to march with a system already prepared. He threatens dreadful things every day, but, thank God, he has not expunged us yet.
All your army friends inquire for you anxiously, and will be delighted to hear of your improvement. We shall not object to your chirography, so you must practise it often, and let me hear of your progress and well-doing. Please present my kindest regards to Mrs. Longstreet, and love to my namesake. The gentlemen of my staff are very grateful for your remembrance, and unite with me in sincere wishes for your welfare and happiness. I am sure the rest of this army would join did they know of the opportunity.
With great regard, very truly yours,
R. E. Lee.
III.
Longstreet to Lee.
Head-quarters Army Corps,
November 24, 1864.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—From the report of scouts received yesterday, it seems that the Tenth Corps is still on this side, or if it went over to the south side, has returned. The information, too, seems to indicate the arrival of the Sixth Corps from the Valley.
Under these circumstances it will be necessary for me to force the enemy to develop the extent of his move on this side before taking any more of my troops to the south side. This I shall do, of course, as rapidly as possible. I am going to have the roads leading from White Oak Swamp to the Williamsburg road well broken up with subsoil ploughs. I think that the enemy will then have to build a corduroy there as he moves. He surely will, if I can have a good gentle rain after the roads are thoroughly ploughed. Can’t you apply this idea to advantage on your side on the roads that General Grant will be obliged to travel if he goes to Burkeville? I don’t know, however, but that it would be better for us to go to Burkeville and block the roads behind him. If the roads that General Sherman must travel to get to Charleston or Savannah can be thoroughly ploughed and the trees felled over them, I think that General Sherman will not be able to get to his destination in fifty days, as the Northern papers expect; and it is not thought to be possible that he can collect more than fifty days’ rations before reaching the coast. If the parties are properly organized, I think that they might destroy or injure all of the roads so as to break down General Sherman’s animals, and result in the capture of most of his forces.
I remain, very respectfully, yours most obediently,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
IV.
Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Gold and Measures for Final Campaign.
[Confidential.]
Head-quarters, February 14, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—Recent developments of the enemy’s designs seem to indicate an early concentration of his armies against Richmond. This, of course, would involve a like concentration on our part, or the abandonment of our capital. The latter emergency would, I think, be almost fatal,—probably quite so, after our recent reverses. To concentrate here in time to meet the movements of the enemy we will be obliged to use the little of our Southern railroad that is left us in transporting our troops, so that we cannot haul provisions over that route. I fear, therefore, that we will not be able to feed our troops unless we adopt extraordinary efforts and measures. I think that there is enough of the necessaries of life left in Virginia and North Carolina to help us through our troubles if we can only reach them. Impressing officers, however, nor collectors of taxes in kind, nor any other plan heretofore employed, is likely to get those supplies in time or in quantities to meet our necessities. The citizens will not give their supplies up and permit their families and servants to suffer for the necessaries of life without some strong inducement. For each one may naturally think that the little that he would supply by denying himself and family would go but little way where so much is needed. He does not want Confederate money, for his meat and bread will buy him clothes, etc., for his family more readily and in larger quantities than the money that the government would pay. The only thing that will insure our rations and national existence is gold. Send out the gold through Virginia and North Carolina and pay liberal prices, and my conviction is that we shall have no more distress for want of food. The winter is about over, and the families can and will subsist on molasses, bread, and vegetables for the balance of the year if they can get gold for their supplies. There is a great deal of meat and bread inside the enemy’s lines that our people would bring us for gold; but they won’t go to that trouble for Confederate money. They can keep gold so much safer than they can meat and bread, and it is always food and clothing.
If the government has not the gold, it must impress it, or if there is no law for the impressment, the gold must be taken without the law. Necessity does not know or wait for law. If we stop to make laws in order that we may reach the gold it will disappear the day that the law is mentioned in Congress. To secure it no one should suspect that we are after it until we knock at the doors of the vaults that contain it, and we must then have guards to be sure that it is not made away with.
It seems to my mind that our prospects will be brighter than they have been if we can only get food for our men; and I think that the plan that I have proposed will secure the food.
There seem to be many reasons for the opinion that the enemy deems our capital essential to him. To get the capital he will concentrate here everything that he has, and we will be better able to fight him when we shall have concentrated than when we are in detachments. The Army of the Mississippi will get new life and spirits as soon as it finds itself alongside of this, and we will feel more comfortable ourselves to know that all are under one eye and one head that is able to handle them.
I remain, most respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
V.
Lee to Longstreet on Plans for Campaign.
[Confidential.]
Head-quarters Confederate States Armies,
February 22, 1865.
Lieutenant-General J. Longstreet,
Commanding, etc.:
General,—Your letter of the 14th instant is received. It arrived during my absence in Richmond, and has not been overlooked. I agree with you entirely in believing that if we had gold we could get sufficient supplies for our army, but the great difficulty is to obtain the gold. It is not in the coffers of the government or the banks, but is principally hoarded by individuals throughout the country, and is inaccessible to us. I hope, under the reorganization of the commissary department, if we can maintain possession of our communications, that the army will be better supplied than heretofore, and that we can accumulate some provisions ahead. As regards the concentration of our troops near the capital, the effect would be to produce a like concentration of the enemy, and an increase of our difficulties in obtaining food and forage. But this, whether for good or evil, is now being accomplished by the enemy, who seems to be forcing Generals Beauregard and Bragg in this direction. If Sherman marches his army to Richmond, as General Beauregard reports it is his intention to do, and General Schofield is able to unite with him, we shall have to abandon our position on the James River, as lamentable as it is on every account. The want of supplies alone would force us to withdraw when the enemy reaches the Roanoke. Our line is so long, extending nearly from the Chickahominy to the Nottoway, and the enemy is so close upon us, that if we are obliged to withdraw we cannot concentrate all our troops nearer than some point on the line of railroad between Richmond and Danville. Should a necessity, therefore, arise, I propose to concentrate at or near Burkeville. The route for the troops north of James River would have to be through Richmond, on the road to Amelia Court-House, the cavalry passing up the north branch of the river, and crossing at some point above Richmond. Pickett’s division would take the route through Chesterfield Court-House, crossing the Appomattox at Goode’s Bridge. With the army concentrated at or near Burkeville, our communications north and south would be by that railroad, and west by the Southside Railroad. We might also seize the opportunity of striking at Grant, should he pursue us rapidly, or at Sherman, before they could unite. I wish you to consider this subject, and give me your views. I desire you also to make every preparation to take the field at a moment’s notice, and to accumulate all the supplies you can. General Grant seems to be preparing to move out by his left flank. He is accumulating near Hatcher’s Run depots of supplies, and apparently concentrating a strong force in that quarter. Yesterday and to-day trains have passed from his right to his left loaded with troops, which may be the body of eight thousand which you report having left Signal Hill yesterday. I cannot tell whether it is his intention to maintain his position until his other columns approach nearer, or to anticipate any movement by us which he might suppose would then become necessary. I wish you would watch closely his movements on the north side of the river, and try and ascertain whether he is diminishing his force. If he makes the move which appearances now indicate, he may draw out his whole force, abandoning his lines of defence, or hold them partially and move with the remainder of his troops.
I should like very much to confer with you on these subjects, but I fear it will be impossible for me to go north of James River, and I do not know that it will be convenient for you to come here.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee,
General.
P.S.—Can you not return Pickett’s brigade to him in order that I may withdraw Grimes’s brigade from his line, its division having been ordered to our right?
R. E. L.
VI.
Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Men.
[Confidential.]
Head-quarters, February 23, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding, etc.:
General,—Your letter of yesterday is received. I think you did not understand my letter of the 14th instant. My effort was to express conviction that Sherman’s move was aimed at Richmond, and that Grant’s concentration here would force us to do the same thing; and, that we might be able to do so, it was necessary that we should have gold, by impressment, to purchase our produce supplies. I think that it is not too late yet. We can surely get the gold by sending impressing officers with guards to the vaults in which it is stored.
I understand that there are twelve hundred men in Lynchburg already organized, and that we may get eight or ten thousand men in Richmond by taking everybody who is able to bear arms. The staff-officers about Richmond would be nearly enough to officer this force. If such a force can be raised and put in my lines, it can hold them, I think, and my corps can move down to the relief of Beauregard, or it may be moved over to our right, and hold Grant in check, so that Sherman will be obliged to unite with him or seek a base at New-Berne or at Wilmington. This would give Beauregard and Bragg time to unite their forces to meet Sherman and Schofield here or wherever they may appear. We shall lose more men by a move than by a battle. It is true that we may be compelled to move after the battle, but I think not. If we fight Sherman as I suggest, we shall surely drive him to the water for fresh supplies, even if we are not otherwise successful. Then we may have time to concentrate as soon as Grant, and reopen the line of communication with the South.
The local and other troops that we may get from Richmond and Lynchburg will have tolerably comfortable huts, and there will be enough old soldiers amongst them to teach them picket duty. There are also some cavalrymen who can aid them.
I should think that Grant, if he moves, can only make a partial move, similar to his last, and that would not injure us very materially.
In preparing to take the field, in view of the abandonment of Richmond, is it your desire to keep our wagons about our camps that we may move at once? Our wagons are out all the time gathering supplies, and at times some distance; so that a very sudden move would leave them behind. Shall we continue to send them or keep them with us?...
Your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
VII.
Lee to Longstreet.
Head-quarters, February 25, 1865.
General,—I have received your letters of the 23d and 24th insts. I fear I did not entirely comprehend your views expressed in your letter of the 14th. I think, however, my reply meets your supposition, in the event of concentration by the enemy. I shall in that case unite all the forces possible. I think you are misinformed as to the number of men in Lynchburg. At my last call upon General Colston, commissary there, he said he had not one hundred men, and they were unarmed. I am very glad to hear that General Ewell can get force enough from Richmond to man the lines north of James River. I know him to be a brave old soldier, ready to attempt anything, but I do not know where he will find the men. Please see him and get a definite statement, for if that can be done it will lighten our labor considerably. You cannot afford to keep your wagons by you. They will have to be kept collecting provisions, forage, etc., or you will starve. I am making great efforts to gather supplies, and send you some documents which will show what the commissary-general is doing in addition to the operations of the officers of his department. It will be a grievous thing to be obliged to abandon our position, and I hope the necessity will never arise, but it would be more grievous to lose our army. I am fully alive to the benefits of procuring gold, but fear it cannot be obtained in the way you suggest; still, I will try. I am much gratified by the earnestness and zeal you display in our operations; and were our whole population animated by the same spirit, we should be invincible. The last reports from S. C. indicated that Sherman was turning eastward. It may be to reach the Pedee in search of supplies.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee,
General.
General Longstreet,
Commanding, etc.
VIII.
Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Gold.
Head-quarters First Corps,
February 26, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—I have just heard from General Ewell indirectly that he can raise force enough at Richmond to hold the lines on this side, so that my corps may be withdrawn temporarily to your right, that is, if you can put a part of the Second Corps in place of Pickett’s division. This arrangement will give you force enough to meet any move that the enemy may make upon your right. If he makes no move, then you can, when the proper moment arrives, detach a force to the aid of General Beauregard, and if the enemy should then press you, you can abandon Petersburg and hold your line here, and take up the line of the Appomattox. But I think that the enemy will be forced to move a force south the moment that he finds that you are reinforcing against Sherman, else he will encounter the risk of losing Sherman as well as Richmond. There is some hazard in the plan, but nothing can be accomplished in war without risk.
The other important question is provisions. We are doing tolerably well by hauling from the country and paying market prices in Confederate money. If you would give us gold I have reason to believe that we could get an abundant supply for four months, and by that time we ought to be able to reopen our communication with the South. The gold is here, and we should take it. We have been impressing food and all of the necessaries of life from women and children, and have been the means of driving thousands from their homes in destitute conditions. Should we hesitate, then, about putting a few who have made immense fortunes at our expense to a little inconvenience by impressing their gold? It is necessary for us, and I do not think that we should let our capital fall into the enemy’s hands for fear of injuring the feelings or interests of a few individuals. We have expended too much of blood and treasure in holding it for the last four years to allow it to go now by default. I think that it may be saved. If it can, we should not leave any possible contingency untried.
I think, however, that the enemy’s positions are so well selected and fortified that we must either wait for an opportunity to draw him off from here or await his attack. For even a successful assault would cripple us so much that we could get no advantage commensurate with our loss.
I remain with great respect, and truly, your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
IX.
Longstreet to Lee on his “Peace” Interview with General Ord.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 1, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—I had another interview with Major-General Ord yesterday, and expressed the opinions that were spoken of in our interview at the President’s mansion on Sabbath last. He acceded promptly to my proposition that the war must cease if we are to go to work to try to make peace, and to the proposal for a military convention. I further claimed that we could not go into convention upon any more favorable basis than an earnest desire to arrange plans for peace that should be equally honorable for both parties. To this also I understood him to give his unqualified consent. He says that General Grant has the authority to meet you if you have authority to appoint a military convention, and proposed that you should indicate your desire to meet General Grant, if you felt authorized to do so. As he made this proposition before mine, to the effect that General Grant should express his desire to meet you, and as the interview between General Ord and myself had been brought on at the request of General Ord, I did not feel that I could well do otherwise than promise to write to you of the disposition on their part to have the interview. If you think it worth your time to invite General Grant to an interview, it might be upon some other as the ostensible grounds, and this matter might be brought up incidentally. I presume that General Grant’s first proposition will be to go into convention upon the basis of reconstruction; but if I have not misunderstood General Ord’s conversation, General Grant will agree to take the matter up without requiring any principle as a basis further than the general principle of desiring to make peace upon terms that are equally honorable for both sides. I would suggest that the interview take place on this side, and at the place of meeting between General Ord and myself; because there are several little points upon which you should be posted before the interview, and I do not see that I can well do that by writing. Besides, as “the ice has already been broken” on this side, your interview would be relieved in a measure of the formality incident to such occasions. If it should be on this side, I hope that you will give me two or three days’ notice. General Stevens is of the opinion that one thousand negro laborers on this line during this month will so strengthen our position that we will be able to spare a division, and I am satisfied that we can do so if we can have the work completed, and can get the aid that General Ewell promises us.
I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
X.
Longstreet to Lee on Exchange of Political Prisoners.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 1, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—I neglected to mention in my letter just finished that General Ord expressed some apprehension for General Grant lest there might be some misunderstanding in regard to the exchange of political prisoners. The terms were general for the exchange of this class of prisoners, but were not intended by him, he says, to include such as were under charges for capital offences. General Grant desired that you should be advised of this construction of the terms.
I remain, respectfully, your most obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XI.
Lee to Longstreet on Interview with General Grant.
Head-quarters,
March 2, 1865.
General,—I have received to-day your letter of the 1st instant, and concluded to propose an interview to General Grant. As you desired to have two or three days’ notice, I have appointed Monday next, 6th instant, at eleven A.M., at the point suggested by you. Will you send my letter to General Grant, and arrange with General Ord for the interview? If you will ride in to my quarters on Saturday next, 4th instant, by ten A.M., in Richmond, I shall be happy to see you, when you can enlighten me on the points you referred to in your letter.
I hope some good may result from the interview.
Very truly yours,
R. E. Lee,
General.
General J. Longstreet,
Commanding, etc.:
P.S.—Seal the letter to General Grant before transmitting.
R. E. L.
XII.
Longstreet to Lee urging Use of Gold.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 7, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—I received a letter yesterday from a friend in the interior of North Carolina assuring me that there are large quantities of provisions in the State; that many have two and three years’ supply on hand, and that gold will bring anything that we need to our armies. The gold is in the country, and most of it is lying idle. Let us take it at once and save Richmond, and end the war. If we hold Richmond and keep our cotton, the war cannot last more than a year longer. If we give up Richmond we shall never be recognized by foreign powers until the government of the United States sees fit to recognize us. If we hold Richmond and let the enemy have our cotton, it seems to me that we shall furnish him the means to carry on the war against us. It looks to me as though the enemy had found that our policy of destroying the cotton rather than let it fall into their hands would break them down, and that it has forced them to the policy of sending on here to make a contract to feed and clothe our armies in order that they may get the means of carrying on the war of subjugation. If we will keep our cotton and use our gold our work will be comparatively easy.
I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XIII.
Longstreet to Lee on guarding the Danville Railroad.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 20, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,—I presume that the enemy’s next move will be to raid against the Danville Railroad, and think that it would be well if we begin at once to make our arrangements to meet it. In order that we may get the troops that may be necessary to meet such a move, would suggest that we collect all the dismounted men of Generals Fitz Lee, Rosser, and Lomax, and put them behind our strongest lines, and draw out a corps of infantry and hold it in readiness for the raid. General W. H. F. Lee’s dismounts might also be used behind our works to great advantage. With a cavalry force of two or three thousand men to hold the enemy in check, I think that our infantry may be able to overtake the raiding column. If we can get a large cavalry force I think that we would surely be able to destroy the raiding force.
I remain your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XIV.
Longstreet to Assistant Adjutant-General Taylor on Suppression of Desertion.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 25, 1865.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Taylor,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
The impression prevails amongst the Georgia troops of this command that persons at home having authority to raise local organizations are writing and sending messages to the men in the ranks here, offering inducements to them to quit our ranks and go home and join the home organizations. The large and increasing number of desertions, particularly amongst the Georgia troops, induces me to believe that some such outside influence must be operating upon our men. Nearly all of the parties of deserters seem to go home, and it must be under the influence of some promise, such as being received in the local forces. I would suggest, therefore, the publication of a general order warning all officers or persons authorized to raise local organizations against receiving such deserters or in any way harboring them, and cautioning all such parties that they shall be punished for such crimes under the twenty-second and twenty-third Articles of War. It may be well to publish the articles in the order, and to send the order South to be published in all the Southern papers. If the order is published, I would suggest that copies be sent to the Southern papers by special messenger or by parties going South who will take pains to have it published, otherwise I fear it may miscarry or be delayed by our irregular mails. Another growing evil seems to trouble us now in the shape of applications to raise negro companies, regiments, brigades, etc. The desire for promotion seems to have taken possession of our army, and it seems that nearly all the officers and men think that they could gain a grade or more if allowed to go home. I presume that many may try to go merely because they get furloughs. I would suggest, therefore, that some regulation be published upon this subject, and it seems to me that it should require the companies to be mustered in as non-commissioned officers and privates by the enrolling officers, and that all of the officers (general, field, and company) shall be selected from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates on duty with the armies of the Confederacy. If these matters are not speedily taken hold of by a firm hand, I fear that we shall be seriously damaged by them.
I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
(Signed) J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XV.
Longstreet to Lee on Sheridan’s Operations.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 28, 1865.
General R. E. Lee,
Commanding, etc.:
Your telegram asking if we can spare General Pickett’s division as a supporting force to our cavalry is received. I suggested that it should be sent on that service because I was apprehensive that our railroad would be in danger of being broken up behind us, leaving us without supplies sufficient to hold Richmond until our communications south could be re-established, or in case Sheridan went to N. C., his mounted force would be too formidable for that of General Johnston’s, and that General Johnston would be in great danger if we shall not reinforce him. I do not think that we can well spare the division. But I think that we would choose a lesser risk by sparing it in case Sheridan’s cavalry makes either of these moves contemplated than we would by holding him here to await the result of these operations. The enemy seems now to count upon taking Richmond by raiding upon our lines of communication, and not by attacking our lines of work. I think, therefore, we should endeavor to put a force in the field that can contend against that of the enemy. If Grant sends off his cavalry, he can hardly intend to make any general move of his main army until its return. In every aspect of affairs, so far as I am advised, I think that the greater danger is from keeping too close within our trenches. If we can remain where we are independently of the railroad, and if General Johnston would be safe with such a force as Sheridan’s operating against him, in addition to Sherman’s, we had better keep the division here. You know much more about all those points than I do, and are much better able to decide upon them. My supply train is in from Northern Neck, and starts back to-morrow for other provisions. If there is any impropriety in sending it back, please telegraph me as soon as you receive this, that I may recall it. We have about one hundred thousand pounds of meat near Dublin and eighteen thousand at New Boston. The C. S. complains that the railroad agents will not ship the meat unless it is boxed. This cannot always be done. If you can in any way aid us in this matter, we shall do very well for some time to come.
I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
(Signed) J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XVI.
Longstreet to Adjutant-General Taylor on Policy towards New Organizations.
Head-quarters First Army Corps,
March 30, 1865.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Taylor,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
Your letter expressing the views of the commander-in-chief in reference to the policy to be pursued in raising negro troops is received. I am apprehensive that we shall have applications and evidence enough to take from us more men than we can well spare at this critical moment in our affairs. It seems to me that any person who has the influence to raise a company or a regiment by going home could do so as well by letters to his friends at home. If I am right in this opinion, an order announcing that the officers of the companies and regiments of colored troops would be appointed from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates on duty with our armies would have the effect of bringing back more absentees than we should lose by making the appointments. If we may judge of our future success in getting up new organizations by the past, we may rely upon it that many will furnish the necessary evidence, and go home and there remain for eight and ten and twelve months. I think it would be well to publish a general order, explaining more clearly the policy indicated in your letter, in order that a better general understanding may exist amongst the parties who may desire to furnish evidence of their ability to get up new organizations. Otherwise I may adopt rules which would not be as favorable to the officers and men of this command as those of other commands.
I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General.
XVII.
Lee to Longstreet on Proposed Publication of a History of Virginia Campaigns.
Lexington, Va., January 19, 1866.
General J. Longstreet:
My dear General,—Upon my return from Richmond, where I have been for a week on business connected with Washington College, I found your letter of the 26th ultimo. I regret very much that you never received my first letter, as you might then, perhaps, have given me the information I desired, with more ease to yourself and with more expedition than now. I did not know how to address it, but sent it to a friend in Richmond, who gave it to one of our officers going south, who transferred it to another, etc., and after travelling many weary miles, has been recently returned to me. I start it again in pursuit of you, though you did not tell me how to address you. I have almost forgotten what it contained, but I hope it will inform you of my purpose in writing a history of the campaigns in Virginia, and of the object that I have in view, so that you may give me all the information in your power. I shall be in no hurry in publishing, and will not do so until I feel satisfied that I have got the true story, as my only object is to disseminate the truth. I am very sorry to hear that your records were destroyed too; but I hope Sorrel and Latrobe will be able to supply you with all you require. I wish to relate the acts of all the corps of the Army of Northern Virginia wherever they did duty, and do not wish to omit so important a one as yours. I will therefore wait as long as I can.
I shall be very glad to receive anything you may give to Mr. Washington McLean, as I know you recommend no one but those who deserve your good opinion.
I am delighted to hear that your arm is still improving, and hope it will soon be restored. You are, however, becoming so accomplished with your left hand as not to need it. You must remember me very kindly to Mrs. Longstreet and all your children. I have not had an opportunity yet to return the compliment she paid me. I had, while in Richmond, a great many inquiries after you, and learned that you intended commencing business in New Orleans. If you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier, I shall be content. No one will then excel you, and no one can wish you more success and more happiness than I. My interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are always offered for your prosperity.
I am most truly yours,
R. E. Lee.
XVIII.
Lee to Longstreet—Congratulations.
Lexington, Va., January 26, 1866.
Longstreet, Owen & Co.,
New Orleans:
Gentlemen,—I am much obliged to you for your business card, and the pleasure it has afforded me to know that you have entered into partnership. I know you will do your work well, and please myself, therefore, with the prospect of your great success.
I wrote to your senior a few days since, at Macon, Mississippi, and hope he will receive my letter. I do not consider my partnership with him yet dissolved, and shall not let go him during life.
Wishing you all happiness and prosperity, I am, with great affection, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee.
XIX.
Lee to Longstreet, suggesting the Preparation of his Memoirs.
Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866.
General J. Longstreet:
My dear General,—Your son Garland handed me a few days since your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, Wilderness, Virginia, and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect.
Can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing your memoirs of the war? Every officer whose position and character would give weight to his statements ought to do so. It is the only way in which we may hope that fragments of truth will reach posterity. Mrs. Longstreet will act as your amanuensis. I am very sorry that your arm improves so slowly. I trust it will be eventually restored to you. You must present my kindest regards to Mrs. Longstreet. I hope your home in New Orleans will be happy; that your life, which is dear to me, may be long and prosperous.
Most truly yours,
R. E. Lee.
XX.
Longstreet to Lee on Battle of Gaines’s Mill.
New Orleans, La., March 20, 1866.
General R. E. Lee,
Lexington, Va.:
My dear General,—Your favor of the 9th instant is received. The papers or copies sent by Garland contain everything that I have or can get in the shape of your letters and orders. I shall be able to give you an account of movements, etc., connected with the Suffolk campaign and the siege of Richmond when I can get our diaries,—that is, Sorrel’s, Latrobe’s, and my own. But I fear that I shall not be able to do so in time to meet your desires. I shall send all that I can gather together to your house as soon as I can. I have sometimes thought that I would make the effort to write at some future time, but begin to despair of my arm. It is too much labor to write with my left hand, and it gives me inconvenience, indeed pain, to keep my right hand in the constrained position necessary in writing. Our business affairs occupy my days from nine till four P.M., so I am glad to give my arm rest after that time. Mrs. Longstreet would be rather a poor amanuensis in the evening, my only spare time, as her two little boys, Lee and Jim, occupy most of her time. She is trying to get a picture of Lee to send you. I delivered your message that you “regretted that you had not been able to return the compliment.” To go back to history and the war. There is one portion of our records as written that I should like corrected,—the battle of Gaines’s Mill. Your report of that battle does not recognize the fact that the line in my front, that is, the enemy’s line, was broken by the troops that were under my orders and handling. A part of Jackson’s command, being astray, reported to me just as I was moving my column of attack forward,—Whiting’s division,—and I put it in my column of attack, as stated in my report. I think that you must have overlooked my report on this point, and have been guided by Jackson’s. Jackson knew nothing of the matter of my having his troops, I suppose, and merely made his report from riding over the ground after the battle. I presume that he was not within one mile of the division when I put it in, and had no idea of its whereabouts. General Whiting reported to me that he had lost his way, and did not know where to find General Jackson, and offered his troops if I had use for them. I was then moving to assault, and put Whiting in a little behind Pickett’s brigade. The commands made the assault together, and broke the enemy’s line. Anderson’s brigade followed and secured it, the assaulting columns being somewhat broken in making the charge. Just after breaking his lines the enemy made a severe attack, and would have recovered his position, I think, but for the timely support of Anderson’s and Kemper’s brigades at this point. Another fact should not be lost sight of in this connection. A. P. Hill had made several formidable attacks at the same point, and had fought manfully against it for several hours, and though not entirely successful, he must have made a decided impression, and have injured the enemy as much as he was himself injured, and thus weakened the enemy’s lines so as to enable us to break them. It is quite common to give those credit only who show results, but it frequently happens, as in this case, that there are others who merit as much who are not known by results,—that is, who are not seen by others than those on the ground.
If you can come across my son when you have an idle moment, I hope that you will give him a few words of kindly advice and encouragement. He is taught to look up to you as superior to others. Mrs. Longstreet joins me in affectionate salutations.
I remain very truly yours,
J. Longstreet.
XXI.
Lee to Longstreet—Situation and Prospects.
Lexington, Va., May 25, 1866.
General J. Longstreet:
My dear General,—I was very glad to receive your letter of the 18th, but you told me so little of yourself that I presume you intend writing to me again shortly. But what you did say was very satisfactory, and I am much pleased to know that your prospects in a commercial point of view are good and progressive. I hope they may regularly and surely advance. I feel much obliged by your kind proposition as regards myself. For the present I must remain where I am. When I see that I have done all the good that I can accomplish for Washington College I may find it necessary to do something that will enable me to procure a competence for my family. I will then turn my hand to whatever may offer. For myself I want nothing but my food and clothes. I send in compliance with your request a number of autographs, enough, I should think, to last for all time; but if they will be of any service to you I will send more. Mr. Lowe has not yet reached Lexington. It will give me pleasure to see him when he does, as he comes from you. As you did not mention your arm, I hope that is improving too. You must never omit to mention it, Mrs. Longstreet, and your children when you write. I see Garland very often in my walks, but very rarely at my house.... All unite in kindest regards to yourself and family.
Most truly yours,
R. E. Lee.
Footnotes
1 Brother of the rear-admiral.
2 He had a similar wound in the war of 1812.
3 Rebellion Record, vol. ii. p. 309. Less two regiments and one cavalry troop.
4 General Beauregard claims that he was not so strong, but estimates seem to warrant the number given.
5 In that attack the division commander, Colonel David Hunter, was wounded.
6 Rebellion Record, vol. ii. pp. 351, 387, 405, 426.
7 Ibid., 328.
8 Not engaged.
9 In reserve at Centreville and not in battle proper.
10 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 521.
11 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 568.
12 Ibid., p. 450.
13 Smith’s War Papers.
14 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part iii. p. 563.
15 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 938.
16 General Berry thought that he got up as far as the Casey camp, but mistook Couch’s opening for that of Casey.
17 Confederate War Papers, G. W. Smith.
18 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 763.
19 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 813.
20 Previous returns give him 11,000, but one of his brigades was absent.
21 Smith’s War Papers.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Smith’s War Papers.
25 Ibid.
26 Letter from General McLaws.
27 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part iii. p. 910.
28 Of interest in this connection is a letter to the author from General D. H. Hill:
“Fayetteville, Ark., February 4, 1879.
“General James Longstreet:
“My dear General,—I never heard of the proposed abandonment of Richmond at the time General Lee took command. I had charge of one of the four divisions with which the retreat from Yorktown was effected, and was called several times into General Lee’s most important councils. I never heard any officer suggest such a course in these councils or in private conversations.
“I feel sure that General Johnston always intended to fight the invading force, and so far as I know no officer of rank entertained any other view.
“I remember very well that some days before the council on the Nine Miles road (when yourself, A. P. Hill, and myself were present) that you suggested the plan of attacking McClellan’s right flank, and that I expressed my preference for an attack on the other flank. This shows that there was no thought of retreat.
“Very truly yours,
“D. H. Hill.”
29 Official account, Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 1036.
30 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 882.
31 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 38.
32 From memory I will say that this message from General Lee was delivered by Captain A. P. Mason.
33 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 517. Stuart.
34 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 627. D. H. Hill.
35 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 100. Heintzelman.
36 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 107.
37 Ibid., pp. 162-164.
38 A name taken by the infantry from the Valley district on account of their swift secret marches.
39 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 664.
40 Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 687.
41 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 52.
42 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 53.
43 His letter of August 14, 1862.
44 Rebellion Record, vol xii. part ii. p. 29.
45 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 378.
46 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 381.
47 Ibid., pp. 74, 75.
48 Ibid., p. 371.
49 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 518.
50 Ibid., p. 520.
51 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 40. General Pope.
52 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.
53 Rebellion Record.
54 Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 558. General Lee’s report.
55 “Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia,
“September 9, 1862.
“Special Orders, No. 191.
“The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.
“General Longstreet’s command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
“General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper’s Ferry and vicinity.
“General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek’s Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key’s Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.
“General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply-trains, etc., will precede General Hill.
“General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind.
“The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
“Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, etc.
“By command of General R. E. Lee.
“R. H. Chilton,
“Assistant Adjutant-General.
“Major-General D. H. Hill,
“Commanding Division.”
56 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part ii. p. 600.
57 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 41. McClellan’s official account.
58 Record, vol. xix. part i.
59 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part ii. p. 281.
60 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 48.
61 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 183.
62 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 961.
63 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 47.
64 Some authorities say (including a small number of “captured or missing”) 12,601.
65 Report of Committee, part i. p. 368.
66 Of this shot, Captain A. B. More, of Richmond, Virginia, wrote, under date of June 16, 1886,—
“The Howitzers have always been proud of that shot, and, thinking it would interest you, I write to say that it was fired by Corporal Holzburton, of the Second Company, Richmond Howitzers, from a ten-pound Parrott.”
67 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 377.
68 Rebellion Record, vol. i. part i. p. 63.
69 This includes eighty-five lost by S. D. Lee’s artillery, not regularly assigned as part of the corps.
70 Surgeon Lafayette Guild, medical director of the Army of Northern Virginia, in his official tabulated report, accounts for 10,291 only.
71 Compiled from the official reports.
72 Left at Leesburg.
73 Commanding brigade while General Evans commanded provisional division.
74 Attached to Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment.
75 John R. Johnson’s and D’Aquin’s batteries were the only ones present with this division at Sharpsburg.
76 Braxton’s, Crenshaw’s, McIntosh’s, and Pegram’s batteries engaged at Sharpsburg.
77 Cutts’s and Jones’s battalions also under D. H. Hill’s command at Sharpsburg.
78 First Virginia Artillery.
79 With D. H. Hill’s division at Sharpsburg.
80 Left at Leesburg.
81 Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-General’s Office. On September 14 the right wing of the army, consisting of the First and Ninth Corps, was commanded by Major-General Burnside; the centre, composed of the Second and Twelfth Corps, by Major-General Sumner, and the left wing, comprising the Sixth Corps and Couch’s division (Fourth Corps), by Major-General Franklin.
82 Designation changed from Third Corps, Army of Virginia, to First Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General’s Office, September 12, 1862.
83 Wounded September 17.
84 Relieved September 14.
85 Wounded September 14.
86 Joined September 9, and detached September 13 as railroad guard.
87 Wounded September 14.
88 Detached at Washington, D. C., since September 6.
89 Wounded September 17.
90 Wounded September 17.
91 Assigned to the Sixth Corps as the Third Division, September 26, 1862.
92 Joined September 17.
93 Joined September 15.
94 This division was organized September 12, and reached the battle-field of Antietam September 18.
95 Assigned to First Division, Second Army Corps, September 17.
96 On the 16th and 17th, Major General Burnside exercised general command on the left, and Brigadier-General Cox was in immediate command of the corps.
97 Killed September 14.
98 Wounded September 17.
99 Designation changed from Second Corps, Army of Virginia, to Twelfth Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General’s Office, September 12, 1862.
100 Mortally wounded September 17.
101 Wounded September 17.
102 No officers present; enlisted men of company attached to Second Massachusetts.
103 Detached September 9.
104 Detached September 13.
105 Killed September 17.
106 Detached at Frederick, Md.
107 Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 520.
108 See organization of the army appended to account of the battle of Fredericksburg.
109 Rebellion Record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 783.
110 Rebellion Record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 1121.
111 Ibid., p. 1057.
112 Rebellion Record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 432.
113 Vol. xxi. of the Official Records.
114 Not assigned to divisions.
115 Majors Garnett, Hamilton, and T. J. Page, Jr., are mentioned in the reports as commanding artillery battalions, but their composition is not stated.
116 Organization of brigades as established November 10, 1862. On roster for December 16, 1862, Hart’s, Breathed’s, Moorman’s, and Chew’s batteries appear as attached, respectively, to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Brigades. Commanders are given as reported December 16, 1862.
117 Detachment on raid to Dumfries.
118 In the Shenandoah Valley.
119 The Confederate dry-goods factories, for want of other dye-stuffs, had long before this resorted to the use of the butternut coloring.
120 Rebellion Record, vol. xxv. part ii. p. 320.
121 Ibid., p. 696.
122 General D. H. Hill was next in rank to General Ewell. He was the hero of Bethel, Seven Pines, South Mountain, and the hardest fighter at Sharpsburg. His record was as good as that of “Stonewall” Jackson, but, not being a Virginian, he was not so well advertised.
123 Report Committee, vol. i p. 480.
124 From General Lee’s official report: “... It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson’s division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour....”
125 Report of Committee, vol. i. p. 488.
126 His account.
127 In his official report he puts Jenkins’s force at the opening campaign at three thousand eight hundred.
128 General Lee, by Fitzhugh Lee (note), p. 299.
129 His official report.
130 Following are the essential portions of the letters referred to, affording unquestionable and overwhelming testimony against the claim that General Longstreet was ordered to give battle “at sunrise”:
“Norfolk, Va., April 28, 1875.
“Dear General,—... I can only say that I never before heard of the ‘sunrise attack’ you were to have made, as charged by General Pendleton. If such an order was given you I never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable that if General Lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but this does not touch the point at issue. I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, perhaps because of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life.
“Yours, very respectfully,
“W. H. Taylor.”
“University of Virginia, May 11, 1875.
“General James Longstreet:
“Dear General,—... I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy’s position, General Lee came himself to General Ewell’s lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the commanding general is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.
“Yours, very truly,
“Charles S. Venable.”
“Baltimore, Md., May 7, 1875.
“Dear General,—... I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee’s official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day....
“Respectfully,
“Charles Marshall.”
“Big Island, Bedford, Va., May 31, 1875.
“Dear General,—... I do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863....
“Yours truly,
“A. L. Long.”
“Freestone P. O., Prince William County, Va.,
“November 12, 1877.
“My dear General Longstreet,—... The winter after the death of General Lee I was in Lexington, visiting my sons at the V. M. I. General Pendleton called to see me at the hotel. General Custis Lee was in my room when he came in. After General Lee left, General Pendleton asked me if General Longstreet was not ordered to attack on the 2d of July at Gettysburg at six o’clock in the morning, and did not attack until four o’clock in the evening. I told him it was not possible. When he left me I was under the impression I had convinced him of his mistaken idea. I told General Pendleton that you and General Lee were together the greater part of the day up to about three o’clock or later; that you separated at the mouth of a lane not long thereafter. You said to me, ‘Those troops will be in position by the time you get there; tell General Hood to attack.’ When I gave the order to General Hood he was standing within a step or two of his line of battle. I asked him to please delay his attack until I could communicate to General Longstreet that he can turn the enemy,—pointing to a gorge in the mountain, where we would be sheltered from his view and attack by his cavalry. General Hood slapped me on the knee and said, ‘I agree with you,—bring General Longstreet to see for himself.’ When I reported to you, your answer was, ‘It is General Lee’s order; the time is up,—attack at once.’ I lost no time in repeating the same to General Hood, and remained with him to see the attack, which was made instantly. We had a beautiful view of the enemy’s left from Hood’s position, which was close up to him. He gave way quickly. General Hood charged, and I spurred to report to you; found you with hat in hand cheering on General McLaws’s division....
“Truly your friend,
“John W. Fairfax.”
131 “Four Years with General Lee.”
132 Upon the various matters of this momentous day, which have been subject of controversy, the following testimony from J. S. D. Cullen is interesting and important:
“Richmond, Va., May 18, 1875.
“General James Longstreet:
“Dear General,—... It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First Army Corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief Meade’s army would have been beaten before its entire force had assembled, and its final discomfiture thereby made certain. It is a little strange that these charges were not made while General Lee was alive to substantiate or disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by in silence regarding them. You are fortunate in being able to call upon the adjutant-general and the two confidential officers of General Lee’s staff for their testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I distinctly remember the appearance in our head-quarters camp of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee’s head-quarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his head-quarters, and said, ‘To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.’ Orders had then been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance when they were stopped by Ewell’s wagon-trains and Johnson’s division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were detained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see you, I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at the hill this side of Gettysburg, about half a mile from the town. You had been at the front with General Lee, and were returning to your camp, a mile or two back. I spoke very exultingly of the victory we were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that you did not take the same cheerful view of it that I did, and presently you remarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to have left undone what we did. You said that the enemy were left occupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them from and then at a great sacrifice. We soon reached the camp, three miles, perhaps, from Gettysburg, and found the column near by. Orders were issued to be ready to march at ‘daybreak,’ or some earlier hour, next morning. About three o’clock in the morning, while the stars were shining, you left your head-quarters and rode to General Lee’s, where I found you sitting with him after sunrise looking at the enemy on Cemetery Hill....”
“I am yours, very truly,
“J. S. D. Cullen.”
133 Rebellion Record.
134 “Four Years with General Lee,” W. H. Taylor, page 103.
135 Eclectic Magazine, May, 1872.
136 At Sharpsburg, General Jackson left the field at seven o’clock in the morning and did not return until four o’clock in the afternoon, when he was ordered with his command and the cavalry to turn and strike down against the Union right. He started to execute the order, then gave it up without even asking permission. He made a brave and gallant fight in the morning, losing 1601 officers and men. But D. H. Hill was there from the first to the last gun, losing from his division 1872 officers and men. Jackson had the greater part of two divisions. But Hill was not a Virginian, and it would not do to leave the field for refreshments. The figures include Jackson’s losses at Harper’s Ferry and Sharpsburg; Hill’s at South Mountain and Sharpsburg.
137 “General Lee,” by Fitzhugh Lee. Marye’s Hill was the stronghold at Fredericksburg.
138 Vide “The French under the First and Last Bonaparte;” the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia under Stonewall Jackson in 1862, in the Valley of Virginia, and J. A. Early in 1864.
139 General Meade’s monthly return for June 30 shows 99,131 “present for duty, equipped.” The Comte de Paris estimates the force actually on the field, including the Sixth Corps, which was in reserve, at 82,000.
140 Rebellion Record, vol. xxvii.
141 Rebellion Record, vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 187.
142 No reports on file for this brigade. Bryan was in command July 7, and was probably Semmes’s immediate successor. The commanders of the Tenth, Fifty-first, and Fifty-third Georgia are given as reported for June 22 and July 31. Manning reported in command of Fiftieth Georgia, June 22. No commander reported on return for July 31.
143 The regimental commanders are given as reported for June 14.
144 The four captains present (West, Robinson, James M. Taylor, Thomas N. Jordan) were reported as wounded July 1; Robinson and Taylor as having rejoined July 2, but it does not appear who commanded during Robinson’s absence.
145 Lieutenant-Colonel Slough and Major John S. Brooks reported as wounded at four P.M., July 1.
146 Colonel Christie, Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston, Major C. C. Blacknall, and the senior captain (Abner D. Pearce) reported as wounded early in the fight, July 1.
147 Commanded his own and W. E. Jones’s brigade.
148 Serving with Ewell’s corps.
149 Mounted.
150 See battalions attached to corps and cavalry.
151 Not engaged.
152 See artillery brigades attached to army corps and the reserves.
153 Not engaged. With exception of the regular battalion, it was, July 1, and while at Beaver Dam Creek, Md., ordered to Washington, D. C., where it arrived July 3.
154 Major-General John F. Reynolds, of this corps, was killed July 1, while in command of the left wing of the army; General Doubleday commanded the corps July 1, and General Newton, who was assigned to that command on the 1st, superseded him July 2.
155 Transferred, in the afternoon of July 1, to the First Brigade.
156 Guarding trains, and not engaged in the battle.
157 Battery E, First New York Light Artillery, attached.
158 After the death of General Reynolds, General Hancock was assigned to the command of all the troops on the field of battle, relieving General Howard, who had succeeded General Reynolds. General Gibbon, of the Second Division, assumed command of the corps. These assignments terminated on the evening of July 1. Similar changes in commanders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when General Hancock was put in command of the Third Corps, in addition to that of his own. He was wounded on the 3d, and Brigadier-General William Hays was assigned to the command of the corps.
159 2d Company Minnesota Sharp-shooters attached.
160 Transferred from Artillery Reserve, July 1; Fourteenth New York Battery attached.
161 Guarding corps trains, and not engaged in the battle.
162 Joined corps June 28. The Second Brigade left in the Department of Washington.
163 Also in command of the Third Brigade, Third Division, on July 3.
164 No First Brigade in division.
165 See foot-note 149, p. 415.
166 Guarding wagon-train at Westminster, and not engaged in the battle.
167 During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General Hancock, on the afternoon of July 1, all the troops on the field of battle were commanded by General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the Eleventh Corps, and General Schimmelfennig of the Third Division.
168 Exercised command of the right wing of the army during a part of the battle.
169 Unassigned during progress of battle; afterwards attached to First Division, as Second Brigade.
170 Served with the Sixth Army Corps, and on the right flank.
171 Serving as light artillery.
172 At Westminster, etc., and not engaged in the battle.
173 With Huey’s Cavalry Brigade, and not engaged in the battle.
174 Tenth New York Battery attached.
175 Not engaged.
176 Eleventh New York Battery attached.
177 The emergency militia and the six months’ volunteers were mustered into the United States service, and the ninety-days’ militia into the State service. Under act of Congress approved April 12, 1866, the State was reimbursed by the United States for money expended in payment of the latter troops.
178 That company did not go with the battalion to Virginia.
179 This was my first meeting with the genial, gallant, lovable William Preston.
180 Rebellion Record.
181 Rebellion Record, vol. xxx. part i. p. 144.
182 In his official report of the battle, General Bragg denies that his march of the 21st was for the crossing of the Tennessee River; refers to the proposition as visionary, and says of the country, “Affording no subsistence for men or animals.”—Rebellion Record.
183 Rebellion Record.
184 Later on he offered the command to Lieutenant-General Hardee, who declined it.
185 “Camp Rappahannock, October 26, 1863.
“My dear General,—I have received your three letters, September 26, October 6, and October 11. The first was received just as I was about to make a move upon General Meade, to prevent his detaching reinforcements to Rosecrans. The second when I had gone as far as I thought I could advantageously go; and the third since my return to this place. I have read them all with interest and pleasure, but have not had time to reply till now.
“I rejoice at your great victory deeply. It seemed to me to have been complete. I wish it could have been followed up by the destruction of the Federal army. As regards your proposition as to myself, I wish that I could feel that it was prompted by other reasons than kind feelings to myself. I think that you could do better than I could. It was with that view I urged your going. The President, being on the ground, I hope will do all that can be done. He has to take a broad view of the whole ground, and must order as he deems best. I will cheerfully do anything in my power.
“In addition to other infirmities, I have been suffering so much from rheumatism in my back that I could scarcely get about. The first two days of our march I had to be hauled in a wagon, and subsequently every motion of my horse, and indeed of my body, gave much pain. I am rather better now, though I still suffer. We could not come up with Meade. We had to take circuitous and by-roads, while he had broad and passable routes on either side of the railroad. We struck his rear-guards three times,—the last at Bristoe, where Hill with his advance of two brigades fell too precipitately on one of his corps,—suffered a repulse and loss. He was finally driven beyond Bull Run. I saw he could easily get behind his intrenchments in front of Alexandria. Our men were dreadfully off for shoes, blankets, and clothes. One division alone had over a thousand barefooted men. We had failed to take any, and I fear had failed to manage as well as we might. The country was a perfect waste. A northeast storm broke upon us. There was neither shelter nor food for man or beast. I saw no real good I could accomplish by manœuvring. The enemy had destroyed the bridge over the Rappahannock and blown up one of the piers. The freshet after we left the Rapidan carried away the railroad bridge over that river. I therefore withdrew to the Rappahannock, destroying the railroad from Cub Run (this side Manassas Junction) to the Rappahannock River.
“We inflicted some punishment upon the enemy,—captured upward of two thousand four hundred prisoners.
“But I missed you dreadfully, and your brave corps. Your cheerful face and strong arms would have been invaluable. I hope you will soon return to me. I trust we may soon be together again. May God preserve you and all with you.
“Very truly yours,
“R. E. Lee.
“General Longstreet.”
186 Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 680.
187 Since those days the name of Holston has been changed to the Tennessee.
188 Writing of these operations since the war, General E. M. Law, in an article in the Philadelphia Weekly Press of July 18, 1888, said,—
“During the night the sounds of retreat continued, and when daylight came the valley about Lenoir presented the scene of an encampment deserted with ignominious haste.”
But he did not take the trouble to report the retreat until nearly twenty-five years after the war. Had he done so at the proper time the work at Campbell’s Station would have been in better season.
189 Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 526.
190 Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 491.
191 Rebellion Record.
192 Rebellion Record.
193 Ibid.
194 Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 549.
195 “Four Years with General Lee.”
196 General Heth’s personal account.
197 Letter to the writer.
198 Decisive Battles of the War, Swinton, p. 378.
199 Military History of U. S. Grant. Badeau.
200 Virginia Campaigns, 1864-65, by General A. A. Humphreys, Army of the Potomac.
201 General Early’s official account.
202 One of our weeklies announced, upon learning that General Bragg was ordered there, “We understand that General Bragg is ordered to Wilmington. Good-by, Wilmington!”
203 General Badeau’s “Military History of U. S. Grant.”
204 Four Years with General Lee.
205 Diary of a member of Corse’s brigade.
206 Estimated from returns.
207 Estimated from general return for March.
208 This account is gathered from the evidence of officers of both sides, given before the Warren Court of Inquiry, which vindicated Warren and Pickett, though the court was inclined to coquette with the lieutenant-general, who, at that late day, was in high authority.
209 He reported that he could have gained the day if the cavalry of his left had been as efficient as that of his right.
210 Virginia Campaigns.
211 General Mahone claimed seven hundred in all.
212 Memoirs of General Lee, A. L. Long.
213 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, A. L. Long.
214 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, A. L. Long.
215 Including the parts of the Third Corps attached after the fall of A. P. Hill, and about five thousand that reported on the 7th, 8th, and 9th in bands and squads from the columns broken up at Sailor’s Creek.
216 Including five thousand two hundred of fragments dispersed at Petersburg and during the rearward march, that joined us in retreat.