XXII The Battles of Santiago, 1898
I — The First Period of the Spanish-American War in the West Indies
Ex-President Roosevelt once said that the most striking thing about the war with Spain was the preparedness of the navy and the unpreparedness of the army. For fifteen years the United States had been building up a navy, and for months preceding the war every effort was made, with the resources at the command of the Navy Department, to put it in a state of first-class efficiency. As early as January 11, 1898, instructions were sent to the commanders of the several squadrons to retain in the service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. As the Cuban situation grew more threatening, the North Atlantic Squadron and a torpedo-boat flotilla were rapidly assembled in Florida waters; and immediately after the destruction of the Maine the ships on the European and South Atlantic stations were ordered to Key West....
Both from a political and a military point of view the blockade of Cuba was the first step for the American government to take, and the surest and quickest means of bringing things to an issue. Cuba was the point in dispute between the United States and Spain, and a blockade would result in one of two things—the surrender of the island or the despatch of a Spanish naval force to its relief. The Navy Department had very little apprehension of an attack on our coast, as no squadron could hope to be in condition after crossing the Atlantic for offensive operations without coaling, and the only places where Spain could coal were in the West Indies. The public, however, took a different view of the situation, and no little alarm was felt in the Eastern cities. A few coast-defence guns of modern pattern would have relieved the department of the necessity of protecting the coast, and enabled it to concentrate the whole fighting force around Cuba. To meet popular demands, however, a Northern Patrol Squadron was organized April 20th, under command of Commodore Howell, to cover the New England coast; and a more formidable Flying Squadron, under Commodore Schley, was assembled at Hampton Roads, and kept there until the appearance of the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The main squadron was stationed at Key West under Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, who had just been promoted to that grade, and given command of the entire naval force in North Atlantic waters. His appointment over the heads of Schley and other officers of superior rank and longer service created a great deal of criticism, although he was everywhere conceded to be one of the most efficient and progressive officers of the new navy.274
One hundred and twenty-eight ships [steam merchantmen, revenue-cutters, light-house tenders, yachts, and ocean liners] were added to the navy, and the government yards were kept busy transforming them. To man these ships the number of enlisted men was raised from 12,500 to 24,123, and a number of new officers appointed.275 The heavy fighting force consisted of four first-class battle-ships, the Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Oregon; one second-class battle-ship, the Texas; and two armored cruisers, the Brooklyn and the New York. As against these seven armored ships Spain had five armored cruisers of modern construction and of greater reputed speed than any of ours except the Brooklyn and the New York, and one battle-ship of the Indiana type. Spain had further a type of vessel unknown to our navy and greatly feared by us—namely, torpedo-boat destroyers, such as the Furor, Pluton, and Terror. It was popularly supposed that the Spanish navy was somewhat superior to the American.
As soon as the Spanish minister withdrew from Washington, a despatch was sent to Sampson at Key West directing him to blockade the coast of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, and to blockade Cienfuegos if it was considered advisable. On April 29th, Admiral Cervera’s division of the Spanish fleet left the Cape de Verde Islands for an unknown destination, and disappeared for two weeks from the knowledge of the American authorities. This fleet was composed of four armored cruisers, the Infanta Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, Oquendo, and Vizcaya, and three torpedo-boat destroyers. Its appearance in American waters was eagerly looked for, and interest in the war became intense....
[In the next two weeks Sampson’s patrol of the Windward Islands and adjacent waters, and his visit to San Juan, Porto Rico, produced no discoveries, and he started to return to the blockade of Havana. At midnight, May 12th–13th, thirty-six hours after the event, the Navy Department learned that Cervera had appeared off Martinique. Sampson, with his fleet, and Schley, with the Flying Squadron, were ordered to Key West, which they reached on May 18th.]
The department had heard that Cervera had munitions of war essential to the defence of Havana, and that his orders were to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail. As Cienfuegos seemed the only place he would be likely to choose, Schley was ordered there with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, May 19th. He was joined later by the Iowa, under Captain Evans, and by several cruisers. The Spanish squadron slipped into Santiago, unobserved by the cruisers on scouting duty, May 19th, two days before Schley arrived at Cienfuegos, so that had Cervera known the conditions he could easily have made the latter port. On the same day the department received from spies in Havana probable information, conveyed by the cable which had been allowed to remain in operation, that Cervera had entered Santiago. As we now know, he had entered early that morning. Several auxiliary cruisers were immediately ordered to assemble before Santiago in order to watch Cervera and follow him in case he should leave.
At the same time the department “strongly advised” Sampson to send Schley to Santiago at once with his whole command. Sampson replied that he had decided to hold Schley at Cienfuegos until it was certain that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Later he sent a despatch to Schley, received May 23d, ordering him to proceed to Santiago if satisfied that the enemy were not at Cienfuegos.276 The next day277 Schley started, encountering on the run much rain and rough weather, which seriously delayed the squadron. At 5.30 P.M., May 26th, he reached a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago, where he was joined by several of the auxiliary cruisers on scouting duty. Captain Sigsbee, of the St. Paul, informed him that the scouts knew nothing positively about the Spanish fleet. The collier Merrimac had been disabled, which increased the difficulty of coaling. At 7.45 P.M., a little over two hours after his arrival, Schley without explanation signalled to the squadron: “Destination, Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots.” Thus began the much-discussed retrograde movement which occupied two days. Admiral Schley states in his book that. Sigsbee’s report and other evidence led him to conclude that the Spanish squadron was not in Santiago; hence the retrograde movement to protect the passage west of Cuba.278 But he has never yet given any satisfactory explanation why he did not definitely ascertain the facts before turning back. Fortunately the squadron did not proceed very far; the lines towing the collier parted and other delays occurred. The next morning Schley received a despatch from the department stating that all the information at hand indicated that Cervera was in Santiago, but he continued on his westward course slowly and at times drifting while some of the ships coaled. The next day, May 28th, Schley returned to Santiago, arriving before that port about dusk, and established a blockade.279
Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago June 1st, and assumed direct command of the squadron. The blockade, which lasted for over a month, was eagerly watched by the whole American people. The most thrilling incident was the daring but unsuccessful attempt made by Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson to sink the collier Merrimac across the entrance to Santiago harbor, undertaken by direction of Admiral Sampson. Electric torpedoes were attached to the hull of the ship, sea-valves were cut, and anchor chains arranged on deck so that she could be brought to a sudden stop. Early on the morning of June 3d, Hobson, assisted by a crew of seven seamen, took the collier into the entrance of the harbor under heavy fire and sunk her. The unfortunate shooting away of her steering-gear and the failure of some of the torpedoes to explode kept the ship from sinking at the place selected, so that the plan miscarried. Hobson and his men escaped death as by a miracle, but fell into the hands of the Spaniards.280
II — The Land Campaign
As soon as Cervera was blockaded in Santiago and the government was satisfied that all his ships were with him, it was decided to send an army to co-operate with the navy. Hitherto the war had been a naval war exclusively, and the two hundred thousand volunteers who had responded to the calls of the President in May had been kept in camp in different parts of the country. Most of the regular infantry and cavalry, together with several volunteer regiments, had been assembled at Tampa and organized as the Fifth Army Corps, in readiness to land in Cuba as soon as the navy had cleared the way. Conspicuous among these troops was the First Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, a regiment which through the energetic efforts of Dr. Leonard Wood, an army surgeon, who became its colonel, and Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned the position of assistant secretary of the navy to become its lieutenant-colonel, had been enlisted, officered, and equipped in fifty days. It was recruited largely from Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and had in its ranks cowboys, hunters, ranchmen, and more than one hundred and sixty full-blooded Indians, together with a few graduates of Harvard, Yale, and other Eastern colleges.
Tampa was ill-suited for an instruction camp, and the preparations made by the department for the accommodation and provisioning of such large bodies of men were wholly inadequate. One of the main difficulties was the inability of the Commissary and Quartermaster departments, hampered by red tape, senseless regulations, and political appointees, to distribute the train-loads of supplies which blocked the tracks leading to Tampa; so great was the congestion that the soldiers could not even get their mail. This condition continued for weeks. The great majority of the troops were finally sent to Santiago to fight under a tropical sun in heavy woollen clothes; lighter clothing was not supplied to them until they were ready to return to Montauk Point, where they needed the woollen. The sanitation of the camp was poor and the water-supply bad; dysentery, malaria, and typhoid soon made their appearance. Similar conditions prevailed at the other camps. The administrative inefficiency of the War Department was everywhere revealed in striking contrast with the fine record of the Navy Department. Secretary Alger had been too much occupied with questions of patronage to look after the real needs of the service. Although war had been regarded for months as inevitable, when it finally came the department was found to be utterly unprepared to equip troops for service in Cuba. As the result of this neglect, for which it should be said Congress was partly responsible, it was necessary to improvise an army—a rather serious undertaking!
It had been the original intention to land the Fifth Army Corps at Mariel, near Havana, and begin operations against the capital city under the direct supervision of General Miles; but the bottling-up of Cervera at Santiago caused a change of plan, and General Miles, who still expected the heavy fighting to take place at Havana, selected Major-General William R. Shafter for the movement against Santiago. By June 1st the battle-ship Indiana, under Captain Henry C. Taylor, with a dozen smaller vessels, was ready to convoy the expedition. The army was very slow in embarking, and it was not until June 8th that the force was ready to depart. Further delay was caused by the unfounded rumor that a Spanish cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroyers had been sighted off the north coast of Cuba.281 In order to ascertain whether all the Spanish ships were at Santiago, Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the navy, landed, and by personal observation from the hills back of the city located Cervera’s entire division in the harbor. On June 14th the transports, about thirty in number, sailed from Tampa with their convoy. They were crowded and ill-provided with supplies, the whole movement showing lack of experience in handling large bodies of men. The expedition consisted of 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men, regulars except the Seventy-first New York, Second Massachusetts, and the First Volunteer Cavalry.282
The expedition under Shafter began disembarking at Daiquiri on the morning of June 22d, and by night six thousand men had with great difficulty been put ashore. No lighters or launches had been provided, and the only wharf, a small wooden one, had been stripped of its flooring: the War Department expected the navy to look after these matters. In addition, the troops had been crowded into the transports without any reference to order, officers separated from their commands, artillery-pieces on one transport, horses on another, harness on a third, and no means of finding out where any of them were. By the aid of a few launches borrowed from the battle-ships, the men were put ashore, or near enough to wade through the surf, but the animals had to be thrown into the sea, where many of them perished, some in their bewilderment swimming out to sea instead of to shore.
General Lawton advanced and seized Siboney next day, and Kent’s division landed here, eight miles nearer Santiago. General Wheeler pushed on with part of Young’s brigade, and on the morning of the 24th defeated the Spanish force at Las Guasimas, with a loss of one officer and fifteen men killed, six officers and forty-six men wounded.283 During the next week the army, including Garcia’s Cuban command, was concentrated at Sevilla. These were trying days. The troops suffered from the heavy rains, poor rations, and bad camp accommodations. No adequate provision had been made for landing supplies or for transporting them to the camps, so that with an abundance, such as they were, aboard the transports, the soldiers were in actual want.
On June 30th it was decided to advance. San Juan Hill, a strategic point on the direct road to Santiago, could not be taken or held while the Spaniards occupied El Caney, on the right of the American advance. The country was a jungle, and the roads from the coast little more than bridle-paths. Lawton moved out to a position south of El Caney that afternoon, so as to begin the attack early next morning. Wheeler’s division of dismounted cavalry and Kent’s division of infantry advanced toward El Poso, accompanied by Grimes’ battery, which was to take position early in the morning and open the way for the advance toward San Juan. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton’s infantry fire was heard at El Caney. After forcing the enemy from this position, Lawton was to move toward Santiago and take position on Wheeler’s right. Little was known of the ground over which the troops were to move or the position and strength of the forces they were to meet, consequently they went into battle without knowing what they were about and fought without any generalship being displayed. General Shafter was too ill to leave his headquarters in the rear.
At El Caney, which was surrounded by trenches and block-houses, the Spaniards developed unexpected strength, and held Lawton in check until late in the afternoon, when he finally carried the position. In this fight about thirty-five hundred Americans were engaged, and not more than six hundred or one thousand Spaniards. The American loss was four officers and seventy-seven men killed, and twenty-five officers and three hundred and thirty-five men wounded. About one hundred and fifty Spaniards were captured, and between three hundred and four hundred killed and wounded.284
Meanwhile there had been a desperate fight at San Juan Hill. As soon as Lawton’s musket-fire was heard at El Caney, Grimes’ battery opened fire from El Poso on the San Juan block-house. This fire was immediately returned by the enemy’s artillery, who had the range, and a number of men were killed. The Spaniards used smokeless powder, which made it difficult to locate them, while some of the Americans had black powder, which quickly indicated their position. The road along which the troops had to advance was so narrow and rough that at times they had to proceed in column of twos. The progress made was very slow, and the long-range guns of the enemy killed numbers of men before they could get into position to return the fire. By the middle of the day the advance had crossed the river, the cavalry division under Sumner deploying to the right in front of Kettle Hill, and Kent’s division of infantry deploying to the left directly in front of San Juan Hill. During this movement the troops were exposed to a galling artillery and rifle fire and suffered greatly, especially the third brigade of Kent’s division, which lost three commanders in fifteen minutes, General Wikoff being killed and Colonels Worth and Liscum disabled. The suffering of the wounded, many of whom lay in the brush for hours without succor, was the most terrible feature of the situation.
Finally the long-expected order to advance was given. The First Regular Cavalry, the Rough Riders, and the Negro troopers of the Ninth and a part of the Tenth advanced up Kettle Hill and drove the Spaniards from the ranch-house, while the infantry division with the Sixth and Sixteenth regiments under Hawkins in the lead charged up San Juan Hill in the face of a destructive fire and captured the block-house. Then the cavalry under Sumner and Roosevelt advanced from Kettle Hill and occupied the trenches on San Juan Hill north of the block-house. The Spaniards fled to their second line of trenches, six or eight hundred yards in the rear.
After occupying San Juan Hill, the cavalry were still exposed to a constant fire, and many were discouraged and wanted to retire, but General Wheeler, who, though ill, had come to the front early in the afternoon, put a stop to this and set the men to work fortifying themselves. The next day Lawton came up and advanced to a strong position on Wheeler’s right. The fighting was resumed on the two following days, but about noon, July 3d, the Spaniards ceased firing. The losses in the three days’ fight were eighteen officers and one hundred and twenty-seven men killed, sixty-five officers and eight hundred and forty-nine men wounded, and seventy-two men missing.285 The condition of the troops after the battle was very bad; many of them were down with fever, and all were suffering from lack of suitable equipment and supplies. General Shafter cabled to the secretary of war, July 3d, that it would be impossible to take Santiago by storm with the forces he then had, and that he was “seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney.”286 The destruction of Cervera’s fleet the same day materially changed the situation.
III — The Destruction of Cervera’s Fleet
The advance made by the American troops around Santiago on July 1st and 2d forced the Spanish authorities to come to a decision in regard to Cervera’s fleet. Captain-General Blanco insisted that the fleet should not be captured or destroyed without a fight. Cervera refused to assume the responsibility of leaving the harbor, and when ordered to do so went out with consummate bravery, knowing that he was leading a forlorn-hope. Sampson seems to have been under the impression all along that the Spanish squadron would attempt to escape at night, but the American ships kept in so close to the shore, with dazzling search-lights directed against the entrance of the harbor, as to render it almost impossible to steer a ship out. On the morning of July 3d, at 8.55, Sampson started east to meet General Shafter in conference at Siboney, signalling to the fleet as he left: “Disregard movements commander-in-chief.” The Massachusetts had also left her place in the blockade to go to Guantanamo for coal. The remaining ships formed a semicircle around the entrance of the harbor, the Brooklyn to the west, holding the left of the line, then the Texas, next the Iowa in the centre and at the south of the curve, then, as the line curved in to the coast on the right, the Oregon and the Indiana. The Brooklyn and the Indiana, holding the left and the right of the line, were about two miles and one and a half miles respectively from the shore, and near them, closer in, lay the converted gunboats Vixen and Gloucester.
At 9.35 A.M., while most of the men were at Sunday inspection, the enemy’s ships were discovered slowly steaming down the narrow channel of the harbor. In the lead was the Maria Teresa, followed by the Vizcaya, the Colon, the Oquendo, and the two torpedo-boat destroyers. The Iowa was the first to signal that the enemy were escaping, though the fact was noted on several ships at almost the same moment, and no orders were necessary. The American ships at once closed in and directed their fire against the Teresa. For a moment there was doubt as to whether the Spanish ships would separate and try to scatter the fire of our fleet or whether they would stick together. This was quickly settled when Cervera turned west, followed by the remainder of his command. At this point Commodore Schley’s flag-ship, the Brooklyn, which was farthest west, turned to the eastward, away from the hostile fleet, making a loop, at the end of which she again steamed westward farther out to sea but still ahead of any of the American vessels. The sudden and unexpected turn of the Brooklyn caused the Texas, which was behind her, to reverse her engines in order to avoid a collision and to come to a standstill, thus losing position, the Oregon and the Iowa both passing her. The two destroyers, which came out last, were attacked by the Indiana and the Gloucester, the commander of the latter, Wainwright, dashing toward them in utter disregard of the fragile character of his vessel. The Furor was sunk and the Pluton was run ashore. The Teresa, struck by several shells which exploded and set her on fire, turned to the shore at 10.15 and was beached about six miles west of the Morro. The Oquendo was riddled by shell and likewise soon on fire. She was beached about half a mile west of the Teresa at 10.20. The Vizcaya and Colon were now left to bear the fire of the pursuing American ships, which were practically uninjured. In this running fight the Indiana dropped behind, owing to the defective condition of her machinery, but kept up her fire. At 11.05 the Vizcaya turned to run ashore about fifteen miles west of the Morro. The Brooklyn and the Oregon, followed at some distance by the Texas, continued the chase of the Colon. The Indiana and the Iowa, at the order of Sampson, who had come up, went back to guard the transports. At 1.15 P.M. the Colon turned to shore thirty miles west of the Vizcaya and surrendered.287
The fight was over, one of the most remarkable naval battles on record. On the American side, though the ships were struck many times, only one man was killed and one wounded. These casualties both occurred on Commodore Schley’s flag-ship, the Brooklyn. The Spaniards lost about six hundred in killed and wounded. The American sailors took an active part in the rescue of the officers and crews of the burning Spanish ships.
Only one hundred and twenty-three out of about eight thousand American projectiles hit the Spanish ships.
IV — The Spanish Surrender
On July 3d, General Shafter demanded the surrender of the Spanish forces in Santiago. This being refused, he notified General Toral that the bombardment of Santiago would begin at noon of the 5th, thus giving two days for the women and children to leave the city. Nearly twenty thousand people came out and filled the villages and roads around. They were in an utterly destitute condition, and had to be taken care of largely by the American army—a great drain on their supplies. On the 10th and 11th the city was bombarded by the squadron. At this point General Miles arrived off Santiago with additional troops intended for Porto Rico. He and Shafter met General Toral under a flag of truce and arranged terms for the surrender, which took place on the 17th. Shafter’s command was by this time in a serious state of health and anxious to return home. Malarial fevers had so weakened the men that an epidemic of yellow-fever, which had appeared sporadically throughout the command, was greatly feared. The situation was desperate, and the War Department apparently deaf to all representations of the case. Under these circumstances the division and brigade commanders and the surgeons met at General Shafter’s headquarters early in August and signed a round-robin addressed to the secretary of war urging the immediate removal of the corps to the United States. This action was much criticised at the time, but it had the desired effect, and on August 4th orders were given to remove the command to Montauk Point, Long Island. The movement was begun at once and completed before the end of the month.
The surrender of Santiago left General Miles free to carry out plans already matured for the invasion of Porto Rico. He left Guantanamo, July 21st, with 3415 men, mostly volunteers, convoyed by a fleet under the command of Captain Higginson, and landed at Guanica on the 25th. Early next morning General Garretson pushed forward with part of his brigade and drove the Spanish forces from Yauco, thus getting possession of the railroad to Ponce. General Miles was reinforced in a few days by the commands of Generals Wilson, Brooke, and Schwan, raising his entire force to 16,973 officers and men. In about two weeks they had gained control of all the southern and western portions of the island, but hostilities were suspended by the peace protocol before the conquest of Porto Rico was completed. The American losses in this campaign were three killed and forty wounded.288
The last engagement of the war was the assault on Manila, which was captured August 13, 1898, by the forces under General Merritt, assisted by Admiral Dewey’s squadron. This occurred the day after the signing of the peace protocol, the news of which did not reach the Philippines until several days later.
V — Controversies Caused by the War
Two controversies growing out of the war with Spain assumed such importance that they cannot be passed by. The first related to the conduct of the War Department, which was charged with inefficiency resulting from political appointments and corruption in the purchase of supplies. The most serious charge was that made by Major-General Miles, commanding the army, who declared that much of the refrigerated beef furnished the troops was “embalmed beef,” preserved with secret chemicals of an injurious character. In September, 1898, President McKinley appointed a commission to investigate these charges, and the hearings held were sensational in the extreme. Commissary-General Eagan read a statement before the commission which was so violent in its abuse of the commanding general that he was later court-martialled and sentenced to dismissal for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, though this sentence was commuted by the President to suspension from rank and duty, but without loss of pay. The report of the commission289 failed to substantiate General Miles’ charges, but it was not satisfactory or convincing. In spite of its efforts to whitewash things, the commission had to report that the secretary of war had failed to “grasp the situation.” Many leading newspapers demanded Alger’s resignation, but President McKinley feared to discredit the administration by dismissing him. Nevertheless, a coolness sprang up between them; and several months later, when Alger became a candidate for the Michigan senatorship, with the open support of elements distinctly hostile to the administration, the President asked for his resignation, which was tendered July 19, 1899.290
The other controversy, which waged in the papers for months, was as to whether Sampson or Schley was in command at the battle of Santiago. As a reward for their work on that day, the President advanced Sampson eight numbers, Schley six, Captain Clark of the Oregon six, and the other captains five. These promotions were all confirmed by the Senate save those of Sampson and Schley, a number of senators holding that Schley should have received at least equal recognition with Sampson. The controversy was waged inside and outside of Congress for three years. The officials of the Navy Department were for the most part stanch supporters of Sampson, while a large part of the public, under the impression that the department was trying to discredit Schley, eagerly championed his cause. Finally, at the request of Admiral Schley, who was charged in certain publications with inefficiency and even cowardice, a court of inquiry was appointed July 26, 1901, with Admiral Dewey as president, for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of Schley during the war with Spain. The opinion of the court was that his service prior to June 1st was “characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.” Admiral Dewey differed from the opinions of his colleagues on certain points, and delivered a separate opinion, in the course of which he took up the question as to who was in command at Santiago, a point which had not been considered by the court. His conclusion was that Schley “was in absolute command and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships.” This made matters worse than ever. Secretary Long approved the findings of the majority of the court, and disapproved Dewey’s separate opinion. Schley appealed from the findings of the court to the President. February 18, 1902, President Roosevelt’s memorandum, in which he reviewed the whole controversy, was made public. He declared that the court had done substantial justice to Schley. As regards the question of command at Santiago, he said that technically Sampson commanded the fleet, and Schley the western division, but that after the battle began not a ship took orders from either Sampson or Schley, except their own two vessels. “It was a captains’ fight.”291
The Spanish war revealed many serious defects in the American military system, some of which have been remedied by the reorganization of the army and the creation of a general staff.292 It demonstrated the necessity of military evolutions on a large scale in time of peace, so as to give the general officers experience in handling and the Quartermaster and Commissary departments experience in equipping and supplying large bodies of troops; it showed the folly and danger of appointing men from civil life through political influence to positions of responsibility in any branch of the military or naval service; it showed the value of field-artillery, of smokeless powder, and of high-power rifles of the latest model; it also showed the necessity of having on hand a large supply of the best war material ready for use. While every American is proud of the magnificent record of the navy, it must not be imagined that the war with Spain was a conclusive test of its invincibility, for, however formidable the Spanish cruisers appeared at the time, later information revealed the fact that through the neglect of the Spanish government they were very far from being in a state of first-class efficiency.
Footnotes
1 Bourne, Spain in America (Am. Nation, III), 31; Hart, Contemporaries, I, 40.
2 Andrews, Colonial Self-Government (Am. Nation, V), chap. v.
3 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, chaps. iv–viii.
4 Cf. Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution (Am. Nation, VIII), chap. i.
5 Ibid., 229.
6 Cf. Hart, Foundations of Am. Foreign Policy, 18.
7 McLaughlin, Confederation and Constitution (Am. Nation, X). chaps. vii, viii.
8 Texts in Am. Hist. Leaflets, No. 32.
9 Federalist (Lodge ed.), No. 14.
10 Cf. Channing, Jeffersonian System (Am. Nation, XII), chap. v.
11 Garrison, Westward Extension (Am. Nation, XVII), chap. v.
12 Ibid., chap. xi.
13 Ibid., chap. vii.
14 Turner, New West (Am. Nation, XIV), 114–122.
15 See chap. iii, below.
16 Bourne, Essays in Historical Criticism, No. 9.
17 Dunning, Reconstruction (Am. Nation, XXII), chap. x.
18 Ibid.
19 Dewey, National Problems (Am. Nation, XXIV), chap. xviii.
20 Official order addressed to Spanish commanders authorizing the conversion, enslavement, or slaughter of the natives.
21 “The shot from Champlain’s arquebus had determined the part that was to be played in the approaching conflict by the most powerful military force among the Indians of North America. It had made the confederacy of the Iroquois and all its nations and dependencies the implacable enemies of the French and the fast friends of the English for all the long struggle that was to come.” [This quotation is from Senator Elihu Root’s eloquent address at the Champlain tercentenary celebration in 1909. Influential as Champlain’s act proved to be, it is well to remember that it was the Dutch treatment of the Iroquois that gained the latter’s friendship for the English, the successors of the Dutch, and also that the Iroquois, as Doctor Thwaites points out in his France in America, did in subsequent years negotiate with the French. But the historic consequence of Champlain’s act is of course obvious, although it is not necessary to accept unreservedly one tercentenary dictum to the effect that “Few decisive battles from Marathon to Waterloo had larger consequences.” Cartier’s first voyage to the St. Lawrence decided the immediate association of the French with their Algonquian neighbors. It would have been impossible for them to be friends of both Algonquians and Iroquois. The consequences of immediate and prolonged hostility on the part of the Algonquians invite curious speculation.—Editor.]
22 Clowes, Royal Navy, III, 186–189.
23 Ibid., 210–214, on Boscawen’s victory; 216–222, on Hawke’s.
24 Clowes, Royal Navy, III, 196–201.
25 Ibid., 201–203.
26 Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, II, 80.
27 For biographical details of Wolfe’s early career, see Wright, Life, and Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, I, 1–128; in ibid., II, 16, is a portrait of Wolfe’s fiancée.
28 Text in Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, VI, 87–90.
29 Lists in Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, II, 22, 23.
30 Wood, Fight for Canada, 166, 167, 173.
31 “Journal of the Expedition up the River St. Lawrence,” by a sergeant-major of grenadiers, in Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, V, 1–11.
32 Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, II, 51–53.
33 Wood, Fight for Canada, 152.
34 Authorities cited in Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, II, 233, 234. For details, consult Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, II, chap. vi.
35 See Bougainville’s correspondence, in Doughty and Parmelee Siege of Quebec, IV, 1–141.
36 September 22, 1759, quoted in Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, II, 249.
37 Official journal of Amherst, in London Magazine, XXVII, 379–383.
38 Stanwix to Pitt, November 20, 1759, MS. in Public Record Office.
39 [There was one regular regiment of American origin with Wolfe, the “Royal Americans,” represented by their second and third battalions. One battalion was left to guard the landing. The superior officers of this regiment were English. There seem to have been also some provincial rangers, although the famous Robert Rogers was not present.—Editor.]
40 Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, II, 237.
41 Ibid., II, 332, with detailed British returns; Wood, Fight for Canada, 262.
42 Greene, The Provincial Governor, passim.
43 Barry, Hist. of Mass., I, 288–295.
44 For a detailed study of this subject, see Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution (American Nation, VIII).
45 5 George III., chap. xii, given in Macdonald, Select Charters, 281.
46 Beer, Commercial Policy of England, 10–13.
47 For details and exact references to laws, see Channing, The Navigation Laws, in Amer. Antiq. Soc., Proceedings, new series, VI. For discussion, see Andrews, Colonial Self-Government, chap. i; Greene, Colonial Commonwealths (American Nation, V, VI).
48 Beer, Commercial Policy of England, chap. vii.
49 6 George II., chap. xiii.
50 Macdonald, Select Charters, 259.
51 Lecky, American Revolution (Woodburn’s ed.), 48.
52 J. Adams, Works, II, 523–525.
53 4 George III., chap. xv.
54 Osgood, in Political Science Quarterly, XIII, 45.
55 Lecky, American Revolution (Woodburn’s ed.), 64.
56 Dulany, in Tyler, Lit. Hist. of Amer. Rev., I, 104–105.
57 Life, Correspondence, and Speeches of Patrick Henry, I, 84–89.
58 Hart, Contemporaries, II, 402.
59 Walpole’s Letters, February 12, 1765.
60 Franklin, Works (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 161–198.
61 6 George III, chap. xii.
62 Morley, Burke, 146.
63 Franklin, Works (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 169.
64 Walpole, Memoirs of George III., II, 275, III, 23–27.
65 7 George III., chaps. xli, xlvi, lvi. See Macdonald, Select Charters, 320–330.
66 Samuel Adams, Writings (Cushing’s ed.), I, 184.
67 Hutchinson, Hist. of Massachusetts Bay, III, 494.
68 Junius (ed. of 1799), II, 31.
69 Collins, Committees of Correspondence (Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1901), I, 247.
70 Va. Cal. of State Pap., VIII, 1–2.
71 R. I. Col. Records, VII, 81, 108.
72 Farrand, “Taxation of Tea,” in Amer. Hist. Review, III, 269.
73 Macdonald, Select Charters, 337–356; Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 216.
74 “Quebec Act and the American Revolution,” in Yale Review, August, 1895.
75 Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, I, 421.
76 Macdonald, Select Charters, 356, 362.
77 Wells, Samuel Adams, I.
78 Franklin, Works (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 41.
79 Franklin’s Plan, in Works (Sparks’ ed.), III, 26, 36–55.
80 Van Tyne, Loyalists, 5.
81 Van Tyne, Loyalists, chap. i.
82 Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, II, 365–368.
83 Hatch, Administration of the Revolutionary Army, 1.
84 Frothingham, Siege of Boston, 100–102.
85 Ibid., 99–101.
86 Bolton, The Private Soldier Under Washington, 90; Force, Am. Archives, 4th series, III, 2.
87 Hatch, Administration of the Revolutionary Army, 13, 14.
88 Frothingham, Siege of Boston, 105, 106.
89 “Bunker Hill Monument celebrates a fact more important than most victories—namely, that the raw provincials faced the British army for two hours, they themselves being under so little organization that it is impossible to tell even at this day who was their commander; that they did this with only the protection of an unfinished earthwork and a rail fence, retreating only when their powder was out.... The newspapers of England, instead of being exultant, were indignant or apologetic.”—Thomas Wentworth Higginson.
90 Later Bemis.
91 “The surrender of Burgoyne turned the scale in favor of the Americans so far as the judgment of Europe was concerned.... The first treaty with France—which was also the first treaty of the United States with any foreign government—was signed February 6, 1778, two months after the news of Burgoyne’s surrender had reached Paris.”—Higginson’s History of the United States.
92 For the text of the articles of capitulation, and the general return of the officers and privates surrendered, see Harper’s Encyclopædia of United States History, X.
93 A detailed description of the topography and events of the Yorktown campaign is afforded in Lossing’s Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution, II, chap. xii. An elaborate and authoritative study from a military point of view is provided in The Yorktown Campaign, by Henry P. Johnston. Both histories are published by Harper & Brothers.
94 Annual Register, XXV, 252–257.
95 Two Centuries of Irish History, 91.
96 Treaties and Conventions, 370, 375.
97 Journals of Congress, January 13, 14, 1784.
98 For the complete history of the American struggle for independence, see Professor Van Tyne’s The American Revolution, IX, in The American Nation. Harper & Brothers.
99 “The destruction of the British fleet gave the United States supremacy on Lake Erie and compelled the abandonment of Malden and Detroit; it recovered Michigan, and made a real invasion of Canada once more a possibility, for by means of the control of the lakes thus given Harrison was enabled to enter at once upon an aggressive campaign on the Canadian side of Lake Erie. His men were easily transported to the north side, and his line of communication was no longer threatened by a British fleet. Its effect, too, upon the American people was decidedly important; for the first time an American fleet had met a British fleet and defeated it. Nor was it fair to discount the significance of the victory by saying that the vessels were small and of hasty construction. The charm of British invincibility had been broken in the great ship duels which made the names of Decatur, Bainbridge, and Hull household words. To this list was now added the name of Perry, who was looked upon by the Americans as a hero of the same class as Nelson.”—Prof. Kendric Charles Babcock in The Rise of American Nationality.
100 “The decisiveness of this battle was evident at once to the British. Hardly was the result known, when measures were taken for the retreat of Prevost’s army into Canada. At best, Prevost’s assault upon the land forces had been so poor as to give little aid to the fleet; and for this failure and his prompt retreat Prevost was ordered to trial by court-martial, but died before the trial could take place. The war was practically ended by this retreat of the British army from Plattsburg into Canada. It would seem as though the persistent mismanagement of the American forces in northern New York, the incompetency of Dearborn and Wilkinson, the strange interference of Secretary Armstrong, the diversion of the forces of Izard from the front of Prevost’s army, were all atoned for by the brilliancy of the accomplishment of Commodore Macdonough and his handful of sailors and soldiers on Lake Champlain.”—Prof. Kendric Charles Babcock in The Rise of American Nationality.
101 For the whole correspondence beginning with this letter, see Senate Docs., 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 25–48.
102 Senate Docs., 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, p. 28.
103 Senate Docs., 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 38, 41.
104 Ibid., pp. 42–48.
105 Niles’ Register, LXVIII, 84.
106 Ibid., 135; Von Holst, United States, III, 80, nn. 3, 4.
107 Dublán y Lozano, Legislatión Mexicana, V, 19–22.
108 Taylor’s successive orders, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 7, 79–82.
109 House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 99.
110 Ibid., pp. 102–109.
111 House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 90.
112 House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 140.
113 Ibid., p. 141.
114 See Polk, MS. Diary, entry for May 9, 1846.
115 Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 442.
116 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 795.
117 [John Slidell, of New Orleans, appointed a commissioner to Mexico in 1845 to endeavor to adjust the boundary and re-establish relations.]
118 Polk, MS. Diary, February 17, 1846.
119 Senate Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, p. 39.
120 Ripley, War with Mexico, I, 149; Polk, MS. Diary, May 14, 16, 1846.
121 Hittell, California, II, bk. vi., chaps. ii–v, passim.
122 Niles’ Register, LXX, 310; Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 298; Polk, MS. Diary, August 18, 19, 1847.
123 House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 324, 353, especially Taylor to Adjutant-General, July 2, 1846, ibid., pp. 329–332; cf. Polk, MS. Diary, September 15, 1846.
124 Taylor to Adjutant-General, October 15, 1846, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 351–354.
125 Polk, MS. Diary, November 14, 1846.
126 Taylor to Adjutant-General, January 27, 1847, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 1100–1102.
127 Taylor to Adjutant-General, March 6, 1847, in Senate Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 132–141.
128 Scott to Marcy, March 29, 1847, ibid., 229.
129 Ripley, War with Mexico, II, 153–155; Polk, MS. Diary, December 28, 1847.
130 Senate Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 52, p. 345.
131 Buchanan to Trist, October 6, 1847, ibid., pp. 91–93; Polk, MS. Diary, October 5, 1847.
132 See official reports of these operations, in Senate Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 354–471.
133 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 683.
134 Gen. Lew Wallace, who reached Buena Vista two days after the battle, furnishes a vigorous defence of the Indiana volunteers in his Autobiography, vol. I, chaps. xviii and xix.—[Editor.]
135 Cf. Am. Nation, XIV; XVI-XVIII, passim.
136 Stephens, War between the States, II, 32.
137 Davis, Confederate Government, I, 80.
138 Adams, New England Federalism, 144–146.
139 Buchanan, Administration on Eve of Rebellion, chap. v; National Intelligencer, January 18, 1861.
140 Secretary of War, Report, 1860, Senate Exec. Docs., 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pp. 214, 216.
141 Secretary of Navy, Report, 1860, ibid., 383.
142 Secretary of War, Report, 1860, ibid., 209, 213.
143 Buchanan, Administration on Eve of Rebellion, 104.
144 National Intelligencer, January 11, 1861.
145 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 68.
146 Ibid., p. 69; Crawford, Fort Sumter, 57, 58.
147 Trescot MS., quoted by Crawford, Fort Sumter, 58, 59.
148 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 70.
149 War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 74, 75.
150 Ibid., 76.
151 Ibid., 80.
152 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 64.
153 War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 79–82.
154 Ibid., p. 82.
155 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 67.
156 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 89.
157 Ibid., 103.
158 War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 96–100; Crawford, Fort Sumter, 77.
159 Trescot MS., quoted by Crawford, Fort Sumter, 78.
160 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 101.
161 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 81–83.
162 Ibid., 85, 86.
163 Curtis, Buchanan, II, 385. The emphasis is Buchanan’s.
164 Governor’s message to legislature, quoted by Crawford, Fort Sumter, 87.
165 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 111.
166 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 91.
167 Crawford, Fort Sumter, chap. x.
168 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 2.
169 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 112.
170 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 110, 111.
171 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 3.
172 Ward H. Lamon, a former law partner of President Lincoln, who visited Charleston at this time and assumed to be a representative of the President.—[Editor.]
173 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 222.
174 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 230.
175 Ibid., 228.
176 Ibid., 284, 285.
177 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 285.
178 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 377.
179 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 283.
180 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 241.
181 Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, 98.
182 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 235.
183 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, IV, 31, 32.
184 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 294.
185 Ibid., 249–251.
186 Talbot’s report, in War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 251.
187 Roman, Beauregard, I, 33.
188 War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 12–25, 213–216.
189 War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 25–58.
190 Statement of Ex-Confederate Secretary of War to writer; Crawford, Fort Sumter, 421.
191 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 297.
192 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 297.
193 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 422.
194 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 13.
195 Ibid., 59; Crawford, Fort Sumter, 424.
196 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 301.
197 Crawford, Fort Sumter, 425, 426.
198 Naval War Records, IV, 248.
199 Fox’s report, in Naval War Records, IV, 245–251.
200 Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, 142.
201 Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, 147.
202 Ibid.
203 Foster’s report, in War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 20, 21.
204 War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 293.
205 Ibid., 22.
206 Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, 158.
207 Foster’s report, in War Records, Serial No. 1, p. 24.
208 Foster’s report, in War Records, Serial No. 1, pp. 23, 24.
209 Doubleday, Sumter and Moultrie, App., where the names appear.
210 Naval War Records, IV, 251.
211 J. E. Johnston, Narrative, 84.
212 Commander J. M. Brooke, in Battles and Leaders, I, 715; Scharf, Navy of the Confederate States, 145 et seq.
213 Battles and Leaders, I, 692 et seq.
214 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, V, 226.
215 Soley, Blockade and Cruisers, 54.
216 See The Appeal to Arms, by Dr. J. K. Hosmer, p. 74.
217 Poore, Burnside, 132.
218 War Records, Serial No. 6, pp. 133–167.
219 Soley, Blockade and Cruisers, 82 et seq.
220 Farragut, Farragut, chaps. i, ii.
221 Naval War Records, XVIII, pp. xv, xvi.
222 Farragut, Farragut, 207.
223 Naval War Records, XVIII (West Gulf Blockading Squadron); Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, 52.
224 Beverly Kennon, a Southern officer, in Battles and Leaders, II, 76, criticises severely the management of the Confederate ships.
225 Naval War Records, XVIII, 134 et seq.; Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, 52 et seq.
226 Parton, Butler in New Orleans, chap. xii.
227 War Records, Serial No. 24, p. 511.
228 Grant, Personal Memoirs, I, 411.
229 Sherman, Memoirs, I, 319.
230 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, VII, 135.
231 Sherman, Memoirs, I, 324.
232 Cullum, Register of Mil. Acad., art., “McPherson.”
233 War Records, Serial No. 36, pp. 371–467.
234 Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, 110 et seq.
235 Johnston, Narrative, 152.
236 War Records, Serial No. 36, pp. 565 et seq.
237 War Records, Serial No. 36, p. 32.
238 Johnston, Narrative, 153.
239 Admiral Porter’s fleet kept up a continuous bombardment for forty days. Seven thousand mortar shells and forty-five hundred shells from the gunboats were discharged at the city. As Grant drew his lines closer, his cannonade was kept up day and night. The people of Vicksburg had taken shelter in caves dug in the clay hills on which the city stands. In these caves families lived day and night, and children were born. Famine attacked the city, and mule-meat made a savory dish. Grant mined under some of the Confederate works, and one of them, Fort Hill Bastion, was blown up on June 25th with terrible effect.—Harper’s Encyclopædia of United States History.
240 War Records, Serial No. 37, pp. 146–424.
241 War Records, Serial No. 41, pp. 41–181 (Port Hudson).
242 Greene, The Mississippi.
243 War Records, Serial Nos. 43 and 44, pp. 1–775 (all on Gettysburg campaign).
244 Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, 331.
245 War Records, Serial No. 45, p. 31.
246 F. H. Lee, Robert E. Lee, 265. For R. E. Lee’s report of Gettysburg, see War Records, Serial No. 44, pp. 293 et seq.; Long, Lee, 280.
247 But see controversy between Mosby and Robertson as to management of the Confederate cavalry, Battles and Leaders, III, 251.
248 Cullum, Register of Mil. Acad., art. “Meade.”
249 Hunt, in Battles and Leaders, III, 258.
250 Livermore, Numbers and Losses, 102.
251 War Records, Serial No. 43, pp. 104–119 (Report of Meade).
252 F. H. Lee, Robert E. Lee, 270.
253 Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, 132.
254 Cullum, Register of Mil. Acad., art. “Hancock.”
255 Walker, Hancock, in Mass. Mil. Hist. Soc. Papers, “Some Federal and Confederate Commanders,” 49.
256 Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, 156.
257 A tradition at Gettysburg.
258 Mrs. Longstreet, Lee and Longstreet at High Tide, 83, 84.
259 For criticisms by the friends of Lee, see Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, II, 447; F. H. Lee, Robert E. Lee, 299; William Allan, in Battles and Leaders, III, 355. Able and impartial is G. F. R. Henderson, Science of War, 280 et seq.
260 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 57 et seq.
261 For Meade’s good judgment and activity, see Walker, in Battles and Leaders, III, 406.
262 Gibbon, in Battles and Leaders, III, 313.
263 Mrs. Longstreet, Lee and Longstreet at High Tide, 48.
264 Pennypacker, Meade, 194.
265 Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, 385 et seq.
266 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 274 et seq. Confirmed to the writer by General E. P. Alexander, who heard the rebuke.
267 Battles and Leaders, III, 349.
268 Committee on Conduct of the War, Report, pt. i (1864–1865), 408 et seq.
269 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, VII, 278.
270 For a minute discussion of Meade’s management, and much testimony, see Committee on Conduct of the War, Report, pt. i (1864–1865), 295–524.
271 Livermore, Numbers and Losses, 102.
272 See the chapter on the Monroe Doctrine in The Rise of the New West, by Prof. F. J. Turner, and also chaps. i and xi of America as a World Power, by Prof. G. H. Latané. (The American Nation, Harper & Brothers.)—[Editor.]
273 The War with Spain, by Henry Cabot Lodge, and The Spanish War, by General Russell A. Alger, may be consulted with advantage. Both are published by Harper & Brothers. Harper’s Encyclopædia of United States History, VI, affords a picturesque account of the battle of Manila Bay, by Ramon Reyes Lala, a Filipino author and lecturer. Professor Latané’s account of the war, in his America as a World Power (Harper & Brothers), offers an excellent example of judicial historical treatment.—Editor.
274 Long, New American Navy, I, 209.
275 Messages and Docs., Abridgment, 1898–1899, II, 921.
276 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., pp. 465, 466.
277 It was on this date, May 24th, that the Oregon, Captain Clark, appeared off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, ready for action, after a voyage of fourteen thousand miles from San Francisco.—[Editor.]
278 Schley, Forty-five Years Under the Flag, 276.
279 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 402; Long, New Am. Navy, I, 258–287.
280 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 437.
281 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 667.
282 Major-General commanding the army, Report, 1898, p. 149.
283 Major-General commanding the army, Report, 1898, p. 162.
284 Major-General commanding the army, Report, 1898, pp. 152, 169, 171, 319, 366, 381. [General Vara el Rey, one of the bravest of the Spanish officers, was the leader in this desperate resistance, and was killed while rallying his men in the village.—Editor.]
285 Major-General commanding the army, Report, pp. 167, 173.
286 Messages and Docs., Abridgment, 1898–1899, I, 270.
287 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., pp. 505–602; Long, New Am. Navy, II, 28–42.
288 Major-General commanding the army, Report, 1898, pp. 138–147, 226–243, 246–266.
289 Senate Docs., 56 Cong., I Sess., No. 221, 8 vols.
290 Nation, LXIX, 61.
291 Proceedings of the Schley Court of Inquiry, House Docs., 57 Cong., I Sess., No. 485.
292 Act of February 14, 1903, U. S. Statutes at Large, XXXII, pt. i, p. 830.