Conclusion
If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:
The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced into the conduct of modern War—viz., those due to changes in the composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc. Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.
Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal importance. Great results—whether strategical or tactical—can only be obtained by the employment of ‘Masses.’
The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both organic, strategic, and tactical.
The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions, have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of which the following are the most important items:
Increase in the price paid for our remounts.
Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the lines of our existing and well-tried organization.
Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.
Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in peace and War.
Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.
Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true quick-firer.
Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary strategical mobility.
Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.
Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field service, to fit us for employment in ‘Masses,’ and to meet the new strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must be taken into account.
Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only simplification in many details, but the addition of sections developing the principles of the employment by ‘Wings’ of the several units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action, and more precise formulation of tactical principles.
Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance, security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where practicable.
A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers; creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on scientific principles.
Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts, to be termed ‘Inspections’ (Corps) and ‘Sub-inspections’ (Divisions), which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.
Annual Cavalry Manœuvres.
Improvement of discipline ‘to meet the demands of modern Warfare.
This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a single stroke of the pen—indeed, it needs a considerable degree of optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.
Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms, safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain victory.
Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races which will survive in the great ‘world struggle for existence’ which seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of force—fighting power—which conditions the development of all other social interests. If we possess the ‘force,’ the rest will follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other ‘act of human intercourse,’ is the ‘best’ ever reached by mortal executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.
In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us, unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: Per aspera ad Astra.
Notes
1 The contrary view to this was largely held by a certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here endeavouring to combat.
2 The same point also arises both in pursuit and in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when employed with concentrated force.
3 Compare ‘Cavalry Regulations,’ § 376.
4 I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually charged—i.e., endeavoured to decide the action by shock.—C. S. G.
5 Clausewitz, ‘Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber, das Einfache ist schwer.’
6 The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his regiment.
7 Rauch’s Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.
8 Section 346 reads: ‘The above general principles applying to the conduct and relations between the several “Lines” must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the attainment of the purpose in view.’
9 The ‘Drei Treffen Taktik’ owes its origin to the study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I would point out that Frederick’s Cavalry were always formed in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two Lines (‘Treffen’) there was generally, but by no means always, a ‘Reserve’—constituted usually of Hussars only—who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a ‘Treffen’ (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special Commander, and was quite independent of the two ‘Treffen’ proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to suggest that Frederick’s Infantry fought habitually in three Lines (‘Drei Treffen’), although a Reserve was frequently held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The truth really is that the modern idea of the ‘Drei Treffen Taktik’ has actually nothing in common with the methods of employment of Frederick’s days at all.
10 ‘Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present Day,’ part i., chap, vii., B.
11 See ‘Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future,’ p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military history—on the contrary, the most complete refutation.
12 The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August 16, 1870.
13 When only three men in four dismount the horses are said to be ‘mobile.’ When the proportion is greater the horses become ‘immobile.’
14 I here call attention to the instructions of Frederick the Great on this subject, as well as to the circumspection with which General J. E. B. Stuart prepared for his own undertakings.
15 Feld Dienst Ordnung.
16 In passing, I may note that some portions of Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being done in this direction.
17 In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868 by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another place, adding, ‘particularly when we have found the right “Murat” to lead it’ (Moltke’s ‘Militarische Werke,’ II., Second Part, First Group, B).
18 Generally defeats its own object; the heavy load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.
19 The wheel should be so low that the man could use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be ‘transportable’ (?’folding’).
20 With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.
21 King William I. had already suggested the formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869—in a marginal note on the report of Moltke’s of 1868—already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.
22 Under the new Regulations this is now left to the discretion of the Regimental Commander.
23 ‘Dressur’ literally means ‘preparation.’ We use the term ‘breaking-in.’ Note the difference.—Translator.
24 Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.
25 As a measure of this excitement the following example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in column of troops to threaten the enemy’s flank. When, however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst the leading one continued on in its original direction. The Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the author.
26 This formation has since been adopted, and is almost invariably employed.—Translator.
Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated. The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:
1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription from instructions concerning the methods of training.
2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more suitable formations.
3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their extension to prescriptions as to the use of ‘Wing’ or ‘Line’ formation.
4. Re-introduction of the true idea of ‘Line tactics,’ limitation of the word ‘Échelon’ to troops overlapping the first line, of ‘Reserve’ for all held back behind it.
5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to any fixed standard of strength.
6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.
7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive. (See next section.)[Back to Main Text]
28 Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.
29 Instruction with models helps the man quickest; it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture of military things.
30 Taking into account these and similar demands on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War, because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to fill the new positions created on mobilization than are employed in peace—a very serious disadvantage. I consider it absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry should be provided with a permanent Staff.