V Review of the Military Situation
The purpose of this volume has been to give as much reliable information upon the cause of the Anglo-Russian dispute, the nature of the probable theatre of operations in case of war, and of the armies of the Powers concerned, as could be obtained and printed within a single fortnight. The richness of the available material made this especially difficult, comprising as it did the record of recent campaigns in Afghanistan, as well as the opinions of those who, like Vámbéry, Veniukoff, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust, are authorities upon Asiatic topics.
As these lines are written [Footnore: April 18, 1885.] the civilized nations of the world await with bated breath the next scene upon the Afghan stage.
Seldom when two gladiators, armed and stripped, enter the arena does a doubt exist as to their purpose. Yet such an exceptional uncertainty attends the presence of England and Russia on the border of Afghanistan.
At least 50,000 British soldiers are drawn up in front of the Indus awaiting a signal from their Queen. Nearly twice that number of Russian troops are massed on or near the northwestern angle of the Ameer’s country.1
It is impossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of the present military situation, certain political elements.
It is apparent that the Russians near Herat stand practically at “the forks of the road”; it is a three-pronged fork—one branch running due south to the sea and two branches due east to India. The first-named requires but passing comment and only as it relates to Herat, planted on a route which cannot be controlled without its possession, for military and commercial reasons well understood.
As already explained, the routes to India, available to Russia, enable her to move from her base on the Merv-Herat line, both via Balkh and Kabul, for the purpose of flanking a British column moving from Quetta westward, or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund; from Turkestan above this route, a British force moving from Kabul to Balkh could also be threatened. By the main Herat-Kandahar route an advance from the east could also be directly opposed; the crossing of the Helmund by either army would probably be contested.
In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Afghan, the first great battle would doubtless be fought on the Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul line.
General Hamley, the leading British military authority,2 shows that this line is, of all proposed, at once the most practicable and desirable line for the defence of India.3 He says: “We should have a strong British governor in Kandahar, and a strong British force on the Helmund and on the road to Kabul; the railway completed to Kandahar, and, in case of a movement from Turkestan against Kabul, a force on our side on its way to occupy that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid warlike populations. Surely there can be no question as to which of these two sets of circumstances would give us most influence in Afghanistan, most power to oppose Russia and to maintain confidence in India.”4
The same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulph’s recommendation to utilize the strong natural positions near Girishk on the Helmund. As to Afghanistan he testifies: “With a power like Russia closing on it, holding Persia and Persian resources subject to its will, it is in vain to think that Afghanistan will be long independent even in name. It is between hammer and anvil, or, to use a still more expressive metaphor, between the devil and the deep sea. Bound to us by no traditions, by no strong political influences such as might have been used to constrain them, the Afghan tribes, mercenary and perfidious to a proverb, an aggregate of tribes—not a nation,—will lose no time, when the moment occurs, in siding with the great power which promises most lavishly, or which can lay strongest hold on them.”
The burning words with which General Hamley closed his lecture one year ago are singularly true to-day, and form a fitting termination to this sketch:
“I do not undervalue the many influences which will always oppose any policy entailing expense. But if the present question is found to be—How shall we guard against a terrible menace to our Indian Empire? any cost to be incurred can hardly be admitted as a reason which ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trustfulness in the virtue and guilelessness of rival states; distrust and denunciation of all who would chill this inverted patriotism by words of warning; refusal of all measures demanding expense which do not promise a pecuniary return:—such is the kind of liberality of sentiment which may ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may be very excellent qualities, but they are specially inapplicable to dealings with the wolf. Do those who shrink from expense think that the presence of Russia in Afghanistan will be inexpensive to us? Will the weakness which will be the temptation and the opportunity of Russia be less costly than effectual defence? When we enter the councils of Europe to assert our most vital interests, shall we speak as we have been accustomed to speak, when our free action is fettered by the imminent perpetual menace to India? These are questions which, now put forth to this limited audience, will, perhaps, within the experience of most of us, be thundered in the ears of the nation. England is just now not without serious perplexities, but none are so fraught with possibilities of mischief as the storm which is now gathering on the Afghan frontier.”
Notes
1 Since the events noted in our first chapter (page 12) transpired, another page has been added to Afghanistan’s blood-stained record. After confronting each other on the Khusk River for some weeks a large Russian force under General Komaross attacked (March 30, 1885) the Afghan troops at Penjdeh, and after a gallant resistance on the part of the native garrison it was utterly routed and the town occupied by the victors. The Russian casualties were inconsiderable, but the Afghans lost nearly 1,000 men.
2 Lieut.-General Sir. E. Hamley, K.C.B.
3 Three lines had been considered: first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani, but this would leave the seaport of Kurrachee unprotected; second, from Pishin northeast to Kabul.
4 Gen. Hamley’s remarks were made before the Royal United Service Institution (May 18, 1884), and, in the discussion which followed, Colonel Malleson said: “Recently in India some influential natives said to me: ‘Russia will continue her advance; she will not stop until she has gained the fertile country of Herat, and then she will intrigue with the native princes behind the Indus, and when you send an army to meet her, you will find those native princes rising in your rear.’ I may fortify my own experience by what was told me by an Austrian gentleman who visited India about seven years ago. He paid a visit to the Maharaja, of Cashmere, who said to him: ‘From you I hope to get the truth; you are not an Englishman nor a Russian. Tell me which is the stronger—the English power or the Russian; because it will be necessarily my duty, if Russia should advance, and if I should find Russia stronger than England, to go for the defence of my throne on the side of Russia.’”