Chapter V Bukorest and Tirgovist, the Capitals of Wallachia — Yassi, the Capital of Moldavia — A Description of Them — Mode of Travelling — Breed of Horses
Bukorest, the present capital of Wallachia, is an extensive dirty town, situated on a low and marshy ground, and containing eighty thousand inhabitants, three hundred and sixty-six churches, twenty monasteries, and thirty large hanns or caravanserays.
About four hundred years back it was but a small village, belonging to a person called Bukor, from whom it derived its name, and retains it to the present day. By degrees it became a town, and it continued increasing, until it surpassed the former capital, Tirgovist, in size. The Voïvode, Constantine Bessarabba, made it in 1698, the permanent seat of government; abandoning with all his nobles the city of Tirgovist, most delightfully situated further in the interior, having on one side a beautiful range of hills, and the other a very fine and extensive plain.
The Greek princes having continued to reside at Bukorest, probably on account of its being nearer to the Turks, Tirgovist was by degrees deserted by the remaining part of its inhabitants, and it is now reduced to a mere village. It contains many ruins of ancient edifices, amongst which those of the Voïvodes’ palace are the most conspicuous. The river Dimbovitza runs alongside of it.
Yassi,the capital of Moldavia, is a smaller but better-built town, containing many elegant houses built in the most modern style of European architecture, forty thousand inhabitants, and seventy churches. One part of it stands upon a fine hill, and the other is situated in a valley. The prince’s palace is the most extensive edifice in the whole town, and is surrounded by gardens and yards. It is furnished in a style which is half Oriental and half European, and has room enough to lodge conveniently more than a thousand people.
The palace of Bukorest was formerly a large building, standing on an eminence at one extremity of the town, and commanding a full view of it. In 1813 it was accidentally burnt down, and it has not been rebuilt. The late prince had, since that time, resided in two private houses joined into one.
Both capitals occupy a great extent of ground, the houses being separate from each other, and surrounded by yards or gardens, and trees. All the buildings are made of brick, and their walls, outside as well as within, are plastered and whitewashed. Tiles are seldom used, and the roofs are generally covered with wood.
The streets of the two capitals, and indeed of all the provincial towns, are, without exception, paved with thick pieces of timber, thrown across, and made tight to each other. In some, the surface is made smooth and even, whilst in others, the logs of wood are almost left in their natural state. In the rainy seasons they are constantly covered over with a deep liquid mud, and in the summer, with a thick black dust, which the least wind renders excessively injurious to the eyes and lungs; besides these great inconveniences, a complete renewal, at least once in every six years, is absolutely necessary.
At Bukorest, under the wooden pavements, to which the natives give the more appropriate name of bridges, there are large kennels, which receive the filth of the houses, and are meant to convey it to the river Dimbovitza, which runs through the town. Hardly any care is taken to keep the different passages open, and the accumulation of dirty substances frequently stops them up; in this state they sometimes remain for months in the hot season, during which they produce the most noxious exhalations, and occasion fevers of a putrid and malignant nature,—diseases to which the natural position of the town must alone dispose a great part of the inhabitants.
It has been long supposed, and it is still considered impossible to pave the streets with stone, not so much on account of the scarcity of the material, as owing to the ground being of a soft clay, which offers no hold to it. This idea, very prevalent among the natives, is certainly erroneous, and there cannot exist a more convincing proof of it, than the stone pavements constructed by Trajan and the Romans, which have so firmly withstood the destructive hand of time.
From a certain distance, and on elevated ground, the city of Bukorest offers itself to the view with great advantage; the mixture of the houses and trees give it a peculiar beauty; but it is like the fine scenery of a theatre which charms the distant eye, and on being approached is found to be a coarse daub.
As late as thirty years back, the Boyars were in the habit of visiting each other, and going to court on horseback, and the women of the most opulent only, went in coaches. Within that period, the fashion of riding in coaches has so increased, and it is now so universal, that no person of either sex, who has claims to respectability, can pass the gates of his house otherwise than in a coach, even in the finest weather. The Boyars consider it derogatory to their dignity to make use of their legs, and leave to the mob the vulgar practice of walking. The consequence is, that the streets, about seven or eight yards wide, are always full of carriages, and frequent accidents happen to the unfortunate pedestrians.
The kind of carriage most in use, is the German calèche; and the Boyars have introduced the fashion of having theirs ornamented in the most gaudy manner; but as they do not so much regard the beauty of the horses and harness, nor the dress of the coachman, it is very common to meet in the streets a carriage glittering with gold, drawn by a pair of miserable hacks, and driven by a gypsy in rags.
There are many coachmakers, both at Bukorest and at Yassi; but the carriages sent from Vienna are preferred to theirs, and much higher prices are paid for them. The Boyars are indifferent as to their solidity, and buy any old vehicle that is made up to deceive the eye, and is offered as new; fine ornaments being the only quality in estimation, every twelve or eighteen months they are obliged to purchase a new carriage. On another hand, their own inattention, and the lazy, slovenly, and careless habits of their coachmen, render this annual expense indispensable.
No coaches of any kind are to be hired, so that travellers, and other non-residents, must submit to the necessity of going on foot. Private lodgings are also seldom to be had, and it was but very lately that a public hotel was set up at Bukorest, which, being well furnished, and provided with every requisite commodity, has become very useful to travellers. A German is the proprietor and director of it.
The mode of travelling in the two principalities is so expeditious, that in this respect it is not equalled in any other country. Their post establishments are well organized; there are post-houses in all directions, and they are abundantly provided with horses. Every idea of comfort must, however, be set aside by those who are willing to conform themselves to the common method of riding post. A kind of a vehicle is given, which is not unlike a very small crate for earthenware, fastened to four small wheels, by the means of wooden pegs, and altogether not higher than a common wheel-barrow. It is filled with straw, and the traveller sits in the middle of it, keeping the upper part of his body in an erect posture, and finding great difficulty to cram his legs within. Four horses are attached to it by cords, which form the whole harness; and, driven by one postilion on horseback, they set off at full speed, and neither stop nor slacken their pace, until they reach the next post-house. Within the distance of half a mile from it, the postilion gives warning of his approach by a repeated and great cracking of his whip, so that, by the time of arrival, another cart is got ready to receive the traveller.
The Boyars, and other people of respectability in the country, travel in their own carriages, and at their own pace. In winter, as the snow lies about two months on the ground, sledges are generally used, as well in town as in the country.
The Wallachian breed of horses is of a peculiar kind. Their stature is very small, and they have no spirit; but they are strong, active, and capable of enduring great fatigue. Those of Moldavia differ only in being a little larger in size. Some of the richest people have their horses sent them from Russia and Hungary; but they are merely meant for their coaches, as, from an aversion to every exercise that occasions the least fatigue, hardly any of them ride on horseback. Handsome saddle-horses, consequently, are seldom seen in the country; the prince is the only person who keeps any; but they are chiefly used by his Albanians, or body-guard.
CHAPTER VI.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREEKS IN GENERAL.—THEIR INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPALITIES.—THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM.—CAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR BETWEEN TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND IN 1806.—THOSE WHICH OCCASIONED THE FAILURE OF THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINOPLE.—SUBSEQUENT CHANGES OF POLICY OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT.—PEACE WITH ENGLAND.—PEACE WITH RUSSIA, AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MOSTLY CONTRIBUTED TO IT.—HOSPODARS CALLIMACKI AND CARADJA.—PRINCE DEMETRIUS MOUROUSI’S DEATH.—CARADJA’S FLIGHT FROM WALLACHIA.—REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PORTE RELATIVE TO THE TWO PRINCIPALITIES.
None of the events that had influenced the political existence, and undermined the public spirit of the Wallachian and Moldavian nations, proved more ruinous to them than the system of policy introduced by the Greeks of the Fannar28, when they were placed at the head of the principalities.
Humiliated, degraded, and oppressed as the Greeks were, since they had ceased to be a nation, civilisation degenerated among them, in proportion to the weight and barbarism of the yoke that had been imposed on them, and they had insensibly contracted those habits of corruption, and servile obedience, which must be inseparable from a state of slavery similar to theirs. Dissimulation and falsehood became the most prominent features of their character; and, in short, the force of the causes which acted upon them incessantly, familiarised them, by degrees, to every thing that could be degrading and humiliating to man.
The ambition of certain Greeks, leading an obscure life at Constantinople, was, however roused, when the office of state-interpreter at the Porte, assumed an important appearance under the direction of their countryman, Alexander Mavrocordato, who, from a petty merchant at the island of Scio, rose by degrees to that station, and was sent in the quality of Ottoman plenipotentiary to the congress of Carlowitz, where he distinguished himself as an able negotiator. He caused his son Nicholas to be raised to the governments of Moldavia and Wallachia, and he suggested to the Porte a new mode of appointment to those principalities, after the elective right had been entirely set aside. The Ottoman court thenceforward appropriated those two dignities to individuals who had once served in the quality of state-interpreter to its satisfaction, not so much as a reward for their services, as on account of the knowledge obtained of their personal character and extent of abilities.
On another hand, the repeated demonstrations of servitude on the part of the Greeks, and the apparent impossibility of their ever becoming a nation again, seemed to render them the fittest tools of the Porte’s new system of government in the principalities; for, although it could not trample upon the whole of their privileges at once, yet, in giving them princes who should be entirely devoted to its interests, and slaves to its will, the existence of those privileges was rendered nugatory.
No sooner was the possibility of sharing in the public administration manifested to the Greeks, than such as were versed in the Turkish and European languages, abandoning all other pursuits, formed themselves into a distinct class, which assumed the title of nobility, and the exclusive right of being called to the service of the state.
In a short time, however, the number of competitors increased considerably; all equally eager and impatient to reach the same objects, they introduced a system of intrigue and bribery, which gave rise to continual changes in the government of the principalities, and accustomed the Porte to look upon these as farms which were to be let out to the highest bidders; the farmer-princes were therefore deposed and recalled, whenever the offers and promises of others of their countrymen appeared more advantageous.
From the period at which this system was introduced, to the beginning of the present century, being a space of ninety years, Wallachia alone has passed through the hands of forty different princes, independently of the time it was occupied by the Russians, from 1770 to 1774; by the Austrians and Russians, from 1789 to 1792, and by the Russians again, from 1806 to 1812.
The evils which naturally arose from such a state of things, weighed so heavily upon the two nations, that the court of Russia, already authorised by the treaty of Kaïnargik29, to interfere in their behalf, insisted at the peace of Yassi in 1792, that the Porte should engage to maintain the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia in their respective stations, for the space of seven years, and not to molest them in any manner previous to the expiration of that term. This agreement was then legally entered into by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, but in the sequel it was not regularly observed by the Porte, whose frequent infractions of it became the subject of continual remonstrance on the part of the court of Russia. In 1802, however, Prince Ipsilanti was appointed to the government of Wallachia, and Prince Alexander Mourousi to that of Moldavia, with the express condition which was obtained through the negotiations of the Russian minister at the Porte, that neither of them should be removed from office previous to the term stipulated in the treaty, if they were not proved guilty of an offence that the Russian minister should allow to be of a nature which justified their deposition.30
In 1805, the intrigues of Buonaparte, who sought to involve Turkey in his continental system, prevailed upon the Porte to adopt a line of conduct which Russia could not otherwise interpret, than as a systematic violation of its existing engagements, and an approaching alliance with France, notwithstanding that a public audience of the Sultan was given to the Russian envoy, Mr. d’Italinsky, in which a formal exchange of ratifications took place of a late treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the two powers.
The Hospodars, Ipsilanti and Mourousi, were suddenly recalled, without the participation of the Russian embassy; the latter was replaced by Charles Callimacki, and the former by Alexander Sutzo, a man who was looked upon as a partisan of Buonaparte, and who had always been obnoxious to the interests of Russia.
Previous to this circumstance, a certain degree of coolness already existed between the courts of St. Petersburgh and Constantinople; it originated in the Porte’s sudden resolution of suppressing foreign protections, in abolishing all letters-patent, until then granted to individuals, natives of Turkey, who were authorised by such letters to place themselves under the protection of foreign courts, although residing and trading in the Ottoman dominions. More particularly in carrying that resolution into effect, by forcibly and publicly compelling all such individuals, protected by Russia, to give up their titles, without paying the least regard to the representations of the Russian embassy.
Ipsilanti’s and Mourousi’s deposition brought things to a crisis. A Russian army was immediately sent to the frontiers to enforce the treaties, and having occupied the fortresses of Bender and Hotim, the Porte looked upon the measure as a declaration of war, and the Mufti issued his Fetvaa31, which declared it legal to repel force by force.
The rupture was soon followed by another with England, who had joined Russia to oppose the increasing influence of Buonaparte over the Porte. When, in 1805, the English ambassador, Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, arrived at Constantinople, the Porte expressed a wish of renewing the treaty of accession made in 1799, the term of which (eight years) was drawing to its end. That treaty, framed upon the wisest principles, completed the triple alliance between England, Russia, and Turkey, from which so many important advantages have accrued to the common cause.
Mr. Arbuthnot not being invested with full powers for that particular object, wrote home for instructions, and received them a short time after; and when on their arrival an offer was made to the Turkish ministers to commence the work, they very unexpectedly began to draw back, and an actual recantation took place, which naturally created the greatest surprise.
The intrigues of the French ambassador, and Buonaparte’s progressive encroachments in Europe, had made on the minds of the Sultan and his ministers such an impression, that no remonstrance, no threat could now induce them to perform what they themselves had shown so much wish for before.
On the other hand, the British embassy could not remain indifferent to the recall of the Hospodars, and to the manner in which the foreign protections had been suppressed.
From an impulse of official regard to the complaints and interests of those individuals who were patentees under the English protection, and in consequence of the Russian envoy’s solicitations that their efforts might be joined for the purpose of resisting the violent measures pursued by the Turkish government, the British ambassador made many representations to the Porte against its proceedings, and although impartial in principle as to the practice of granting protection to natives of the country, he, at all events, recommended moderation, and a less offensive mode of carrying the new system into execution. But having soon discovered and ascertained beyond a doubt, that all interference was of no avail, that the resolution of the Turkish cabinet was such as to hazard all, sooner than withdraw from the adopted plan, he deemed it expedient to advise the British patentees to proceed, as if from their own accord, and give up their titles to the Porte, and in the mean time recommended in a private manner, the property and personal safety of such individuals, who, by this means, not only avoided the resentment of the Turkish government, but were all well treated, and some taken into favour.
The British ambassador, however, showed less disposition to compliance with regard to the other proceedings of the Porte, and having insisted with Russia on the immediate reinstatement of the Hospodars Ipsilanti and Mourousi, the subject was discussed at the divan, where the general opinion inclined to a firm resistance of those pretensions; but the Sultan finally declared, that however humiliating might be the alternative of ceding to them, he was resolved to recur to it rather than break with England.
This decision was at the time carried into execution, to the extreme disappointment of the French ambassador, Sebastiani, whose great object was to kindle the fire he had raised. But very soon after, advices being received that the Russian troops had already entered the Moldavian territory, affairs underwent a total change; the Russian envoy was dismissed, and the Grand Vezier took the field.
To represent these events in a more proper point of view, it is necessary to observe, that it was neither the intention of England, nor the wish of Russia, to engage in a serious war with Turkey. Their object was to bring the Porte to a sense of its true interests, in diverting it from a line of conduct which bore every appearance of a change in its political system, and was every way calculated to confirm the suspicion that the Sultan was contracting an alliance with Buonaparte.
In order to separate the Porte from the French party, and induce it to return to the connexions which had formerly existed with the allies of Turkey, a plan of coercive measures had been found necessary; and, to give them a greater weight, it had been determined that Russia should send an army from the north, and England a fleet from the south.
When the English fleet appeared before Constantinople, it naturally occasioned the greatest confusion and alarm. The Sultan lost no time in sending on board to offer terms of peace, and negotiations were commenced with Mr. Arbuthnot, who was in the flag-ship, the Royal Sovereign. But they were carried on with much less vigour than it was necessary to give them, and left time to the French intrigues to gain the advantage. Buonaparte’s active agents, General Sebastiani and Franchini32, were the more anxious to counteract the operations of the English plenipotentiary, as they were aware that the first result of his success would have been the expulsion of the French embassy from Constantinople. They employed for that purpose every means in their power, and they succeeded by the following stratagem.
The chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan-Aga, had formerly been colonel of a regiment, which had acted once as guard of honour, given to a French embassy at the Porte. Having remained some time in that station, he had contracted a lasting connexion with the French, to whose party, since that period, he devoted himself. When General Sebastiani saw that peace with England was on the point of being concluded, he sent Franchini to him to suggest a plan which the Turkish officer carried into immediate execution. He went to the seraglio33, as if in great haste, and having obtained audience of the Sultan, he thus addressed his imperial chief:—
“May God preserve your sacred person and the Ottoman empire from every possible evil. A pure sense of duty brings me before your Royal Person, to represent that so strong and general a fermentation has arisen amongst my Janissaries since the appearance of the infidel’s fleet before your royal palace: they express so great a discontent at the measures pursued by your ministers in negotiating with the English, from a shameful fear that the appearance of that fleet has thrown them into; that a general insurrection is on the point of breaking out, unless the negotiations be laid aside, and all offers of peace be rejected with scorn. They declare that it is beneath the dignity and fame of the Ottoman empire, to submit to such an act of humiliation, as to sign a treaty, because a few ships have come to bully its capital, and dictate their own terms to the Ottoman sovereign. Your brave Janissaries will not suffer so disgraceful a stain to tarnish the splendour of the Ottoman arms. They are all ready to sacrifice themselves in defence of your residence, and in vindication of the honour and faith of the Ottoman nation. But they can never consent to stand tacit witnesses of a submission so ignominious to the Turkish name.”
Sultan Selim, a prince naturally timid and credulous, no sooner heard a message of this sort delivered in the name of the Janissaries, then in good understanding with the chiefs of government, and apparently united with the troops of the Nisam-y-gedid34, than he ordered all communications with the English fleet to be suspended, and immediate preparations of defence to be made, in the event of its commencing hostilities.
This manœuvre, unknown at the time, and with which very few persons are yet acquainted, was the true cause of the failure of the negotiations which, at the commencement, bore so sure a prospect of success.
The fleet returned without even having made a show of hostile intentions, and left to the triumphant French party the most decided influence in the Seraglio.
Before we enter into further observations on the events which followed, it may not be amiss to make a few remarks on the character of those who were then at the head of the Turkish administration, as it is to them that the whole change of system of the Porte is to be attributed.
Haffiz-Ismaïl Pashah, Grand Vezier, appointed early in 1805, was a low-bred, ignorant man, so poor and thirsty after money, that the moment he was elevated to his station, he formed the plan of operating a change in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, although the time prescribed by the treaties was not yet near, with a view of getting a subsidy, and securing to himself an income which the candidates, who took no small advantage of the Vezier’s inexperience and selfish views, had promised to allow him when the appointment should have taken place.
Ibraïm-Aga, Kiaya-Béÿ, or minister of the interior, a man of little experience and great ambition, under the idea of ingratiating himself with his master, and rendering, as he thought, a signal service to the state, undertook the affair of protections which he treated in a manner so insulting and provoking, that it was impossible for any foreign power, jealous of its own dignity, to suffer it to remain unnoticed.
The Mufti, Sheriff-Zaadé-Attaa-Effendi, and the chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan-Mehmet Aga, were entirely devoted to the French party. They willingly seconded the adoption of any measures which tended to alienate the Porte from England and Russia, and appeared calculated to promote Buonaparte’s scheme of overthrowing the triple alliance.
Galib Reïs-Effendi, minister of foreign affairs, and Yussuf-Aga, Validay-Kiayassi or chancellor to the Emperor’s mother, were the only two men in power friendly to the common cause. They disapproved of the measures pursued, but their opinion was over-ruled, and they both thought it prudent to retire from business, in order to screen themselves from responsibility with respect to the consequences they foresaw.
The military operations on the Danube be between the Russians and the Turks, which followed the first acts of hostility, were not more successful with regard to the object that brought them on, than the threats of the English fleet.
The peace of Tilsit took place; and the Porte, which had reason to expect an effective interference on the part of Buonaparte in behalf of its differences with Russia, gained no other advantage than the conclusion of a long armistice, the first condition of which was the retreat of the Russian armies from the principalities, whence, however, they did not remove. Negotiations for peace were, notwithstanding, set on foot; and the great revolutions, which overthrew the Sultan Selim, and consigned him to death, finally established a new order of things at Constantinople, and operated a complete change in the political system of the Turkish cabinet. The Porte remained no longer blind to the equivocal conduct of Buonaparte since his reconciliation with Russia, and began to look upon its state of hostility with England not only as useless, but even injurious to the interests of the country.
In 1808, an English35plenipotentiary had been for the second time36 sent to treat at the Dardanelles, and peace was definitively signed in the month of December of the same year.
At the same time the Turkish plenipotentiaries, sent to Bukorest during the armistice, were endeavouring to adjust the differences with Russia; but the interview of the Emperor Alexander with Buonaparte took place at Erfurth, and the failure of their joint proposals to the court of London37 was followed by instructions to Prince Prosoroffsky, commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in Moldavia and Wallachia, to signify to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries that, as the Emperor Alexander had acceded to the Continental System, the chief object of which was a continual state of warfare with England, he could no longer enter upon terms of peace with Turkey, unless the English ambassador, lately admitted at Constantinople, were sent out of the Ottoman dominions.
The Turkish ministers expressed astonishment at the versatility of the court of Russia, which, having made the first overtures for a negotiation, had not then in any manner alluded to England; they demanded time, however, for the arrival of instructions which were necessary to regulate their official reply to a communication so unexpected. They dispatched a messenger to Constantinople for that purpose, and he was accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Prince Prosoroffsky, Colonel Bock, who, on his arrival, signified to the Porte the Emperor’s ultimatum, through the channel of the French minister Latour Maubourg.
The Ottoman government, without much hesitation, recalled the Turkish plenipotentiaries from the congress of Bukorest, and hostilities were renewed.
A plan of partition had been formed at Erfurth between the emperors Alexander and Napoleon, by which the Turkish provinces were to fall to the share of Russia, and Spain to that of France. It was after this understanding between the two sovereigns that overtures were made to England. The English negotiation took time, and before it came to a decided issue, Buonaparte declared to his senate that the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were annexed to the dominions of his friend and ally the Emperor Alexander. When, however, Buonaparte found England determined to treat upon no basis which did not expressly admit of the evacuation of Spain, and that by entering into such terms he left a decided advantage to Russia with respect to Turkey, without reaping any benefit to himself from the political bargain made at Erfurth, he changed his views. The continental system, which he endeavoured to justify in attributing the general calamities of Europe to a tyrannical perseverance in war on the part of England, furnished him with a sufficient pretext for engaging Russia to continue her war against Turkey, who had just entered into terms of friendship with England. On the other hand, he prevailed upon the Turkish government to insist on the restitution of the principalities occupied by the Russian armies, and to continue hostilities so long as the Russian court should withhold its consent to that measure. His desire of keeping these two powers at variance with each other could not but increase when he had subsequently formed the plan of invading Russia, who, molested on one side by the Turks, and on the other by the Persians, was thus forced to employ considerable armies on distant frontiers.
The exhausted state of Turkey, the mediation of England, and the impatience of Russia, who was pressed by the hostile preparations of France, evidently intended against her, hastened the conclusion of peace in 1812 between the Mussulman powers and the Russians; but, critical as the circumstances were, the Court of St. Petersburgh signed a most advantageous treaty with both.
Galib Effendi, who, since the great changes of government at Constantinople, had resumed the functions of minister of foreign affairs, was chief plenipotentiary at the congress of Bukorest in 1811 and 1812; but the Greek prince Demetrius Mourousi, who, in his quality of state-interpreter, was present at the negotiations, conducted the greatest part of them, and was indeed intrusted with extensive power. He had, with his two brothers, been invariably attached to the Russian party since the beginning of his public career, and his hopes of being appointed to one of the principalities, the greatest objects of his ambition, after the restoration of peace, appeared grounded upon the best foundation. His office, his services at the congress, and the support of the court of Russia, were, in fact, considerations which appeared to render his nomination certain.
The cession of Wallachia and Moldavia could not, therefore, by any means, suit his views, and he combated it with energy and success; but, in rendering so important a service to the Porte, some proof of attachment to Russia was also necessary on his part; and although by insisting on the entire restitution of the principalities, no doubt but the Russian plenipotentiaries, who were instructed to hasten the conclusion of peace upon any terms not beyond that restitution, would have consented without hesitation, Mourousi, who was aware of it, finally settled the conditions by ceding to Russia the finest part of Moldavia, that which is situated between the rivers Dniester and Pruth, thus fixing the future line of demarcation of the Russian frontiers by the direction of the latter river.
The vigilant agents of Buonaparte at Constantinople did not suffer the conduct of Mourousi to remain unnoticed. When, after the signing of the treaty, they saw themselves frustrated in the hope of inducing the Porte to continue the war, they sought to bring the Mourousi family into disgrace, that they might, at least, prevail upon the Ottoman government to place at the head of the principalities persons of their own choosing. They represented the Prince Demetrius as a traitor who had been bribed by the Russians to serve their interests, at a time when it was in his power to obtain the most advantageous terms of peace.
Meanwhile hostilities commenced between France and Russia, and the Porte having evinced a resolution of remaining neutral, unwilling to give umbrage to either of the contending powers in the choice of the new Hospodars, resolved to fix upon two individuals whose political principles had never been connected with foreign parties. A great number of candidates offered their services, but none of them being qualified for the appointments, their claims were rejected. Halett-Effendi, intimate counsellor of the sultan, was instructed to make a choice, and he fixed it on the prince Charles Callimacki38 for Moldavia, and Yanco Caradja for Wallachia. Halett-Effendi had been several years before Turkish secretary to Callimacki’s father, whilst at the head of the Moldavian government, and on terms of intimate friendship with Caradja, who had also a subaltern employment under the same prince. Being perfectly acquainted with the personal character of both, he recommended them to the sultan as the fittest persons in those circumstances, and they were appointed in August 1812.
Demetrius Mourousi, who, with Galib Effendi, had not yet departed from Wallachia, received the news of the nominations at a time that he expected with confidence that of his own. He was at the same time secretly informed that his return to Constantinople would expose him to the greatest dangers, and advised to retire into a Christian country. Offers were made him of an asylum in Russia, with a considerable pension from the government; but, fearful that his flight might direct the vengeance of the Porte on his family, who had remained in the power of the Turks, and in the hope of justifying his conduct, since the whole responsibility of the transactions at the congress ought properly to have fallen on Galib Effendi, he made up his mind to accompany that minister back to the capital. He little suspected, however, that the Turkish minister, whose conduct had been disapproved of, had removed every unfavourable impression relative to himself from the mind of the Sultan, by attributing the conditions of peace to which he had subscribed, to the intrigues and treachery of Mourousi; and that he had, in consequence, received secret orders to arrest the Greek prince the moment they crossed the Danube together, and send him prisoner to the Grand Vezier, who had not yet removed his head-quarters from Shumla.
Mourousi, still more encouraged by the friendly assurances of Galib Effendi, left Bukorest in September, and from Rustehiuk was conveyed under an escort to Shumla, where, on entering the gates of the Vezier’s dwelling, he was met by several Chiaoushes39 who fell upon him with their sabres and cut him in pieces. His head was sent to Constantinople, where it was exposed three days at the gates of the Seraglio, with that of his brother Panayotti Mourousi, who, during the absence of Demetrius had filled his place at the Porte, and was accused of having been his accomplice in betraying the Ottoman interests.
The Hospodars Caradja and Callimacki took possession of their respective governments on the 3d of October, 1812, the day fixed for the restitution of the principalities; and the Porte, whose present security on the side of Russia, in a great measure depends on the strictest adherence to its treaties with that power, has made no attempt of removing the princes previous to the expiration of the seven years.
The Hospodar Caradja, however, having in the course of six years’ residence in Wallachia, amassed immense wealth, apprehensive of being called to account on his return to Constantinople for laying aside so many riches for his own use, judged it prudent to make a timely retreat, and to settle in some Christian country of Europe beyond the reach of Turkish influence. He remitted all his money to European banks, and one day in October, 1818, he assembled some of the principal Boyars, consigned to them the reins of government, and left Bukorest with all his family for Kronstadt in the Austrian dominions, where he arrived in safety after a short journey.40
After his departure, the Boyars petitioned the Sultan that he would no longer appoint Greek princes to govern Wallachia, but confide the administration to the members of the divan, who engaged to accept and maintain any tributary conditions that he would think proper to prescribe to them. The Ottoman cabinet, however, did not conceive it prudent to listen to the proposal; and after communicating with the Russian ambassador, appointed to the principality the same Alexander Sutzo, who had been so strongly opposed by the Russian Envoy in 1805.
Russia had no longer reasons to object to his nomination; and no doubt but the Prince Sutzo, who is an enlightened and well-thinking statesman, will acquit himself of his charge as well as the circumstances in which he is situated, will permit. But the harassing and ruinous system of government, still maintained in the principalities, offers, it must be confessed, no small matter of regret on the indifference of the Porte with regard to the adoption of measures better calculated for their welfare and prosperity.
The Ottoman court has often witnessed the consequences of the dread with which the Greeks employed in its service are impressed, and has felt on various occasions how much its policy must tend to alienate from the Turks every sentiment of good-will of the inhabitants of those provinces, and make them desirous and ready to throw themselves into the arms of the first nation whose armies approach their territory to make war on Turkey; and yet it continues in the same system. Greek princes, however devoted to the interests of the Porte, would certainly do little without armies, in the event of an unexpected revolution in Wallachia and Moldavia. Their presence alone is by no means sufficient to maintain in them the Turkish authority. The fortified places on the Danube, are the only guarantees of the fidelity of the principalities. In suffering the two nations to be governed entirely by their own natural authorities, would the Ottoman supremacy incur the least diminution of power? and would it not continue to maintain the same commanding advantages?
The inattention of the Turkish cabinet is not to be exclusively ascribed to the general system of governing the empire, but chiefly to the selfish views and personal avidity of the ministers who compose it. They have accustomed themselves to look upon Wallachia and Moldavia as two rich provinces over which they have but a momentary authority; and, instead of seeking the means most calculated to secure a permanent possession of them, they shorten the possibility by a systematic devastation of all their resources.
The Sultan himself, who takes a much more active part in the affairs of state than many of his predecessors have done; whose talents and liberal sentiments would claim equality with those of any other sovereign, were they not so much restrained by the religious prejudices and stubborn ignorance of his Mahometan subjects: and whose chief attention has of late years been directed to a new organization of the empire, unfortunately seems equally averse to any changes which might tend to improve the condition of Wallachia and Moldavia.