Chapter III — Criticism of the Accepted View — The Defeat of Varus by W. A. Oldfather

Chapter III Criticism of the Accepted View

Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part without question by later writers—and their availability for sound historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.

The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions, which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000 troops.1 The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the Romans were hemmed in, we are told2, by woods, lakes, and bodies of the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests, a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to the Roman defeat.3 Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed by a leader very generally represented4 as indolent, rash, and self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.5

This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against Maroboduus6, while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united under the same command.7 This difficulty has not escaped notice. Schiller recognizes it8, and while denying that the explanation is to be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen observes9: “We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously governed universal empire.” Immediately following this Mommsen offers as explanation: “there is no other reason to be found for it than that they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the empire.” Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome’s policy in the time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus10, believes that Augustus turned back to his “weaker wisdom” of an earlier day (the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius’ revolt and the battle as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army, the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which permitted service in the army only to citizens.11 To have subdued Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.

These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome’s lack of resources necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and Germany at this period.

When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof, been employed. The population of the empire under Augustus was not far from 55,000,00012, and, as service was voluntary and men of any nationality were admitted, at least into the auxilia, practically the whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions were restricted to Roman citizens, and the auxilia, consisting of foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries13, but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the so-called legiones vernaculae), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil, Ecl. I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and out “miles... barbarus.”14 Now Augustus appears to have made some consistent efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least, from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the Latin Occident15, and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army.16 Seeck indeed, after a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman citizens of the provinces.17 But granting this position for the sake of argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legionaries only from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of the empire (about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.)18 was sufficient to raise an army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause, which, with an equal number of auxilia, would yield a total potential military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken.19 That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a total army of between five and six hundred thousand men20, while after Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything, and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000 men.21

However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we must remember that the resources of the whole population were available to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency, and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men; for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception contributed abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed. Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or three campaigns.

For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions varied somewhat from time to time. After Actium Augustus had about 50 legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt.22 Three were lost in 9 A. D., and in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death was 25.23 Taking this latter as that of the average number about the time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the legion at 6000 men24, and adding in an equal number of auxilia, the city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached contingents25, we get about 325,000. The effective force would be somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if any under 300,000 men.26 Now the majority of these could have been launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions, or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, Tiberius, 16), and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen legions and the whole of the otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.

On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities (Tacitus, Germania, 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land on the marches between hostile tribes.27 Agriculture was primitive, and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in fact (Gutsche und Schultze, Deutsche Geschichte, I (1894), p. 236, for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than 15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a very difficult undertaking.28 Fustel de Coulanges long since and H. Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the numerical weakness of the tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century29, and Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small.30

H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the calculation of the population of Germany.31 On the basis of Beloch’s calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of 4-5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000 inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole nation.32 This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as five thousand, at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.

A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after Delbrück’s critique.33 Taking the results of extensive studies in the population of nations at different stages of economic development, he estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for “the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about the beginning of the Christian era” to have varied between the limits 5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results reached by these three different methods employed independently, the historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are the following.

Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included a large number of tribes (even the distant Semnones and the Longobardi) seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of 74,000 men.34 This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out35, bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force, twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him.36 Now this is probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear arms, i. e., following the customary Roman calculations37, one-fourth of the whole population. The Marcomannic confederation at its greatest development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even terms; hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the two confederations was about equal.38 Of course a large number of the tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control, but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and Schmoller.

Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members, the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as E. Levasseur, who has used this datum for his calculations of the population of Gaul, observes39, the number of large tribes was probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000) must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i. e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great altar at Lyons40, existed in Posidonius’ day, one would get a total population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch’s own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but prefers 5,700,000.41 Now the Germans being without cities, developed agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes42, a maximum of 3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23 tribes43, a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the population of Germany.

Finally, one might note Lamprecht’s ingenious estimate of the population in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative number of place names recorded for different epochs.44 He finds that a district which in 1800 A. D. had a population of about 450,000, had in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about 23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era45, we must bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.

We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar’s calculation of one man for every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people could collect from a considerable extent of territory46, we should get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower Rhine, remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and auxilia. Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions47, and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than eight48, and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of meeting his eight legions.49

We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence, partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service, and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very important rôle in the great battles, and in the one serious defeat of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned.50 Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than that of Gaul in Caesar’s time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit them at various stations inland as the armies advanced; besides, the numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army.51

This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other, or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet cooperated with the Rhine armies.

To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority52 in total population, size of army, general resources, equipment, tactics, strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore, did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on, the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different. We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes. To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable position.

It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat. One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself, if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above53, “without further direct military consequences.” If there was an advantage on either side it was with the Romans54, for immediately the army was increased to eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its head.55 It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition. Tiberius’ activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius (II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter’s partiality and proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt that Tiberius proceeded cautiously56 in the years 10 and 11, but in the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri57, resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt Tiberius’ assassination.58 Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested only one more year for the completion of his work.59 This means that Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control of as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed force shows beyond doubt that Rome’s resources were as yet by no means exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says60: “Nevertheless they had already once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war these results could not fail to be reached.” Gardthausen61 too agrees that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had she tried.

As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops. If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia had been put down.62 It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany’s subjugation, if he had wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat? Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus reveals preeminently in his public and private life.63 Nor is there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus’ nature a desire for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable to the undertaking.64 Meyer, after contrasting Augustus’ calm and deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says65: “In all seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand.... Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art.” No basis whatever exists for the reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar.66 Considering then that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation, that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery, there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome’s entire previous history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been so greatly diminished.67 That too in the face of the fact that he was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: “nulli genti bello per iniuriam lato.”68 That he was a man of peace is shown also by the statement of Suetonius;69 and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus laid down as his policy that “he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the former [subject territory] or that any new regions should be acquired, but deemed it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already possessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate.” Similar too, we note, is the view of Gibbon:70 “It was reserved for Augustus to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and to introduce a spirit of moderation into the public councils. Inclined to peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that Rome, in her present exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms.” Finally, Augustus found no joy in war for war’s sake, as did Julius Caesar.71

Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes and character would determine the policy of the empire. And, as seen above, it was contrary to Augustus’ character and wishes to carry on extensive wars of conquest. Further, that peace was Rome’s object at this period is universally admitted.72 The reason for this desire for peace Meyer sums up as follows73: “weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so furchtbaren Charakter getragen hatten, weil... aus dem entsetzlichen Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sicherheit um jeden Preis.” While it is true that this feeling and condition refer more particularly to the early part of Augustus’ reign, the same policy of peace manifested itself all through his rule, and was continued by his successors.74 The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since Rome’s beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the first few years of Augustus’ reign75 proves that he was eager for a cessation of war.

The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus’ defeat has long been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, “a wound to the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire.”76 While it was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius’ legion77, which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome’s policy more than Varus’ misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems highly improbable that “a wound to her pride” could have done so, when she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.

We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt was made, why was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination, contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent historian who has investigated the subject78, despite the fact that it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus’ plans with respect to Germany “das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung79, welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man meinte, nach Osten weiter schiffend in das caspische Meer gelangen zu können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde umkreise.” Further, he speaks of Augustus’ ambition as directed toward the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander. Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic error of Strabo.80 And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium. And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the “Emperor of the Sahara” would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing his military renown can be used as a valid reason for his having altered his belief in this respect.81

Kornemann82 indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for, such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added to the Monumentum Ancyranum (which Kornemann believes was a political document written in five distinct parts and at as many different periods83), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus, forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added, about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35, in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial conquest find contradiction in an article by Wilcken84, who argues that while Augustus worked long over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the three parts, honores, impensae, res gestae, form a whole, and were written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany. Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that it was inserted after the other two.85 For Germany could not have been called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9 B. C. Hence the first outline of the res gestae antedates not only the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore Augustus’ warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the date claimed by Kornemann.

This conclusion Kornemann combats86 with the assumption that while the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A. D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius’ naval expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir. But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier87, on the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates to each fragment of the Monumentum Ancyranum and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14 A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said is that the three parts, honores, impensae, res gestae were written at three different times and that they correspond to the different and successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however, that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D.88 Kornemann’s theories are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their rejection by such scholars as Wilcken, Gardthausen, Koepp, Marcks, Vulić, and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly, as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of events.

More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year 16 B. C. is cited as the time which brought a significant change in Rome’s foreign policy89, and committed Augustus to the subjugation of Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg90 as follows: “es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben, abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of Melo91, attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide92, cut off and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its standard.93 To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach Germanien hinein und... ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.”94 It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that he finally decided on the latter.95 Eduard Meyer finds not only the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus’ wars against Germany96: “nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen.” So Schiller urges the same reasons.97 Likewise it is Mommsen’s view98 that Augustus’ change in policy was necessary to Rome’s security; that it is easy to understand how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps; that “Great Germany” (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg99 thinks that Augustus was greatly influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the three military leaders of his household, his spirited stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.100 Gardthausen also believes101 that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious. As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania”102 discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will.”103 The urgency of the undertaking depended on the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus under the advice of Licinus may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul... as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the teeming populations of the eastern provinces.” Finally we may note the view expressed by Seeck104, viz., that Rome discovered from the events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit Roman territory bordering the empire’s boundaries to come to quiet and fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: “so wurde denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.”

Gardthausen voices the belief105 that political reasons also forced Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier’s desire for his natural element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus’ government were easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome’s position abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of the individual diminished by the empire’s enlargement. But of special moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions in Gaul, finds106 a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus, and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus’ social reforms. Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and as Egyptian influence grew stronger.

By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of opinions and explanations given above:

(1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus’ peace policy through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have been shown to have no basis in fact.

(2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as each new province became civilized the bordering territory must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality that we must not impute to one of the most astute political geniuses of the ancient world.

(3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it is at variance with what we do know of Augustus’ caution and singular independence in dealing with matters of state.

(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example, pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the nobility. As for the plebs urbana, they had by this time lost practically all their political activity and influence. Neither their condition nor their temper would prompt them to yearn for a war, which would likely result in their being called away to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and splendid than ever.

(5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only means at Augustus’ disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than Germany’s subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of territory between these borders and the strongholds of the enemy. A study of Rome’s several campaigns from this point of view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy. The “bufferstate” policy (see Chapter IV), once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus’ military advisers was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy, in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during, and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid’s writings appealed, that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation was complete or practically complete;107 that the provincial organization was just about to be put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an organization forever impossible.108 Gardthausen thinks109 that Drusus’ death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the very heart of the land110: Koepp sees no reason to conclude that Germany was ever a Roman province111; he is quite sure that the part on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the battle with Varus.112 Zumpt113 was probably the first to deny the existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen’s view became the accepted one.114 He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a “governor of Germany”, and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as “a province, though still by no means reduced to tranquillity”, a discussion on the “Organization of the province of Germany”, as evidence for which he adduces the administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the “province of Germany”, as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for “giving up the new German province” (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): “The original province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the Elbe, subsisted only twenty years”, i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on (p. 108) we are told that “the governorship and the command were not, in a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so to speak, placed in suspense”, and that out of the parts on the left of the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany115; that these were “in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic”, but that the latter, since “a separation of the military and civil administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two armies, so long as the troops were stationed there” [east of the Rhine].

The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld116, who believes that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner Marquardt117 thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in Lugdunum] theil.”118 On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year 9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz Germaniae.”119 Further on120 we are told that after Quintilius Varus succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober-und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant, bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem Rheine am linken Ufer.”121 Riese, who has carefully examined all the available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made, and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul, which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.122 The east boundary of Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.123 The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all Gaul124, which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1): “accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus’ command, in the year 12 B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more certainly Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands. The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus is called by Velleius “legatus Augusti in Germania”, and by Dio “τῆς Γερμανίας ἄρχων”. But this does not mean that at that time there was a German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe. Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius (“in formam provinciae redacti”), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but “sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae” (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II, 30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term provincia in different senses.125 Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than “land”, since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of Gaul. In answer to Mommsen’s view that the establishment of a separate province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case it had been customary in every province for the emperor’s worship to be observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same province126, e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus, and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor’s policy from the beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with the emperor’s house.127 And not only are we nowhere told the contrary, but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province, or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested as directly responsible for the catastrophe which befell Varus. So Ferrero says128: “In Germany... the people, apparently subdued, were not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman conquests.” Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that such an anomalous “conquest” should not long since have been recognized as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do so? Many, as shown above129, argue that Rome was unable to accomplish her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt.130 Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a more remote one.131 He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus to suspend or give up a plan that was well considered and already successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost, since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius132, and was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.133. But the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war. Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus, and the Germans remained free.134 Koepp135 sees the reason for Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius, but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too expensive.136 Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus, but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany, and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of these armies to be united with that of Gaul.137

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small concern, and significant only because of chance association with other reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

(1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.

(2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were severely defeated.

(3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a thorough conquest had that been the desire.

(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the undertaking.

(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of Rome at this period.

(6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on account of a single setback.

(7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus, certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any conquest ever undertaken, and a rational criticism will try to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a preconceived theory.

(8) There was certainly no “provincia” to abandon, under any circumstances.

(9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius, and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time. Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had after the defeat of Lollius.

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians138, and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.

Footnotes

1 Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 41; 51; Idem, Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.

2 Vell., II, 119.

3 Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents and conditions: “ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate fortunae circumventus... inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also Tac., Ann., I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus emersum”.

4 Vell., II, 117; II, 120: “ex quo apparet Varum magis imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum”; Suet., Tib., 18: “Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse.” Cf. also Tac., Ann., II, 46: “quoniam tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper leadership. So Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann... von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (Rh. Jahrbr., 87, p. 59) accepting Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see Westd. Zeitschr., 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet, entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den Ann., II, 46, nennt ‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.

5 Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them, particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (Die Oertlichkeit, etc., p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three times their equal.

6 Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen.

7 See Eduard Meyer, “Kaiser Augustus” (in Kleine Schriften, Halle a. S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, Suet., Aug., 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling (“Zur Geschichte des römischen Heeres in Gallien,” Rh. Jahrbr., 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27 legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the uprising in Illyricum.

8 Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag 16.000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte, dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the same view is expressed by him in Westfalen, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob der Untergang dreier Legionen ein Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden.”

9 Hist. of Rome, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which... an isolated failure in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”

10 Kaiser Augustus, p. 116.

11 Kaiser Augustus, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., Aug., 25. According to Suetonius libertini were employed twice by Augustus: “Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni.” These two occasions, at the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.

12 This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer (“Bevölkerung des Altertums,” Conrad’s Handw. d. Staatsw., 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who accepts with slight modifications, Beloch’s calculations. The latter (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (1886), p. 507) gave 54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (Rh. Mus., IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible, would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch’s revision, calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions, and O. Seeck (Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, III, 13 (1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch’s vigorous reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more conservative figure.

13 That this was the custom followed for the socii and auxilia during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, N. H., 25, 33, 6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5, in speaking of the “sociae triremes alasque et auxilia cohortium,” adds, “neque multo secus in numero virium.” Detailed information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere given. See Liebenam, art. “Exercitus,” Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1601, 1607. G. L. Cheesman (The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army, Oxford, 1914 p. 53 ff.) finds that the auxilia under Augustus were at least as numerous as the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf. also Delbrück, op. cit., II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).

14 Cf. Ed. Meyer, ibid., p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by Liebenam, art. “Dilectus,” Pauly-Wiss., V, 611 ff.

15 Mommsen, Eph. Epigr., V (1884), p. 159 ff.; Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.

16 We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus, whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, l. c., p. 611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing in the general conditions which required it.

17 Rh. Mus., XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a Galatian contingent, the Deiotariana, which was given citizenship and a place in the army (Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 2nd ed. (1885), p. 70; O. Seeck, Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt, 3rd ed., I, p. 260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome (Tac., Ann., I, 31, “vernacula multitudo”; cf. Mommsen, Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck’s statement of the system which he believes Augustus followed is: “Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und Alen und einen Theil der Flotte.”

18 In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the Mon. Anc., 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population (Augustus, II, 532; and Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik, III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the numbers in the Mon. Anc. include women and children seems the only one possible. See Meyer’s complete refutation of Kornemann, Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.

19 This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her total population in the field, even according to the most conservative estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, I, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 349, 355 ff.

20 Mommsen, Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as 300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.

21 The details in Marquardt, Röm. Staatsver., V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884), p. 444 f.

22 Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, “Zur Geschichte des Rheinheeres,” Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt, 1910, on the date of the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above note 7.

23 Mommsen, op. cit., p. 75; Liebenam in Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1605. We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, op. cit., p. 448 ff.

24 The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently summarized by R. Cagnat, “Legio,” Daremberg et Saglio, III, p. 1050 f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, Lager und Heer der Römer, 1912, pp. 1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size, from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich’s review of Stolle’s work, Berl. Philol. Wochenschr., 1913, 530 ff.

25 A list of these is given by Liebenam, op. cit., p. 1607 ff.

26 Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (The Annals of Tacitus, I (1884), p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (Rh. Mus., XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen soldiery out of Italy: in his Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt, 3rd ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000 to 350,000; H. Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1904), p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (Augustus, I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18 legions were maintained. G. Boissier’s number, 500,000 (L’opposition sous les Césars, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the auxilia three times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in doubling that!

27 For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.

28 E. M. Arndt, Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1845), p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile, but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000. H. Von Sybel (Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums, 1881, p. 80) estimates the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose an incredibly dense population.

29 Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, I (1875), “L’Invasion Germanique,” p. 310 ff. For Delbrück’s results see the chapter entitled “Zahlen,” Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies, a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the older view, but Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.

30 “Observations sur l’état et le nombre des populations germaniques dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle, d’après Ammien Marcellin,” Mélanges Cagnat, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.

31 “Der urgermanische Gau und Staat,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p. 474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, Gesch. der deutschen Stämme, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück’s calculations indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.

32 Preuss. Jahrb., p. 482.

33 Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, I, Leipzig, 1901, p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.

34 Velleius, II, 109.

35 Op. cit., I, p. 48; II, p. 209.

36 See Gardthausen, Augustus, I. p. 1169 on this campaign.

37 This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (Bell. Gall., I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf. Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system of reckoning. Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., 81, p. 480, uses the one to five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.

38 That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, Ann., II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus’ statement that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most improbable; see L. Schmidt, op. cit., II, 2, 181.

39 La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789, I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad., 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for calculations. Beloch, however, (Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 414 f.) utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄνδρες here as equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus, who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch’s remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but only of the fighting men, seems to go too far. If one number be known it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted proportion between the total population of a district and the number of fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on just such estimates.

40 Strabo, IV, 3, 2.

41 Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.

42 Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.

43 Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 428, note, and Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.

44 Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter, Leipzig, 1886, I, p. 148 ff., esp. 161 ff.

45 Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, Nat. Hist., IV, 98.

46 See Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his Bevölkerung, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.

47 Tac., Ann., I, 56.

48 Tac., Ann., II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.

49 Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.

50 Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.

51 Velleius, II, 106.

52 The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr., p. 486; von Domaszewski, Geschichte der römischen Kaiser, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war” (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).

53 See p. 37.

54 Cf. Koepp, Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 35: “Kurz, als Tiberius am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer ergänzt, ja vermehrt”; Hübner, op. cit., p. 111: “Nach des Varus Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder”; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, V, 53: “The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably reinforced”; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: “damals... wurde die Rheinarmee auf acht Legionen verstärkt.” So Niese, Röm. Gesch., p. 298.

55 Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam... ultro Rhenum cum exercitu transgreditur.”

56 Suet., Tib., 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.

57 Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.

58 Suet., Tib., 19.

59 Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (Hist. of Rome, V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in the record Riese explains, Forschungen, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, op. cit., p. 34.

60 Hist. of Rome, V, p. 62.

61 I, p. 1201.

62 Cf. p. 36.

63 Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: “Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger.” These characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically embellished gossip about Augustus’ discomposure after the defeat of Varus; see Suet., Aug., 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest evidence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111, 1). So there was profound alarm at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius Capitolinus, Marcus Antoninus, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13), while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied with fear (Sall., Jug., 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt, and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.

64 Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated by Gardthausen’s further statement: “Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte.” These words are nothing more than an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are forced to explain, viz., Augustus’ reversal of policy in “die schwere Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der fortgesetzten Eroberung.”

65 Kleine Schriften, p. 462.

66 Meyer, l. c.: “Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss unbegründet.”

67 The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I, p. 637; Furneaux, Tacitus, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 8: “ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte.”

68 Monumentum Ancyranum, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., Aug., 101; Tac., Ann., I, 11: “quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam.” The sneer, “metu an per invidiam”, found in the words of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to restrict Augustus’ peace policy to the period after Varus’ defeat. But no such restriction should be made. We now know that the Monum. Ancyr. was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus’ life, but was finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9 A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.

69 Aug., 21: “nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit.”

70 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.

71 Gardthausen, I, p. 317: “Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte.” Tacitus’ statement (Ann., I, 3), that Augustus’ later wars against the Germans were “abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi imperii”, does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.

72 Vell., II, 89: “Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciis auctoritas.” This is well expressed by Botsford, Hist. of Rome, p. 205: “The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers, to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of peace.”

73 Kleine Schriften, p. 455.

74 Gardthausen, I, p. 477: “Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt.” Cf. Lang, op. cit., p. 56: “Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe und Ordnung zu verschaffen.”

75 Suet., Aug., 22: “Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit.”

76 Davis, Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire, New York, 1907, p. 59.

77 Dio, 54, 20; Suet., Aug., 23.

78 See Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made world-conquest impossible”; Ibid., p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p. 1069; Drumann, Röm. Gesch., IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p. 57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf. J. Geffcken, Kaiser Julianus, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt... wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In The Caesars, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.” (Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).

79 Op. cit., p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results, contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his times.

80 II, 39.

81 Cf. Drumann, Gesch. Roms,² 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung. Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”

82 “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” Beiträge zur alten Gesch., II (1902), pp. 141-162.

83 This view, together with the statement that the last addition was made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann in placing the number of revisions at seven (Klio, IV (1904), pp. 88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D. (Beiträge zur alten Gesch., III (1903), p. 74 f.).

84 “Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyr.,” Hermes, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.

85 Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” Riv. di Storia Ant., XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam... pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which for the time Rome’s beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word “provinciae” (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the abandonment of the geographical order.

86 “Nochmals das Monum. Ancyr.,” Klio, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.

87 “Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti,” Mélanges Cagnat, Paris, 1912, p. 144.

88 Cf. Bésnier, op. cit., p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’ Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C. et peut-être plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ére il a cessé d’y travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement d’additions nombreuses et significatives.... Le souple génie politique d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspire tour à tour pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”

89 Cf. Ritterling, op. cit., p. 176: “Aber eine durchgreifende Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des durch diese hervorgerufenen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen... Eine Eroberung des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen zur Ausführung dieses Planes.”

90 Op. cit., p. 25.

91 Monumentum Ancyranum, VI, 3.

92 Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.

93 Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., Aug., 23.

94 Paul Meyer, Der Triumphzug des Germanicus, p. 85.

95 I, p. 1067. According to Niese, op. cit., p. 295, the decision came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: “Dann erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen.”

96 Kleine Schriften, p. 471.

97 Op. cit., p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und... auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu vertheidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”

98 Germanische Politik, etc., p. 9.

99 Op. cit., 29.

100 The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale, General Hist. of Rome, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (Hist. of the Roman Empire, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of “The project of extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus.” Cf. Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 10: “Ob Augustus ganz von freien Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag.”

101 I, p. 1049 f.

102 Op. cit., V, p. 142.

103 Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the question, how it came to pass that the... Germans were not bent under the yoke of Rome... the only reason history can give is that it was the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own free will.” On the other hand Beloch, Griech. Gesch.², I, 1 (1912), p. 15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt wert war.”

104 Kaiser Augustus, p. 111.

105 I, p. 1048 f.

106 Op. cit., V, p. 153 f.

107 Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 13: “wie Gallien durch Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt worden.” In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius’ time, Germany is spoken of as “almost a province” (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen says: “so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war.” Niese, Grundriss der röm. Gesch., 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr. Kauffman, “Deutsche Altertumskunde” (in Matthias’ Handbuch d. deutschen Unterrichts, München, 1913, p. 317): “In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb. bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein bis zur Elbe unfasste.”

108 But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus’ own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For since no part of the Monum. Ancyr. was written after 6 A. D., it cannot be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus’ views after 9 A. D., as is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document took place in 14 A. D.

109 II, p. 1089.

110 I, p. 1198: “Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben.”

111 Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in Kleine Schriften, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: “Now the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact that Germany was not subdued by the Romans.... Caesar would have subdued Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to herself.”

112 Westfalen, p. 40: “das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht.”

113 Studia Romana, 1859, P. 130.

114 Röm. Gesch., V, p. 23 f.

115 In Germanische Politik, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct status, see Riese’s view as given below, p. 73 ff.

116 “Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze,” etc., Commentationes philologae in honorem Th. Mommseni, p. 434.

117 Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I (1881), p. 271.

118 Op. cit., p. 212.

119 p. 219.

120 p. 229.

121 p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in Essays on Roman History, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement (Germ., 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it was in reality “debatable land” (dubiae possessionis of Tacitus), and had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her own territory.

122 Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit, p. 5 f. See also Riese in Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst, Korrespondenz-Blatt, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab es also... nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitiger Hülfe verbundenen Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine Germania inferior.... Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der Heeresbezirk der gallischen Provinzen.”

123 Plin., N. H., iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.

124 Ritterling (op. cit., p. 162) believes, however, that there were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning of Augustus’ reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.

125 See p. 27 and note.

126 Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I², 504.

127 There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling, op. cit., p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinandergreifen der geplanten Operationen am Mittel-und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando notwendig.”

128 Characters and Events of Roman History, p. 165.

129 See also Sadée, Römer und Germanen, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter “Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius”); Wolf, Die That des Arminius, p. 41 f. (“Der Befreiungskampf”). Eduard Meyer’s statement that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p. 38).

130 Reitzenstein, “Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus,” Hermes, 48 (1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had no such significance; that there was no change in Rome’s policy until Germanicus’ time, and that Rome’s contest with Germany through three decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political situation which is found at a much later time.

131 Cf. also Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 14 f.: “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens... stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich. Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor.” As reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius’ return and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1) the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of Tiberius.

132 II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, Characters and Events, p. 165.

133 Op. cit., p. 117: “Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur 8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten wehren können.”

134 Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, op. cit., p. 86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns, but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well deserved triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, op. cit., p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen unschädlich.”

135 Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 45.

136 This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten diese Schädigungen... nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight drain on the treasury.

137 See op. cit., p. 20.

138 Cf. Merivale: History of the Romans under the Empire, IV, p. 240: “These repeated advances... though far from having the character of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power.”

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