XXXVIII
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Suppose that I surrender at discretion and admit that it is likewise included in fate that vows be assuredly performed. Then for that reason they will be performed. It is fated that a man be eloquent, but only if he use due means and apply himself to study. The same destiny enjoins that he should study; therefore he will study. Another will be rich, but he must first go to sea. But in the order of fate in which he is promised a great fortune, it is also decreed that he go to sea; therefore he will go to sea. In regard to expiation, I apply just the same principle. A man is fated to escape danger if he expiate the threats foretold by heaven. But it is likewise contained in fate that he offer expiation; therefore he will offer it.
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An objection is usually urged against this view which seeks to prove that no freedom of will is on this assumption left to us, all sway is handed over to fate. When I come to treat of that subject, I will explain how, without infringing the power of fate, something may still be left to human choice. For the nonce, I have explained the point at issue, viz. how, consistently with an order fixed by fate, perils from prodigies may be averted through expiation and sacrifice, inasmuch as they do not conflict with fate, but, on the contrary, are assumed by the very law of fate. What benefit, then, you say, can I derive from a soothsayer? In any case I must of necessity offer expiation, even though he be not by to advise it. He so far does good in that he is the instrument of fate. In like manner, when recovery from illness seems the work of fate, it is due at the same time to the doctor, because the boon of fate passes through his hands in order to reach us.