Sea Power in its Relations, Vol. 1

Contents

Antecedents of the War

CHAPTER I Colonial Conditions
	Page
Remote origin of the causes of the War of 1812	1
Two principal causes: impressment and the carrying trade	2
Claim of Great Britain as to impressment	3
Counter-claim of the United States	4
Lack of unanimity among the American people	5
Prevailing British ideas as to sea power and its relations to carrying trade and impressment	9
The Navigation Acts	10
Distinction between “Commerce” and “Navigation”	11
History and development of the Navigation Acts, and of the national opinions relating to them	13
Unanimity of conviction in Great Britain	22
Supposed benefit to the British carrying trade from loss of the American colonies	23
British entrepôt legislation	24
Relation of the entrepôt idea to the Orders in Council of 1807	27
Colonial monopoly a practice common to all European maritime states	27
Effect of the Independence of the United States upon traditional commercial prepossessions	29
Consequent policy of Great Britain	29
Commercial development of the British transatlantic colonies during the colonial period	31
Interrelation of the continental and West India colonies of Great Britain	35
Bearing of this upon the Navigation Acts	36
Rivalry of American-built ships with British navigation during the colonial period	37
Resultant commercial rivalry after Independence	40
Consequent disagreements, derived from colonial restrictions, and leading to war	41
CHAPTER II From Independence to Jay’s Treaty
Rupture of the colonial relation	42
Transitional character of the period 1774-1794, to the United States	43
Epochal significance of Jay’s Treaty	43
The question of British navigation, as affected by the loss of the colonies	45
British commercial expectations from the political weakness of the United States, 1783-1789	46
System advocated by Lord Sheffield	47
Based upon considerations of navigation and naval power	49
Navigation Acts essentially military in purpose	51
Jefferson’s views upon this question	52
Imperial value of the British Navigation Act before American Independence	53
Influence of the inter-colonial trade at the same period	55
Essential rivalry between it and British trade in general	55
Common interest of continental America and of Great Britain in the West Indies	56
Pitt’s Bill, of March, 1783	58
Controversy provoked by it in Great Britain	60
British jealousy of American navigation	63
Desire to exclude American navigation from British colonial trade	65
Lord Sheffield’s pamphlet	65
Reply of the West India planters	66
Lapse of Pitt’s bill	67
Navigation Acts applied in full rigor to intercourse between the United States and West Indies	68
This policy continues till Jay’s Treaty	69
Not a wrong to the United States, though an injury	70
Naval impotence of the United States	71
Dependence on Portugal against Barbary pirates	72
Profit of Great Britain from this impotence	74
Apparent success of Sheffield’s trade policy, 1783-1789	75
Increase of British navigation	75
American counteractive legislation after the adoption of the Constitution	76
Report of the committee of the British Privy Council on this subject, 1790	77
Aggressive spirit of the Navigation Acts	79
Change of conditions through American navigation laws	80
Recommendations of the British committee	81
Effects of the French Revolution	85
Collapse of French colonial system	85
Failure of Sheffield’s policy, in supplying the West Indies from Canada	86
Great Britain’s war necessities require aid of American shipping	86
Her resolve to deprive France of the same aid	88
Consequent lawless measures towards American ships and commerce	88
Jay’s mission.—Impressment not mentioned in his instructions	88
CHAPTER III From Jay’s Treaty to the Orders in Council, 1794-1807
Arbitrary war measures of Great Britain, 1793	89
Rule of 1756	90
Peculiar relation of the United States to this Rule	92
Jay’s arrival in London	93
Characteristics of his negotiations	94
Great Britain concedes direct trade with West Indies	95
Rejection of this article by the Senate, on account of accompanying conditions	96
Concession nevertheless continued by British order	97
Reasons for this tolerance	97
Conditions of trade from Jay’s mission to the Peace of 1801	97
No concession of the principle of the Rule of 1756	98
Renewal of war between Great Britain and France, 1803	99
Prosperity of American commerce	100
Question raised of “direct trade”	100
Decision in British Admiralty Court adverse to United States, 1805	101
United States subjected again to colonial regulation	103
Remonstrance and negotiation of Monroe, American Minister in London	104
Death of Pitt. Change of ministry in Great Britain. Position of Charles James Fox	105
Fox’s attempt at compromise	108
The blockade of May 16, 1806	108
Its lawfulness contested by the United States	110
Its importance in history	112
Retaliatory commercial action by the United States	113
Pinkney sent to England as colleague to Monroe	113
Colonial trade, and impressment of seamen from American vessels, the leading subjects mentioned in their instructions	114
Historical summary of the impressment question	114
Opening of negotiations by Monroe and Pinkney	128
Death of Fox	131
Course of the negotiations	131
Provisional treaty, signed December 31, 1806	133
Rejected by United States Government	133
Monroe and Pinkney directed to reopen negotiations	133
Change of ministry in Great Britain. Canning becomes Foreign Secretary	134
The British Government refuses further negotiation	135
Monroe leaves England, Pinkney remaining as minister	135
“Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights”	135
Consistency of Jefferson’s Administration on the subject of impressment	137
It neglects to prepare for war	138
CHAPTER IV From the Orders in Council to War
Reservation of the British Government in signing the treaty of December 31, 1806	141
The Berlin Decree	142
Ambiguity of its wording	143
The question of “private property,” so called, embarked in commercial venture at sea. Discussion	144
Wide political scope of the Berlin Decree	148
Twofold importance of the United States in international policy	149
Consequent aims of France and Great Britain	149
British Order in Council of January 7, 1807	150
Attitude of the United States Government	152
Military purpose of the Berlin Decree and the Continental System	153
The “Chesapeake” affair	155
Conference concerning it between Canning and Monroe	156
Action of President Jefferson	160
Use made of it by Canning	161
Correspondence concerning the “Chesapeake” affair	161
Rose appointed envoy to Washington to negotiate a settlement	165
Failure of his mission	167
Persistent British refusal to punish the offending officer	169
Significance of the “Chesapeake” affair in the relations of the two nations	168
Its analogy to impressment	170
Enforcement of the Berlin Decree by Napoleon	172
Its essential character	174
The Decree and the Continental System are supported by the course of the American Government	175
Pinkney’s conviction of Great Britain’s peril	177
The British Orders in Council, November, 1807	177
Their effect upon the United States	178
Just resentment in America	178
Action of the Administration and Congress	181
The Embargo Act of December, 1807	182
Explanations concerning it to Great Britain	183
Its intentions, real and alleged	185
Its failure, as an alternative to war	186
Jefferson’s aversion to the carrying trade	187
Growing ill-feeling between the United States and Great Britain	190
Relief to Great Britain from the effects of the Continental System, by the Spanish revolt against Napoleon	191
Depression of United States industries under the Embargo	192
Difficulty of enforcement	194
Evasions and smuggling	195
The Embargo beneficial to Canada and Nova Scotia	198
Effects in Great Britain	199
Relief to British navigation through the Embargo	200
Effect of the Embargo upon American revenue	202
Numbers of American vessels remain abroad, submitting to the Orders in Council, and accepting British licenses and British convoy	203
Napoleon’s Bayonne Decree against them; April 17, 1808	203
Illustrations of the working of Napoleon’s Decrees and of the Orders in Council	204
Vigorous enforcement of the Embargo in 1808	206
Popular irritation and opposition	207
Act for its further enforcement, January 9, 1809	208
Evidences of overt resistance to it	209
Act for partial repeal, introduced February 8	210
Conflicting opinions as to the Embargo, in and out of Congress	211
The Non-Intercourse Act, March 1, 1809	214
Its effect upon commercial restrictions	215
Canning’s advances, in consequence of Non-Intercourse Act	215
Instructions sent to Erskine, British Minister at Washington	216
Erskine’s misleading communication of them, April 18, 1809	218
Consequent renewal of trade with Great Britain	219
Erskine disavowed. Non-Intercourse resumed, August 9, 1809	219
Orders in Council of November, 1807, revoked; and substitute issued, April 26, 1809	220
Consequent partial revival of American commerce	220
Francis J. Jackson appointed as Erskine’s successor	221
His correspondence with the American Secretary of State	222
Further communication with him refused	225
Criticism of the American side of this correspondence	226
Wellesley succeeds Canning as British Foreign Secretary	229
Jackson’s dismissal communicated to Wellesley by Pinkney	229
Wellesley delays action	230
British view of the diplomatic situation	231
Failure of the Non-Intercourse Act	232
Difficulty of finding a substitute	233
Act of May 1, 1810.—Its provisions	234
Napoleon’s Rambouillet Decree, March 23, 1810	235
Act of May 1, 1810, communicated to France and Great Britain	236
Napoleon’s action. Champagny’s letter, August 5, 1810	237
Madison accepts it as revoking the French Decrees	238
The arguments for and against this interpretation	239
Great Britain refuses to accept it	242
Statement of her position in the matter	243
Wellesley’s procrastinations	245
Pinkney states to him the American view, at length, December 10, 1810	245
Wellesley’s reply	246
Inconsistent action of the French Government	247
Non-Intercourse with Great Britain revived by statute, March 2, 1811	249
The American Minister withdraws from London, February 28, 1811	251
Non-Intercourse with Great Britain remains in vigor to, and during, the war	252
Augustus J. Foster appointed British Minister to the United States, February, 1811	252
His instructions	253
His correspondence with the Secretary of State	254
Settlement of the “Chesapeake” affair	255
The collision between the “President” and the “Little Belt”	256
Special session of Congress summoned	259
The President’s Message to Congress, November 5, 1811	259
Increase of the army voted	259
Debate on the navy	260
Congress refuses to increase the navy, January 27, 1812	263
Embargo of ninety days preparatory to war, April 4	263
The evasions of this measure	264
Increasing evidence of the duplicity of Napoleon’s action	266
Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1812	269
Consequent British declaration	270
Use of these papers by Barlow, American Minister to France	271
The spurious French Decree of April 28, 1811, communicated to Barlow	272
Communicated to the British Government	273
Considerations influencing the British Government	274
The Orders in Council revoked	276
Madison sends a war message to Congress, June 1, 1812	279
Declaration of war, June 18, 1812	279
Conditions of the army, navy, and treasury	279
CHAPTER V The Theatre of Operations
Limitations on American action through deficient sea power	283
Warfare against commerce considered	284
Its financial and political effects	285
Its military bearing	285
Distinction between military and commercial blockade	286
Commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying by cruisers	287
Recognition of this by Napoleon	287
Commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger navy; by cruisers, of the weaker	288
Inefficiency of the American Government shown in the want of naval preparation	289
Conditions in the army even worse	290
Jefferson’s sanguine expectations	291
Propriety of the invasion of Canada discussed	292
The United States, weak on the seaboard, relatively strong towards Canada	295
Function of the seaboard in the war; defensive	296
Offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence	298
Application of this principle; in general, and to 1812	298
Conditions on the Canada frontier, favoring the offensive by the United States	300
Importance of the Great Lakes to military operations	301
Over-confidence of Americans	303
Corresponding apprehension of British officers	304
Decisive points on the line between the countries	305
Importance of the Indians as an element in the situation	306
Proper offensive policy of the United States	307
Natural advantages favoring the United States	309
The land frontier the proper scene of American offensive action	310
Seaboard conditions, for offence and defence	311
CHAPTER VI Early Cruises and Engagements. Hull’s Operations and Surrender
Composition of Commodore Rodgers’ squadron at outbreak of war	314
Indecisions of the Navy Department	315
Question between small squadrons and single cruisers for commerce-destroying	315
Opinions of prominent officers	316
British convoy system for protecting trade	319
The Navy Department formulates a plan of operations	320
Discussion of its merits	321
Rodgers sails without receiving Department’s plan	322
Encounter with the “Belvidera”	323
The cruise unproductive, offensively	324
But not therefore unsuccessful, defensively	325
Its effect upon the movements of British vessels	326
The sailing of the “Constitution”	328
Chased by a British squadron	329
Cruise of the “Constitution” under Hull	329
Engagement with the “Guerrière”	330
Hull and Rodgers meet in Boston	335
Misfortune on land	336
Wretched condition of the American army	336
Appointment of Henry Dearborn and William Hull as generals. Hull to command in the Northwest	337
Isaac Brock, the British general commanding in Upper Canada	337
His well-considered scheme of operation	338
Incompetency of the American War Department	339
Hull takes command at Dayton	340
Advances to Detroit	341
Crosses to Canada	341
Brock causes seizure of Michilimackinac	341
Hull’s delays in Canada, before Malden	343
The danger of his position	343
The British attack his communications	345
Hull recrosses to Detroit	345
Brock’s difficulties	346
Moves against Hull, and reaches Malden	346
Crosses to Detroit, and advances	346
Hull surrenders	347
Criticism of his conduct	348
Extenuating circumstances	349
Ultimate responsibility lies upon the Governments which had been in power for ten years	350
CHAPTER VII Operations on the Northern Frontier after Hull’s Surrender. European Events bearing on the War
Brock returns to Niagara from Detroit	351
Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, arranges with Dearborn a suspension of hostilities	352
Suspension disapproved by the American Government. Hostilities resumed	353
Brock’s advantage by control of the water	353
Two of his vessels on Lake Erie taken from him by Lieutenant Elliott, U.S. Navy	354
Brock’s estimate of this loss	356
American attack upon Queenston	357
Repulsed, but Brock killed	357
Abortive American attack on the Upper Niagara	358
Inactivity of Dearborn on the northern New York frontier	359
Military inefficiency throughout the United States	360
Improvement only in the naval situation on the lakes	361
Captain Chauncey appointed to command on Lakes Erie and Ontario	361
His activity and efficiency	362
Disadvantages of his naval base, Sackett’s Harbor	363
Chauncey’s early operations, November, 1812	364
Fleet lays up for the winter	366
Effect of his first operations	366
General Harrison succeeds to Hull’s command	367
Colonel Procter commands the British forces opposed	367
His instructions from Prevost and Brock	367
Harrison’s plan of operations	368
The American disaster at Frenchtown	370
Effect upon Harrison’s plans	371
The army remains on the defensive, awaiting naval control of Lake Erie	371
Chauncey visits Lake Erie	374
Disadvantages of Black Rock as a naval station	374
Chauncey selects Presqu’Isle (Erie) instead	375
Orders vessels built there	375
Advantages and drawbacks of Erie as a naval base	375
Commander Perry ordered to the lakes	376
Assigned by Chauncey to command on Lake Erie	376
Naval conditions on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at close of 1812	377
Contemporary European conditions	378
Napoleon’s expedition against Russia	379
Commercial embarrassments of Great Britain	379
Necessity of American supplies to the British armies in Spain	381
Preoccupation of the British Navy with conditions in Europe and the East	382
Consequent embarrassment from the American war	383
Need of the American market	384
Danger to British West India trade from an American war	384
Burden thrown upon the British Admiralty	385
British anxiety to avoid war	385
CHAPTER VIII Ocean Warfare against Commerce—Privateering—British Licenses—Naval Actions: “Wasp” and “Frolic,” “United States” and “Macedonian”
Consolidation of British transatlantic naval commands	387
Sir John Borlase Warren commander-in-chief	387
British merchant ships forbidden to sail without convoy	388
Continued hope for restoration of peace	389
Warren instructed to make propositions	390
Reply of the American Government	391
Cessation of impressment demanded. Negotiation fails	391
Warren’s appreciation of the dangers to British commerce	392
Extemporized character of the early American privateering	394
Its activities therefore mainly within Warren’s station	394
Cruise of the privateer “Rossie,” Captain Barney	395
Privateering not a merely speculative undertaking	396
Conditions necessary to its success	397
Illustrated by the privateer “America”	398
Comparative immunity of American shipping and commerce at the beginning of hostilities	399
Causes for this	400
Controversial correspondence between Warren and the Admiralty	401
Policy of the Admiralty. Its effects	404
American ships of war and privateers gradually compelled to cruise in distant seas	406
American commerce excluded from the ocean	406
Sailing of the squadrons of Rodgers and Decatur	407
Their separation	408
Cruise of Rodgers’ squadron	409
British licenses to American merchant vessels	410
Action between the “Wasp” and “Frolic”	412
Cruise of the “Argus,” of Decatur’s division	415
Action between the “United States” and “Macedonian”	416
The “United States” returns with her prize	422