Chapter I The French and British Period
To know the history of any town is to know the significance of its geographical position. This is particularly true of the early history of Fort Wayne (Known to the Indians as Kiskakon or Kekionga1 and to the French and English as Fort Miami). Therefore, it is necessary to explain the significance of the site of Fort Wayne in an era of exploration and trade when wilderness was king and waterways were the arteries of communication. The story of Fort Wayne begins as the history of the Maumee-Wabash portage. Located at the confluence of rivers, St. Joseph and St. Mary’s, which together form the Maumee or Miami of Lake Erie, Fort Wayne is situated at the northeast starting point of the seven mile portage to the Little River, (see map on page 2) Twenty-two miles southwest of Fort Wayne, the Little River joins the Wabash, which, in turn, empties into the Ohio and then into the Mississippi. The Maumee-Wabash portage was from the early seventeenth century until the mid-nineteenth century a vital overland link that tied together the great waterway systems of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi. In other respects the site of Fort Wayne was at the “crossroads”. From this point the traveler could journey northeast up the St. Joseph river into the present state of Michigan, or turn southeast up the St. Mary’s river into the central portion of the present state of Ohio. This, then, is the significance of the words of Little Turtle, the great Miami chief, who once called the site of Fort Wayne, “that glorious gate... through which all the good words of our chiefs had to pass from the north to the south, and from the east to the west.”2
Of the five great portage routes used by the French,3 the Maumee-Wabash was the last to be exploited, for, unlike the more northern routes, it was along the line of “most resistance”. The Iroquois warfare in this region and as far west as the Illinois country made it virtually impossible for the French to use the routes extending through southern Lake Erie. With the establishment of the French posts along the lower Mississippi, however, the Maumee-Wabash portage gained importance, as it proved to be the shortest route connecting the settlements of New France (Canada) and Louisiana. The first white man to use this portage may have been some unknown French “coureur de bois”, pursuing his lawless life of adventure and fur-trading. There is some claim that LaSalle used the Maumee-Wabash portage in his explorations of 1670 or later, but it is based, for the most part, on conjecture and is still open to various interpretations.4 In any event, LaSalle’s description of the territory between Lake Erie and Lake Michigan indicates a familiarity with the region, and it was he who first directed the attention of the French to this portage by pointing out the way to shorten the route to the lower Ohio river.5 Whatever LaSalle’s plans were for opening up this easy channel of communications6 they had to be abandoned because of the failure of the French to appease the Iroquois. This powerful confederacy had all but annihilated the Erie Indians earlier in the century and were now pressing their attacks upon the western tribes south of Lake Michigan. Out of fear of the Iroquois the area of Indiana was largely abandoned by the Miamis and other related tribes. Therefore by the 1670’s, when LaSalle set out to achieve his great objective, control of the Mississippi for the French, he found it necessary “to go to the Illinois [river] through the lakes Huron and Illinois [Lake Michigan] as the other routes which I have discovered by the head of Lake Erie and by the southern shore of the same, have become too hazardous by frequent encounters with the Iroquois who are always on that shore.”7 That this route had become “too dangerous” is indicated by the letter of Jean de Lamberville to Count de Frontenac on Sept. 20, 1682, in which he expressed his fears that “an Iroquois army, twelve hundred strong... would completely annihilate the Miamis and their neighbors the Siskakon [Kiskakon] and Ottawa tribes on the headwaters of the Maumee.”8
The events which took place near the turn of the eighteenth century completely altered the situation for the French in this region. Differences between the Fox Indians, located west of Lake Michigan, and the French alienated the former entirely. The result was to compel the French to seek a more direct line of communication with the Mississippi settlements than by the Wisconsin river-Lake Michigan route, and to encourage them to promote the trade in the less remote posts. This new policy was inaugurated by Cadillac’s plan to establish a post at Detroit, which met with the Crown’s approval and was carried out in 1701. At the same time, the French were able to conclude a temporary peace with the Iroquois and to induce the pro-French tribes of Miamis to begin migrating eastward and to re-establish themselves at the headwaters of the Wabash and Maumee rivers. This migration of the Miamis was a gradual process and can be traced from northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin around the head of Lake Michigan to their old settlements on the Wabash, Maumee, and Miami rivers. The Miamis were persuaded to move for a number of reasons—the hostility of the Fox Indians, the advantages in trade and protection furnished by their proximity to Detroit, and finally the abundance of fur, especially beaver, to be found in the area south and southwest of Lake Erie. By 1712, the Miamis had taken possession of the entire Wabash valley,9 and the country as far eastward as the Big Miami river. Their principal village, Kiskakon, was situated where the present city of Fort Wayne now stands. Of the northern tribes the Miami confederacy was second only to that of the Iroquois. Father Marquette paid them high tribute, while LaSalle described them as “the most civilized of all nations of Indians—neat of dress, splendid of bearing, haughty of manner, holding all other tribes as inferiors.”10
Other tribes came to the Ohio valley about the same time. The Wyandots established themselves along the southern shore of Lake Erie about 1701. The Shawnee, a southern tribe, settled principally in the lower Scioto valley around 1730, while the Delaware were to be found in the Muskingum valley by 1750. A small group of Ottawas were located on the Auglaize river, a tributary of the Maumee, about fifty miles northeast of Kiskakon. The importance of this small tribe rests in their famous chief, Pontiac, and his “conspiracy” against the English in 1763. Altogether these tribes numbered about 15,000 people. For the most part, they were friends of the French, although at times they expressed discontent.
Grasping the new importance of the Maumee-Wabash trade route after 1712, the officials of New France were quick to suggest to the crown the construction of a chain of posts from the head of the Maumee to the mouth of the Wabash in order to protect this increasingly vital line of communication between Canada and Louisiana, and, equally, important, to counteract the English ever pressing closer to the Indians in the upper Ohio valley.11 The idea was not new, as LaSalle had suggested such a policy to the home government previously, but the time was now ripe. Economic reasons for establishing these posts were not lacking. Fear of the English meant fear of their participation in the fur trade, which was exceedingly valuable in this area. Wild life had increased abundantly during the years of Iroquois warfare when the region was practically uninhabited. A French memorialist, writing at this time, pointed out that the New York traders, through the medium of the Iroquois agents, secured between 80,000 and 100,000 beaver skins annually from the area south and southwest of Lake Erie.12 This almost equalled the amount taken annually from the whole of the land north of the Great Lakes. Cadillac, the founder of Detroit, reported in 1707 that the Maumee valley was “the finest land under heaven—fishing and hunting are most abundant there.”13
The revitalized village of Kiskakon became the location of one of the earliest posts established in the French chain along the Maumee-Wabash route, and was known as Post or Fort Miami. The exact year of the founding of Port Miami by the French is uncertain. Although some writers believe the post was established as early as 1680 or 1686,14 there is no evidence to support such suppositions. Some confusion seems to arise from a misinterpretation of those French colonial documents which refer to the Fort Miami built by LaSalle at the mouth of the St. Joseph river of Lake Michigan, and not, as these writers believed, to the Fort Miami at the headwaters of the Maumee. A careful reading of these documents is necessary in each instance to determine which Fort Miami is meant. About the same time that the eastward migration of the Miamis began 1697 Jean Baptiste Bissot, Sieur de Vincennes, was appointed attache to the Miamis.15 At first he was obviously at the Miami fort on the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan, although, as the Miami village, Kiskakon, grew in importance, Vincennes found it increasingly necessary to visit the Miami village from 1702 to 1719. It is possible that in 1706 he built a small post primarily for trading purposes at Kiskakon.16 By 1715 a new element, the English fur trader had entered the picture and Vincennes, as well as the French colonial government, was convinced that it was no longer feasible to encourage the Indians to migrate eastward. From Kiskakon, Vincennes reported to the royal officials that the English of Carolina were having recourse to every sort of expedient to persuade the Miamis to join them against the French.17 The increased English efforts to gain footholds in the Wabash and Maumee valleys, determined Vincennes upon a course of action approved by the Marques de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada. Vincennes’ plan called for the removal of the Miamis at the headwaters of the Maumee to a new center on the St. Joseph river of Lake Michigan, near the present city of South Bend.18 It is possible that the plan might have succeeded as Vincennes was “much loved” by the Miamis; however, with his death at Kiskakon in 1719, the Miamis “resolved not to move to the River St. Joseph, [but] to remain where they are”.19 The Miamis preserved for a long time the memory of Vincennes. Thirty years after his death, Celeron de Bienville, while urging a group of Miamis to return to Kiskakon, used the name of Vincennes to work upon their minds, speaking of him as the one “whom you loved so much and who always governed you, so that your affairs were prosperous.”20
On hearing of the Miamis’ decision, Governor de Vaudreuil resolved, with the approval of the Council of Marine, to establish a strong post at the headwaters of the Maumee. For this purpose he sent Captain Dubuisson, the former commander at Detroit, who had already achieved success on one occasion with the Miamis, to build the fortifications.21 Finished in May, 1722, the fort was located on the right bank of the St. Mary’s at a latitude later given by Father Joseph Pierre de Bonnecamps (professor of hydrography at the Jesuit college of Quebec who visited Fort Miami in 1749) as 41 degrees, 29 minutes. Other information Father de Bonnecamps gives indicates that the fort was about one-half mile down the river from the Maumee-Wabash portage road.22 Writing the Council of Marine on October 24, 1722, de Vaudreuil stated:
The log fort Fort Miami which he Dubuisson had build is the finest in the upper country. It is a strong fort and safe from insult from the savages. This post which is of considerable worth ought to have a missionary. One could be sent there in 1724 if next year the council will send the four Jesuits which I ask.23
It is unlikely that the priest requested was ever stationed at Fort Miami, as there is no indication from the Jesuit Relations or other sources of one being here, although it is possible that some missionaries visited this spot on occasion.
Fort Miami proved of value to the French for various reasons. After its construction, it soon became a military post of consequence, with a garrison of twenty to thirty men.24 It was the policy of the French to locate their garrisons and trading posts wherever there existed a sufficiently large village of friendly Indians or wherever the strategic importance of a place itself made it necessary to erect a fort. Fort Miami combined both of these advantages. Once the Miamis determined to remain at Kiskakon, they would benefit the French not only by their fur trade but would be a means of protection against hostile tribes and the English. The strategic position for a fort at the Maumee-Wabash portage was recognized even by the English as early as 1717.25 Pouchet, a French historian, writing shortly after the French and Indian War was of the opinion that the French would have been wiser to have strengthened their fortifications in the Miami region than establish their line of defense in the upper Ohio.26
Perhaps Fort Miami’s greatest importance was as a center of French activity among the Indians. Being at the principal village of the Miami confederacy, this outpost was used as a counter-balance to the English intrigue from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas. It is to be noted that Dubuisson was sent to Kiskakon “to counteract the effect of all those Belts it [the Miami nation] was but too frequently receiving and which, as they caused eight or ten Miami canoes to go this year to trade at Orange, might finally induce all that nation to follow their example.”27
In 1734, the Sieur de Noyelles was entrusted with the task of gathering the scattered Miamis in their village, where they would be protected from English intrigue. In this affair he was seconded by the Sieur Darnaud who was in command at Fort Miami.28 The French had good reason to fear the English trader, who had strong economic advantages. The goods furnished by the English in exchange for the furs of the Indians were produced more cheaply than the French items. Also British virtual control of the sea trade meant these goods were transported for less. Finally rum one of the principal factors in the English trade was produced in the colonies, while the French traders had to import brandy from the mother country. As early as 1716, de Vandreuil reported to the Council of Marine that the Iroquois were sending belts to the Miamis and Ouiatenons, an allied tribe on the Wabash, to induce them to seek the necessities of life at the English post on the “Oyo river”. Here the Indians were offered merchandise “a half cheaper than among the French.”29 The following year the king replied through the Council that he was well pleased to learn that M. de Vincennes, apparently at Kiskakon, had prevented the Miamis and Ouiatenons from accepting the belts of the English. His majesty hoped that the sending of scarlet cloth would turn the savages away from the English trade.30
Other accounts show the wide-spread influence the French maintained from Fort Miami. There were considerable outlays for the savages in food, merchandise, and the repairing of arms. From here important chiefs were sent to conferences in Detroit and Montreal, with interpreters and guides and all expenses paid. One Miami chief, Cold Foot, was paid handsomely for his loyalty in putting an end to a hostile movement.31 The expenses for messengers were especially numerous during the year’s 1748-1749, when English influence was particularly active. Between December 25, 1747, and July 25, 1748, 1,894 livres were spent at Fort Miami for presents for the Indians.32 The high expenditures at Fort Miami of those years, of which we have records, gives some indication of the value the French ascribed to the post at the Maumee headwaters. Some years the annual expenses for the Indians at Fort Miami almost equalled those of Detroit.33
Fort Miami had its economic “raison d’etre” as the center of the thriving fur trade of the surrounding region. The furs were brought westward from the northwestern and central parts of the present state of Ohio, as well as northward from the Wabash valley, and eastward from the Illinois country. In his “Memoir of 1757”, Bougainville points out that the Miami post, like many of the French posts, was one “removed from free commerce”.34 That is, Fort Miami was leased for a period of three years to the commandant or “farmer” who secured exclusive rights to the fur trade. The price of the lease was twelve hundred livres per year. Moreover the farmer was charged with the cost of the presents to the savages as well as the wages of the interpreters. There were extraordinary expenses, however, that the government paid. For instance, Sieur Charly, the farmer at Post Miami in 1747, collected 2,007 livres for the use of twenty-four horses by a party of Indians being led to Detroit for conferences.34a These expense accounts had to be approved by the governor and the “intendant”, the financial representative of the crown, who oftentimes scaled the figures down as they saw fit. An example of a most drastic reduction is found in the case of a bill of Sieur Charly for December, 1744. In this instance, Hocquart, the royal intendant moderated the bill from 1,491 livres to 100 livres.35
In an ordinary year there issued from Fort Miami 250 to 300 packages of furs. These furs were shipped by way of Detroit to Montreal, as Fort Miami by its geographical position belonged politically and economically within the colony of New France rather than Louisiana. Nevertheless, by its proximity to the Wabash there was frequent communication and trade with the Louisiana settlements, particularly Vincennes and those of the Illinois country. For example, in 1749, 200 livres were paid at Fort Miami to Jean Baptiste Riddey de Bosseron, “voyageur” who had just returned from the Illinois country.36 Grain and livestock were sent to Fort Miami from the French settlements along the lower Wabash and Ohio rivers. For this reason the price of corn, flour, and beef was generally lower at Fort Miami than at Detroit and the northern posts such as Michilimackinac.37
The Maumee-Wabash portage became the scene of increased activity as the French and English rivalry in the upper Ohio country grew more tense during the decade preceding 1756. From the year 1719 when ten canoes of Miami Indians passed down the Maumee on their way to Albany, New York, with furs and returned with firearms, ammunition, and trinkets, the English endeavored to bring the Miamis under their influence. During the 1740’s, there was a notable expansion of English trade with the Indians of this region. Twice—in 1739 and again in 1744—the French commander of Detroit, M. de Longueuil, led strong expeditions along the Maumee-Wabash against British traders on the White river near the center of the present state of Indiana. While he succeeded in his immediate objective, this display of military power no longer held the Indians in check. In 1747, the Wyandot chief, Sanosket, also known as Nicolas, under the influence of the English led an uprising against the French. The Miamis at Kiskakon believing that Detroit had been captured, set fire to Fort Miami and captured the eight men within the stockade at the time.38 The temporary commander, Ensign Douville, was at Detroit when the Indians committed the pillage. He had been sent to the Miamis in order to invite them to a conference at Montreal, and two of their chiefs, Cold Foot and Porc Epic had accompanied him as far as Detroit when they received the news that the post had been taken.39 Douville journeyed on to Montreal alone, while Ensign Dubuisson hastened to Kiskakon with the two chiefs and a force of some sixty men, “with a view to deprive the enemy [the British] of the liberty of seizing a post of considerable importance.”40 Dubuisson found the fort and buildings only partially destroyed, but he was able to do little more than hold his position, without attempting to repair the place.
In the spring of 1748, Dubuisson returned to Detroit leaving Captain Charles DeRaymond in charge of the post, which Father de Bonnecamps, arriving the next year, described as being “in a very bad condition”.41 DeRaymond was probably the most colorful figure to command Fort Miami during the French period. He had been one of the chief proponents of the policy of destroying the English influence in the Ohio, as he saw the danger of tolerating the English traders in the Miami region. In a memoir he presented in 1745 he gives one of the best analyses of the whole Ohio question from the French point of view.42 Writing from Fort Miami in 1747 to the crown, he pointed out that had the growth of English influence been checked immediately, the uprising under Nicolas could never have occurred.43 Now in command of a partially ruined fort, DeRaymond had good reason to fear further trouble. Although the Miamis had given assurances of loyalty after the arrival of Dubuisson, most of them under the leadership of a Miami chief, “La Demoiselle” (so termed because of his fondness for dress and ornaments) had moved to Pickawillany, an English trading post on Loramie’s Creek at the start of the portage to the St. Mary’s river, northwest of the present town of Piqua, Ohio.
The French, determined to make a strong impression on the savages of the Ohio country, and to find out the true conditions existing there, sent the veteran officer, Pierre Joseph Celoron Celoron, Sieur de Bienville, with a force of 230 men down to the Great Miami river. Journeying up the later river to its headwaters, Celoron stopped at the village of “La Demoiselle” and urged the Miamis to return to Kiskakon. Celoron was disappointed bitterly when the wily “La Demoiselle” would merely promise to return to Kiskakon sometime in the future. Crossing the portage to the St. Mary’s, Celoron’s expedition continued up that river to Fort Miami. Here they stopped only long enough to buy provisions and canoes to continue to Detroit.44 Celoron and Father de Bonnecamps, the chaplain and hydrographer of the expedition, found the energetic DeRaymond dissatisfied with his “decaying” fort. Moreover, he “did not approve the situation of the fort and maintained that it should be placed on the bank of the St. Joseph, a scant league from the present site.”45 DeRaymond wished to show them the spot that he had selected for the new fort and obtain their opinion of it, but Celoron was in haste to depart. DeRaymond received some consolation from the fact that Father de Bonnecamps, an expert, could trace a plan for the proposed fort.46
Early in the year 1750, DeRaymond completed the new fort on the left bank of the St. Joseph. It stood on rather high ground (at the present St. Joe Boulevard and Delaware Avenue), less than a mile from the junction of the St. Joseph and St. Mary’s.47 Chief Cold Foot, a staunch friend of the French, occupied the discarded buildings of the old fort, which became the center of an Indian settlement known as Cold Foot Village. Half a mile to the south of the new fort, where the Maumee turns in its course toward the east, lay the village of Kiskakon. Most of its inhabitants had joined the English at Pickawillany. Writing to Governor LaJonquiere in September, 1749, DeRaymond reported that the attitude of all the nations was very bad and apparently was becoming worse.48 Again in 1751, he reported:
My people [the French traders] are leaving me for Detroit. Nobody wants to stay here and have his throat cut. All of the tribes who go to the English at Pickawillany come back loaded with gifts. I am too weak to meet the danger. Instead of twenty men, I need five hundred.... The tribes here are leaguing together to kill all the French.... This I am told by Cold Foot, a great Miami chief, whom I think an honest man.... If the English stay in this country, we are lost. We must attack and drive them out.49
To add to the distress of the French, a smallpox epidemic in the winter of 1751, carried away many of the inhabitants of Cold Foot’s Village, including their good friend, Cold Foot, and his son.50
That not all of the French traders at Fort Miami were scurrying to Detroit is evident from the fact that in the year 1750 one of the most noted traders of the area, Joseph Drouet de Richerville, came to Kiskakon.51 Richerville was a scion of French nobility who either was seeking a life of adventure or was engaged in the fur trade for the mere sake of a livelihood, as the family wealth had dwindled. Shortly after his arrival, Richerville married Tahcumwah, the daughter of the reigning Miami chief, Aquenochqua, and sister of the future chief, Little Turtle. Tahcumwah was later known as Marie Louisa,52 apparently the name she received in baptism. All who came in contact with her at a later date speak of her as a clever and intelligent woman, and it was largely through her efforts that her son, Jean Baptiste de Richerville, arose to such high prominence as the last civil chief of the Miamis.53
The arrival of Joseph Drouet de Richerville at Fort Miami was an isolated case, however, and what DeRaymond had said of the traders leaving for Detroit remained true. In all likelihood, DeRaymond, despite his zeal, was glad to be relieved in 1751 by a new commandant, Neyon De Villiers. De Villiers had hardly assumed command when an English trader, John Pathin, was captured within the fort itself. As France and England were then at peace, Governor George Clinton of New York demanded an explanation of the incident. The French governor, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, replied sharply:
The English, far from confining themselves within the limits of the King of Great Britain’s possessions, not satisfied with multiplying themselves more and more on Rock River... have more than that proceeded within sight of Detroit, even unto the fort of the Miamis.... John Pathin, an inhabitant of Willensten, has been arrested in the French fort of the Miamis by M. de Villiers, commandant of that post... he entered the fort of the Miamis to persuade the Indians who remained there, to unite with those who have fled to the beautiful river [the Ohio.] He has been taken in the French fort. Nothing more is necessary.54
A short time later, two men of de Villiers’ garrison were scalped by “La Demoiselle’s savages.” Indeed the English seem to have laid claim to the very fort itself, for on Mitchell’s “Map of North America”, drawn in 1755, Fort Miami is referred to as “the Fort usurped by the French”.55
In June, 1752, a French and Indian force, coming by way of the Maumee and St. Mary’s rivers, fell on Pickawillany, completely destroying the English post, so annoying to the French at Fort Miami. Four years later, during the French and Indian War, Lieutenant Bellestre, the commandant of Fort Miami, led a party of 25 French and 205 Indians from his post to the head of the James River, where they captured a blockhouse and some ten Virginia “Rangers”. After his release, one of the captives, Major Smith, proposed to lead a force of 1,000 woodsmen and a sufficient number of Indians across the Ohio and over the Shawnee trail from old Pickawillany to Fort Miami and then on to Detroit.56 Although nothing came of Major Smith’s plans, the site of the future Fort Wayne was to figure prominently in all the military campaigns north of the Ohio river for the next half century, that is throughout the dramatic events marked by Pontiac’s conspiracy, the American Revolution, the Indian wars, and the War of 1812.
When de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, capitulated at Montreal in 1760, he issued orders for the surrender of the posts—Michilimackinac, Detroit, Green Bay, St. Joseph, Ouiatenon, and Miami—as dependencies of Canada.57 On November 29, 1760, Detroit was surrendered to Major Robert Rogers in command of the “Rangers”. Eight days later, Lieutenant John Butler with a detachment of twenty men set out from Detroit to receive the formal transfer of Fort Miami from the French commander, thus bringing to an end French rule at the headwaters of the Maumee.58
Although of strategic importance, Fort Miami never became more than a military outpost and trading center during the French period of occupation. Father de Bonnecamps wrote in 1749 of the French village in and around the fort, “The French there number twenty-two; all of them... had the fever... There were eight houses, or to speak more correctly, eight miserable huts which only the desire of making money render endurable.”59 “The desire of making money” is of course a reference to the fur trade, the only occupation, outside of the military, of those French living there. The large Indian villages surrounding the fort naturally brought the trader and soldier, but, at the same time, this uncertain element of Indian friendship probably excluded any sizable French settlement. Whatever the reasons we must conclude that, unlike Vincennes, Fort Miami did not attract any type of French settler, outside of those connected with the fur trade.
Lieutenant Butler of the “Rangers” had been chosen by Col. Henry Bouquot to receive the surrender of Fort Miami since he could speak French and seemed “very intelligent”. He had orders to hold the post, as it was of great importance to Detroit and being at the “carrying place of nine miles into the waters of the Ouabache Wabash... it would prevent a surprise in the Spring.”60 Lieutenant Butler found the savages destitute and sent a French trader to Fort Pitt for the necessary supplies.61 In the spring, Butler was relieved by Ensign Robert Holmes, who was destined to become one of the first victims of the Indian uprising of 1763, known as “Pontiac’s conspiracy”. Ironically, Holmes was also one of the first to learn of the impending danger and passed the information on to Major Gladwyn, the English commander at Detroit, adding, however, “this affair is very timely stopt”.62 A month later he allowed himself to be lured from the fort by a false request on the part of his Indian mistress to aid a sick Miami woman. Holmes was instantly killed by the savages concealed nearby, and the small garrison surrendered upon the demand of Jacques Godefroy and Money Chene, two Frenchmen who were implicated with the Miamis in the scheme. Godefroy, after leading another successful attack on Ouiatenon, journeyed to Sandusky where he fell into the hands of Colonel Brandstreet who had arrived from Niagara with a large force to quell the uprising. Godefroy had been a prominent citizen of Detroit and had taken the oath of allegiance to the British crown; consequently, he expected death at the hands of the British. Instead he was given his freedom on condition that he would guide and protect an English officer, Captain Thomas Morris, who was being sent to the Illinois Indians by way of the Maumee. Captain Morris, was a man of culture and literary tendencies. Being such, he kept an excellent diary of experiences, which he was later persuaded to publish.63
Almost any man would have failed in an attempt to go through hundreds of miles of hostile Indian country, and Captain Morris was no exception. Having journeyed up the Maumee as far as Kiskakon, Morris met such a dangerous reception at this place that he was forced to turn back. In fact he was fortunate to escape with his life, as the Indians intended to burn him at the stake, and he was saved by the intercession of Godefroy and the young chief Pecanne. Morris was also befriended within the fort by two French traders, Capucin and L’Esperance and a Jewish trader, Levi. L’Esperance concealed the English officer within his house until it was safe for him to leave. Captain Morris, despite the ill-treatment by the Indians, clearly saw the reason for their dissatisfaction. He observed that the French policy, or custom, of intermarriage with the Indians had been more beneficial than that of English, as the Indians felt that they and the French were one people. Moreover, he noted that the French prohibited, “the sale of spiritous liquors to Indians under pain of not receiving absolution; none but a bishop [could] absolve a person guilty of it.” He went on to point out, “This prevented many mischiefs too frequent among the unfortunate tribes of savages who are fallen to our lot.”64
The failure of Captain Morris to get past Kiskakon, demonstrated beyond doubt that as long as the Indians at this spot were unfriendly, they could prevent any intercourse with those tribes to the south and southwest. Consequently, Colonel George Croghan, a famous English trader in the Ohio valley, was sent to the Maumee-Wabash area to pacify the tribes. Croghan was received with a display of enthusiasm by the Indians at Kiskakon, who hoisted an English flag he had given them at Fort Pitt. Croghan reported as follows:
The Twightwee village [the English called the Miamis “twightwees”] is situated on both sides of a river called St. Joseph. This river where it falls into the Miami [Maumee] river about a quarter of a mile from this place is one hundred yards wide, on the east side of which stands a stockade fort, somewhat ruinous. The Indian village consists of about forty or fifty cabins, besides nine or ten French houses, a runaway colony from Detroit during the late Indian war; they were concerned in it, and being afraid of punishment came to this post, where ever since they have spirited up the Indians against the English. All the French residing here are a lazy indolent people, fond of breeding mischief... and should by no means be suffered to remain here.... The country is pleasant, the soil rich and well watered.65
Croghan’s judgment of the French at Kiskakon seems rather harsh, although his opinion of the French at Vincennes is no better. Apparently in the eyes of the austere English and colonists, the more carefree life of the French “habitants” of the western posts seemed to be an indication of indolence on the latter’s part.66 Furthermore, it is difficult to explain why the same French people who had saved the life of Captain Morris in the previous year would now be “spiriting up” the Indians against the English, especially since Pontiac’s plans had collapsed. On the other hand, it was not to be expected that these French people would immediately cast aside all hostility toward their recent enemies. By 1765, it is likely that these French traders, weary of the warfare that had ruined their business, were ready to assume a neutral attitude, while the Indians themselves grudgingly came to terms with the English.
From the day Fort Miami fell to Pontiac’s Miami allies in 1763 until General Anthony Wayne built the American fort on the side of the modern city of Fort Wayne in 1794, there was no permanent67 garrison stationed at the headwaters of the Maumee. Over this period of thirty-one years—during which time the American nation came into being—the region of which we speak gradually became the rendezvous of a defiant mixture of Indian warriors and lawless renegades of the frontier, such as the Girties. It was also the home of a heterogeneous population of English and French traders and their families, French “engages”, and Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee tribes. In 1790, General Harmar’s men counted seven distinct villages in the immediate area. All together, they formed a considerable settlement or settlements, known near the end of the Revolution as the Miami Towns, the Miami Villages, or simply, Miamitown. In a sense such a place was the forerunner of the lawless frontier towns of the next century.
In 1772, Sir William Johnson, in charge of Indian affairs in America, pointed out to the British government the advisability of reoccupying and strengthening the Miami post, as it was “a place of some importance”.68 Since the Indians were pacified, the home government for the sake of economy, did not see fit to carry out his suggestion at the time. A memorandum of the same year speaks of the “fort being inhabited by Eight or Ten French families”.69 A census, apparently taken in 1769 by the English, lists the names of nine French families living at Fort Miami.70 These French residents were nearly all traders, though some of them had been located here for many years. By 1772, most of them were willing to accept the friendship of their former foes, the English—primarily for mercenary reasons. British policy kept the colonists from occupying the land north of the Ohio, which meant the preservation of the Indian fur trade. Moreover practically all their furs were sold through the London market. Thus, with the outbreak of the American Revolution, the French traders at Fort Miami felt they had more to lose by being friendly with the American cause than their neighbors, the French inhabitants of Vincennes and the Illinois settlements who were primarily interested in farming.71
With the outbreak of the Revolution, British troops could not be spared for the post at Miamitown, but it was placed under strict supervision by Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit. Hamilton appointed Jacques Lasselle, an officer in the Canadian militia, to the super-intendency of this post as an agent of Indian affairs. Lasselle arrived with his family in 1776 from Montreal.72 His duties were to see that the Indians maintained their active friendship for the British cause and to check the passports of all persons going from Detroit to the Wabash and lower Ohio.73 None but those holding a license issued by the British authorities were permitted to engage in trade.
The year that brought Lasselle to Miamitown gave also to the region Peter LaFontaine and Charles (John?) Beaubien from Detroit.74 Both settled in the Spy Run area of modern Fort Wayne. In his marriage with a Miami woman and the identification of his interests with those of the Indians, LaFontaine declared his loyalty to the red men. LaFontaine’s grandson, Francis LaFontaine, was the last chief of the Miamis to hold any real authority over the tribe. To Charles Beaubien there attaches greater interest. He was very active in the English cause and was a favorite of both Hamilton and Major Arent S. DePeyster, who succeeded Hamilton as Lieutenant-Governor of Detroit. From Miamitown, Beaubien, with a young Frenchman named Lorimer and a band of some eighty Indians, made a raid into Kentucky, where they captured an American party under Daniel Boone at Blue Licks in 1778. In the same year he served as a scout for Hamilton’s army, preceding it to Vincennes. DePeyster, in 1780, proposed to recall all the traders, but Beaubien, from Miamitown. Because of his pro-British activities, Beaubien was cordially hated by the people of Vincennes, who “wish[ed] to hang” him.75
On September, 26, 1778, Hamilton received from Beaubien at Miamitown the first news that Colonel George Rogers Clark and his Virginians had taken Vincennes.76 Hamilton prepared for his ill-fated expedition to Vincennes by ordering the militia to prepare the Maumee-Wabash portage route and strengthen the defenses at Miamitown. Supplies, valued at $50,000, were left there to be sent to Vincennes later. Concerning the portage, Hamilton wrote:
The waters were so uncommonly low that we should not have been able to have passed but that at the distance of four miles from the landing place the beavers had made a dam which kept up the water; these we cut through to give passage to our boats.... The beaver are never molested at that place by the traders or Aberigines, and soon repair their dam.77
Clark constantly thought the capture of Detroit to be his ultimate goal in the northwest campaign. The first step in his proposed expedition was to be the reduction of Miamitown; however, he was prevented from making any move toward Miamitown and Detroit, as he lacked men and supplies. While the subject was still fresh in the minds of the inhabitants along the lower Ohio, another individual made his appearance to undertake what even the daring Clark considered imprudent. This man was Augustus Mottin de LaBalme, a lieutenant-colonel in the French cavalry who had come to America to offer his services to the colonies. In July, 1777, he was commissioned inspector general of cavalry by Congress, but feeling himself slighted in not being placed in command of that division of the army, he resigned in October and engaged in private business. Late in the spring of 1780, he was sent west to arouse the French in Illinois. The antipathy of the Indians and French toward the Virginians hindered him a great deal and in order to accomplish his purpose, he abandoned the Virginians and promised the French and Indians that royal troops of France would soon be on the Mississippi.78
At Vincennes and Kaskaskia he gathered a force to lead against Miamitown, with the ultimate objective being Detroit. Four hundred men were to have joined him at Ouiatenon, but as these reinforcements did not appear, he was obliged to strike at Miamitown on November 3, 1780, with but 103 men, before the news of the expedition reached there. The initial blow was successful as the traders and Indians were taken by surprise and barely had time to flee the village. The Lasselle family was forced to escape by way of the Maumee, and in their haste, their small daughter was drowned. LaBalme’s men fell to plundering the traders’ goods and Indian villages, then retired to Aboite creek, a few miles to the southwest. Beaubien and LaFontaine, whose goods had been destroyed, incited the Indians to attack LaBalme, as the Indians, learning the party was French, were not disposed at first to retaliate. The red men, led by their famous war chief, Little Turtle, in his first major engagement, completely defeated LaBalme’s force, all but a few being either killed or captured. LaBalme himself was killed and his personal papers, along with the news of the victory, were sent to DePeyster at Detroit. Among these papers was the intelligence LaBalme had gathered about Miamitown and its traders. The goods at Beaubiens’ store, which was “kept by Mr. LaFontaine, and old man” was valued at 50,000 livres. Another store, kept by Mr. Mouton, a partner of Beaubien, was also valued at 50,000 livres. These goods were “equally well disposed” to “Mr. Barthelemy [listed in the census of Fort Miami in 1769], Mr. Rivard, Mr. Lorrance, Mr. Gouin of Detroit, Mr. Lascelle [Lasselle?], Mr. Pottevin, Mr. Paillet, Mr. Duplessy, & others... & an American called George, a partner of Israel [possibly the Jew, Levi, who aided Captain Morris in 1764].”79
DePeyster was thoroughly alarmed upon learning of LaBalme’s expedition, and he immediately dispatched the “Rangers” to Miamitown with orders to cover the cannon there, until it was possible to send them to Detroit.80 Captain Thompson of the “Rangers” reported to DePeyster on March 14, 1781, that he was taking immediate action to alter the old fort. A false rumor that the French of Vincennes were heading for Miamitown, brought the Indians flocking to their villages. Their spirit was very high, and several times they asked Captain Thompson for assistance “to go and destroy Post St. Vincent, as it is the only place that gives them any uneasiness.”81 Within a year, however, DePeyster reported that the Miamis and other tribes in the area were growing fearful of being too closely allied with the British.82 It is possible that they had received some information concerning Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown.
The treaty of Paris in 1783, which formally brought to an end the Revolutionary War, transferred the sovereignty of the land south of the Great Lakes to the United States. Actually this transfer made little impression on conditions at Miamitown, for, in truth, the Revolution in the West closed only with the Jay and Greenville treaties. Great Britain, in violation of the treaty of Paris, continued to hold Detroit together with other posts along the southern shore of the Lakes. By this means they maintained effective control of the fur trade of the Northwest, and, thereby, to a great extent, influenced the Indians. Just how much the British officials were responsible for the Indian warfare from 1783 to 1794 is a debatable question. At times the action of the British officials seems to have been a case of the right hand not letting the left hand know what it was doing. Most present-day students of the subject are inclined to acquit the British government of any positive agency in the matter. They point out that the constant warfare injured the fur trade of the area which was in a state of decline during this period anyway.83 Nor did the Indians need much encouragement to take the warpath, as the ever-increasing tide of immigration coming down the Ohio and across the mountains threatened to engulf them. But the American settler did not reason this way; to him the English government was responsible. Milo Quaife, historian of the Northwest, correctly observes:
The present day scholar, possessing sources of information denied to contemporaries and entire immunity from the gory scalping knife and tomahawk, may consider the subject calmly and philosophically; the American borderer’s opinions were based upon the acts of Great Britain’s agents in America and the visible facts of the situation on the frontier.84
A concrete example of the condition of the Indian fur trade and warfare during this period and their connection with the British trader and his government is given in the history of Miamitown between 1783 and 1794. Strong evidence indicates that despite the general decline in the fur trade, the region southwest of Detroit, and Miamitown especially, was extremely important for the British fur trade. In 1790, the British commander at Detroit, Major Smith, wrote to his superiors:
How far the loss of the Miamis Country, to the protection of His Majesty, will effect this Post and its trade, is a matter it would be presumptive in me to comment on. I think it however my duty to observe that it is a considerable mart of Indian Commerce uniting in this place.85
A month later Dorchester, Governor of Canada, warned the authorities in London that the loss of Miamitown to the Americans would bring grave hardships to the trade at Detroit.86 In an earlier document he had estimated that 2000 packs of furs were taken yearly from the Miami region, bringing an income of some 24,000 pounds sterling. This far exceeded any other area south of the Great Lakes, doubling in fact the number of packs taken from the next most important area, that from Detroit north to Lake Huron.87
In the heart of the Indian country, Miamitown was also the principal point from which the Indian raiding parties harassed the frontier. Twenty-six war parties left Miamitown in a period of six months during 1786.88 There is a strong tradition and some evidence to show that a secret society of Miami warriors of necessary courage and cunning met at stated intervals at Miamitown for the purpose of burning a captive and eating his flesh.89 By its proximity to Detroit, Miamitown remained within the British orbit of trade. The merchants at Miamitown formed a loose association for their mutual benefit called the “Society of the Miamis”.90 Business was carried on not only with Detroit and other English controlled stations, but also with Vincennes and the Illinois settlements, until Indian warfare and the animosity of the American settlers toward the traders made it virtually impossible to go to the lower Wabash.
Low market prices, bad fur seasons, and almost constant warfare by the Indians threatened to ruin the fur trade in the years immediately following the Revolution. Many of the small companies failed and the larger ones had difficulties. David Gray, a prominent trader at Miamitown, was advised not to come to Detroit, as his creditor, William Robertson, was awaiting Gray’s arrival.91 The previous year, 1785, the same Gray had been requested to aid in collecting a long-standing debt from two of his fellow villagers, Rivard and LaBerche.92 Larimier, another trader at Miamitown, failed because he could not meet the claims of his creditors.93 There was constant danger that the British traders might lose all the export trade of the region to the Spanish at New Orleans. In 1787, the “Society” found it necessary to send “the Grandmaster to Vincennes to keep the trade from going to New Orleans.”94 The Indians were also an uncertain quantity and at times were hostile even to the traders. Chapeau, a member of the “Society”, was killed by the Indians and George Ironside reluctantly told Gray at Vincennes to send the goods to New Orleans rather than risk shipping them up the Wabash.95 Gray was repeatedly warned by Ironside to be most cautious on his return trip to Miamitown as he was in danger of losing his life. It is to the credit of the Miamitown traders that they traded only sparingly in liquor with the Indians. Their reasons were not altogether altruistic, however, as the price of liquor was exceptionally high.
The most candid description of the character of the trade at Miamitown has been left to us by Henry Hay, who wrote in his journal of 1790:
... but few skins comes in, and almost every individual (except the engages) is an Indian trader, everyone tries to get what he can either by fowle play or otherwise—that is by traducing one another’s characters and merchandise. For instance by saying such a one has no Blankets another no strowde or is damned bad or he’ll cheat you & so on—in short I cannot term it in a better manner than calling it a Rascally Scrambling Trade &c &c.96
Henry Hay, the writer, was an English trader and partisan who sojourned in Miamitown for a period of four months during the winter of 1789-90. His day-by-day account, obviously not intended for publication, gives us a cross section of life at Miamitown in all its aspects, both civilized and savage. Hay seems to have been in the employee of William Robertson, the Detroit merchant, although there is good reason to believe that he was also employed by Major Murray, the English commander at Detroit. Set off against the hard life of a trading post among Indian villages was the characteristic vivacity and gaiety of the French atmosphere prevalent in the town. The daily routine was by no means dull; drinking, dancing, and parties formed a constant round of entertainment in which the visitors gladly take part. Hay and John Kinzie (later the founder of Chicago) played the flute and fiddle for parties and dances, as well as for the ladies alone, and at Mass in the home of one of the oldest residents, Barthelemy. Their religion was an intricate part of the lives of the French inhabitants. During the four months Hay was at Miamitown, Mass was celebrated at Barthelemy’s house by Father Louis Payet, a missionary from Detroit. After playing at Mass on one occasion, Hay wrote, “The French settlers of this place go to prayers of a Sunday, morning and evening,... the people are collected by the Ringing of three cow bells, which three boys runs about thro’ the village, which makes as much noise as twenty cows would.”97
Miamitown in 1790 had certain refinements not to be expected behind its rough exterior. Afternoon coffee and lunch was served in the home of Mrs. Adhemar on numerous occasions. Dinners were given in grand style. For the parties the men and women dressed in their finest apparel. Mr. Adhemar and Mr. DeSeleron made their appearance at a ball wearing very fine fur caps, “adorned with a quantity of Black Ostridge Feathers” and “Cockades made with white tinsell Ribbon, amasingly large.”98 Less refining was the constant drinking. At different times, Hay and his companions became “infernally drunk”, “very drunk”, and “damned drunk”. One affair was memorable in that none of the men became drunk, “which is mostly the case in this place when they collect together”.99 Dancing was also a favorite pastime, so much so, that after dancing three nights in succession, Hay found his feet too swollen to continue. It appeared as if dancing was never enjoyed more by anyone than by these French “habitants”. It became almost a passion; when they grew weary of the old steps, new ones were devised. The almost annual springtime flood seems to have been more severe than usual in the year 1790. But not even the flood dampened the gaiety, for before the waters had subsided, the ladies were taken for a row on the river to be serenaded by the flute and fiddle. Not all was fun and frolic, however, as business was transacted regularly by the traders.
In strange contrast to the minuet and “dance ronby” were the wild war dances of the Indians across the river in celebration of a victorious raid on the American settlements.100 From the French village situated on the St. Joseph river where it meets the St. Mary’s, Hay could easily see these spectacles. Behind the traders’ houses, northward to Spy Run Creek, lived the band of Miamis under LeGris, one of the most prominent and intellectual chiefs of his time. Across the river, in the present Lakeside area of Fort Wayne, was the principal village of the Miamis under Pacan, who in his youth had saved Captain Morris.101 Frequent discussions were held by the traders with Pacan, LeGris, Blue Jacket, and Little Turtle; LeGris and Little Turtle often ate and stayed at Hay’s house. The three Girty brothers, the terrors of the frontier, visited Miamitown on a number of occasions during Hay’s sojourn. James and George Girty lived only three miles from Miamitown, and came more often than their brother, Simon. It is noteworthy that Hay obligingly wrote a letter for George Girty to Alexander McKee, the British Indian agent, informing McKee that the Miamis had upbraided the Delawares by “telling them that the Ground they occupied now is not theirs and that... the Delawares answered, they were great fools to fight for lands that was not theirs and consequently would not go to war against the Americans any more.”102 Girty asked McKee to check the Delaware dissatisfaction.
It is clear that the inhabitants of Miamitown were, for the most part, English partisans. Hay could not venture his “carcass” among the “parcel of renegards” [sic] at Vincennes.103 When Antoine Lasselle did venture southward and was captured by the Indians who thought him to be sympathetic with the Americans, Major Murray intervened and the people of the village certified that Lasselle was “a good loyalist” and “always for supporting his King”.104 When Lorraine, an inhabitant of Miamitown for forty years, died and was buried, “the young Volunteers of the place gave him three Vollies... in Honor to his services rendered to the King of Great Britain.”105 Evidently the time Lorraine had aided Pontiac’s Indians in capturing the British post at Ouiatenon was forgotten at this late date. Not all of the traders at Miamitown were good loyalists, however. James Abbott is described as being “one of our dis-affected subjects.” He refused to obtain the necessary permit for trading and spoke to the Indians of “Major Murray & Capt. McKee in so disrespectfull a manner that they... determined to send Strings of Wampum into Detroit immediately to informe them of it.”106
On the first of April, 1790, Hay departed for Detroit, “much regretted by every one in the village”.107 Less than seven months later Miamitown lay in ashes, ravaged by an American army which left 183 of its men dead in the vicinity. There is nothing in Hay’s journal to indicate that the French, English, or Indian occupants of the villages anticipated the blow which was to be dealt them by Harmar’s army, although they were fully aware of the movements which preceded the coming of Harmar. “John Thompson [a prisoner]... informed me their was great talk of raising men to come against the Ind’s”, wrote Hay on March 24, 1790. “However”, he continued, “General St. Clair who is now at the Big Miami [Cincinnati] with two boat loads of goods, means to call the Indians together at a Council at Post Vincennes—But if the Indians do not come to a settlement with them, they mean to fight them.”107
This and other councils were held. St. Clair, governor of the newly created Northwest Territory, following Washington’s instructions, offered peace to the Indians. Antoine Gamelin, a merchant from Vincennes favorably known by the Indians, was sent with the Governor’s overtures to the hostile Indians. The tribes along the Wabash would give Gamelin no answer until he conferred with those at Miamitown. Here, the Indians, as well as the traders, assembled to hear Gamelin’s speech. Their reply was evasive and unsatisfactory, while their true attitude was revealed by the burning of an American prisoner only three days after Gamelin’s departure.108
War was now inevitable, and during the five years of bloody conflict that followed, Miamitown was the principal goal of the American forces. As early as 1784, Washington had confided in his future Secretary of War, Henry Knox, that the establishment of a strong post at Miamitown was desirable for the welfare of the new nation in the West.109 The following year, Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee for the benefit of the Continental Congress, advocating a strong western policy. In his letter Washington said:
Would it not be worthy of the wisdom and the attention of congress to have the western waters well explored, the navigation of them fully ascertained, and accurately laid down,... at least as far westerly as the Miamis running into the Ohio [the Great Miami] and Lake Erie [the Maumee]... for I cannot forbear observing that the Miami village points to an important post for the Union.110
St. Clair, while in Philadelphia during 1790, talked to both Secretary of War, Henry Knox and President Washington, and suggested that an American fort be established on the site of Miamitown.111 Writing to Knox on November 26, 1790, St. Clair again urged that General Harmar in the forthcoming campaign be empowered to carry out this plan, concluding his argument by saying, “we [will] never have peace with the Western Nations until we have a garrison there.”112 Knox, after conferring with Washington, rejected the idea. In doing so, he wrote to the disappointed St. Clair, the following explanation:
In contemplating the establishment of military posts northwest of the Ohio, to answer the purposes of awing the Indians residing on the Wabash, the west end of Lake Erie, St. Joseph’s, and the Illinois... and, at the same time, exhibiting a respectable appearance to the British troops at Detroit and Niagara, the Miami village presents itself as superior to any other position. This opinion was given to me by the President in the year 1784, and has several times been held forth by me to Brigadier Harmar. But at the same time, it must be acknowledged that the measure would involve a much larger military establishment than perhaps the value of the object or disposition of the United States would admit, and that it would be so opposed to the inclinations of the Indians generally... as to bring on inevitably an Indian war of some duration. In addition to which, it is supposed that the British garrison would find themselves so uneasy with such a force impending over them as not only to occasion a considerable reinforcement of their upper posts, but also fomenting... the opposition of the Indians.113
It would appear that the government did not wish to offend Great Britain, a policy which was not too strong perhaps, but one that kept the young republic at peace at a crucial time in her history. The proposed attack on Miamitown had to be under the guise of punishing the Indians. To do this and retire was permissible, but the establishment of an American fort there would have been considered by the British as a dagger pointed at Detroit. Consequently, when Harmar finally moved from Fort Washington with his army of 1,600 men, he had orders to destroy Miamitown and, if possible, its Indian occupants. Harmar himself promised that, in the event of a successful campaign, he would attend to “the villanous traders”.114 Interestingly the British officials at Detroit and Canada believed that Harmar fully intended to build a fort at Miamitown although they expressed surprise at the “imprudence” of such action. Their spies, such as the Girties and Alexander McKee, kept them well informed of the strength and movement of Harmar’s army. They even noted Harmar’s tendency to be intoxicated.115
Forewarned by the British agents of the impending attack, the Indians adopted a “scorched earth” policy. The traders were forced to give their stores of ammunition to the Indians and were aided in fleeing with what goods they could carry. What was not destroyed by the Indians at Miamitown was burned by the Americans (20,000 bushels of corn, among other things). In two major engagements, the first at Hellar’s Corners, eight miles north of Miamitown, and the second, a three-pronged attack within the heart of the village and on the banks of the Maumee and St. Joseph rivers, the Indian forces, under Little Turtle, were victorious.116 Although their crops and towns were destroyed and the trade ruined, the Indians were elated over their victories, and their frontier raids continued.
Knox now felt that, despite possible British disapproval, the only means of checking the Indians was to establish the fort at Miamitown for which St. Clair had asked. To carry this out, the Secretary of War asked Congress to increase the size of the army. The force contemplated for the intended post was 1,000 to 1,200 men. St. Clair argued that a strong fort at Miamitown “would curb the Wabash Indians, as well as the Ottawas and Chippewas, and all other northern tribes”; that it would “more effectually cover the line of frontier along the Ohio, than by a post any other place whatever (excluding Detroit)”; and “would afford more fully security to the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio.”117 For an economy-minded Congress, he pointed out that “it would assist in the reduction of the national debt, by holding out security to people to purchase and settle the public lands.”118
General Knox still feared English hostility to this move, and he instructed St. Clair to “make such intimations as may remove all such disposition.” These intimations, however, were better to follow, than precede, the possession of the post, unless circumstances dictated otherwise, as it was “not the inclination of the United States to enter into a contest with Great Britain.”119
St. Clair never reached Miamitown. Badly trained and inexperienced, his army of 1,400 men suffered one of the most terrible defeats ever inflicted on American forces. Five hundred and thirty-two men fell before Little Turtle’s Indians on the site of Fort Recovery, Ohio. The situation was now critical. The Indians now attacked the frontier with impunity and another defeat might mean the complete alienation of the West from the new union. At this crucial point, General Anthony Wayne, hero of Stony Point in the Revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief of the American army. It is not necessary to give in detail the long months of preparation of Wayne’s “Legion” and the swift campaign which was carried out in the Maumee valley. Wayne cut the Indian forces in two by feinting toward Miamitown, then moving between it and the English Fort Miami at the mouth of the Maumee. Before the various tribes could reorganize fully, the “Legion” turned on the Indian forces to the east. At Fallen Timbers, a short distance from Toledo, on August 20, 1794, Wayne’s army met and defeated the red men. The Indian power in the Northwest was for the time being shattered and Wayne moved down the Maumee to complete his task, the construction, near the site of the old Kiskakon, of a new American stronghold in the Northwest—Fort Wayne.
a. Green Bay, Lake Winnebago and Fox River to the Wisconsin River and to the Mississippi.b. From the upper end of Lake Michigan, the Chicago river, and a short portage to the Des Plaines, and Illinois rivers.c. The St. Joseph of Lake Michigan, a portage to the Kankakee and so to the Illinois river again.d. The St. Joseph river to the Wabash by a longer portage and then down to the Ohio and Mississippi.e. The Miami of Lake Erie, a portage to the Wabash and down as above.
33Ibid.
-80.]
.]
.]
.]
[109]“Gamelin’s Journal”, St. Clair Papers, II, pp. 155-160; American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, P. 37.
Notes
1“Kekionga” is said to mean “blackberry bush”, this plant being considered an emblem of antiquity because it sprang up on the sites of old villages. This theory rests on the statement of Barron, an old French trader of the area. However, the word “Kekionga” is more likely a corruption of Kiskakon. The Kiskakons or “cut tails” were the principal tribe of the Ottawas who lived on the Maumee at a very early time, for which reason this river was sometimes called the “Ottawa”. Archeological American, 1,278; “Relation of Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac, 1718” Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVI, p. 353.
2From Little Turtle’s speech at the Treaty of Greenville, quoted in H. S. Knapp’s History of the Maumee Valley, p. 357.
3Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, IV, 224 lists the following:
4H. S. Knapp, History of the Maumee Valley, pp. 9-10; Justin Winsor, Cartier to Frontenac, p. 224; Elbert J. Benton, “The Wabash Trade Route in the Development of the Old Northwest” John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, XXI, 12.
5Pierre Margry, Decouvertes des francais dans L’Amerique Septentrionale II, 98.
6Justin Winsor, Cartier to Frontenac, p. 256.
7Pierre Margry, op. cit., II, 296; see also, Beverley Bond, Foundations of Ohio, pp. 70-8. Bond holds that the Maumee-Wabash route was the original one intended to be used by LaSalle who then decided to establish his communication by means of the upper Ohio; due to the Iroquois, however, he fell back upon the Maumee-Wabash route as the best means of reaching the Mississippi, but was forced to abandon this also to the Iroquois. Later Cadillac was to adopt LaSalle’s Lake Erie-Maumee-Wabash route.
8Logan Esarey, History of Indiana, p. 12.
9Elbert J. Benton, op. cit., p. 17.
10Otho Winger, The Last of the Miamis, p. 3.
11Pierre Margry, op cit., V, 359-62.
12Beverley Bond, op. cit., p. 76.
13Cadillac Papers, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection, XXXIII, 338.
14Charles Slocum, History of the Maumee River Basin, I, 86; H. S. Knapp, op. cit., p. 9; “Forts Miami and Fort Industry”, Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, XII, 120.
15New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 676. This French officer was the elder Vincennes, the uncle of Francois Margane, Sieur de Vincennes. The younger Vincennes was the founder of the town of Vincennes on the lower Wabash.
16Archives des Colonies, c 11 117, 118, (Paris) Pierre Margry, op. cit., V, 178, 218, 225-8; 239-43; 256-8, 262-7; 271-3; 278; 280-283.
17New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, IX, 891.
18Archives de la Province Quebec, Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
19New York Colonial Documents, IX, 894.
20“Céloron Journal” Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 51.
21Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
22The Jesuits Relations, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, p. 189.
23Archives de la Province Quebec, de Vaudreuil to Council of Marine, Oct. 24, 1722.
24Archives des Colonies, c 11 117, 118.
25Letters of Governor Spotswood, II, 296.
26Norman Cadwell, The French in the Mississippi Valley, 1740-1750, p. 95.
27New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, IX, 894.
28Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 211. Sieur Darnaud was in all likelihood Nicolas-Marie Renoud Davenne, born 1696, died 1743.
29Indiana Historical Society Publications, VII, 72. This post was a new settlement of the English from Carolina apparently on the upper Ohio River.
30Ibid., p. 72.
31Archives des Colonies, C 11 117, 118.
32Archives de Colonies, C 11 117, 118.
34Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 175.
34aArchives des Colonies, C 11 118.
35Norman Caldwell, op. cit., p. 41.
36Ibid., p. 31.
37Ibid., p. 41.
38New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, X, 140.
39Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 486-7.
40New York Colonial Documents, Paris Documents, X, 150.
41The Jesuit Relations, ed. by Reuben G. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.
42Norman Caldwell, op. cit., p. 95.
43Ibid., p. 95.
44The journal kept by Celoron on this expedition may be found in Margry, op. cit., VI, 666 ff.
45Jesuit Relations, ed. by R. Thwaites, LXIX, 189.
46Ibid., p. 189.
47Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, XII, 120.
48Mississippi Valley Historical Review, IX, 315.
49Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, 87.
50Charles Slocum, op. cit., p. 99.
51Charles Lasselle, “Indian Traders of Indiana”, Indiana Magazine of History, II, Number 1, 4.
52A Narrative of Life on the Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal, ed. by Milo Quaife, p. 261.
53See below, pp. [p 79
54Marquis de la Jonquiere to Governor Clinton, Aug. 10, 1751, New York Colonial Documents, VI, pp. 731-34.
55Mitchell’s map was the best known of contemporary maps of North America. A reproduction of this map may be found in the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collection, XXXVI, 52-3.
56Beverley Bond, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
57For an interesting discussion of the French attempt during the peace negotiations at the end of the war to establish the Maumee and Wabash rivers as the new boundary between the two colonial empires, see Theodore Pease’s article, “Indiana in Contention between France and England” in the Indiana Historical Bulletin, XII.
58“Croghan’s Journal”, Early Western Travels, ed. by R. G. Thwaites, I, 122-23.
59Jesuit Relations, LXIX, 189.
60Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 47.
61Ibid., p. 47.
62Francis Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, I, 189.
63The Journal of Captain Morris as quoted in his Miscellanies in Prose and Verse has been reprinted in Early Western Travels, I, 301-ff.
64Captain Thomas Morris, op. cit., p. 312. This prohibition of the sale of liquor to the Indiana was not always as successful as Capt. Morris thought.
65“Croghan’s Journal”, Western Travels, I, 149-150.
66For the French philosopher Volney’s description of these French Creoles See Below, [p. 34
67After LaBalme’s raid, a British force was stationed at Fort Miami for four months, See Below, [p. 16
68Illinois Historical XVI, 60.
69Indiana Historical Society Publications, II, 435.
70Ibid., p. 439-40. The following names are listed: Capuchin, Baptiste Campau, Nicholas Perct, Pierre Barthe, Bergerson, Berthelemy, Dorien, Francois Maisonville, Laurain.
71As it turned out the people of Vincennes suffered a great deal for their friendship with the American cause.
72Charles Lasselle, loc. cit., p. 4.
73Wallace A. Brice, History of Fort Wayne, p. 102.
74Charles Lasselle, loc. cit., p. 4.
75DePeyster to Haldimand, Nov. 16, 1780, and Haldimand to DePeyster, June 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers relating to Detroit, 1772-84, II, British Museum. After his release from captivity by the Americans, Colonel Hamilton accused Beaubien of treachery for not following Hamilton’s orders during the campaign, cf. Hamilton’s account of the ill fated expedition against Vincennes, Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
76Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 26, 1778. Michigan Pioneer Collections, X, 449.
77Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
78Michigan Pioneer Collections, XIX, 699. For LaBalme’s dramatic speeches to the French, see the Illinois Historical Collections, II, p. xci. For other information concerning LaBalme, see the Virginia State Papers, I, p. 380. The complete papers of LaBalme were forwarded to the war ministry in London and together with the map carried by LaBalme at the time of his death are available in the Haldimand Papers, II, 13, British Museum (London).
79“LaBalme Papers”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 578-8.
80“Haldimand Papers”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 582.
81Capt. A. Thompson to DePeyster, Mar. 14, 1781, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XIX, 589-600.
82DePeyster to Haldimand, Apr. 22, 1782, Haldimand Papers, II, British Museum.
83Wayne Steven, “The Northwest Fur Trade” University of Illinois Studies in Social Sciences, XIV, p. 513.
84Milo Quaife, op. cit., p. 209.
85Major Smith to Dorchester, Oct. 16, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73, London.
86Dorchester to Grenville, October 17, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73.
87Dorchester to Grenville, May 31, 1790, Public Records Office, (Colonial Series) CO-42 73.
88Leonard Helderman, “Danger on the Wabash, Vincennes letters of 1786-87” Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIV, 459.
89Logan Esarey, op. cit., I, 102.
90George Sharp to Paul Camelin, June 23, 1786, “Letters from Eighteenth Century Indiana Merchants” (the Lasselle Papers) ed. C.B. Coleman and published in the Indiana Magazine of History, V, 145-146.
91George Leith to Gray, Apr. 3, 1786, loc. cit., V, 144-145.
92John MacPherson to Gray, March, 1785, loc. cit., V, 142-143.
93Ironside to Gray, Apr. 15, 1787, loc. cit., V, 151-152.
94Ironside to Gray, Mar. 15, 1787, loc. cit., V, 150.
95Ironside to Gray, Feb. 16, 1787, loc. cit., V, 149. George Ironside was a leading trader in the Maumee valley. He was born in 1760 and died in 1830, at Amherstburg. For many years he was in the British Indian service. He was an M. A. of King’s College, Aberdeen and was known, even to the Americans, for his humanity and hospitality.
96A Narrative of Life on the Old Frontier, Henry Hay’s Journal from Detroit to the Mississippi River, edited by M. M. Quaife, p. 224.
97Ibid., p. 221.
98Ibid., p. 241.
99Ibid., p. 240.
100Ibid., p. 260. Hay gives an interesting description of the “Natt”, the Indian symbol of war, carried about much like the Ancient Roman standards.
101above, [p. 23
102Quaife, op. cit., p. 226.
103Ibid., p. 245.
104Ibid., p. 237.
105Ibid., p. 258.
106Ibid., p. 245.
107Ibid., p. 261.
108Indiana Historical Society Publications, VII, 360.
109St. Clair Papers, ed. Wm. Smith, II, 181.
110The Writings of George Washington, ed. Jared Sparks, IX, 80-81.
111St. Clair Papers, II, 181.
112Ibid., 193.
113Knox to St. Clair, Sept. 14, 1790, St. Clair Papers, II, p. 181.
114American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, p. 104-5.
115Dorchester to Grenville, Nov. 10, 1790, including dispatches from A. McKee and others, Public Record Office (Colonial Series) CO-42; 73, London.
116For the accounts of the battles see Harmar’s report in ASP, Indian Affairs, I, pp. 104; also the “Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny” in Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, VII, 343-353. The heaviest action took place at Harmar’s ford at the end of Harmar Street. Here the regulars suffered severely while attempting to cross the Maumee in the face of the Indians’ fire.
117ASP, Indian Affairs, I, 112.
118Ibid., p. 112.
119“Knox’s Instructions to St. Clair”, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, XXIV, 197-8.