Part II Arguments Against the Concession of the Parliamentary Suffrage to Woman
I
WOMAN’S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OF
PHYSICAL FORCE
International Position of State would be Imperilled by
Woman’s Suffrage—Internal Equilibrium of State
would be Imperilled.
THE woman suffrage movement has now
gone too far to be disposed of by the over-
throw of its arguments, and by a mere indica-
tion of those which could be advanced on the
other side. The situation demands the bring-
ing forward of the case against woman’s suf-
frage; and it must be the full and quite unex-
purgated case.
I shall endeavour to do this in the fewest pos-
sible words, and to be more especially brief
where I have to pass again over ground which
I have previously traversed in dealing with the
arguments of the suffragists.
I may begin with what is fundamental. 79
It is an axiom that we should in legislating
guide ourselves directly by considerations of
utility and expediency. For abstract princi-
ples—I have in view here rights, justice, egali-
tarian equity, equality, liberty, chivalry, logi-
cality, and such like—are not all of them
guides to utility; and each of these is, as we
have seen, open to all manner of private mis-
interpretation.
Applying the above axiom to the issue be-
fore us, it is clear that we ought to confine
ourselves here to the discussion of the ques-
tion as to whether the State would, or would
not, suffer from the admission of women to
the electorate.
We can arrive at a judgment upon this by
considering, on the one hand, the class-char-
acters of women so far as these may be rele-
vant to the question of the suffrage; and, on
the other hand, the legislative programmes
put forward by the female legislative re-
former and the feminist.
In connexion with the class-characters of 80
woman, it will be well, before attempting to
indicate them, to interpolate here the general
consideration that the practical statesman,
who has to deal with things as they are, is not
required to decide whether the characters of
women which will here be considered are, as
the physiologist (who knows that the sexual
products influence every tissue of the body)
cannot doubt, “secondary sexual characters”;
or, as the suffragist contends, “acquired char-
acters.” It will be plain that whether defects
are “secondary sexual characters” (and there-
fore as irremediable as “racial characters”); or
whether they are “acquired characters” (and
as such theoretically remediable) they are
relevant to the question of the concession of
the suffrage just so long as they continue to
be exhibited.1
1 This is a question on which Mill (vide Subjection of Women, last third of Chapter I) has endeavoured to confuse the issues for his reader, first, by representing that by no possibility can man know anything of the “nature,” i.e., of the “secondary sexual characters” of woman; and, secondly, by distracting at- tention from the fact that “acquired characters” may produce unfitness for the suffrage. 81
The primordial argument against giving
woman the vote is that that vote would not
represent physical force.
Now it is by physical force alone and by
prestige—which represents physical force in
the background—that a nation protects itself
against foreign interference, upholds its rule
over subject populations, and enforces its own
laws. And nothing could in the end more cer-
tainly lead to war and revolt than the decline
of the military spirit and loss of prestige which
would inevitably follow if man admitted
woman into political co-partnership.
While it is arguable that such a partnership
with woman in government as obtains in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand is sufficiently unreal
to be endurable, there cannot be two opinions
on the question that a virile and imperial race
will not brook any attempt at forcible control
by women.
Again, no military foreign nation or native
race would ever believe in the stamina and 82
firmness of purpose of any nation that submit-
ted even to the semblance of such control.
The internal equilibrium of the State also
would be endangered by the admission to the
register of millions of electors whose vote would
not be endorsed by the authority of physical
force.
Regarded from this point of view a
Woman’s Suffrage measure stands on an ab-
solutely different basis to any other extension
of the suffrage. An extension which takes in
more men—whatever else it may do—makes
for stability in the respect that it makes the
decrees of the legislature more irresistible.
An extension which takes in any women
undermines the physical sanction of the
laws.
We can see indications of the evil that would
follow such an event in the profound dissatis-
faction which is felt when—in violation of the
democratic principle that every man shall
count for one, and no man for more than one 83
—the political wishes of the large constituen-
cies which return relatively few members to
Parliament, are overborne by those of con-
stituencies which, with a smaller aggregate
population, return more members.
And we see what such evil finally culminates
in when the over-representation of one part of
a country and the corresponding under-rep-
resentation of other portions has led a large
section of the people to pledge themselves to
disregard the eventual ordinances of Parlia-
ment.
If ever the question as to whether the will
of Ulster or that of the Nationalists is to pre-
vail is brought to the arbitrament of physical
force, it will be due to the inequalities of parlia-
mentary representation as between England
and Ireland, and as between the Unionist and
Nationalist population of Ulster.
The general lesson that all governmental
action ought to be backed by force, is fur-
ther brought home to the conscience when we
take note of the fact that every one feels that 84
public morality is affronted when senile, in-
firm, and bedridden men are brought to the
poll to turn the scale in hotly contested elec-
tions.
For electoral decisions are felt to have moral
prestige only when the electoral figures quan-
titatively represent the physical forces which
are engaged on either side. And where vital
interests are involved, no class of men can be
expected to accept any decision other than one
which rests upon the ultima ratio.
Now all the evils which are the outcome of
disparities between the parliamentary power
and the organised physical force of contend-
ing parties would “grow” a hundredfold if
women were admitted to the suffrage.
There would after that be no electoral or
parliamentary decision which would not be
open to challenge on the ground that it was
impossible to tell whether the party which
came out the winner had a majority which
could enforce its will, or only a majority ob-
tained by the inclusion of women. And no 85
measure of redistribution could ever set that
right.
There may find place here also the considera-
tion that the voting of women would be an un-
settling element in the government of the
State, forasmuch as they would, by reason of a
general lack of interest in public affairs, only
very; seldom come to the poll: would, in fact,
come to the poll in full strength only when
some special appeal had come home to their
emotions.
Now an electorate which includes a very
large proportion of quite uninterested voters
would be in the same case as a legislature
which included a very large proportion of
members who made a practice of staying away.
It would be in the same case, because the ab-
sentees, who would not have acquired the train-
ing which comes from consecutive attention
to public affairs, might at any moment step
in and upset the stability of State by voting
for some quite unconsidered measure.
Coming back in conclusion to our main is- 86
sue, I would re-emphasise an aspect of the
question upon which I have already elsewhere
insisted.1 I have in view the fact that woman
does, and should, stand to physical violence in
a fundamentally different relation to man.
Nothing can alter the fact that, the very mo-
ment woman resorts to violence, she places
herself within the jurisdiction of an ethical
law, which is as old as civilisation, and which
was framed in its interests.
1 Vide Appendix, pp. 176-179. 87
II
WOMAN’S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OF
INTELLECT
Characteristics of the Feminine Mind—Suffragist Il-
lusions with Regard to the Equality of Man and
Woman as Workers—Prospect for the Intellectual
Future of Woman—Has Woman Advanced?
THE woman voter would be pernicious to
the State not only because she could not back
her vote by physical force, but also by reason
of her intellectual defects.
Woman’s mind attends in appraising a state-
ment primarily to the mental images which it
evokes, and only secondarily—and sometimes
not at all—to what is predicated in the state-
ment. It is over-influenced by individual in-
stances; arrives at conclusions on incomplete
evidence; has a very imperfect sense of pro-
portion; accepts the congenial as true, and re-
jects the uncongenial as false; takes the imagi- 88
nary which is desired for reality, and treats the
undesired reality which is out of sight as non-
existent—building up for itself in this way,
when biased by predilections and aversions, a
very unreal picture of the external world.
The explanation of this is to be found in all
the physiological attachments of woman’s
mind: 1 in the fact that mental images are in
her over-intimately linked up with emotional
reflex responses; that yielding to such reflex
responses gives gratification; that intellec-
tual analysis and suspense of judgment involve
an inhibition of reflex responses which is felt as
neural distress; that precipitate judgment
brings relief from this physiological strain;
and that woman looks upon her mind not as an
implement for the pursuit of truth, but as an
instrument for providing her with creature
comforts in the form of agreeable mental im-
ages.
In order to satisfy the physical yearning
1 Certain of these have already been referred to in the letter printed in the Appendix (vide p.167 infra). 89
for such comforts, a considerable section
of intelligent and virtuous women insist
on picturing to themselves that the reign of
physical force is over, or as good as over; that
distinctions based upon physical and intellec-
tual force may be reckoned as non-existent;
that male supremacy as resting upon these is a
thing of the past; and that Justice means
Egalitarian Equity—means equating the
weaklings with the strong and the incapable
with the capable.
All this because these particular ideas are
congenial to the woman of refinement, and be-
cause it is to her, when she is a suffragist, un-
congenial that there should exist another prin-
ciple of justice which demands from the phys-
ically and intellectually capable that they shall
retain the reins of government in their own
hands; and specially uncongenial that in all
man-governed States the ideas of justice of
the more forceful should have worked out so
much to the advantage of women, that a
large majority of these are indifferent or ac- 90
tively hostile to the Woman’s Suffrage Move-
ment.
In further illustration of what has been said
above, it may be pointed out that woman, even
intelligent woman, nurses all sorts of miscon-
ceptions about herself. She, for instance, is
constantly picturing to herself that she can
as a worker lay claim to the same all-round
efficiency as a man—forgetting that woman
is notoriously unadapted to tasks in which se-
vere physical hardships have to be con-
fronted; and that hardly any one would, if
other alternative offered, employ a woman
in any work which imposed upon her a com-
bined physical and mental strain, or in any
work where emergencies might have to be
faced.
In like manner the suffragist is fond of
picturing to herself that woman is for all
ordinary purposes the intellectual equal, and
that the intelligent woman is the superior of
the ordinary man.
These results are arrived at by fixing the at- 91
tention upon the fact that an ordinary man
and an ordinary woman are, from the point of
view of memory and apprehension, very much
on a level; and that a highly intelligent woman
has a quicker memory and a more rapid power
of apprehension than the ordinary man; and
further, by leaving out of regard that it is not
so much a quick memory or a rapid power of
apprehension which is required for effective
intellectual work, as originality, or at any rate
independence of thought, a faculty of fel-
icitious generalisations and diacritical judg-
ment, long-sustained intellectual effort, an un-
selective mirroring of the world in the mind,
and that relative immunity to fallacy which
goes together with a stable and comparatively
unresponsive nervous system.
When we consider that the intellect of the
quite ungifted man works with this last-
mentioned physiological advantage, we can
see that the male intellect must be, and—
pace [with the permission of] the woman suffragist—it in point of fact
is, within its range, a better instrument for 92
dealing with the practical affairs of life than
that of the intelligent woman.
How far off we are in the case of woman
from an unselective mirroring of the world in
the mind is shown by the fact that large and
important factors of life may be represented
in woman’s mind by lacunæ [gaps] of which she is
totally unconscious.
Thus, for instance, that not very unusual
type of spinster who is in a condition of re-
tarded development (and you will find this
kind of woman even on County Council’s), is
completely unconscious of the sexual element
in herself and in human nature generally.
Nay, though one went from the dead, he could
not bring it home to her that unsatisfied sex-
uality is an intellectual disability.
Sufficient illustration will now have been
given of woman’s incapacity to take a com-
plete or objective view of any matter in which
she has a personal, or any kind of emotional
interest; and this would now be the place to
discuss those other aspects of her mind which 93
are relevant to her claim to the suffrage. I
refer to her logical endowment and her political
sagacity.
All that I might have been required to say
here on these issues has, however, already been
said by me in dealing with the arguments of
the suffragist. I have there carefully writ-
ten it in between the lines.
One thing only remains over.—We must,
before we pass on, consider whether woman
has really, as she tells us, given earnest for the
future weeding out of these her secondary sex-
ual characters, by making quite phenomenal
advances within the lifetime of the present gen-
eration; and, above all, whether there is any
basis for woman’s confident assurance that,
when for a few generations she shall have en-
joyed educational advantages, she will at any
rate pull up level with man.
The vision of the future may first engage
our attention; for only this roseate prospect
makes of any man a feminist.
Now the basis that all this hope rests upon 94
is the belief that it is a law of heredity that ac-
quired characteristics are handed down; and,
let it be observed, that whereas this theory
found, not many decades ago, under the in-
fluence of Darwin, thousands of adherents
among scientific men, it finds to-day only here
and there an adherent.
But let that pass, for we have to consider
here, not only whether acquired characteristics
are handed down, but further whether, “if we
held that doctrine true,” it would furnish scien-
tific basis for the belief that educational ad-
vantages carried on from generation to gen-
eration would level up woman’s intellect to
man’s; and whether, as the suffragist also be-
lieves, the narrow education of past genera-
tions of women can be held responsible for their
present intellectual shortcomings.
A moment’s consideration will show—for
we may here fix our eyes only on the future—
that woman could not hope to advance rela-
tively to man except upon the condition that
the acquired characteristics of woman, instead 95
of being handed down equally to her male and
female descendants, were accumulated upon
her daughters.
Now if that be a law of heredity, it is a law
which is as yet unheard of outside the sphere
of the woman suffrage societies. Moreover,
one is accustomed to hear women, when they
are not arguing on the suffrage, allege that
clever mothers make clever sons.
It must, as it will have come home to us, be
clear to every thoughtful mind that woman’s
belief that she will, through education and the
cumulation of its effects upon her through
generations, become a more glorious being,
rests, not upon any rational basis, but only on
the physiological fact that what is congenial
to woman impresses itself upon her as true.
All that sober science in the form of history
and physiology would seem to entitle us to
hope from the future of woman is that she will
develop pari passu [step by step] with man; and that educa-
tion will teach her not to retard him overmuch
by her lagging in the rear. 96
In view of this larger issue, the question as
to whether woman has, in any real sense of the
word, been making progress in the course of
the present generation, loses much of interest.
If to move about more freely, to read more
freely, to speak out her mind more freely, and
to have emancipated herself from traditionary
beliefs—and, I would add, traditionary ethics
—is to have advanced, woman has indubitably
advanced.
But the educated native too has advanced
in all these respects; and he also tells us that
he is pulling up level with the white man.
Let us at any rate, when the suffragist
is congratulating herself on her own progress,
meditate also upon that dictum of Nietzsche,
“Progress is writ large on all woman’s ban-
ners and bannerets; but one can actually see
her going back.” 97
III
WOMAN’S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OF
PUBLIC MORALITY
Standards by which Morality can be Appraised—Con-
flict between Different Moralities—The Correct
Standard of Morality—Moral Psychology of Men
and Woman—Difference between Man and Woman
in Matters of Public Morality.
YET a third point has to come into considera-
tion in connexion with the woman voter. This
is, that she would be pernicious to the State
also by virtue of her defective moral equip-
ment.
Let me make clear what is the nature of the
defect of morality which is here imputed to
woman.
Conduct may be appraised by very differ-
ent standards.
We may appraise it by reference to a trans-
cendental religious ideal which demands that 98
the physical shall be subordinated to the spirit-
ual, and that the fetters of self should be flung
aside.
Or again, we may bring into application
purely mundane utilitarian standards, and
may account conduct as immoral or moral ac-
cording as it seeks only the happiness of the
agent, or the happiness of the narrow circle
of humanity which includes along with him
also his relatives and intimate friends, or again,
the welfare of the wider circle which includes
all those with whom he may have come into con-
tact, or whom he may affect through his work;
or again, the welfare of the whole body-politic
of which we are members; or lastly, that of the
general body of mankind.
Now it might be contended that all these dif-
ferent moralities are in their essence one and
the same; and that one cannot comply with the
requirements of any one of these systems of
morality without fulfilling in a measure the re-
quirements of all the other moralities.
It might, for example, be urged that if a 99
man strive after the achievement of a trans-
cendental ideal in which self shall be annulled,
he will pro tanto [to such extent] be bringing welfare to his do-
mestic circle; or again, that it would be im-
possible to promote domestic welfare without,
through this, promoting the welfare of the
nation, and through that the general welfare
of the world.
In like manner it might be argued that all
work done for abstract principles of morality
like liberty and justice, for the advancement
of knowledge, and for whatever else goes to
the building up of a higher civilisation, will,
by promoting the welfare of the general body
of mankind, redound to the advantage of each
several nation, and ultimately to the advantage
of each domestic circle.
But all this would be true only in a very
superficial and strictly qualified sense. In re-
ality, just as there is eternal conflict between
egoism and altruism, so there is conflict be-
tween the different moralities.
To take examples, the attempt to actualise 100
the transcendental religious ideal may, when
pursued with ardour, very easily conflict with
the morality which makes domestic felicity its
end. And again—as we see in the anti-mili-
tarist movement in France, in the history of
the early Christian Church, in the case of the
Quakers and in the teachings of Tolstoy—it
may quite well set itself in conflict with na-
tional ideals, and dictate a line of conduct
which is, from the point of view of the State,
immoral.
We need no further witness of the divorce
between idealistic and national morality than
that which is supplied in the memorable utter-
ance of Bishop Magee, “No state which was
conducted on truly Christian principles could
hold together for a week.”
And domestic morality will constantly come
into conflict with public morality.
To do everything in one’s power to advance
one’s relatives and friends irrespectively of all
considerations of merit would, no doubt, be
quite sound domestic morality; it could, how- 101
ever, not always be reconciled with public
morality. In the same way, to take one’s
country’s part in all eventualities would be
patriotic, but it might quite well conflict with
the higher interests of humanity.
Now, the point towards which we have been
winning our way is that each man’s moral sta-
tion and degree will be determined by the elec-
tion which he makes where egoism and altru-
ism, and where a narrower and a wider code
of morality, conflict.
That the moral law forbids yielding to the
promptings of egoism or to those of the nar-
rower moralities when this involves a violation
of the precepts of the wider morality is axio-
matic. Criminal and anti-social actions are
not excused by the fact that motives which im-
pelled their commission were not purely ego-
istic.
But the ethical law demands more than ab-
stention from definitely anti-social actions.
It demands from every individual that he
shall recognise the precepts of public mor- 102
ality as of superior obligation to those of ego-
ism and domestic morality.
By the fact that her public men recognised
this ethical law Rome won for herself in the
ancient world spectacular grandeur. By an
unexampled national obedience to it glory has
in our time accrued to Japan. And, in truth,
there is not anywhere any honour or renown
but such as comes from casting away the bonds
of self and of the narrower moralities to
carry out the behests of the wider morality.
Even in the strongholds of transcendental
religion where it was axiomatic that mor-
ality began and was summed up in personal
morality, it is gradually coming to be rec-
ognised that, where we have two competing
moralities, it is always the wider morality
which has the prior claim upon our allegiance.
Kingsley’s protest against the morality of
“saving one’s dirty soul” marked a step in ad-
vance. And we find full recognition of the
superior claim of the larger morality in that
other virile dictum of Bishop Magee, “I would 103
rather have England free, than England
sober.” That is, “I would maintain the con-
ditions which make for the highest civilisation
even at the price of a certain number of lapses
in personal and domestic morality.”
What is here new, let it be noted, is only
the acknowledgment by those whose official
allegiance is to a transcendental ideal of per-
sonal morality that they are called upon to
obey a higher allegiance. For there has al-
ways existed, in the doctrine that guilty man
could not be pardoned and taken back into
favour until the claims of eternal justice had
been satisfied, theoretical recognition of the
principle that one must conform to the pre-
cepts of abstract morality before one may
ethically indulge oneself in the lower moral-
ities of philanthropy and personal benevo-
lence.
The view point from which I would pro-
pose to survey the morality of woman has now
been reached. It has, however, still to be
pointed out that we may appropriately, in com- 104
paring the morals of man and woman, confine
our survey to a comparatively narrow field.
That is to say, we may here rule out all that
relates to purely personal and domestic mor-
ality—for this is not relevant to the suffrage.
And we may also rule out all that relates to
offences against the police laws—such as public
drunkenness and offences against the criminal
law—for these would come into consideration
only in connexion with an absolutely inappre-
ciable fraction of voters.
It will be well to begin by signalising certain
points in the moral psychology of man.
When morality takes up its abode in a
man who belongs to the intellectual caste it
will show itself in his becoming mindful of his
public obligations. He will consider the qual-
ity of his work as affecting the interest of those
who have to place dependence upon it; be-
haviour to those who are casually brought into
relations with him; the discharge of his in-
debtedness to the community; and the proper
conduct of public affairs. 105
In particular, it will be to him a matter of
concern that the law shall be established upon
classifications which are just (in the sense of
being conformable to public advantage); and
that the laws shall everywhere be justly, that
is to say rigorously and impartially, adminis-
tered.
If we now turn to the man in the street we
shall not find him especially sensible to the
appeals of morality. But when the special
call comes it will generally be possible to trust
him: as an elector, to vote uninfluenced by con-
siderations of private advantage; and, when
called to serve on a jury, to apply legal class-
ifications without distinction of person.
Furthermore, in all times of crisis he may be
counted upon to apply the principles of com-
munal morality which have been handed down
in the race.
The Titanic disaster, for example, showed
in a conspicuous manner that the ordinary man
will, “letting his own life go,” obey the com-
munal law which lays it upon him, when in- 106
volved in a catastrophe, to save first the wo-
men and children.
Lastly, we come to the man who is intoler-
ant of all the ordinary restraints of personal
and domestic morality. Even in him the seeds
of communal morality will often be found
deeply implanted.
Time and again a regiment of scallawags,
who have let all other morality go hang, have,
when the proper chord has been made to vi-
brate in them, heard the call of communal
morality, and done deeds which make the ears
of whosoever heareth of them to tingle.
We come into an entirely different land
when we come to the morality of woman. It
is personal and domestic, not public, morality
which is instinctive in her.
In other words, when egoism gives
ground to altruism, that altruism is exercised
towards those who are linked up to her by a
bond of sexual affection, or a community in
blood, or failing this, by a relation of personal
friendship, or by some other personal relation. 107
And even when altruism has had her perfect
work, woman feels no interest in, and no re-
sponsibility towards, any abstract moral ideal.
And though the suffragist may protest, in-
stancing in disproof of this her own burning
enthusiasm for justice, we, for our part, may
legitimately ask whether evidence of a moral
enthusiasm for justice would be furnished by
a desire to render to others their due, or by
vehement insistence upon one’s own rights,
and systematic attempts to extort, under the
cover of the word “justice,” advantages for
oneself.
But it will be well to dwell a little longer
on, and to bring out more clearly, the point
that woman’s moral ideals are personal and
domestic, as distinguished from impersonal
and public.
Let us note in this connexion that it would
be difficult to conceive of a woman who had
become deaf to the appeal of personal and do-
mestic morality making it a matter of amour
propre to respond to a call of public morality; 108
and difficult to conceive of a woman recover-
ing lost self-respect by fulfilling such an obli-
gation.
But one knows that woman will rise and re-
spond to the call of any strong human or trans-
cendental personal affection.
Again, it is only a very exceptional woman
who would, when put to her election between
the claims of a narrow and domestic and a
wider or public morality, subordinate the
former to the latter.
In ordinary life, at any rate, one finds her
following in such a case the suggestions of
domestic—I had almost called it animal—mor-
ality.
It would be difficult to find any one who
would trust a woman to be just to the rights
of others in the case where the material in-
terests of her children, or of a devoted hus-
band, were involved. And even to consider
the question of being in such a case intellec-
tually just to any one who came into competi-
tion with personal belongings like husband and 109
child would, of course, lie quite beyond the
moral horizon of ordinary woman.
It is not only the fact that the ideals of
abstract justice and truth would inevitably
be brushed aside by woman in the interests of
those she loves which comes into consideration
here; it is also the fact that woman is almost
without a moral sense in the matter of execut-
ing a public trust such as voting or attaching
herself to a political association with a view
to influencing votes.
There is between man and woman here a
characteristic difference.
While it is, of course, not a secret to any-
body that the baser sort of man can at any
time be diverted from the path of public mor-
ality by a monetary bribe or other personal
advantage, he will not, at any rate, set at
naught all public morality by doing so for a
peppercorn. He will, for instance, not join,
for the sake of a daughter, a political move-
ment in which he has no belief; nor vote for this
or that candidate just to please a son; or cen- 110
sure a member of Parliament who has in vot-
ing on female suffrage failed to consider the
predilections of his wife.
But woman, whether she be politically en-
franchised as in Australasia, or unenfran-
chised as at home; whether she be immoral in
the sense of being purely egoistic, or moral in
the sense of being altruistic, very rarely makes
any secret or any shame of doing these things.
In this matter one would not be very far
from the truth if one alleged that there are no
good women, but only women who have lived
under the influence of good men.
Even more serious than this postponement
of public to private morality is the fact that
even reputedly ethical women will, in the in-
terests of what they take to be idealistic causes,
violate laws which are universally accepted as
being of moral obligation.
I here pass over the recent epidemic of polit-
ical crime among women to advert to the want
of conscience which permits, in connexion with
professedly idealistic causes, not only misrepre- 111
sentations, but the making of deliberately false
statements on matters of public concern.
It is, for example, an illustration of the pro-
foundly different moral atmospheres in which
men and women live that when a public woman
recently made, for what was to her an idealistic
purpose, a deliberately false statement of fact
in The Times, she quite naïvely confessed to
it, seeing nothing whatever amiss in her ac-
tion.
And it did not appear that any other woman
suffragist could discern any kind of immoral-
ity in it. The worst thing they could find to
say was that it perhaps was a little gauche
to confess to making a deliberately false state-
ment on a public question when it was for the
moment particularly desirable that woman
should show up to best advantage before the
eyes of man.
We may now for a moment put aside the
question of woman’s public morality and con-
sider a question which is inextricably mixed up 112
with the question of the admission of woman
to the suffrage. This is the mental attitude
and the programme of the female legislative
reformer. 113
IV
MENTAL OUTLOOK AND PROGRAMME OF
THE FEMALE LEGISLATIVE REFORMER
THE suffragist woman, when she is the kind
of woman who piques herself upon her ethical
impulses, will, even when she is intellectually
very poorly equipped, and there is no imprint
of altruism upon her life, assure you that noth-
ing except the moral influence of woman, ex-
erted through the legislation, which her prac-
tical mind would be capable of initiating, will
ever avail to abate existing social evils, and to
effect the moral redemption of the world.
It will not be amiss first to try to introduce
a little clearness and order into our ideas upon
those formidably difficult problems which the
female legislative reformer desires to attack,
and then to consider how a rational reforming
mind would go to work in the matter of pro-
posing legislation for these. 114
First would come those evils which result
from individuals seeking advantage to them-
selves by the direct infliction of injury upon
others. Violations of the criminal law and the
various forms of sweating and fleecing one’s
fellow-men come under this category.
Then would come the evils which arise out of
purveying physiological and psychological re-
freshments and excitements, which are, ac-
cording as they are indulged in temperately or
intemperately, grateful and innocuous, or
sources of disaster and ruin. The evils which
are associated with the drink traffic and the
betting industry are typical examples.
Finally, there would come into consideration
the evils of death or physical suffering deliber-
ately inflicted by man upon man with a view to
preventing worse evils. The evil of war would
come under this category. In this same cate-
gory might also come the much lesser evil of
punitive measures inflicted upon criminals.
And with this might be coupled the evil of 115
killing and inflicting physical suffering upon
animals for the advantage of man.
We may now consider how the rational legis-
lative reformer would in each case go to
work.
He would not start with the assumption that
it must be possible by some alteration of the
law to abolish or conspicuously reduce any of
the afore-mentioned evils; nor yet with the as-
sumption that, if a particular alteration of the
law would avail to bring about this result, that
alteration ought necessarily to be made. He
would recognise that many things which are
theoretically desirable are unattainable; and
that many legislative measures which could
perfectly well be enforced would be barred by
the fact that they would entail deplorable un-
intended consequences.
The rational legislator whom we have here
in view would accordingly always take expert
advice as to whether the desired object could
be achieved by legal compulsion; and as to 116
whether a projected law which satisfied the
condition of being workable would give a bal-
ance of advantages over disadvantages.
In connexion with a proposal for the pre-
vention of sweating he would, for instance,
take expert advice as to whether its provisions
could be enforced; and whether, if enforce-
able, they would impose added hardships on
any class of employees or penalties on any in-
nocent class of employers.
In like manner in connexion with a pro-
posed modification in criminal procedure, the
rational reformer would defer to the expert
on the question as to whether such modification
would secure greater certainty of punishment
for the guilty without increasing the risk of
convicting the innocent.
In connexion with the second category of
evils—the category under which would come
those of drinking and betting—the rational
legislative reformer would recognise the com-
plete impracticability of abolishing by legis- 117
lative prohibition physiological indulgences
and the evils which sometimes attend upon
them.
He would consider instead whether these at-
tendant evils could be reduced by making the
regulating laws more stringent; and whether
more stringent restrictions—in addition to
the fact that they would filch from the all too
small stock of human happiness—would not,
by paving the way for further invasions of per-
sonal liberty, cripple the free development of
the community.
On the former question, which only experts
could properly answer, the reasonable reformer
would defer to their advice. The answer to
the last question he would think out for him-
self.
In connexion with the evils which are de-
liberately inflicted by man with a view to reap-
ing either personal profit, or profit for the na-
tion, or profit for humanity, the reasonable
reformer would begin by making clear to
himself that the world we live in is not such 118
a world as idealism might conjure up, but a
world of violence, in which life must be taken
and physical suffering be inflicted.
And he would recognise that the vital
material interests of the nation can be pro-
tected only by armed force; that civilisation
can be safeguarded only by punishing viola-
tions of the criminal law; and that the taking
of animal life and the infliction of a certain
amount of physical suffering upon animals is
essential to human well-being, comfort, and
recreation; and essential also to the achieve-
ment of the knowledge which is required to
combat disease.
And the reasonable reformer will, in con-
formity with this, direct his efforts, not to the
total abolition of war, but to the prevention of
such wars as are not waged for really vital
material interests, and to the abatement of the
ferocities of warfare.
In the case of punishment for criminals he
would similarly devote his efforts not to the
abrogation of punishments, but to the relin- 119
quishment of any that are not reformatory, or
really deterrent.
In like manner the reasonable reformer
would not seek to prohibit the slaughtering of
animals for food, or the killing off of animal
pests, or the trapping, shooting, or hunting of
animals for sport or profit, nor yet would he
seek to prevent their utilisation of animals for
the acquirement of knowledge.
He would direct his efforts to reducing the
pain which is inflicted, and to preserving every-
where measure and scale—not sentimentally
forbidding in connexion with one form of
utilisation of animals what is freely allowed
in connexion with another—but differentia-
ting, if differentiating at all in favour of per-
mitting the infliction of proportionately greater
suffering in the case where national and hu-
manitarian interests, than in the case where
mere recreation and luxury and personal
profit, are at stake.
Having recognised what reason would pre-
scribe to the legislative reformer, we have next 120
to inquire how far the man voter conforms to
these prescriptions of reason, and how far the
woman reformer would do so if she became
a voter.
Let it be noted that the man in the street
makes no question about falling in with the
fact that he is born into a world of violence,
and he acquiesces in the principle that the
State, and, failing the State, the individual,
may employ force and take life in defence
of vital material interests. And he frankly
falls in with it being a matter of daily
routine to kill and inflict suffering upon ani-
mals for human profit or advantage.
Even if these principles are not formulated
by the man in the street in quite such plain
terms, he not only carries them out in practice,
but he conducts all his thinking upon these pre-
suppositions.
He, for instance, would fall in with the prop-
osition that morality does not require from
man that he should give up taking life
or inflicting physical suffering. And he would 121
not cavil with the statement that man should
put reasonable limits to the amount of suffer-
ing he inflicts, and confine this within as nar-
row a range as possible—always requiring for
the death or suffering inflicted some tangible
advantage.
Moreover, if the question should be raised
as to whether such advantage will result, the
ordinary man will as a rule, where the matter
lies beyond his personal ken, take expert opin-
ion before intervening.
He will, for instance, be prepared to be so
guided in connexion with such questions as
whether disease could, if more knowledge were
available, be to a large extent prevented and
cured; as to how far animal experiments would
contribute to the acquirement of that knowl-
edge; and as to how far the physical suffer-
ing which might be involved in these experi-
ments can be minimised or abolished.
But not every man is prepared to fall in
with this programme of inflicting physical suf-
fering for the relief of physical suffering. 122
There is also a type of spiritually-minded man
who in this world of violence sets his face un-
compromisingly against the taking of any
life and the infliction of any physical suffer-
ing—refusing to make himself a partaker of
evil.
An idealist of this type will, like Tolstoy,
be an anti-militarist. He will advocate a gen-
eral gaol delivery for criminals. He will be a
vegetarian. He will not allow an animal’s
life to be taken in his house, though the mice
scamper over his floors. And he will, consist-
ently with his conviction that it is immoral to
resort to force, refuse to take any part in legis-
lation or government.
This attitude, which is that commended by
the Hindoo and the Buddhist religions, is, of
course, a quite unpractical attitude towards
life. It is, in fact, a self-destructive attitude,
unless a man’s fellow-citizens are prepared by
forcible means to secure to him the enjoyment
of the work of his hands or of his inherited
property, or unless those who refuse to desist 123
from the exercise of force are prepared to un-
take the support of idealists.
We have not only these two classes of men—
the ordinary man who has no compunction in
resorting to force when the requirements of life
demand it, and the idealist who refuses to have
any lot or part in violence; there is also a hy-
brid. This male hybrid will descant on the
general iniquity of violence, and then not only
connive at those forms of violence which min-
ister to his personal comforts, but also make
a virtue of trying to abate by legal violence
some particular form of physical suffering
which happens to offend in a quite special man-
ner his individual sensibility.
There is absolutely nothing to be said about
this kind of reforming crank, except only that
anything which may be said in relation to the
female legislative reformer may be appositely
said of him; and perhaps also this, that the
ordinary man holds him both in intellectual
and in moral contempt, and is resolved not to 124
allow him to do any really serious injury to
the community.
To become formidable this quasi-male per-
son must, as he recognises, ally himself with
the female legislative reformer.
Passing on to deal with her, it imports us first
to realise that while the male voter has—ex-
cept where important constitutional issues
were in question—been accustomed to leave
actual legislation to the expert, the female re-
former gives notice beforehand that she will,
as soon as ever she gets the suffrage, insist
on pressing forward by her vote her reform-
ing schemes.
What would result from the ordinary voter
legislating on matters which require expert
knowledge will be plain to every one who will
consider the evolution of law.
There stand over against each other here, as
an example and a warning, the Roman Law,
which was the creation of legal experts: the
prætor and the jurisconsult; and the legal 125
system of the Greeks, which was the creation
of a popular assembly—and it was a popu-
lar assembly which was quite ideally intelli-
gent.
Upon the Roman Law has been built the law
of the greater part of the civilised world. The
Greek is a by-word for inconsequence.
How can one, then, without cold shudders
think of that legal system which the female
amateur legal reformer would bring to the
birth?
Let us consider her qualifications. Let us
first take cognisance of the fact that the re-
forming woman will neither stand to the prin-
ciple that man may, where this gives a balance
of advantage, inflict on his fellow-man, and a
fortiori upon animals, death and physical suf-
fering; nor yet will she stand to the principle
that it is ethically unlawful to do deeds of vio-
lence.
She spends her life halting between these
two opinions, eternally shilly-shallying.
She will, for instance, begin by announcing 126
that it can never be lawful to do evil that good
may come; and that killing and inflicting suf-
fering is an evil. (In reality the precept of
not doing evil that good may come has rela-
tion only to breaking for idealistic purposes
moral laws of higher obligation.) She will
then go back upon that and concede that war
may sometimes be lawful, and that the punish-
ment of criminals is not an evil. But if her
emotions are touched by the forcible feeding
of a criminal militant suffragist, she will again
go back upon that and declare that the appli-
cation of force is an intolerable evil.
Or, again, she will concede that the slaugh-
tering of animals for food is not an evil, but
that what is really unforgivable is the infliction
of physical suffering on animals. And all the
time for her, as well as for man, calves and
lambs are being emasculated to make her meat
succulent; wild animals are painfully done to
death to provide her table with delicacies;
birds with young in the nest are shot so that
she may parade in their plumage; or fur-bear- 127
ing animals are for her comfort and adorn-
ment massacred and tortured in traps.
When a man crank who is co-responsible
for these things begins to talk idealistic re-
forms, the ordinary decent man refuses to
have anything more to say to him.
But when a woman crank holds this lan-
guage, the man merely shrugs his shoulders.
“It is,” he tells himself, “after all, the woman
whom God gave him.”
It must be confessed that the problem as to
how man with a dual nature may best accom-
modate himself to a world of violence pre-
sents a very difficult problem.
It would obviously be no solution to follow
out everywhere a programme of violence.
Not even the predatory animals do that.
Tigers do not savage their cubs; hawks do not
pluck hawks’ eyes; and dogs do not fight
bitches.
Nor would, as has been shown, the solution
of the problem be arrived at by everywhere
surrendering—if we had been given the grace 128
to do this—to the compunctious visitings of
nature.
What is required is to find the proper com-
promise. As to what that would be there is,
as between the ordinary man and woman on
the one side, and the male crank and the
battalions of sentimental women on the other,
a conflict which is, to all intents and purposes,
a sex war.
The compromise which ordinary human na-
ture had fixed upon—and it is one which, min-
istering as it does to the survival of the race,
has been adopted through the whole range of
nature—is that of making within the world in
which violence rules a series of enclaves in
which the application of violence is progres-
sively restricted and limited.
Outside the outermost of the series of ring
fences thus constituted would be the realm of
uncompromising violence such as exists when
human life is endangered by wild animals, or
murderous criminals, or savages. Just within
this outermost fence would be civilised war— 129
for in civilised war non-combatants and prison-
ers and wounded are excluded from the appli-
cation of violence. In like manner we bring
humanity in general within a more sheltered
enclosure than animals—pet animals within a
more sheltered enclosure than other animals.
Again, we bring those who belong to the white
race within a narrower protecting circle than
mankind in general, and those of our own na-
tion within a still narrower one.
Following out the same principle, we in-
clude women and children within a narrower
shelter fence than our adult fellow-male; and
we use the weapon of force more reluctantly
when we are dealing with our relatives and
friends than when we are dealing with those
who are not personally known to us; and
finally, we lay it aside more completely when
we are dealing with the women of our house-
holds than when we are dealing with the
males.
The cause of civilisation and of the amenities,
and the welfare of the nation, of the family, 130
and of woman, are all intimately bound up with
a faithful adherence to this compromise.
But this policy imposes upon those whom
it shelters from violence corresponding obliga-
tions.
In war non-combatants—not to speak of the
wounded on the battlefield—must desist from
hostile action on the pain of being shot down
like wild beasts. And though an individual
non-combatant might think it a patriotic action
for him to take part in war, the thoughtful
man would recognise that such action was a
violation of a well-understood covenant made
in the interest of civilisation, and that to break
through this covenant was to abrogate a hu-
manitarian arrangement by which the general
body of non-combatants immensely benefits.
Exactly the same principle finds, as already
pointed out, application when a woman em-
ploys direct violence, or aspires to exercise by
voting indirect violence.
One always wonders if the suffragist appre-
ciates all that woman stands to lose and all 131
that she imperils by resort to physical force.
One ought not to have to tell her that, if she
had to fight for her position, her status would
be that which is assigned to her among the
Kaffirs—not that which civilised man concedes
to her.
From considering the compromise by which
man adapts his dual nature to violence in the
world, we turn to that which the female legis-
lative reformer would seek to impose by the
aid of her vote.
Her proposal, as the reader will have dis-
cerned, would be that all those evils which make
appeal to the feminine emotions should be
legally prohibited, and that all those which fail
to make this appeal shall be tolerated.
In the former class would be included those
which come directly under woman’s ken, or
have been brought vividly before the eyes of
her imagination by emotional description.
And the specially intolerable evils will be those
which, owing to the fact that they fall upon
woman or her immediate belongings, induce 132
in the female legislative reformer pangs of
sympathetic discomfort.
In the class of evils which the suffragist is
content to tolerate, or say nothing about, would
be those which are incapable of evoking in her
such sympathetic pangs, and she concerns her-
self very little with those evils which do not
furnish her with a text for recriminations
against man.
Conspicuous in this programme is the ab-
sence of any sense of proportion. One would
have imagined that it would have been plain
to everybody that the evils which individual
women suffer at the hands of man are very far
from being the most serious ills of humanity.
One would have imagined that the suffering
inflicted by disease and by bad social condi-
tions—suffering which falls upon man and
woman alike—deserved a first place in the
thoughts of every reformer. And one might
have expected it to be common knowledge that
the wrongs individual men inflict upon women
have a full counterpart in the wrongs which 133
individual women inflict upon men. It may
quite well be that there are mists which here
“blot and fill the perspective” of the female
legislative reformer. But to look only upon
one’s own things, and not also upon the things
of others, is not for that morally innocent.
There is further to be noted in connexion
with the female legislative reformer that she
has never been able to see why she should be
required to put her aspirations into practical
shape, or to consider ways and means, or to
submit the practicability of her schemes to ex-
pert opinion. One also recognises that from
a purely human point of view such tactics are
judicious. For if the schemes of the fe-
male legislative reformer were once to be re-
viewed from the point of view of their prac-
ticability, her utility as a legislator would come
into question, and the suffragist could no
longer give out that there has been committed
to her from on High a mission to draw water
for man-kind out of the wells of salvation.
Lastly, we have to reflect in connection with 134
the female legislative reformer that to go about
proposing to reform the laws means to aban-
don that special field of usefulness which lies
open to woman in alleviating misery and re-
dressing those hard cases which will, under all
laws and regulations of human manufacture
and under all social dispositions, inevitably
occur. Now when a woman leaves a social
task which is commensurate with her abilities,
and which asks from her personal effort and
self-sacrifice, for a task which is quite beyond
her abilities, but which, she thinks, will bring
her personal kudos, shall we impute it to her
for righteousness? 135
V
ULTERIOR ENDS WHICH THE WOMAN’S SUF-
FRAGE MOVEMENT HAS IN VIEW
WE have now sufficiently considered the
suffragist’s humanitarian schemes, and we
may lead up to the consideration of her further
projects by contrasting woman’s suffrage as it
presents itself under colonial conditions—i.e.
woman’s suffrage without the female legisla-
tive reformer and the feminist—with the
woman suffrage which is being agitated for in
England—i.e. woman suffrage with the fe-
male legislative reformer and the feminist.
In the colonies and undeveloped countries
generally where women are in a minority, and
where owing to the fact that practically all
have an opportunity of marrying, there are not
for woman any difficult economic and physio-
logical conditions, there is no woman’s ques- 136
tion; and by consequence no female legislative
reformer or feminist. The woman voter fol-
lows, as the opportunist politicians who en-
franchised her intended, the lead of her men-
folk—serving only a pawn in the game of pol-
itics. Under such conditions woman’s suf-
frage leaves things as they are, except only
that it undermines the logical foundations of
the law, and still further debases the standard
of public efficiency and public morality.
In countries, such as England, where an ex-
cess female population 1 has made economic
difficulties for woman, and where the severe
sexual restrictions, which here obtains, have
bred in her sex-hostility, the suffrage move-
ment has as its avowed ulterior object the abro-
gation of all distinctions which depend upon
sex; and the achievement of the economic inde-
pendence of woman.
To secure this economic independence every
post, occupation, and Government service is to
1 In England and Wales there are, in a population of 8,000,-
000 women between the ages of twenty and fifty, 3,000,000 un-
married women. 137
be thrown open to woman; she is to receive
everywhere the same wages as man; male and
female are to work side by side; and they are
indiscriminately to be put in command the one
over the other. Furthermore, legal rights are
to be secured to the wife over her husband’s
property and earnings. The programme is,
in fact, to give to woman an economic inde-
pendence out of the earnings and taxes of
man.
Nor does feminist ambition stop short here.
It demands that women shall be included in
every advisory committee, every governing
board, every jury, every judicial bench, every
electorate, every parliament, and every minis-
terial cabinet; further, that every masculine
foundation, university, school of learning,
academy, trade union, professional corpora-
tion and scientific society shall be converted
into an epicene institution—until we shall have
everywhere one vast cock-and-hen show.
The proposal to bring man and woman
together everywhere into extremely intimate 138
relationships raises very grave questions. It
brings up, first, the question of sexual compli-
cations; secondly, the question as to whether
the tradition of modesty and reticence between
the sexes is to be definitely sacrificed; and,
most important of all, the question as to
whether epicene conditions would place ob-
stacles in the way of intellectual work.
Of these issues the feminist puts the first two
quite out of account. I have already else-
where said my say upon these matters.1 With
regard to the third, the feminist either fails to
realise that purely intellectual intercourse—as
distinguished from an intercommunion of men-
tal images—with woman is to a large section
of men repugnant; or else, perceiving this,
she makes up her mind that, this notwithstand-
ing, she will get her way by denouncing the
man who does not welcome her as selfish; and
by insisting that under feminism (the quota-
tion is from Mill, the italics which question his
sincerity are mine) “the mass of mental facul-
1 Vide Appendix, pp. 169-173. 139
ties available for the higher service of man-
kind would be doubled.”
The matter cannot so lightly be disposed of.
It will be necessary for us to find out whether
really intimate association with woman on the
purely intellectual plane is realisable. And if
it is, in fact, unrealisable, it will be necessary to
consider whether it is the exclusion of women
from masculine corporations; or the perpetual
attempt of women to force their way into these,
which would deserve to be characterised as
selfish.
In connexion with the former of these issues,
we have to consider here not whether that form
of intellectual co-operation in which the man
plays the game, and the woman moves the
pawns under his orders, is possible. That
form of co-operation is of course possible, and
it has, doubtless, certain utilities.
Nor yet have we to consider whether quite
intimate and purely intellectual association on
an equal footing between a particular man and
a selected woman may or may not be possible. 140
It will suffice to note that the feminist alleges
that this also is possible; but everybody knows
that the woman very often marries the man.
What we have to ask is whether—even if
we leave out of regard the whole system of at-
tractions or, as the case may be, repulsions
which come into operation when the sexes are
thrown together—purely intellectual inter-
course between man and the typical unselected
woman is not barred by the intellectual im-
moralities and limitations which appear to be
secondary sexual characters of woman.
With regard to this issue, there would seem
to be very little real difference of opinion
among men. But there are great differences
in the matter of candour. There are men who
speak out, and who enunciate like Nietzsche
that “man and woman are alien—never yet
has any one conceived how alien.”
There are men who, from motives of delicacy
or policy, do not speak out—averse to saying
anything that might be unflattering to woman.
And there are men who are by their pro- 141
fession of the feminist faith debarred from
speaking out, but who upon occasion give
themselves away.
Of such is the man who in the House of
Commons champions the cause of woman’s
suffrage, impassionately appealing to Justice;
and then betrays himself by announcing that
he would shake off from his feet the dust of its
purlieus if ever women were admitted as mem-
bers—i.e. if ever women were forced upon him
as close intellectual associates.
Wherever we look we find aversion to com-
pulsory intellectual co-operation with woman.
We see it in the sullen attitude which the or-
dinary male student takes up towards the pres-
ence of women students in his classes. We see
it in the fact that the older English universi-
ties, which have conceded everything else to
women, have made a strong stand against mak-
ing them actual members of the university;
for this would impose them on men as intellec-
tual associates. Again we see the aversion in
the opposition to the admission of women to 142
the bar. But we need not look so far afield.
Practically every man feels that there is in
woman—patent, or hidden away—an element
of unreason which, when you come upon it,
summarily puts an end to purely intellectual
intercourse. One may reflect, for example,
upon the way the woman’s suffrage contro-
versy has been conducted.
Proceeding now on the assumption that
these things are so, and that man feels that he
and woman belong to different intellectual
castes, we come now to the question as to
whether it is man who is selfish when he ex-
cludes women from his institutions, or woman
when she unceasingly importunes for admit-
tance. And we may define as selfish all such
conduct as pursues the advantage of the agent
at the cost of the happiness and welfare of
the general body of mankind.
We shall be in a better position to pronounce
judgment on this question of ethics when we
have considered the following series of analo-
gies: 143
When a group of earnest and devout be-
lievers meet together for special intercession
and worship, we do not tax them with selfish-
ness if they exclude unbelievers.
Nor do we call people who are really de-
voted to music selfish if, coming together for
this, they make a special point of excluding
the unmusical.
Nor again would the imputation of selfish-
ness lie against members of a club for black-
balling a candidate who would, they feel, be
uncongenial.
Nor should we regard it as an act of selfish-
ness if the members of a family circle, or of
the same nation, or of any social circle, desired
to come together quite by themselves.
Nor yet would the term selfish apply to an
East End music hall audience when they eject
any one who belongs to a different social class
to themselves and wears good clothes.
And the like would hold true of servants re-
senting their employers intruding upon them
in their hours of leisure or entertainments. 144
If we do not characterise such exclusions as
selfish, but rather respect and sympathise with
them, it is because we recognise that the whole
object and raison d’ être of association would
in each case be nullified by the weak-minded
admission of the incompatible intruder.
We recognise that if any charge of selfish-
ness would lie, it would lie against that in-
truder.
Now if this holds in the case where the in-
terests of religious worship or music, or family,
national, or social life, or recreation and relax-
ation after labour are in question, it will hold
true even more emphatically where the inter-
ests of intellectual work are involved.
But the feminist will want to argue. She
will—taking it as always for granted that
woman has a right to all that men’s hands or
brains have fashioned—argue that it is very
important for the intellectual development of
woman that she should have exactly the same
opportunities as man. And she will, scouting [rejecting with contempt]
the idea of any differences between the intelli- 145
gences of man and woman, discourse to you of
their intimate affinity.
It will, perhaps, be well to clear up these
points.
The importance of the higher development
of woman is unquestionable.
But after all it is the intellect of man which
really comes into account in connexion with
“the mass of mental faculties available for the
higher service of mankind.”
The maintenance of the conditions which
allow of man’s doing his best intellectual work
is therefore an interest which is superior to
that of the intellectual development of woman.
And woman might quite properly be referred
for her intellectual development to instruc-
tional institutions which should be special to
herself.
Coming to the question of the intimate re-
semblances between the masculine and the
feminine intelligence, no man would be ven-
turesome enough to dispute these, but he may 146
be pardoned if he thinks—one would hope in
no spirit of exaltation—also of the differences.
We have an instructive analogy in connexion
with the learned societies.
It is uncontrovertible that every candidate
for election into such a society will have, and
will feel that he has, affinities with the members
of that association. And he is invited to set
these forth in his application. But there may
also be differences of which he is not sensible.
On that question the electors are the judges;
and they are the final court of appeal.
There would seem to be here a moral which
the feminist would do well to lay to heart.
There is also another lesson which she might
very profitably consider. A quite small dif-
ference will often constitute as effective a bar
to a useful and congenial co-operation as a
more fundamental difference.
In the case of a body of intellectual workers
one might at first sight suppose that so small
a distinction as that of belonging to a different 147
nationality—sex, of course, is an infinitely pro-
founder difference—would not be a bar to un-
restricted intellectual co-operation.
But in point of fact it is in every country,
in every learned society, a uniform rule that
when foreign scientists or scholars are admitted
they are placed not on the ordinary list of
working members, but on a special list.
One discerns that there is justification for
this in the fact that a foreigner would in cer-
tain eventualities be an incompatible person.
One may think of the eventuality of the
learned society deciding to recognise a national
service, or to take part in a national movement.
And one is not sure that a foreigner might not
be an incompatible person in the eventuality
of a scientist or scholar belonging to a national-
ity with which the foreigner’s country was at
feud being brought forward for election.
And he would, of course, be an impossible
person in a society if he were, in a spirit of
chauvinism, to press for a larger representa-
tion of his own fellow-countrymen. 148
Now this is precisely the kind of way man
feels about woman. He recognises that she is
by virtue of her sex for certain purposes an in-
compatible person; and that, quite apart from
this, her secondary sexual characters might in
certain eventualities make her an impossible
person.
We may note, before passing on, that these
considerations would seem to prescribe that
woman should be admitted to masculine insti-
tutions only when real humanitarian grounds
demand it; that she should—following here the
analogy of what is done in the learned societies
with respect to foreigners—be invited to co-
operate with men only when she is quite spe-
cially eminent, or beyond all question useful
for the particular purpose in hand; and lastly,
that when co-opted into any masculine institu-
tion woman should always be placed upon a
special list, to show that it was proposed to con-
fine her co-operation within certain specified
limits.
From these general questions, which affect 149
only the woman with intellectual aspirations,
we pass to consider what would be the effect
of feminism upon the rank and file of women
if it made of these co-partners with man in
work. They would suffer not only because
woman’s physiological disabilities and the re-
strictions which arise out of her sex place
her at a great disadvantage when she has to
enter into competition with man, but also be-
cause under feminism man would be less and
less disposed to take off woman’s shoulders a
part of her burden.
And there can be no dispute that the most
valuable financial asset of the ordinary woman
is the possibility that a man may be willing—
and may, if only woman is disposed to fulfil her
part of the bargain, be not only willing but
anxious—to support her and to secure for her,
if he can, a measure of that freedom which
comes from the possession of money.
In view of this every one who has a real fel-
low-feeling for woman, and who is concerned
for her material welfare, as a father is con- 150
cerned for his daughter’s, will above every-
thing else desire to nurture and encourage in
man the sentiment of chivalry, and in woman
that disposition of mind that makes chivalry
possible.
And the woman workers who have to fight
the battle of life for themselves would indi-
rectly profit from this fostering of chivalry;
for those women who are supported by men do
not compete in the limited labour market which
is open to the woman worker.
From every point of view, therefore, except
perhaps that of the exceptional woman who
would be able to hold her own against mas-
culine competition—and men always issue in-
formal letters of naturalisation to such an ex-
ceptional woman—the woman suffrage which
leads up to feminism would be a social disaster. 151