§ 4 The Just Price of Labour
Particular rules were laid down for determining the just price of certain classes of goods. These need not be treated in detail, as they were merely applications of the general principle to particular cases, and whatever interest they possess is in the domain of practice rather than of theory. In the sale of immovable property the rule was that the value should be arrived at by a consideration of the annual fruits of the property.1 The only one of the particular contracts which need detain us here is that of a contract of service for wages (locatio operarum). Wages were considered as ruled by the laws relating to just price. ‘That is called a wage (merces) which is paid to any one as a recompense for his work and labour. Therefore, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for a thing taken from another person, so also to pay the wages of work and labour is an act of justice.’2 Again, ‘Remuneration of service or work … can be priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labour which they exercise by work or by tongue.’3 Biel insists that the value of labour is subject to the same influences as the value of any other commodity which is offered for sale, and that therefore a just price must be observed in buying it.4
This, according to Brants,1 is essentially a matter upon which more enlightenment will be found in histories of the working classes2 than in books dealing with the enunciation of abstract theories; nevertheless, it is possible to state generally that it was regarded as the duty of employers to give such a wage as would support the worker in accordance with the requirements of his class. In the great majority of cases the rate of wages was fixed by some public—municipal or corporative—authority, but Langenstein enunciates a rule which seems to approach the statement of a general theory. According to him, when a man has something to sell, and has no indication of the just price from its being fixed by any outside authority, he must endeavour to get such a price as will reasonably recompense him for any outlay he may have incurred, and will enable him to provide for his needs, spiritual and temporal.3 It was not until the sixteenth century that the fixing of the just price of wages was submitted to scientific discussion;4 in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there is little to be found bearing on this subject except the passage of Langenstein which we have quoted, and some strong exhortations by Antoninus of Florence to masters to pay good wages.5 The reason for this paucity of authority upon a subject of so much importance is that in practice the machinery provided by the guilds had the effect of preserving a substantially just remuneration to the artisan. When a man is in perfect health he does not bother to read medical books. In the same way, the proper remuneration of labour was so universally recognised as a duty, and so satisfactorily enforced, that it seems to have been taken for granted, and therefore passed over, by the writers of the period. One may agree with Brants in concluding that, ‘the principle of just price in sales was applied to wages; fluctuations in wages were not allowed; the just price, as in sales, rested on the approximate equality of the services rendered; and that this equality was estimated by common opinion.’6 Of course, in the case of slave labour it could not be said that any wage was paid. The master was entitled to the services of the slave, and in return was bound to furnish him with the necessaries of life.7
§ 5. Value of the Conception of the Just Price.
It is probably correct to say that the canonical teaching on just price was negative rather than positive; in other words, that it did not so much aim at positively fixing the price at which goods should be sold, as negatively at indicating the practices in buying and selling which were unjust. ‘The doctrine of just price,’ according to Dr. Ryan, ‘may sometimes have been associated with incorrect views of industrial life, but all competent authorities agree that it was a fairly sound attempt to define the equities of mediæval exchanges, and that it was tolerably successful in practice.’1 The condition of mediæval markets was frequently such that the competition was not really fair competition, and consequently the price arrived at by competition would be unfair either to buyer or seller. ‘This,’ according to Dr. Cunningham, ‘was the very thing which mediæval regulation had been intended to prevent, as any attempt to make gain out of the necessities of others, or to reap profit from unlooked-for occurrences would have been condemned as extortion. It is by taking advantage of such fluctuations that money is most frequently made in modern times; but the whole scheme of commercial life in the Middle Ages was supposed to allow of a regular profit on each transaction.’2 There might be some doubt as to the positive justice of this or that price; but there could be no doubt as to the injustice of a price which was enhanced by the necessities of the poor, or the engrossing of a vital commodity.3 Merely to buy up the whole supply of a certain commodity, even if it were bought up by a ‘ring’ of merchants, provided that the commodity was resold within the limits of the just price, was not a sin against justice, though it might be a sin against charity.4 If the authorities granted a monopoly, they must at the same time fix a just price.5 A monopoly which was not privileged by the State, and which had for its aim the raising of the price of goods above the just price was regarded with universal reprobation.6 ‘Whoever buys up corn, meat, and wine,’ says Trithemius, ‘in order to drive up their price and to amass money at the cost of others is, according to the laws of the Church, no better than a common criminal. In a well-governed community all arbitrary raising of prices in the case of articles of food and clothing is peremptorily stopped; in times of scarcity merchants who have supplies of such commodities can be compelled to sell them at fair prices; for in every community care should be taken that all the members should be provided for, and not only a small number be allowed to grow rich, and revel in luxury to the hurt and prejudice of the many.7 Thus the doctrine of the just price was a deadly weapon with which to fight the ‘profiteer.’ The engrosser was looked upon as the natural enemy of the poor; and the power of the trading class was justly reckoned so great, that in cases of doubt prices were always fixed low rather than high. In other words, the buyer—that is to say, the community—was the subject of protection rather than the seller.[8]
It must at the same time be clearly kept in mind that the seller was also protected. All the authorities are unanimous that it was as sinful for the buyer to give too little as for the seller to demand too much, and it is this aspect of the just price which appears most favourable in comparison with the theory of price of the classical economists. In the former case prices were fixed having regard to the wages necessary for the producer; in the latter the wages of the producer are determined by the price at which he can sell his goods, exposed to the competition of machinery or foreign—possibly slave—labour.1 According to the Catholic Encyclopædia: ‘To the mediæval theologian the just price of an article included enough to pay fair wages to the worker—that is, enough to enable him to maintain the standard of living of his class.’2 ‘The difference,’ says Dr. Cunningham, ‘which emerges according as we start from one principle or the other comes out most distinctly with reference to wages. In the Middle Ages wages were taken as a first charge; in modern times the reward of the labourer cannot but fluctuate in connection with fluctuations in the utility and market price of the things. There must always be a connection between wages and prices, but in the olden times wages were the first charge, and prices on the whole depended on them, while in modern times wages are, on the other hand, directly affected by prices.’3 Dr. Cunningham draws attention to the fact that the labouring classes rejected the idea of the fixing of a just price for their services when, from a variety of causes, a situation arose when they were able to earn by open competition a reward higher than what was necessary to support them according to their state in life.4 Nowadays the reverse has taken place; unrestricted competition has in many cases resulted in the reduction of wages to a level below the margin of subsistence; and the general cry of the working classes is for the compulsory fixing of minimum rates of wages which will ensure that their subsistence will not be liable to be impaired by the fluctuations of the markets. What the workers of the present day look to as a desirable, but almost unattainable, ideal, was the universal practice in the ages when economic relations were controlled by Christian principles.
§ 6. Was the Just Price Subjective or Objective?
The question whether the just price was essentially subjective or objective has recently formed the subject matter of an interesting and ably conducted discussion, provoked by certain remarks in Dr. Cunningham’s Western Civilisation.1 Dr. Cunningham, although admiring the ethical spirit which animated the conception of the just price, thought at the same time that the economic ideas underlying the conception were so undeveloped and unsound that the theory could not be applied in practice at the present day. ‘Their economic analysis was very defective, and the theory of price which they put forward was untenable; but the ethical standpoint which they took is well worth examination, and the practical measures which they recommended appear to have been highly beneficial in the circumstances in which they had to deal. Their actions were not unwise; their common-sense morality was sound; but the economic theories by which they tried to give an intellectual justification for their rules and their practice were quite erroneous…. The attempt to determine an ideal price implies that there can and ought to be stability in relative values and stability in the measure of values—which is absurd. The mediæval doctrine and its application rested upon another assumption which we have outlived. Value is not a quality which inheres in an object so that it can have the same worth for everybody; it arises from the personal preference and needs of different people, some of whom desire a thing more and some less, some of whom want to use it in one way and some in another. Value is not objective—intrinsic in the object—but subjective, varying with the desire and intentions of the possessors or would-be possessors; and, because it is thus subjective, there cannot be a definite ideal value which every article ought to possess, and still more a just price as the measure of that ideal value.’ In these and similar observations to be found in the Growth of English History and Commerce, Dr. Cunningham showed that he profoundly misunderstood the doctrine of the just price; the objectivity which he attributed to it was not the objectivity ascribed to it by the scholastics. It was to correct this misunderstanding that Father Slater contributed an article to the Irish Theological Quarterly[2] pointing out that the just price was subjective rather than objective. This article, which was afterwards reprinted in Some Aspects of Moral Theology, and the conclusions of which were embodied in the same writer’s work on Moral Theology, was controverted in a series of articles by Father Kelleher in the Irish Theological Quarterly.[3]
Father Slater draws attention to the fact that Dr. Cunningham overlooked to some extent the importance of common estimation in arriving at the just price. He points out that, far from objects being invested with some immutable objective value, their value was in fact determined by the price which the community as a whole was willing to pay for them: ‘As the value in exchange will be determined by what the members of the community at the time are prepared to give, … it will be determined by the social estimation of its utility for the support of life and its scarcity. It will depend upon its capacity to satisfy the wants and desires of the people with whom commercial transactions are possible and practicable. Father Slater then goes on categorically to refute Dr. Cunningham’s presentation of the objectivity of price: ‘All that that doctrine asserts is that there should be, and that there is, an equivalent in social value between the commodity and its price at a certain time and in a certain place; it says nothing whatever about the stability or permanence of prices at different times and at different places. By maintaining that the just price did not depend upon the valuation of the individual buyer or seller the mediæval doctors did not dream of making it intrinsic to the object.’ In the work on Moral Theology, to which we have referred, expressions occur which lead one to believe that Father Slater did not see any great difference between the mediæval just price arrived at by common estimation and the modern normal or market price arrived at by open competition. Thus, in endeavouring to correct Dr. Cunningham’s misunderstanding, Father Slater seems to have gone too far in the other direction, and his position has been ably and, in our judgment, successfully, controverted by Father Kelleher.
The point at issue between the upholders of the two opposing views on just price is well stated by Father Kelleher in the first of his articles on the subject: ‘We must try to find out whether the just and fair price determined the rate of exchange, or whether the rate of exchange, being determined without an objective standard and merely according to the play of human motives, determines what we call the just and fair price.’1 We have already demonstrated that the common estimation referred to by the mediæval doctors was something quite apart from the modern higgling in the market; and that, far from being merely the result of unbridled competition on both sides, it was rather the considered judgment of the best-informed members of the community. As we have seen, even Dr. Cunningham admits that there was a fundamental difference between the common estimation of the scholastics and the modern competitive price. This is clearly demonstrated by Father Kelleher, who further establishes the proposition that the modern price is purely subjective, and that no subjective price can rest on an ethical basis. The question at issue therefore between what we may call the subjective and objective schools is not whether the sale price was determined by competition in the modern sense, but whether the common estimation of those best qualified to form an opinion on the subject in itself determined the just price, or whether it was merely the most reliable evidence of what the just price in fact was at a particular moment.
Father Kelleher draws attention to the fact that Aquinas in his article on price did not specifically affirm that the just price was objective, but he explains this omission by saying that the objectivity of the price was so well and universally understood that it was unnecessary expressly to restate it. Indeed, as we saw above, the teaching of Aquinas on price left a great deal to be supplied by later writers, not because he was in any doubt about the subject, but because the theory was so well understood. ‘Not even in St. Thomas can we find a formal discussion of the moral obligation of observing an objective equivalence in contracts of buying and selling. He simply took it for granted, as, indeed, was inevitable, seeing that, up to his time and for long after, all Catholic thought and legislation proceeded on that hypothesis. But that he actually did take it for granted, he has given many clear indications in his article on Justice which leave us no room for reasonable doubt.’1 As Father Kelleher very cogently points out, the discussion in Aquinas’s article on commerce, whether it was lawful to buy cheap and sell dear, very clearly indicates that the author maintained the objective theory, because if the just price were simply determined by what people were willing to give, this question could not have arisen.
Nor is the fact that the just price admitted of a certain elasticity an argument in favour of its being subjective. Father Kelleher fully admits that the common estimation was the general criterion of just price, and, of course, the common estimation could not, of its very nature, be rigid and immutable. Commodities should, indeed, exchange according to their objective value, but, even so, commodities could not carry their value stamped on their faces. Even if we assume that the standard of exchange was the cost of production, there would still remain room for a certain amount of difference of opinion as to what exactly their value would be in particular instances. Suppose that the commodity offered for sale was a suit of clothes, in estimating its value on the basis of the cost of production, opinions might differ as to the precise amount of time required for making it, or as to the cost of the cloth out of which it was made. Unless recourse was to be had to an almost interminable process of calculations, nobody could say authoritatively what precisely the value was, and in practice the determination of value had perforce to be left to the ordinary human estimate of what it was, which of its very nature was bound to admit a certain margin of fluctuation. Thus we can easily understand how, even with an objective standard of value, the just price might be admitted to vary within the limits of the maximum as it might be expected to be estimated by sellers and the minimum as it would appear just to buyers. The sort of estimation of which St. Thomas speaks is therefore nothing else than a judgment, which, being human, is liable to be slightly in excess or defect of the objective value about which it is formed.’1 As Father Kelleher puts it on a later page, ‘There is a sense certainly in which, with a solitary exception in the case of wages, it may be said with perfect truth that the common estimation determines the just price. That is, the common estimation is the proximate practical criterion.’2
Father Kelleher uses in support of his contention a very ingenious argument drawn from the doctrine of usury. As we said in the first chapter, and as we shall prove in detail in the next section, the prohibition of usury was simply one of the applications of the theory of equivalence in contracts—in other words, it was the determination of the just price to be paid in an exchange of money for money. If, asks Father Kelleher, the common estimation was the final test of just price, why was not moderate usury allowed? That the general opinion of the community in the Middle Ages was undoubtedly in favour of allowing a reasonable percentage on loans is shown by the constant striving of the Church to prevent such a practice. Nevertheless the Church did not for a moment relax its teaching on usury in spite of the almost universal judgment of the people. Here, therefore, is a clear example of one contract in which the standard of value is clearly objective, and it is only reasonable to draw the conclusion that the same standard which applied in contracts of the exchange of money should apply in contracts of the sale of other articles.
Father Kelleher’s contention seems to be completely supported by the passage from Nider which we have cited above, to the effect that the common estimation ceases to be the final test of the just price when the contracting parties know or believe that the common estimation has erred.1 This seems to us clearly to show that the common estimation was but the most generally received test of what the just price in fact was, but that it was in no sense a final or irrefutable criterion.2
The theory that the just price was objective seems to be accepted by the majority of the best modern students of the subject. Sir William Ashley says: ‘The fundamental difference between the mediæval and modern point of view is… that with us value is something entirely subjective; it is what each individual cares to give for a thing. With Aquinas it was entirely objective; something outside the will of the individual purchaser or seller; something attached to the thing itself, existing whether he liked it or not, and that he ought to recognise.’1 Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, following the authority of Knies, expresses the same opinion: ‘Perhaps the contrast between mediæval and modern ideas of value is best expressed by saying that with us value is usually something subjective, consisting of the mental determination of buyer and seller, while to the schoolmen it was in a sense objective, something intrinsically bound up with the commodity itself.’2 Dr. Ryan agrees with this view: ‘The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries assumed that the objective price would be fair, since it was determined by the social estimate. In their opinion the social estimate would embody the requirements of objective justice as fully as any device or institution that was practically available. For the condition of the Middle Ages and the centuries immediately following, this reasoning was undoubtedly correct. The agencies which created the social estimate and determined prices—namely the civil law, the guilds, and custom—succeeded fairly in establishing a price that was equitable to all concerned.’3 Dr. Cleary says: ‘True, the pretium legale is regarded as being a just price, but in order that it may be just, it supposes some objective basis—in other words, it rather declares than constitutes the just price.’4 Haney is also strongly of opinion that the just price was objective. ‘Briefly stated, the doctrine was that every commodity had some one true value which was objective and absolute.’5 The greater number of modern students therefore who have given most care and attention to the question are inclined to the opinion that the just price was not subjective, but objective, and we see no valid reason for disagreeing with this view, which seems to be fully warranted by the original authorities.
§7. The Mediæval Attitude towards Commerce.
Before passing from the question of price, we must discuss the legitimacy of the various occupations which were concerned with buying and selling. The principal matter which arises for consideration in this regard is the attitude of the mediæval theologians towards commerce. Aquinas discusses the legitimacy of commerce in the same question in which he discusses just price, and indeed the two subjects are closely allied, because the importance of the observance of justice in buying and selling grew urgent as commerce extended and advanced.
In order to understand the disapprobation with which commerce was on the whole regarded in the Middle Ages, it is necessary to appreciate the importance of the Christian teaching on the dignity of labour. The principle that, far from being a degrading or humiliating occupation, as it had been regarded in Greece and Rome, manual labour was, on the contrary, one of the most noble ways of serving God, effected a revolution in the economic sphere analogous to that which the Christian sanctification of marriage effected in the domestic sphere. The Christian teaching on labour was grounded on the Divine precepts contained in both the Old and New Testaments,1 and upon the example of Christ, who was Himself a working man. The Gospel was preached amongst the poor, and St. Paul continued his humble labours during his apostolate.2 A life of idleness was considered something to be avoided, instead of something to be desired, as it had been in the ancient civilisations. Gerson says it is against the nature of man to wish to live without labour as usurers do,3 and Langenstein inveighs against usurers and all who live without work.4 ‘We read in Sebastian Brant that the idlers are the most foolish amongst fools, they are to every people like smoke to the eyes or vinegar to the teeth. Only by labour is God truly praised and honoured; and Trithemius says “Man is born to labour as the bird to fly, and hence it is contrary to the nature of man when he thinks to live without work.”’5 The example of the monasteries, where the performance of all sorts of manual labour was not thought inconsistent with the administration of the sacred offices and the pursuit of the highest intellectual exercises, acted as a powerful assertion to the laity of the dignity of labour in the scheme of things.6 The value of the monastic example in this respect cannot be too highly estimated. ‘When we consider the results of the founding of monasteries,’ says Dr. Cunningham, ‘we find influences at work that were plainly economic. These communities can be best understood when we think of them as Christian industrial colonies, and remember that they moulded society rather by example than by precept. We are so familiar with the attacks and satires on monastic life that were current at the Reformation period, that it may seem almost a paradox to say that the chief claim of the monks to our gratitude lies in this, that they helped to diffuse a better appreciation of the duty and dignity of labour.’7
The result of this teaching and example was that, in the Middle Ages, labour had been raised to a position of unquestioned dignity. The economic benefit of this attitude towards labour must be obvious. It made the working classes take a direct pride and interest in their work, which was represented to be a means of sanctification. ‘Labour,’ according to Dr. Cunningham, ‘was said to be pregnant with a double advantage—the privilege of sharing with God in His work of carrying out His purpose, and the opportunity of self-discipline and the helping of one’s fellow-men.’1 ‘Industrial work,’ says Levasseur, ‘in the times of antiquity had always had, in spite of the institutions of certain Emperors, a degrading character, because it had its roots in slavery; after the invasion, the grossness of the barbarians and the levelling of towns did not help to rehabilitate it. It was the Church which, in proclaiming that Christ was the son of a carpenter, and the Apostles were simple workmen, made known to the world that work is honourable as well as necessary. The monks proved this by their example, and thus helped to give to the working classes a certain consideration which ancient society had denied them. Manual labour became a source of sanctification.’2 The high esteem in which labour was held appears from the whole artistic output of the Middle Ages. ‘Many of the simple artists of the time represented the saints holding some instrument of work or engaged in some industrial pursuit; as, for instance, the Blessed Virgin spinning as she sat by the cradle of the divine Infant, and St. Joseph using a saw or carpenter’s tools. “Since the Saints,” says the Christian Monitor, “have laboured, so shall the Christian learn that by honourable labour he can glorify God, do good, and save his own soul.”’3 Work was, alongside of prayer and inseparable from it, the perfection of Christian life.4
It must not be supposed, however, that manual labour alone was thought worthy of praise. On the contrary, the necessity for mental and spiritual workers was fully appreciated, and all kinds of labour were thought equally worthy of honour. ‘Heavy labourer’s work is the inevitable yoke of punishment, which, according to God’s righteous verdict, has been laid upon all the sons of Adam. But many of Adam’s descendants seek in all sorts of cunning ways to escape from the yoke and to live in idleness without labour, and at the same time to have a superfluity of useful and necessary things; some by robbery and plunder, some by usurious dealings, others by lying, deceit, and all the countless, forms of dishonest and fraudulent gain, by which men are for ever seeking to get riches and abundance without toil. But while such men are striving to throw off the yoke righteously imposed on them by God, they are heaping on their shoulders a heavy burden of sin. Not so, however, do the reasonable sons of Adam proceed; but, recognising in sorrow that for the sins of their first father God has righteously ordained that only through the toil of labour shall they obtain what is necessary to life, they take the yoke patiently on them…. Some of them, like the peasants, the handicraftsmen, and the tradespeople, procure for themselves and others, in the sweat of their brows and by physical work, the necessary sustenance of life. Others, who labour in more honourable ways, earn the right to be maintained by the sweat of others’ brows—for instance, those who stand at the head of the commonwealth; for by their laborious exertion the former are enabled to enjoy the peace, the security, without which they could not exist. The same holds good of those who have the charge of spiritual matters….’1 ‘Because,’ says Aquinas, ‘many things are necessary to human life, with which one man cannot provide himself, it is necessary that different things should be done by different people; therefore some are tillers of the soil, some are raisers of cattle, some are builders, and so on; and, because human life does not simply mean corporal things, but still more spiritual things, therefore it is necessary that some people should be released from the care of attending to temporal matters. This distribution of different offices amongst different people is in accordance with Divine providence.’2
All forms of labour being therefore admitted to be honourable and necessary, there was no difficulty felt about justifying their reward. It was always common ground that services of all kinds were entitled to be properly remunerated, and questions of difficulty only arose when a claim was made for payment in a transaction where the element of service was not apparent.1 The different occupations in which men were engaged were therefore ranked in a well-recognised hierarchy of dignity according to the estimate to which they were held to be entitled. The Aristotelean division of industry into artes possessivae and artes pecuniativae was generally followed, the former being ranked higher than the latter. ‘The industries called possessivae, which are immediately useful to the individual, to the family, and to society, producing natural wealth, are also the most natural as well as the most estimable. But all the others should not be despised. The natural arts are the true economic arts, but the arts which produce artificial riches are also estimable in so far as they serve the true national economy; the commutation of the exchanges and the cambium being necessary to the general good, are good in so far as they are subordinate to the end of true economy. One may say the same thing about commerce. In order, then, to estimate the value of an industrial art, one must examine its relation to the general good.’2 Even the artes possessivae were not all considered equally worthy of praise, but were ranked in a curious order of professional hierarchy. Agriculture was considered the highest, next manufacture, and lastly commerce. Roscher says that, whereas all the scholastics were agreed on the excellence of agriculture as an occupation, the best they could say of manufacture was Deo non displicet, whereas of commerce they said Deo placere non potest; and draws attention to the interesting consequence of this, namely, that the various classes of goods that took part in the different occupations were also ranked in a certain order of sacredness. Immovables were thought more worthy of protection against execution and distress than movables, and movables than money.3 Aquinas advises the rulers of States to encourage the artes possessivae, especially agriculture.4 The fullest analysis of the order in which the different artes possessivae should be ranked is to be found in Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Politics. He places first agriculture, which comprises cattle-breeding, tillage, and hunting; secondly, manufacture, which helps to supply man’s corporal needs, such as building and architecture; thirdly, administrative occupations; and lastly, commerce. The Christian Exhortation, quoted by Janssen,5 says, ‘The farmer must in all things be protected and encouraged, for all depend on his labour, from the monarch to the humblest of mankind, and his handiwork is in particular honourable and well pleasing to God.’
The division of occupations according to their dignity adopted by Nicholas Oresme is somewhat unusual. He divides professions into (1) honourable, or those which increase the actual quantity of goods in the community or help its development, such as ecclesiastical offices, the law, the soldiery, the peasantry, artisans, and merchants, and (2) degrading—such as campsores, mercatores monetae sen billonatores.’[1]
No occupation, therefore, which involved labour, whether manual or mental, gave any ground for difficulty with regard to its remuneration. The business of the trader or merchant, on the other hand, was one which called for some explanation. It is important to understand what commerce was taken to mean. The definition which Aquinas gives was accepted by all later writers: ‘A tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things. According to the philosopher, exchange of things is twofold; one natural, as it were, and necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a commodity in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such trading, properly speaking, does not belong to traders, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants, who have to provide the household or the State with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit; and this kind of trade, properly speaking, regards traders.’ It is to be remarked in this definition, that it is essential, to constitute trade, that the exchange or sale should be for the sake of profit, and this point is further emphasised in a later passage of the same article: ‘Not every one that sells at a higher price than he bought is a trader, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary, he buys, not for sale, but for possession, and afterwards for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction, even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by hand. In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.’2 The importance of this definition is that it rules out of the discussion all cases where the goods have been in any way improved or rendered more valuable by the services of the seller. Such improvement was always reckoned as the result of labour of one kind or another, and therefore entitled to remuneration. The essence of trade in the scholastic sense was selling the thing unchanged at a higher price than that at which it had been bought, for the sake of gain.3
The legitimacy of trade in this sense was only gradually admitted. The Fathers of the Church had with one voice condemned trade as being an occupation fraught with danger to the soul. Tertullian argued that there would be no need of trade if there were no desire for gain, and that there would be no desire for gain if man were not avaricious. Therefore avarice was the necessary basis of all trade.1 St. Jerome thought that one man’s gain in trading must always be another’s loss; and that, in any event, trade was a dangerous occupation since it offered so many temptations to fraud to the merchant.2 St. Augustine proclaimed all trade evil because it turns men’s minds away from seeking true rest, which is only to be found in God, and this opinion was embodied in the Corpus Juris Canonici.3 This early view that all trade was to be indiscriminately condemned could not in the nature of things survive experience, and a great step forward was taken when Leo the Great pronounced that trade was neither good nor bad in itself, but was rendered good or bad according as it was honestly or dishonestly carried on.4
The scholastics, in addition to condemning commerce on the authority of the patristic texts, condemned it also on the Aristotelean ground that it was a chrematistic art, and this consideration, as we have seen above, enters into Aquinas’s article on the subject.1
The extension of commercial life which took place about the beginning of the thirteenth century, raised acute controversies about the legitimacy of commerce. Probably nothing did more to broaden the teaching on this subject than the necessity of justifying trade which became more and more insistent after the Crusades.1
By the time of Aquinas the necessity of commerce had come to be fully realised, as appears from the passage in the De Regimine Principum: ‘There are two ways in which it is possible to increase the affluence of any State. One, which is the more worthy way, is on account of the fertility of the country producing an abundance of all things which are necessary for human life, the other is through the employment of commerce, through which the necessaries of life are brought from different places. The former method can be clearly shown to be the more desirable…. It is more admirable that a State should possess an abundance of riches from its own soil than through commerce. For the State which needs a number of merchants to maintain its subsistence is liable to be injured in war through a shortage of food if communications are in any way impeded. Moreover, the influx of strangers corrupts the morals of many of the citizens… whereas, if the citizens themselves devote themselves to commerce, a door is opened to many vices. For when the desire of merchants is inclined greatly to gain, cupidity is aroused in the hearts of many citizens…. For the pursuit of a merchant is as contrary as possible to military exertion. For merchants abstain from labours, and while they enjoy the good things of life, they become soft in mind and their bodies are rendered weak and unsuitable for military exercises…. It therefore behoves the perfect State to make a moderate use of commerce.’1
Aquinas, who, as we have seen, recognised the necessity of commerce, did not condemn all trade indiscriminately, as the Fathers had done, but made the motive with which commerce was carried on the test of its legitimacy: ‘Trade is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit, and tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain, which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue; wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the needy; or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage—for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life—and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labour.’1 This is important in connection with what we have said above as to property, as it shows that the trader was quite justified in seeking to obtain more profits, provided that they accrued for the benefit of the community. This justification of trade according to the end for which it was carried on, was not laid down for the first time by Aquinas, but may be found stated in an English treatise of the tenth century entitled The Colloquy of Archbishop Alfric, where, when a doctor asks a merchant if he wishes to sell his goods for the same price for which he has bought them, the merchant replies: ‘I do not wish to do so, because if I do so, how would I be recompensed for my trouble? but I wish to sell them for more than I paid for them so that I might secure some gain wherewith to support myself, my wife, and family.’2
In spite of the fact that the earlier theory that no commercial gain which did not represent payment for labour could be justified was still maintained by some writers—for instance, Raymond de Pennafort1—the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas was generally accepted throughout the later Middle Ages. Canonists and theologians accepted without hesitation the justification of trade formulated by Aquinas.2 Henri de Gand,3 Duns Scotus,4 and François de Mayronis [5] unhesitatingly accepted the view of Aquinas, and incorporated it in their works.6 ‘An honourable merchant,’ says Trithemius, ‘who does not only think of large profits, and who is guided in all his dealings by the laws of God and man, and who gladly gives to the needy of his wealth and earnings, deserves the same esteem as any other worker. But it is no easy matter to be always honourable in all mercantile dealings and not to become usurious. Without commerce no community can of course exist, but immoderate commerce is rather hurtful than beneficial, because it fosters greed of gain and gold, and enervates and emasculates the nation through love of pleasure and luxury.’7 Nider says that to buy not for use but for sale at a higher price is called trade. Two special rules apply to this: first, that it should be useful to the State, and second, that the price should correspond to the diligence, prudence, and risk undertaken in the transaction.[8]
The later writers hi the fifteenth century seem to have regarded trade more liberally even than Aquinas, although they quote his dictum on the subject as the basis of their teaching. Instead of condemning all commerce as wrong unless it was justified by good motives, they were rather inclined to treat commerce as being in itself colourless, but capable of becoming evil by bad motives. Carletus says: ‘Commerce in itself is neither bad nor illegal, but it may become bad on account of the circumstances and the motive with which it is undertaken, the persons who undertake it, or the manner in which it is conducted. For instance, commerce undertaken through avarice or a desire for sloth is bad; so also is commerce which is injurious to the republic, such as engrossing.’1
Endemann, having thoroughly studied all the fifteenth-century writers on the subject, says that commerce might be rendered unjustifiable either by subjective or objective reasons. Subjective illegality would arise from the person trading—for instance, the clergy—or the motive with which trade was undertaken; objective illegality on account of the object traded in, such as weapons in war-time, or the bodies of free men.1 Speculative trading, and what we to-day call profiteering, were forbidden in all circumstances.2
We need not dwell upon the prohibition of trading by the clergy, because it was simply a rule of discipline which has not any bearing upon general economic teaching, except in so far as it shows that commerce was considered an occupation dangerous to virtue. Aquinas puts it as follows: ‘Clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so many vices, since “a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips.” [1] There is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore the Apostle says:2 “No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular business.” Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first-mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.’3 The rule of St. Benedict contains a strong admonition to those who may be entrusted with the sale of any of the products of the monastery, to avoid all fraud and avarice.4
On the whole, the attitude towards commerce seems to have grown more liberal in the course of the Middle Ages. At first all commerce was condemned as sinful; at a later period it was said to be justifiable provided it was influenced by good motives; while at a still later date the method of treatment was rather to regard it as a colourless act in itself which might be rendered harmful by the presence of bad motives. This gradual broadening of the justification of commerce is probably a reflection of the necessities of the age, which witnessed a very great expansion of commerce, especially of foreign trade. In the earlier centuries remuneration for undertaking risk was prohibited on the authority of a passage in the Gregorian Decretals, but the later writers refused to disallow it.1 The following passage from Dr. Cunningham’s Growth of English Industry and Commerce correctly represents the attitude of the Church towards commerce at the end of the Middle Ages: ‘The ecclesiastic who regarded the merchant as exposed to temptations in all his dealings would not condemn him as sinful unless it were clear that a transaction were entered on solely for greed, and hence it was the tendency for moralists to draw additional distinctions, and refuse to pronounce against business practices where common sense did not give the benefit of the doubt.’2 We have seen that one motive which would justify the carrying on of trade was the desire to support one’s self and one’s family. Of course this motive was capable of bearing a very extended and elastic interpretation, and would justify increased commercial profits according as the standard of life improved. The other motive given by the theologians, namely, the benefit of the State, was also one which was capable of a very wide construction. One must remember that even the manual labourer was bound not to labour solely for avaricious gain, but also for the benefit of his fellow-men. ‘It is not only to chastise our bodies,’ says Basil, ‘it is also by the love of our neighbour that the labourer’s life is useful so that God may furnish through us our weaker brethren’;3 and a fifteenth-century book on morality says: ‘Man should labour for the honour of God. He should labour in order to gain for himself and his family the necessaries of life and what will contribute to Christian joy, and moreover to assist the poor and the sick by his labours. He who acting otherwise seeks only the pecuniary recompense of his work does ill, and his labours are but usury. In the words of St. Augustine, “thou shalt not commit usury with the work of thy hands, for thus wilt thou lose thy soul,”’4 The necessity for altruism and regard for the needs of one’s neighbour as well as of one’s self were therefore motives necessary to justify labour as well as commerce; and it would be wrong to conclude that the teaching of the scholastics on the necessity for a good motive to justify trade operated to damp individual enterprise, or to discourage those who were inclined to launch commercial undertakings, any more than the insistence on the need for a similar motive in labourers was productive of idleness. What the mediæval teaching on commerce really amounted to was that, while commerce was as legitimate as any other occupation, owing to the numerous temptations to avarice and dishonesty which it involved, it must be carefully scrutinised and kept within due bounds. It was more difficult to insure the observance of the just price in the case of a sale by a merchant than in one by an artificer; and the power which the merchant possessed of raising the price of the necessaries of life on the poor by engrossing and speculation rendered him a person whose operations should be carefully controlled.
Finally, it must be clearly understood that the attempt of some modern writers to base the mediæval justification of commerce on an analysis of all commercial gains as the payment for labour rests on a profound misunderstanding. As we have already pointed out, Aquinas distinctly rules out of consideration in his treatment of commerce the case where the goods have been improved in value by the exertions of the merchant. When the element of labour entered into the transaction the matter was clearly beyond doubt, and the lengthy discussion devoted to the question of commerce by Aquinas and his followers shows that in justifying commercial gains they were justifying a gain resting not on the remuneration for the labour, but on an independent title.
§ 8. Cambium.
There was one department of commerce, namely, cambium, or money-changing, which, while it did not give any difficulty in theory, involved certain difficulties in practice, owing to the fact that it was liable to be used to disguise usurious transactions. Although cambium was, strictly speaking, a special branch of commerce, it was nevertheless usually treated in the works on usury, the reason being that many apparent contracts of cambium were in fact veiled loans, and that it was therefore a matter of importance in discussing usury to explain the tests by which genuine and usurious exchanges could be distinguished. Endemann treats this subject very fully and ably;1 but for the purpose of the present essay it is not necessary to do more than to state the main conclusions at which he arrives.
Although the practice of exchange grew up slowly and gradually during the later Middle Ages, and, consequently, the amount of space devoted to the discussion of the theory of exchange became larger as time went on, nevertheless there is no serious difference of opinion between the writers of the thirteenth century, who treat the subject in a fragmentary way, and those of the fifteenth, who deal with it exhaustively and systematically. Aquinas does not mention cambium in the Summa, but he recognises the necessity for some system of exchange in the De Eegimine Principum.1 All the later writers who mention cambium are agreed in regarding it as a species of commerce to which the ordinary rules regulating all commerce apply. Francis de Mayronis says that the art of cambium is as natural as any other kind of commerce, because of the diversity of the currencies in different kingdoms, and approves of the campsor receiving some remuneration for his labour and trouble.2 Nicholas de Ausmo, in his commentary on the Summa Pisana, written in the beginning of the fifteenth century, says that the campsor may receive a gain from his transactions, provided that they are not conducted with the sole object of making a profit, and that the gain he may receive must be limited by the common estimation of the place and time. This is practically saying that cambium may be carried on under the same conditions as any other species of commerce. Biel says that cambium is only legitimate if the campsor has the motive of keeping up a family or benefiting the State, and that the contract may become usurious if the gain is not fair and moderate.3 The right of the campsor to some remuneration for risk was only gradually admitted, and forms the subject of much discussion amongst the jurists.4 This hesitation in allowing remuneration for risk was not peculiar to cambium, but, as we have seen above, was common to all commerce. Endemann points out how the theologians and jurists unanimously insisted that cambium could not be justified except when the just price was observed, and that, when the doctrine attained its full development, the element of labour was but one of the constituents in the estimation of that price.5
All the writers who treated of exchange divided it into three kinds; ordinary exchange of the moneys of different currencies (cambium minutum), exchange of moneys of different currencies between different places, the justification for which rested on remuneration for an imaginary transport (cambium per litteras), and usurious exchange of moneys of the same currency (cambium siccum). The former two species of cambium were justifiable, whereas the last was condemned.1
The most complete treatise on the subject of money exchange is that of Thomas da Vio, written in 1499. The author of this treatise divides money-changing into three kinds, just, unjust, and doubtful. There were three kinds of just change; cambium minutum, in which the campsor was entitled to a reasonable remuneration for his labour; cambium per litteras, in which the campsor was held entitled to a wage (merces) for an imaginary transportation; and thirdly, when the campsor carried money from one place to another, where it was of higher value. The unjust change was when the contract was a usurious transaction veiled in the guise of a genuine exchange. Under the doubtful changes, the author discusses various special points which need not detain us here.
Thomas da Vio then goes on to discuss whether the justifiable exchange can be said to be a species of loan, and concludes that it can not, because all that the campsor receives is an indemnity against loss and a remuneration for his labour, trouble, outlay, and risk, which is always justifiable. He then goes on to state the very important principle, that in cambium money is not to be considered a measure of value, but a vendible commodity,[1] a distinction which Endemann thinks was productive of very important results in the later teaching on the subject.2 The last question treated in the treatise is the measure of the campsor’s profit, and here the contract of exchange is shown to be on all fours with every other contract, because the essential principle laid down for determining its justice is the observance of the equivalence between both parties.1
Notes
1 Caepolla, de Cont. Sim., 78; Carletus, Summa
Angelica, lxv.
2 Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. 114, 1.
3 II. ii. 78, 2, ad. 3.
4 Op. cit., IV. xv. 10. Modern Socialists caricature the correct principle ‘that labour is a commodity’ into ‘the labourer is a commodity’—a great difference, which is not sufficiently understood by many present-day writers. (See Roscher, Political Economy, s. 160.)
1 Op. cit., p. 103.
2 An excellent bibliography of books dealing with the history of the working classes in the Middle Ages is to be found in Brants, op. cit., p. 105. The need for examining concrete economic phenomena is insisted on in Ryan’s Living Wage, p. 28.
3 De Cont. We have here a recognition of the principle that the value of labour is not to be measured by anything extrinsic to itself, e.g. by the value of the product, but by its own natural function and end, and this function and end is the supplying of the requirements of human life. The wage must, therefore, be capable of supplying the same needs that the expenditure of a labourer’s energy is meant to supply. (See Cronin, Ethics, vol. ii. p. 390.)
4 Brants, op. cit., p. 118.
5 The passages from the Summa of Antoninus bearing on the subject are reprinted in Brants, op. cit., p. 120.
6 Op. cit., p. 125.
7 Brants, op. cit., p. 116, quoting Le Lime du Trésor of Brunetto Latini.
1 The Living Wage, p. 27.
2 Growth of English Industry and Commerce, vol. i. p. 460.
3 Endemann, Studien, vol. ii. p. 60.
4 Lessius, De Justitia et Jure, II. xx. 1, 21.
5 Ibid.
6 Langenstein, De Cont.; Biel, op. cit., iv. xv. 11.
7 Quoted in Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 102.
1 Ashley, op. cit., vol. i. pt. i. p. 129.
2 Art. ‘Political Economy.’
3 Growth of English Industry and Commerce, vol. i. p. 461.
4 Christianity and Economic Science, p. 29.
1 Pp. 77-9.
1 ‘Market Prices,’ vol. ix. p. 398 and vol. x. p. 163; and
‘Father Slater on Just Price and Value,’ vol. xi. p. 159.
1 Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. ix. p. 41.
1 Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. x. p. 165.
1 Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. x. p. 166.
2 P. 173.
1 De Cont. Merc., ii. xv. Nider was regarded as a very weighty authority on the subject of contracts (Endemann, Studien, vol. ii. p. 8).
2 The argument in favour of what we have called the ‘objective’ theory of the just price is strengthened by the consideration that goods do not satisfy mere subjective whims, but supply real wants. For example, food supplies a real need of the human being, as also does clothing; in the one case hunger is appeased, and in the other cold is warded off, just as drugs used in medical practice produce real objective effects on the person taking them.
1 Op. cit., vol. i. pt. i. p. 140.
2 Art. ‘Justum Pretium.’
3 ‘The Moral Aspect of Monopoly,’ by J.A. Ryan, D.D., Irish Theological Quarterly, in. p. 275; and see Distributive Justice, pp. 332-4.
4 Op. cit., p. 193.
5 History of Economic Thought, p. 75.
1 Gen. iii. 19; Ps. cxxvii. 2; 2 Thess. iii. 10. The last-mentioned text is explained, in opposition to certain Socialist interpretations which have been put on it, by Dr. Hogan in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. xxv. p. 45.
2 Wallon, op. cit., vol. iii. p. 401.
3 De Cont., i. 13.
4 De Cont.
5 Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. pp. 93-4.
6 Levasseur, Histoire des Classes ouvrières en France, vol. i. pp. 182 et seq.
7 Western Civilisation, vol. ii. p. 35.
1 Christianity and Economic Science, pp. 26-7.
2 Op. cit., vol. i. p. 187.
3 Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 9.
4 Wallon, op. cit., vol. i. p. 410.
1 Langenstein, quoted in Janssen, op. cit., p. 95.
2 Summa Cont. Gent., iii. 134.
1 Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. 77, 4; Nider, op. cit., II. x.
2 Brants, op. cit., p. 82.
3 Geschichte, p. 7.
4 De Regimine Principum, vol. ii. chaps, v. and vi.
5 Op. cit., vol. i. p. 297.
1 Tractatus de Origine, etc., Monetarum.
2 Tractatus de Origine, etc., Monetarum, ad. 2.
3 ‘Fit autem mercatio cum non ut emptor ea utatur sed ut earn carius vendat etiam non mutatam suo artificio; illa mercatio dicitur proprie negotiatio’ (Biel, op. cit., IV. xv. 10.)
1 De Idol., xi.
2 Ashley, op. cit., vol. i. pt. i. p. 129.
3 See Corpus Juris Canonici, Deer. I.D. 88 c. 12.
4 Epist. ad Rusticum, c. ix.
1 Rambaud, op. cit., p. 52.
1 On the economic influence of the Crusades the following
works may be consulted: Blanqui, Histoire de l’Economie politique;
Heeren, Essai sur l’Influence politique et sociale des Croisades;
Scherer, Histoire du Commerce; Prutz, Culturgeschichte der
Kreuzzüge; Pigonneau, Histoire du Commerce de la France; List, Die
Lehren der Handelspolitischen Geschichte.
1 ii. 3.
1 II. ii. 77, 4.
2 Loria, Analysi de la proprietà, capitalista, ii. 168.
1 Summa Theologica, II. vii. 5.
2 Ashley, op. cit., p. 55.
3 Quodlib., i. 40.
4 Lib. Quat. Sent., xv. 2.
6 See Jourdain, op. cit., p. 20 et seq.
7 Quoted in Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 97.
1 Summa Angelica, 169: ‘Mercatio non est mala ex genere, sed bona, humano convictui necessaria dum fuerit justa. Mercatio simpliciter non est peccatum sed ejus abusus.’ Biel, op. cit., iv. xv. 10.
1 Studien, vol. ii. p. 18.
2 The Ayenbite of Inwit, a thirteenth-century confessor’s manual, lays it down that speculation is a kind of usury. (Rambaud, Histoire, p. 56.)
2 2 Tim. ii. 4.
3 Summa, II. ii. 77, 4, ad. 3.
4 Beg. St. Ben., 57.
1 Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce, vol. i. p. 255.
2 P. 255.
3 Reg. Fus. Tract., XXXVII. i.
4 Quoted in Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 9.
1 Studien, vol. i. p. 75.
1 ‘Cum enim extraneae monetae communicantur in permutationibus oportet recurrere ad artem campsoriam, cum talia numismata non tantum valeant in regionibus extraneis quantum in propriis (De Reg. Prin., ii. 13).
2 In Quot. Lib. Sent., iv. 16, 4.
3 Op. oil., IV. xv. 11.
4 Endemann, Studien, vol. i. pp. 123-36.
5 Ibid., p. 213.
1 Laurentius de Rodulfis, De Usuris, pt. iii. Nos. 1 to 5.
1 ‘Numisma quamvis sit mensura et instrumentum in permutationibus; tamen per se aliquid esse potest.’ It is this principle that justifies the treatment of cambium in this section rather than the next.
2 Studien, vol. ii. p. 212.