Introduction — To the Critique of Political Economy — A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy by Karl Marx

Introduction — To the Critique of Political Economy156

1. Production in General

The subject of our discussion is first of all material production by individuals as determined by society, naturally constitutes the starting point. The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting point with Smith and Ricardo, belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinsonades which do not by any means represent, as students of the history of civilization imagine, a reaction against over-refinement and a return to a misunderstood natural life. They are no more based on such a naturalism than is Rosseau’s “contrat social,” which makes naturally independent individuals come in contact and have mutual intercourse by contract. They are the fiction and only the aesthetic fiction of the small and great Robinsonades. They are, moreover, the anticipation of “bourgeois society,” which had been in course of development since the sixteenth century and made gigantic strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition the individual appears free from the bonds of nature, etc., which in former epochs of history made him a part of a definite, limited human conglomeration. To the prophets of the eighteenth century, on whose shoulders Smith and Ricardo are still standing, this eighteenth century individual, constituting the joint product of the dissolution of the feudal form of society and of the new forces of production which had developed since the sixteenth century, appears as an ideal whose existence belongs to the past; not as a result of history, but as its starting point.

Since that individual appeared to be in conformity with nature and [corresponded] to their conception of human nature, [he was regarded] not as a product of history, but of nature. This illusion has been characteristic of every new epoch in the past. Steuart, who, as an aristocrat, stood more firmly on historical ground, contrary to the spirit of the eighteenth century, escaped this simplicity of view. The further back we go into history, the more the individual and, therefore, the producing individual seems to depend on and constitute a part of a larger whole: at first it is, quite naturally, the family and the clan, which is but an enlarged family; later on, it is the community growing up in its different forms out of the clash and the amalgamation of clans. It is but in the eighteenth century, in “bourgeois society,” that the different forms of social union confront the individual as a mere means to his private ends, as an outward necessity. But the period in which this view of the isolated individual becomes prevalent, is the very one in which the interrelations of society (general from this point of view) have reached the highest state of development. Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by isolated individuals outside of society—something which might happen as an exception to a civilized man who by accident got into the wilderness and already dynamically possessed within himself the forces of society—is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another. We need not dwell on this any longer. It would not be necessary to touch upon this point at all, were not the vagary which had its justification and sense with the people of the eighteenth century transplanted in all earnest into the field of political economy by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon and others. Proudhon and others naturally find it very pleasant, when they do not know the historical origin of a certain economic phenomenon, to give it a quasi historico-philosopohical explanation by going into mythology. Adam or Prometheus hit upon the scheme cut and dried, whereupon it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more tediously dry than the dreaming locus communis.

Whenever we speak, therefore, of production, we always have in mind production at a certain stage of social development, or production by social individuals. Hence, it might seem that in order to speak of production at all, we must either trace the historical process of development through its various phases, or declare at the outset that we are dealing with a certain historical period, as, e. g., with modern capitalistic production which, as a matter of fact, constitutes the subject proper of this work. But all stages of production have certain landmarks in common, common purposes. Production in general is an abstraction, but it is a rational abstraction, in so far as it singles out and fixes the common features, thereby saving us repetition. Yet these general or common features discovered by comparison constitute something very complex, whose constituent elements have different destinations. Some of these elements belong to all epochs, others are common to a few. Some of them are common to the most modern as well as to the most ancient epochs. No production is conceivable without them; but while even the most completely developed languages have laws and conditions in common with the least developed ones, what is characteristic of their development are the points of departure from the general and common. The conditions which generally govern production must be differentiated in order that the essential points of difference be not lost sight of in view of the general uniformity which is due to the fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, remain the same. The failure to remember this one fact is the source of all the wisdom of modern economists who are trying to prove the eternal nature and harmony of existing social conditions. Thus they say, e. g., that no production is possible without some instrument of production, let that instrument be only the hand; that none is possible without past accumulated labor, even if that labor consist of mere skill which has been accumulated and concentrated in the hand of the savage by repeated exercise. Capital is, among other things, also an instrument of production, also past impersonal labor. Hence capital is a universal, eternal natural phenomenon; which is true if we disregard the specific properties which turn an “instrument of production” and “stored up labor” into capital. The entire history of production appears to a man like Carey, e. g., as a malicious perversion on the part of governments.

If there is no production in general, there is also no general production. Production is always some special branch of production or an aggregate, as, e. g., agriculture, stock raising, manufactures, etc. But political economy is not technology. The connection between the general destinations of production at a given stage of social development and the particular forms of production, is to be developed elsewhere (later on).

Finally, production is not only of a special kind. It is always a certain body politic, a social personality that is engaged on a larger or smaller aggregate of branches of production. The connection between the real process and its scientific presentation also falls outside of the scope of this treatise. [We must thus distinguish between] production in general, special branches of production and production as a whole.

It is the fashion with economists to open their works with a general introduction, which is entitled “production” (see, e. g., John Stuart Mill) and deals with the general “requisites of production.”

This general introductory part treats or is supposed to treat:

1. Of the conditions without which production is impossible, i. e., of the most essential conditions of production. As a matter of fact, however, it dwindles down, as we shall see, to a few very simple definitions, which flatten out into shallow tautologies;

2. Of conditions which further production more or less, as, e. g., Adam Smith’s [discussion of] a progressive and stagnant state of society.

In order to give scientific value to what serves with him as a mere summary, it would be necessary to study the degree of productivity by periods in the development of individual nations; such a study falls outside of the scope of the present subject, and in so far as it does belong here is to be brought out in connection with the discussion of competition, accumulation, etc. The commonly accepted view of the matter gives a general answer to the effect that an industrial nation is at the height of its production at the moment when it reaches its historical climax in all respects. Or, that certain races, climates, natural conditions, such as distance from the sea, fertility of the soil, etc., are more favorable to production than others. That again comes down to the tautology that the facility of creating wealth depends on the extent to which its elements are present both subjectively and objectively. As a matter of fact a nation is at its industrial height so long as its main object is not gain, but the process of gaining. In that respect the Yankees stand above the English.

But all that is not what the economists are really after in the general introductory part. Their object is rather to represent production in contradistinction to distribution—see Mill, e. g.—as subject to eternal laws independent of history, and then to substitute bourgeois relations, in an underhand way, as immutable natural laws of society in abstracto. This is the more or less conscious aim of the entire proceeding. On the contrary, when it comes to distribution, mankind is supposed to have indulged in all sorts of arbitrary action. Quite apart from the fact that they violently break the ties which bind production and distribution together, so much must be clear from the outset: that, no matter how greatly the systems of distribution may vary at different stages of society, it should be possible here, as in the case of production, to discover the common features and to confound and eliminate all historical differences in formulating general human laws. E. g., the slave, the serf, the wage-worker—all receive a quantity of food, which enables them to exist as slave, serf, and wage-worker. The conqueror, the official, the landlord, the monk, or the levite, who respectively live on tribute, taxes, rent, alms, and the tithe,—all receive [a part] of the social product which is determined by laws different from those which determine the part received by the slave, etc. The two main points which all economists place under this head, are: first, property; second, the protection of the latter by the administration of justice, police, etc. The objections to these two points can be stated very briefly.

1. All production is appropriation of nature by the individual within and through a definite form of society. In that sense it is a tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a condition of production. But it becomes ridiculous, when from that one jumps at once to a definite form of property, e. g. private property (which implies, besides, as a prerequisite the existence of an opposite form, viz. absence of property). History points rather to common property (e. g. among the Hindoos, Slavs, ancient Celts, etc.) as the primitive form, which still plays an important part at a much later period as communal property. The question as to whether wealth grows more rapidly under this or that form of property, is not even raised here as yet. But that there can be no such a thing as production, nor, consequently, society, where property does not exist in any form, is a tautology. Appropriation which does not appropriate is a contradictio in subjecto.

2. Protection of property, etc. Reduced to their real meaning, these commonplaces express more than what their preachers know, namely, that every form of production creates its own legal relations, forms of government, etc. The crudity and the shortcomings of the conception lie in the tendency to see but an accidental reflective connection in what constitutes an organic union. The bourgeois economists have a vague notion that it is better to carry on production under the modern police, than it was, e. g. under club-law. They forget that club law is also law, and that the right of the stronger continues to exist in other forms even under their “government of law.”

When the social conditions corresponding to a certain stage of production are in a state of formation or disappearance, disturbances of production naturally arise, although differing in extent and effect.

To sum up: all the stages of production have certain destinations in common, which we generalize in thought; but the so-called general conditions of all production are nothing but abstract conceptions which do not go to make up any real stage in the history of production.

2. The General Relation of Production to Distribution, Exchange, and Consumption

Before going into a further analysis of production, it is necessary to look at the various divisions which economists put side by side with it. The most shallow conception is as follows: By production, the members of society appropriate (produce and shape) the products of nature to human wants; distribution determines the proportion in which the individual participates in this production; exchange brings him the particular products into which he wishes to turn the quantity secured by him through distribution; finally, through consumption the products become objects of use and enjoyment, of individual appropriation. Production yields goods adopted to our needs; distribution distributes them according to social laws; exchange distributes further what has already been distributed, according to individual wants; finally, in consumption the product drops out of the social movement, becoming the direct object of the individual want which it serves and satisfies in use. Production thus appears as the starting point; consumption as the final end; and distribution and exchange as the middle; the latter has a double aspect, distribution being defined as a process carried on by society, while exchange, as one proceeding from the individual. In production the person is embodied in things, in [consumption 157] things are embodied in persons; in distribution, society assumes the part of go-between of production and consumption in the form of generally prevailing rules; in exchange this is accomplished by the accidental make-up of the individual.

Distribution determines what proportion (quantity) of the products the individual is to receive; exchange determines the products in which the individual desires to receive his share allotted to him by distribution.

Production, distribution, exchange, and consumption thus form a perfect connection, production standing for the general, distribution and exchange for the special, and consumption for the individual, in which all are joined together. To be sure this is a connection, but it does not go very deep. Production is determined [according to the economists] by universal natural laws, while distribution depends on social chance: distribution can, therefore, have a more or less stimulating effect on production: exchange lies between the two as a formal (?) social movement, and the final act of consumption which is considered not only as a final purpose, but also as a final aim, falls, properly, outside of the scope of economics, except in so far as it reacts on the starting point and causes the entire process to begin all over again.

The opponents of the economists—whether economists themselves or not—who reproach them with tearing apart, like barbarians, what is an organic whole, either stand on common ground with them or are below them. Nothing is more common than the charge that the economists have been considering production as an end in itself, too much to the exclusion of everything else. The same has been said with regard to distribution. This accusation is itself based on the economic conception that distribution exists side by side with production as a self-contained, independent sphere. Or [they are accused] that the various factors are not treated by them in their connection as a whole. As though it were the text books that impress this separation upon life and not life upon the text books; and the subject at issue were a dialectic balancing of conceptions and not an analysis of real conditions.

a. Production is at the same time also consumption. Twofold consumption, subjective and objective. The individual who develops his faculties in production, is also expending them, consuming them in the act of production, just as procreation is in its way a consumption of vital powers. In the second place, production is consumption of means of production which are used and used up and partly (as e. g. in burning) reduced to their natural elements. The same is true of the consumption of raw materials which do not remain in their natural form and state, being greatly absorbed in the process. The act of production is, therefore, in all its aspects an act of consumption as well. But this is admitted by economists. Production as directly identical with consumption, consumption as directly coincident with production, they call productive consumption. This identity of production and consumption finds its expression in Spinoza’s proposition, Determinatio est negatio. But this definition of productive consumption is resorted to just for the purpose of distinguishing between consumption as identical with production and consumption proper, which is defined as its destructive counterpart. Let us then consider consumption proper.

Consumption is directly also production, just as in nature the consumption of the elements and of chemical matter constitutes production of plants. It is clear, that in nutrition, e. g., which is but one form of consumption, man produces his own body; but it is equally true of every kind of consumption, which goes to produce the human being in one way or another. [It is] consumptive production. But, say the economists, this production which is identical with consumption, is a second production resulting from the destruction of the product of the first. In the first, the producer transforms himself into things; in the second, things are transformed into human beings. Consequently, this consumptive production—although constituting a direct unity of production and consumption—differs essentially from production proper. The direct unity in which production coincides with consumption and consumption with production, does not interfere with their direct duality.

Production is thus at the same time consumption, and consumption is at the same time production. Each is directly its own counterpart. But at the same time an intermediary movement goes on between the two. Production furthers consumption by creating material for the latter which otherwise would lack its object. But consumption in its turn furthers production, by providing for the products the individual for whom they are products. The product receives its last finishing touches in consumption. A railroad on which no one rides, which is, consequently not used up, not consumed, is but a potential railroad, and not a real one. Without production, no consumption; but, on the other hand, without consumption, no production; since production would then be without a purpose. Consumption produces production in two ways.

In the first place, in that the product first becomes a real product in consumption; e. g., a garment becomes a real garment only through the act of being worn; a dwelling which is not inhabited, is really no dwelling; consequently, a product as distinguished from a mere natural object, proves to be such, first becomes a product in consumption. Consumption gives the product the finishing touch by annihilating it, since a product is the [result] of production not only as the material embodiment of activity, but also as a mere object for the active subject.

In the second place, consumption produces production by creating the necessity for new production, i. e. by providing the ideal, inward, impelling cause which constitutes the prerequisite of production. Consumption furnishes the impulse for production as well as its object, which plays in production the part of its guiding aim. It is clear that while production furnishes the material object of consumption, consumption provides the ideal object of production, as its image, its want, its impulse and its purpose. It furnishes the object of production in its subjective form. No wants, no production. But consumption reproduces the want.

In its turn, production:

First, furnishes consumption 158 with its material, its object. Consumption without an object is no consumption, hence production works in this direction by producing consumption.

Second. But it is not only the object that production provides for consumption. It gives consumption its definite outline, its character, its finish. Just as consumption gives the product its finishing touch as a product, production puts the finishing touch on consumption. For the object is not simply an object in general, but a definite object, which is consumed in a certain definite manner prescribed in its turn by production. Hunger is hunger; but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked meat eaten with fork and knife is a different kind of hunger from the one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands, nails, and teeth. Not only the object of consumption, but also the manner of consumption is produced by production; that is to say, consumption is created by production not only objectively, but also subjectively. Production thus creates the consumers.

Third. Production not only supplies the want with material, but supplies the material with a want. When consumption emerges from its first stage of natural crudeness and directness—and its continuation in that state would in itself be the result of a production still remaining in a state of natural crudeness—it is itself furthered by its object as a moving spring. The want of it which consumption experiences is created by its appreciation of the product. The object of art, as well as any other product, creates an artistic and beauty-enjoying public. Production thus produces not only an object for the individual, but also an individual for the object.

Production thus produces consumption: first, by furnishing the latter with material; second, by determining the manner of consumption; third, by creating in consumers a want for its products as objects of consumption. It thus produces the object, the manner, and the moving spring of consumption. In the same manner, consumption [creates] the disposition of the producer by setting (?) him up as an aim and by stimulating wants. The identity of consumption and production thus appears to be a three fold one.

First, direct identity: production is consumption; consumption is production. Consumptive production. Productive consumption. Economists call both productive consumption, but make one distinction by calling the former reproduction, and the latter productive consumption. All inquiries into the former deal with productive and unproductive labor; those into the latter treat of productive and unproductive consumption.

Second. Each appears as the means of the other and as being brought about by the other, which is expressed as their mutual interdependence; a relation, by virtue of which they appear as mutually connected and indispensable, yet remaining outside of each other.

Production creates the material as the outward object of consumption; consumption creates the want as the inward object, the purpose of production. Without production, no consumption; without consumption, no production; this maxim figures (?) in political economy in many forms.

Third. Production is not only directly consumption and consumption directly production; nor is production merely a means of consumption and consumption the purpose of production. In other words, not only does each furnish the other with its object; production, the material object of consumption; consumption, the ideal object of production. On the contrary, either one is not only directly the other, not (?) only a means of furthering the other, but while it is taking place, creates the other as such for itself (?). Consumption completes the act of production by giving the finishing touch to the product as such, by destroying the latter, by breaking up its independent material form; by bringing to a state of readiness, through the necessity of repetition, the disposition to produce developed in the first act of production; that is to say, it is not only the concluding act through which the product becomes a product, but also [the one] through which the producer becomes a producer. On the other hand, production produces consumption, by determining the manner of consumption, and further, by creating the incentive for consumption, the very ability to consume, in the form of want. This latter identity mentioned under point 3, is much discussed in political economy in connection with the treatment of the relations of demand and supply, of objects and wants, of natural wants and those created by society.

Hence, it is the simplest matter with a Hegelian to treat production and consumption as identical. And this has been done not only by socialist writers of fiction but even by economists, e. g. Say; the latter maintained that if we consider a nation as a whole, or mankind in abstracto—her production is at the same time her consumption. Storch pointed out Say’s error by calling attention to the fact that a nation does not entirely consume her product, but also creates means of production, fixed capital, etc. To consider society as a single individual is moreover a false mode of speculative reasoning. With an individual, production and consumption appear as different aspects of one act. The important point to be emphasized here is that if production and consumption be considered as activities of one individual or of separate individuals, they appear at any rate as aspects of one process in which production forms the actual starting point and is, therefore, the predominating factor. Consumption, as a natural necessity, as a want, constitutes an internal factor of productive activity, but the latter is the starting point of realization and, therefore, its predominating factor, the act into which the entire process resolves itself in the end. The individual produces a certain article and turns again into himself by consuming it; but he returns as a productive and a self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a factor of production.

In society, however, the relation of the producer to his product, as soon as it is completed, is an outward one, and the return of the product to the individual depends on his relations to other individuals. He does not take immediate possession of it. Nor does the direct appropriation of the product constitute his purpose, when he produces in society. Between the producer and the product distribution steps in, which determines by social laws his share in the world of products; that is to say, distribution steps in between production and consumption.

Does distribution form an independent sphere standing side by side with and outside of production?

b. Production and Distribution. In perusing the common treatises on economics one can not help being struck with the fact that everything is treated there twice; e. g., under distribution, there figure rent, wages, interest, and profit; while under production we find land, labor, and capital as agents of production. As regards capital, it is at once clear that it is counted twice: first, as an agent of production; second, as a source of income; as determining factors and definite forms of distribution, interest and profit figure as such also in production, since they are forms, in which capital increases and grows, and are consequently factors of its own production. Interest and profit, as forms of distribution, imply the existence of capital as an agent of production. They are forms of distribution which have for their prerequisite capital as an agent of production. They are also forms of reproduction of capital.

In the same manner, wages is wage-labor when considered under another head; the definite character which labor has in one case as an agent of production, appears in the other as a form of distribution. If labor were not fixed as wage-labor, its manner of participation in distribution 159 would not appear as wages, as is the case e. g. under slavery. Finally, rent—to take at once the most developed form of distribution—by means of which landed property receives its share of the products, implies the existence of large landed property (properly speaking, agriculture on a large scale) as an agent of production, and not simply land, no more than wages represents simply labor. The relations and methods of distribution appear, therefore, merely as the reverse sides of the agents of production. An individual who participates in production as a wage laborer, receives his share of the products, i. e. of the results of production, in the form of wages. The subdivisions and organization of distribution are determined by the subdivisions and organization of production. Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in so far as the material goods are concerned, since only the results of production can be distributed; but also as regards its form, since the definite manner of participation in production determines the particular form of distribution, the form under which participation in distribution takes place. It is quite an illusion to place land under production, rent under distribution, etc.

Economists, like Ricardo, who are accused above all of having paid exclusive attention to production, define distribution, therefore, as the exclusive subject of political economy, because they instinctively 160 regard the forms of distribution as the clearest forms in which the agents of production find expression in a given society.

To the single individual distribution naturally appears as a law established by society determining his position in the sphere of production, within which he produces, and thus antedating production. At the outset the individual has no capital, no landed property. From his birth he is assigned to wage-labor by the social process of distribution. But this very condition of being assigned to wage-labor is the result of the existence of capital and landed property as independent agents of production.

From the point of view of society as a whole, distribution seems to antedate and to determine production in another way as well, as a pre-economic fact, so to say. A conquering people divides the land among the conquerors establishing thereby a certain division and form of landed property and determining the character of production; or, it turns the conquered people into slaves and thus makes slave labor the basis of production. Or, a nation, by revolution, breaks up large estates into small parcels of land and by this new distribution imparts to production a new character. Or, legislation perpetuates land ownership in large families or distributes labor as an hereditary privilege and thus fixes it in castes.

In all of these cases, and they are all historic, it is not distribution that seems to be organized and determined by production, but on the contrary, production by distribution.

In the most shallow conception of distribution, the latter appears as a distribution of products and to that extent as further removed from and quasi-independent of production. But before distribution means distribution of products, it is first, a distribution of the means of production, and second, what is practically another wording of the same fact, it is a distribution of the members of society among the various kinds of production (the subjection of individuals to certain conditions of production). The distribution of products is manifestly a result of this distribution, which is bound up with the process of production and determines the very organization of the latter. To treat of production apart from the distribution which is comprised in it, is plainly an idle abstraction. Conversely, we know the character of the distribution of products the moment we are given the nature of that other distribution which forms originally a factor of production. Ricardo, who was concerned with the analysis of production as it is organized in modern society and who was the economist of production par excellence, for that very reason declares not production but distribution as the subject proper of modern economics. We have here another evidence of the insipidity of the economists who treat production as an eternal truth, and banish history to the domain of distribution.

What relation to production this distribution, which has a determining influence on production itself, assumes, is plainly a question which falls within the province of production. Should it be maintained that at least to the extent that production depends on a certain distribution of the instruments of production, distribution in that sense precedes production and constitutes its prerequisite; it may be replied that production has in fact its prerequisite conditions, which form factors of it. These may appear at first to have a natural origin. By the very process of production they are changed from natural to historical, and if they appear during one period as a natural prerequisite of production, they formed at other periods its historical result. Within the sphere of production itself they are undergoing a constant change. E. g., the application of machinery produces a change in the distribution of the instruments of production as well as in that of products, and modern land ownership on a large scale is as much the result of modern trade and modern industry, as that of the application of the latter to agriculture.

All of these questions resolve themselves in the last instance to this: How do general historical conditions affect production and what part does it play at all in the course of history? It is evident that this question can be taken up only in connection with the discussion and analysis of production.

Yet in the trivial form in which these questions are raised above, they can be answered just as briefly. In the case of all conquests three ways lie open. The conquering people may impose its own methods of production upon the conquered (e. g. the English in Ireland in the nineteenth century, partly also in India); or, it may allow everything to remain as it was contenting itself with tribute (e. g. the Turks and the Romans); or, the two systems by mutually modifying each other may result in something new, a synthesis (which partly resulted from the Germanic conquests). In all of these conquests the method of production, be it of the conquerors, the conquered, or the one resulting from a combination of both, determines the nature of the new distribution which comes into play. Although the latter appears now as the prerequisite condition of the new period of production, it is in itself but a product of production, not of production belonging to history in general, but of production relating to a definite historical period. The Mongols with their devastations in Russia e. g. acted in accordance with their system of production, for which sufficient pastures on large uninhabited stretches of country are the main prerequisite. The Germanic barbarians, with whom agriculture carried on with the aid of serfs was the traditional system of production and who were accustomed to lonely life in the country, could introduce the same conditions in the Roman provinces so much easier since the concentration of landed property which had taken place there, died away completely with the older systems of agriculture. There is a prevalent tradition that in certain periods robbery constituted the only source of living. But in order to be able to plunder, there must be something to plunder, i. e. there must be production.161 And even the method of plunder is determined by the method of production. A stockjobbing nation 162 e. g. can not be robbed in the same manner as a nation of shepherds.

In the case of the slave the instrument of production is robbed directly. But then the production of the country in whose interest he is robbed, must be so organized as to admit of slave labor, or (as in South America, etc.) a system of production must be introduced adapted to slavery.

Laws may perpetuate an instrument of production, e. g. land, in certain families. These laws assume an economic importance if large landed property is in harmony with the system of production prevailing in society, as is the case e. g. in England. In France agriculture had been carried on on a small scale in spite of the large estates, and the latter were, therefore, broken up by the Revolution. But how about the legislative attempt to perpetuate the minute subdivision of the land? In spite of these laws land ownership is concentrating again. The effect of legislation on the maintenance of a system of distribution and its resultant influence on production are to be determined elsewhere.

c. Exchange and Circulation. Circulation is but a certain aspect of exchange, or it may be defined as exchange considered as a whole. Since exchange is an intermediary factor between production and its dependent, distribution, on the one hand, and consumption, on the other; and since the latter appears but as a constituent of production, exchange is manifestly also a constituent part of production.

In the first place, it is clear that the exchange of activities and abilities which takes place in the sphere of production falls directly within the latter and constitutes one of its essential elements. In the second place, the same is true of the exchange of products, in so far as it is a means of completing a certain product, designed for immediate consumption. To that extent exchange constitutes an act included in production. Thirdly, the so-called exchange between dealers and dealers 163 is by virtue of its organization determined by production, and is itself a species of productive activity. Exchange appears to be independent of and indifferent to production only in the last stage when products are exchanged directly for consumption. But in the first place, there is no exchange without a division of labor, whether natural or as a result of historical development; secondly, private exchange implies the existence of private production; thirdly, the intensity of exchange, as well as its extent and character are determined by the degree of development and organization of production, as e. g. exchange between city and country, exchange in the country, in the city, etc. Exchange thus appears in all its aspects to be directly included in or determined by production.

The result we arrive at is not that production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one entity, different sides of one unit. Production predominates not only over production itself in the opposite sense of that term, but over the other elements as well. With it the process constantly starts over again. That exchange and consumption can not be the predominating elements is self evident. The same is true of distribution in the narrow sense of distribution of products; as for distribution in the sense of distribution of the agents of production, it is itself but a factor of production. A definite [form of] production thus determines the [forms of] consumption, distribution, exchange, and also the mutual relations between these various elements. Of course, production in its one-sided form is in its turn influenced by other elements; e. g. with the expansion of the market, i. e. of the sphere of exchange, production grows in volume and is subdivided to a greater extent.

With a change in distribution, production undergoes a change; as e. g. in the case of concentration of capital, of a change in the distribution of population in city and country, etc. Finally, the demands of consumption also influence production. A mutual interaction takes place between the various elements. Such is the case with every organic body.

3. The Method of Political Economy

When we consider a given country from a politico-economic standpoint, we begin with its population, then analyze the latter according to its subdivision into classes, location in city, country, or by the sea, occupation in different branches of production; then we study its exports and imports, annual production and consumption, prices of commodities, etc. It seems to be the correct procedure to commence with the real and concrete aspect of conditions as they are; in the case of political economy, to commence with population which is the basis and the author of the entire productive activity of society. Yet, on closer consideration it proves to be wrong. Population is an abstraction, if we leave out e. g. the classes of which it consists. These classes, again, are but an empty word, unless we know what are the elements on which they are based, such as wage-labor, capital, etc. Those imply, in their turn, exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. Capital, e. g. does not mean anything without wage-labor, value, money, price, etc. If we start out, therefore, with population, we do so with a chaotic conception of the whole, and by closer analysis we will gradually arrive at simpler ideas; thus we shall proceed from the imaginary concrete to loss and less complex abstractions, until we get at the simplest conception. This once attained, we might start on our return journey until we would finally come back to population, but this time not as a chaotic notion of an integral whole, but as a rich aggregate of many conceptions and relations. The former method is the one which political economy had adopted in the past at its inception. The economists of the seventeenth century, e. g., always started out with the living aggregate: population, nation, state, several states, etc., but in the end they invariably arrived, by means of analysis, at certain leading, abstract general principles, such as division of labor, money, value, etc. As soon as these separate elements had been more or less established by abstract reasoning, there arose the systems of political economy which start from simple conceptions, such as labor, division of labor, demand, exchange value, and conclude with state, international exchange and world market. The latter is manifestly the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete, because it is a combination of many objects with different destinations, i. e. a unity of diverse elements. In our thought, it therefore appears as a process of synthesis, as a result, and not as a starting point, although it is the real starting point and, therefore, also the starting point of observation and conception. By the former method the complete conception passes into an abstract definition; by the latter, the abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete subject in the course of reasoning. Hegel fell into the error, therefore, of considering the real as the result of self-coordinating, self-absorbed, and spontaneously operating thought, while the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is but a way of thinking by which the concrete is grasped and is reproduced in our mind as a concrete. It is by no means, however, the process which itself generates the concrete. The simplest economic category, say, exchange value, implies the existence of population, population that is engaged in production under certain conditions; it also implies the existence of certain types of family, clan, or state, etc. It can have no other existence except as an abstract one-sided relation of an already given concrete and living aggregate.

As a category, however, exchange value leads an antediluvian existence. And since our philosophic consciousness is so arranged that only the image of the man that it conceives appears to it as the real man and the world as it conceives it, as the real world; it mistakes the movement of categories for the real act of production (which unfortunately (?) receives only its impetus from outside) whose result is the world; that is true—here we have, however, again a tautology—in so far as the concrete aggregate is a thought aggregate, in so far as the concrete subject of our thought is in fact a product of thought, of comprehension; not, however, in the sense of a product of a self-emanating conception which works outside of and stands above observation and imagination, but of a mental consummation of observation and imagination. The whole, as it appears in our heads as a thought-aggregate, is the product of a thinking mind which grasps the world in the only way open to it, a way which differs from the one employed by the artistic, religious, or practical mind. The concrete subject continues to lead an independent existence after it has been grasped, as it did before, outside of the head, so long as the head contemplates it only speculatively, theoretically. So that in the employment of the theoretical method [in political economy], the subject, society, must constantly be kept in mind as the premise from which we start.

But have these simple categories no independent historical or natural existence antedating the more concrete ones? Ça depend. For instance, in his Philosophy of Law Hegel rightly starts out with possession, as the simplest legal relation of individuals. But there is no such thing as possession before the family or the relations of lord and serf, which are a great deal more concrete relations, have come into existence. On the other hand, one would be right in saying that there are families and clans which only possess, but do not own things. The simpler category thus appears as a relation of simple family and clan communities with respect to property. In earlier society the category appears as a simple relation of a developed organism, but the concrete substratum from which springs the relation of possession, is always implied. One can imagine an isolated savage in possession of things. But in that case possession is no legal relation. It is not true that the family came as the result of the historical evolution of possession. On the contrary, the latter always implies the existence of this “more concrete category of law.” Yet so much may be said, that the simple categories are the expression of relations in which the less developed concrete entity may have been realized without entering into the manifold relations and bearings which are mentally expressed in the concrete category; but when the concrete entity attains fuller development it will retain the same category as a subordinate relation.

Money may exist and actually had existed in history before capital, or banks, or wage-labor came into existence. With that in mind, it may be said that the more simple category can serve as an expression of the predominant relations of an undeveloped whole or of the subordinate relations of a more developed whole, [relations] which had historically existed before the whole developed in the direction expressed in the more concrete category. In so far, the laws of abstract reasoning which ascends from the most simple to the complex, correspond to the actual process of history.

On the other hand, it may be said that there are highly developed but historically unripe forms of society in which the highest economic forms are to be found, such as co-operation, advanced division of labor, etc., and yet there is no money in existence, e. g. Peru.

In Slavic communities also, money, as well as exchange to which it owes its existence, does not appear at all or very little within the separate communities, but it appears on their boundaries in their inter-communal traffic; in general, it is erroneous to consider exchange as a constituent element originating within the community. It appears at first more in the mutual relations between different communities, than in those between the members of the same community. Furthermore, although money begins to play its part everywhere at an early stage, it plays in antiquity the part of a predominant element only in one-sidedly developed nations, viz. trading nations, and even in most cultured antiquity, in Greece and Rome, it attains its full development, which constitutes the prerequisite of modern bourgeois society, only in the period of their decay. Thus, this quite simple category attained its culmination in the past only at the most advanced stages of society. Even then it did not pervade (?) all economic relations; in Rome e. g. at the time of its highest development taxes and payments in kind remained the basis. As a matter of fact, the money system was fully developed there only so far as the army was concerned; it never came to dominate the entire system of labor.

Thus, although the simple category may have existed historically before the more concrete one, it can attain its complete internal and external development only in complex (?) forms of society, while the more concrete category has reached its full development in a less advanced form of society.

Labor is quite a simple category. The idea of labor in that sense, as labor in general, is also very old. Yet, “labor” thus simply defined by political economy is as much a modern category, as the conditions which have given rise to this simple abstraction. The monetary system, e. g. defines wealth quite objectively, as a thing (?)164 in money. Compared with this point of view, it was a great step forward, when the industrial or commercial system came to see the source of wealth not in the object but in the activity of persons, viz. in commercial and industrial labor. But even the latter was thus considered only in the limited sense of a money producing activity. The physiocratic system in that it considers a certain form of labor, viz. agriculture, as the source of wealth, and wealth itself not in the disguise of money, but as a product in general, as the general result of labor. But corresponding to the limitations of the activity, this product is still only a natural product. Agriculture is productive, land is the source of production par excellence. It was a tremendous advance on the part of Adam Smith to throw aside all limitations which mark wealth-producing activity and [to define it] as labor in general, neither industrial, nor commercial, nor agricultural, or one as much as the other. Along with the universal character of wealth-creating activity we have now the universal character of the object defined as wealth, viz. product in general, or labor in general, but as past incorporated labor. How difficult and great was the transition, is evident from the way Adam Smith himself falls back from time to time into the physiocratic system. Now, it might seem as though this amounted simply to finding an abstract expression for the simplest relation into which men have been mutually entering as producers from times of yore, no matter under what form of society. In one sense this is true. In another it is not.

The indifference as to the particular kind of labor implies the existence of a highly developed aggregate of different species of concrete labor, none of which is any longer the predominant one. So do the most general abstractions commonly arise only where there is the highest concrete development, where one feature appears to be jointly possessed by many, and to be common to all. Then it can not be thought of any longer in one particular form. On the other hand, this abstraction of labor is but the result of a concrete aggregate of different kinds of labor. The indifference to the particular kind of labor corresponds to a form of society in which individuals pass with ease from one kind of work to another, which makes it immaterial to them what particular kind of work may fall to their share. Labor has become here, not only categorically but really, a means of creating wealth in general and is no longer grown together with the individual into one particular destination. This state of affairs has found its highest development in the most modern of bourgeois societies, the United States. It is only here that the abstraction of the category “labor,” “labor in general,” labor sans phrase, the starting point of modern political economy, becomes realized in practice. Thus, the simplest abstraction which modern political economy sets up as its starting point, and which expresses a relation dating back to antiquity and prevalent under all forms of society, appears in this abstraction truly realized only as a category of the most modern society. It might be said that what appears in the United States as an historical product,—viz. the indifference as to the particular kind of labor—appears among the Russians e. g. as a natural disposition. But it makes all the difference in the world whether barbarians have a natural predisposition which makes them applicable alike to everything, or whether civilized people apply themselves to everything. And, besides, this indifference of the Russians as to the kind of work they do, corresponds to their traditional practice of remaining in the rut of a quite definite occupation until they are thrown out of it by external influences.

This example of labor strikingly shows how even the most abstract categories, in spite of their applicability to all epochs—just because of their abstract character—are by the very definiteness of the abstraction a product of historical conditions as well, and are fully applicable only to and under those conditions.

The bourgeois society is the most highly developed and most highly differentiated historical organization of production. The categories which serve as the expression of its conditions and the comprehension of its own organization enable it at the same time to gain an insight into the organization and the conditions of production which had prevailed under all the past forms of society, on the ruins and constituent elements of which it has arisen, and of which it still drags along some unsurmounted remnants, while what had formerly been mere intimation has now developed to complete significance. The anatomy of the human being is the key to the anatomy of the ape. But the intimations of a higher animal in lower ones can be understood only if the animal of the higher order is already known. The bourgeois economy furnishes a key to ancient economy, etc. This is, however, by no means true of the method of those economists who blot out all historical differences and see the bourgeois form in all forms of society. One can understand the nature of tribute, tithes, etc., after one has learned the nature of rent. But they must not be considered identical.

Since, furthermore, bourgeois society is but a form resulting from the development of antagonistic elements, some relations belonging to earlier forms of society are frequently to be found in it but in a crippled state or as a travesty of their former self, as e. g. communal property. While it may be said, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economy contain what is true of all other forms of society, the statement is to be taken cum grano salis. They may contain these in a developed, or crippled, or caricatured form, but always essentially different. The so-called historical development amounts in the last analysis to this, that the last form considers its predecessors as stages leading up to itself and perceives them always one-sidedly, since it is very seldom and only under certain conditions that it is capable of self-criticism; of course, we do not speak here of such historical periods which appear to their own contemporaries as periods of decay. The Christian religion became capable to assist us to an objective view of past mythologies as soon as it was ready for self-criticism to a certain extent, dynamei so-to-say. In the same way bourgeois political economy first came to understand the feudal, the ancient, and the oriental societies as soon as the self-criticism of the bourgeois society had commenced. So far as bourgeois political economy has not gone into the mythology of purely (?) identifying the bourgeois system with the past, its criticism of the feudal system against which it still had to wage war resembled Christian criticism of the heathen religions or Protestant criticism of Catholicism.

In the study of economic categories, as in the case of every historical and social science, it must be borne in mind that as in reality so in our mind the subject, in this case modern bourgeois society, is given and that the categories are therefore but forms of expression, manifestations of existence, and frequently but one-sided aspects of this subject, this definite society; and that, therefore, the origin of [political economy] as a science does not by any means date from the time to which it is referred as such. This is to be firmly held in mind because it has an immediate and important bearing on the matter of the subdivisions of the science.

For instance, nothing seems more natural than to start with rent, with landed property, since it is bound up with land, the source of all production and all existence, and with the first form of production in all more or less settled communities, viz. agriculture. But nothing would be more erroneous. Under all forms of society there is a certain industry which predominates over all the rest and whose condition therefore determines the rank and influence of all the rest.

It is the universal light with which all the other colors are tinged and are modified through its peculiarity. It is a special ether which determines the specific gravity of everything that appears in it.

Let us take for example pastoral nations (mere hunting and fishing tribes are not as yet at the point from which real development commences). They engage in a certain form of agriculture, sporadically. The nature of land-ownership is determined thereby. It is held in common and retains this form more or less according to the extent to which these nations hold on to traditions; such e. g. is land-ownership among the Slavs. Among nations whose agriculture is carried on by a settled population—the settled state constituting a great advance—where agriculture is the predominant industry, such as in ancient and feudal societies, even the manufacturing industry and its organization, as well as the forms of property which pertain to it, have more or less the characteristic features of the prevailing system of land ownership; [society] is then either entirely dependent upon agriculture, as in the case of ancient Rome, or, as in the middle ages, it imitates in its city relations the forms of organization prevailing in the country. Even capital, with the exception of pure money capital, has, in the form of the traditional working tool, the characteristics of land ownership in the Middle Ages.

The reverse is true of bourgeois society. Agriculture comes to be more and more merely a branch of industry and is completely dominated by capital. The same is true of rent. In all the forms of society in which land ownership is the prevalent form, the influence of the natural element is the predominant one. In those where capital predominates the prevailing element is the one historically created by society. Rent can not be understood without capital, nor can capital, without rent. Capital is the all dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting point as well as the end and be developed before land-ownership is. After each has been considered separately, their mutual relation must be analyzed.

It would thus be impractical and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they were the determining factors in the course of history. Their order of sequence is rather determined by the relation which they bear to one another in modern bourgeois society, and which is the exact opposite of what seems to be their natural order or the order of their historical development. What we are interested in is not the place which economic relations occupy in the historical succession of different forms of society. Still less are we interested in the order of their succession “in idea” (Proudhon), which is but a hazy (?) conception of the course of history. We are interested in their organic connection within modern bourgeois society.

The sharp line of demarkation (abstract precision) which so clearly distinguished the trading nations of antiquity, such as the Phenicians and the Carthagenians, was due to that very predominance of agriculture. Capital as trading or money capital appears in that abstraction, where capital does not constitute as yet the predominating element of society. The Lombardians and the Jews occupied the same position among the agricultural nations of the middle ages.

As a further illustration of the fact that the same category plays different parts at different stages of society, we may mention the following: one of the latest forms of bourgeois society, viz. stock companies, appear also at its beginning in the form of the great chartered monopolistic trading companies. The conception of national wealth which is imperceptibly formed in the minds of the economists of the seventeenth century, and which partly continues to be entertained by those of the eighteenth century, is that wealth is produced solely for the state, but that the power of the latter is proportional to that wealth. It was as yet an unconsciously hypocritical way in which wealth announced itself and its own production as the aim of modern states considering the latter merely as a means to the production of wealth.

The order of treatment must manifestly be as follows: first, the general abstract definitions which are more or less applicable to all forms of society, but in the sense indicated above. Second, the categories which go to make up the inner organization of bourgeois society and constitute the foundations of the principal classes; capital, wage-labor, landed property; their mutual relations; city and country; the three great social classes, the exchange between them; circulation, credit (private). Third, the organization of bourgeois society in the form of a state, considered in relation to itself; the “unproductive” classes; taxes; public debts; public credit; population; colonies; emigration. Fourth, the international organization of production; international division of labor; international exchange; import and export; rate of exchange. Fifth, the world market and crises.

4. PRODUCTION, MEANS OF PRODUCTION, AND CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION, THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION.165 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FORM OF STATE AND PROPERTY ON THE ONE HAND AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION(1) ON THE OTHER. LEGAL RELATIONS. FAMILY RELATIONS.

Notes on the points to be mentioned here and not to be omitted:166

1. War attains complete development before peace; how certain economic phenomena, such as wage-labor, machinery, etc., are developed at an earlier date through war and in armies than within bourgeois society. The connection between productive force and the means of communication is made especially plain in the case of the army.

2. The relation between the idealistic and realistic methods of writing history; namely, the so-called history of civilization which is all a history of religion and states.

In this connection something may be said of the different methods hitherto employed in writing history. The so-called objective [method]. The subjective. (The moral and others). The philosophic.

3. Secondary and tertiary. Conditions of production which have been taken over or transplanted; in general, those that are not original. Here [is to be treated] the effect of international relations.

4. Objections to the materialistic character of this view. Its relation to naturalistic materialism.

5. The dialectics of the conceptions productive force (means of production) and relation of production, dialectics whose limits are to be determined and which does not do away with the concrete difference.

6. The unequal relation between the development of material production and art, for instance. In general, the conception of progress is not to be taken in the sense of the usual abstraction. In the case of art, etc., it is not so important and difficult to understand this disproportion as in that of practical social relations, e. g. the relation between education in the United States and Europe. The really difficult point, however, that is to be discussed here is that of the unequal (?) development of relations of production as legal relations. As, e. g., the connection between Roman civil law (this is less true of criminal and public law) and modern production.

7. This conception of development appears to imply necessity. On the other hand, justification of accident. Varia. (Freedom and other points). (The effect of means of communication). World history does not always appear in history as the result of world history.

8. The starting point [is to be found] in certain facts of nature embodied subjectively and objectively in clans, races, etc.

4. Produktion, Produktionsmittel und Produktionsverhältnisse. Produktionsverhältnis und Verkehrsverhältnisse. Staats-und Eigenthumsformen im Verhältnis zu den Produktions-und Verkehrsverhältnissen. Rechtsverhältnisse. Familienverhältnisse.

Notabene in bezug auf Punkte, die hier zu erwähnen und nicht vergessen werden dürfen:

1. Der Krieg ist früher ausgebildet, wie der Frieden: [Auszuführen wäre] die Art, wie durch den Krieg und in den Armeen etc. gewisse ökonomische Verhältnisse wie Lohnarbeit, Maschinerie etc. früher entwickelt [werden] als im Inneren der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Auch das Verhältnis von Produktivkraft und Verkehrsverhältnissen wird besonders anschaulich in der Armee.

2. Verhältnis der bisherigen idealen Geschichtsschreibung zur realen. Namentlich die sogenannte Kulturgeschichte, die alle Religions-und Staatengeschichte.

Bei der Gelegenheit kann auch etwas gesagt werden über die verschiedenen Arten der bisherigen Geschichtsschreibung. Sogenannte objektive. Subjektive. (Moralische und andere.) Philosophische.

3. Sekundäres und Tertiäres. Ueberhaupt abgeleitete, übertragene, nicht ursprüngliche Produktionsverhältnisse. Hier [ist das] Einspielen der internationalen Verhältnisse [zu behandeln].

4. Vorwürfe über Materialismus dieser Auffassung. Verhältnis zum naturalistischen Materialismus.

5. Dialektik der Begriffe Produktivkraft (Produktionsmittel) und Produktionsverhältnis, eine Dialektik, deren Grenzen zu bestimmen sind und den realen Unterschied nicht aufhebt.

6. Das unegale Verhältnis der Entwicklung der materiellen Produktion zum Beispiel zur künstlerischen. Ueberhaupt ist der Begriff des Fortschritts nicht in der gewöhnlichen Abstraktion zu fassen. Bei der Kunst etc. ist diese Disproportion noch nicht so wichtig und schwierig zu fassen als innerhalb praktisch-sozialer Verhältnisse selbst, zum Beispiel das Bildungsverhältnis der Vereinigten Staaten zu Europa. Der eigentlich schwierige Punkt, der hier zu erörtern, ist aber der, wie die Produktionsverhältnisse als Rechtsverhältnisse in ungleiche (?) Entwicklung treten. Also zum Beispiel das Verhältnis des römischen Privatrechts (im Kriminalrecht und öffentlichen ist das wenige der Fall) zur modernen Produktion.

7. Diese Auffassung erscheint als nothwendige Entwicklung. Aber Berechtigung des Zufalls. Varia.167 (Die Freiheit und anderes noch.) (Einwirkung der Kommunikationsmittel.) Weltgeschichte eigentlich 168 nicht immer in der Geschichte als weltgeschicht[liches] Resultat.

8. Der Ausgangspunkt [ist] natürlich von der Naturbestimmtheit [zu nehmen]; subjektiv und objektiv, Stämme, Rassen etc.

It is well known that certain periods of highest development of art stand in no direct connection with the general development of society, nor with the material basis and the skeleton structure of its organization. Witness the example of the Greeks as compared with the modern nations or even Shakespeare. As regards certain forms of art, as e. g. the epos, it is admitted that they can never be produced in the world-epoch making form as soon as art as such comes into existence; in other words, that in the domain of art certain important forms of it are possible only at a low stage of its development. If that be true of the mutual relations of different forms of art within the domain of art itself, it is far less surprising that the same is true of the relation of art as a whole to the general development of society. The difficulty lies only in the general formulation of these contradictions. No sooner are they specified than they are explained. Let us take for instance the relation of Greek art and of that of Shakespeare’s time to our own. It is a well known fact that Greek mythology was not only the arsenal of Greek art, but also the very ground from which it had sprung. Is the view of nature and of social relations which shaped Greek imagination and Greek [art] possible in the age of automatic machinery, and railways, and locomotives, and electric telegraphs? Where does Vulcan come in as against Roberts & Co.; Jupiter, as against the lightning rod; and Hermes, as against the Credit Mobilier? All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature. What becomes of the Goddess Fame side by side with Printing House Square?169 Greek art presupposes the existence of Greek mythology, i. e. that nature and even the form of society are wrought up in popular fancy in an unconsciously artistic fashion. That is its material. Not, however, any mythology taken at random, nor any accidental unconsciously artistic elaboration of nature (including under the latter all objects, hence [also] society). Egyptian mythology could never be the soil or womb which would give birth to Greek art. But in any event [there had to be] a mythology. In no event [could Greek art originate] in a society which excludes any mythological explanation of nature, any mythological attitude towards it and which requires from the artist an imagination free from mythology.

Looking at it from another side: is Achilles possible side by side with powder and lead? Or is the Iliad at all compatible with the printing press and steam press? Does not singing and reciting and the muses necessarily go out of existence with the appearance of the printer’s bar, and do not, therefore, disappear the prerequisites of epic poetry?

But the difficulty is not in grasping the idea that Greek art and epos are bound up with certain forms of social development. It rather lies in understanding why they still constitute with us a source of aesthetic enjoyment and in certain respects prevail as the standard and model beyond attainment.

A man can not become a child again unless he becomes childish. But does he not enjoy the artless ways of the child and must he not strive to reproduce its truth on a higher plane? Is not the character of every epoch revived perfectly true to nature in child nature? Why should the social childhood of mankind, where it had obtained its most beautiful development, not exert an eternal charm as an age that will never return? There are ill-bred children and precocious children. Many of the ancient nations belong to the latter class. The Greeks were normal children. The charm their art has for us does not conflict with the primitive character of the social order from which it had sprung. It is rather the product of the latter, and is rather due to the fact that the unripe social conditions under which the art arose and under which alone it could appear can never return.

(End of Manuscript.)

Footnotes

1 Cf. Seligman, “The Economic Interpretation of History.” MacMillan. 1902.

2 Aristotle, d. Rep. L. l, c. 9 (edit. I Bekkeri Oxonii, 1837)
“ἐκαστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστιν... ἡ μὲν οἰκεία, ἡ δ ‘οὐκ οἰκεια τού ‘πράγματος, οῖον ὑποδηματος ἥ τε ὑπόδησις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. Ἀμφότεραι γὰρ hὑποδηματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ hἡ ἀλλαττομενος τῷ δεομένω hὑποδηματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἡ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδηματι ἧ hὑπόδημα, ἀλλ ‘οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγης ἕνεκεν γέγονεν. Τὸν αὐτον δὲ τρόπον ἕχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἅλλων κτημάτων.”
(“Of everything which we possess there are two uses:—one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions.” The Politics of Aristotle, translated into English by B. Jowett, Oxford, 1885, v. I., p. 15.)

3 That is the reason why German compilers are so fond of dwelling on use-value, calling it a “good.” See e. g. L. Stein, “System der Staatswissenschaften,” v. I., chapter on “goods” (Gütter). For intelligent information on “goods” one must turn to treatises on commodities.

4 A ridiculous presumption has gained currency of late to the effect that common property in its primitive form is specifically a Slavonian, or even exclusively Russian form. It is the primitive form which we can prove to have existed among Romans, Teutons, and Celts; and of which numerous examples are still to be found in India, though in a partly ruined state. A closer study of the Asiatic, especially of Indian forms of communal ownership would show how from the different forms of primitive communism different forms of its dissolution have been developed. Thus e. g. the various original types of Roman and Teutonic private property can be traced back to various forms of Indian communism.

5 “La Ricchezza è una ragione tra due persone.” (“Value is a relation between two persons”) Galiani, “Della Moneta,” p. 220 in vol. II. of Custodi’s collection of “Scrittori classici Italiani di Economia Politica. Parte Moderna,” Milano, 1803.

6 “In its natural state, matter... is always destitute of value.” McCulloch, “A Discourse on the Rise, Progress, Peculiar Objects, and Importance of Political Economy,” 2nd edition, Edinburgh, 1825, pg. 48. It is evident how even a McCulloch stands above the fetishism of German “thinkers”, who declare “matter” and half a dozen other foreign things to be elements of value. Cf. e. g. L. Stein, l. c. v. I., p. 110.

7 Berkeley, The Querist, London, 1750.

8 Thomas Cooper, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, London, 1831, p. 99.

9 F. List could never grasp the difference between labor as a source of use-value and labor as the creator of certain social form of wealth or exchange value, because comprehension was altogether foreign to his practical mind; he therefore saw in the modern English economists mere plagiarists of Moses, the Egyptian.

10 It can be readily understood what kind of “service” is rendered by the category “service” to economists of the type of J. B. Say and F. Bastiat, whose pondering sagacity, as Malthus has justly remarked, always abstracts from the specially definite forms of economic relations.

11 “Egli è proprio ancora delle misure d’aver si fatta relazione colle cose misurate, che in certo modo la misurata divien misura della misurante.” Montanari, Della Moneta, p. 48 in v. III of Custodi’s “Scrittori classici Italiani di Economia Politica. Parte Antica.” (“It is the property of measure to be in such a relation to the things measured, that in a certain way the thing measured becomes the measure of the measuring thing.”)

12 It is in that sense that Aristotle (see the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter) conceives exchange value.

13 This expression is used by Genovesi.

14 Aristotle makes the same remark with reference to the private family as the primitive community. But the primitive form of family is the tribal family, from the historical dissolution of which the private family develops. ἐν μὲν οὔν τῃ πρώτο κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ ‘ἐστὶν οἰκίἀ) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς (namely της ἀλλαγῆς) “And in the first community, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use.” Jowett’s transl. l. c.)

15 “Money is, in fact, only the instrument for carrying on buying and selling (but, if you please, what do you understand by buying and selling?) and the consideration of it no more forms a part of the science of political economy, than the consideration of ships, or steam engines, or of any other instrument employed to facilitate the production and distribution of wealth.” Th. Hodgskin, Popular Political Economy, etc. London, 1827, p. 178, 179.

16 A comparative study of the writings and characters of Petty and Boisguillebert, outside of the light which it would throw upon the difference of French and English society at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, would disclose the origin of the national contrast between English and French Political Economy. The same contrast reasserts itself in Ricardo and Sismondi.

17 Petty had illustrated the productive power inherent in the division of labor on a much grander scale than that was done later by Adam Smith. See his “Essay concerning the multiplication of mankind, etc.,” 3rd edition, 1686, p. 35-36. He not only brings out the advantages of the division of labor on the example of the manufacture of a watch, as Adam Smith did later on that of a needle, but considers also a city and an entire country from the point of view of a large manufacturing establishment. The Spectator, of November 26, 1711, refers to this “illustration of the admirable Sir William Petty.” McCulloch is, therefore, mistaken when he supposes that the Spectator confounded Petty with a writer forty years his junior. See McCulloch, “The Literature of Political Economy, a classified catalogue,” London, 1845, p. 105. Petty is conscious of being the founder of a new science. His method, he says, “is not yet very usual, for instead of using only comparative and superlative Words, and intellectual Arguments,” he has undertaken to speak “in Terms of Number, Weight or Measure; to use only Arguments of Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as have visible Foundations in Nature; leaving those that depend upon the mutable Minds, Opinions, Appetites, and Passions of particular Men, to the Consideration of others.” (Political Arithmetick, etc., London, 1699. Preface.) (A new edition of “The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty,” edited by Chas. Henry Hull, has been published by the University Press at Cambridge, 1899. The above passage will be found in vol. I., p. 244. The further references are given to this new, more accessible edition. Translator.) His wonderful keenness shows itself e. g. in the proposal to transport “all the moveables and people of Ireland, and of the Highlands of Scotland... into the rest of Great Britain.” Thereby much labor-time would be saved, the productivity of labor increased, and “the King and his Subjects would thereby become more Rich and Strong.” (Political Arithmetick, ch. 4, p. 285.) Or in the chapter of his Political Arithmetic in which he proves that England’s mission is the conquest of the world’s market at a time when Holland still played the leading part as a trading nation and France seemed to be on the way of becoming the ruling trading Power: “That the King of England’s Subjects, have Stock competent and convenient, to drive the Trade of the whole Commercial World” (l. c., ch. 10, p. 311). “That the Impediments of England’s greatness are but contingent and removable” (l. c., ch. 5, p. 298). A singular humor pervades all his writings. Thus, he shows that it was by material means that Holland—at that time the model country with English economists, just as England is with continental economists to-day—conquered the world market “without such Angelical Wits and Judgments, as some attribute to the Hollanders” (l. c., p. 258). He advocates “Liberty of Conscience” as a condition of trade, because “Dissenters... are... patient Men, and such as believe that Labour and Industry is their Duty towards God,” and “They believe that... for those who have less Wealth, to think they have the more Wit and Understanding, especially of the things of God which they think chiefly belong to the Poor.” “From whence it follows that Trade is not fixt to any species of Religion as such; but rather... to the Heterodox part of the whole” (l. c., p. 262-264). He advocates an “allowance by Publick Tax” for those “who live by begging, cheating, stealing, gaming, borrowing without intention of restoring,” because “it were more for the publick profit” to tax the country for such persons “than to suffer them to spend extravagantly, at the only charge of careless, credulous, and good natured People” (p. 269-270). But he is opposed to taxes which transfer the wealth from industrious people “to such as do nothing at all, but eat and drink, sing, play, and dance; nay such as study the Metaphysicks” (ibid.). Petty’s writings are rarities of the bookseller’s trade and are to be found only in scattered poor old editions, which is the more surprising since William Petty was not only the father of English Political Economy, but also the ancestor of Henry Petty, alias Marquis of Lansdowne, the nestor of the English Whigs. However, the Lansdowne family could hardly bring out a complete edition of Petty’s works without prefacing it with his biography, and what can be said of most origins of the great Whig families holds good also in this case, viz., “the less said of them the better.” The keen-witted but cynical army surgeon who was as ready to plunder in Ireland under the shield of Cromwell as to crawl before Charles II. to get the title of baron which he needed for his plunderings, is a model hardly fit for public exhibition. Besides that, Petty seeks to prove in most of his writings which he published in his lifetime, that England’s prosperity reached its climax under Charles II., a heterodox view for the hereditary exploiters of the “glorious revolution.”

18 In contrast with the “black art of finance” of his time, Boisguillebert says: “La science financière n’est que la connaissance approfondie des intérêts de l’agriculture et du commerce.” Le Détail de la France, 1697. Eugène Daire’s edition of Economistes financiers du XVIII. siècle, Paris, 1843, vol. I., p. 241.

19 But not Romance Political Economy, since the Italians reproduce the contrast between the English and French economists in the two respective schools of Naples and Milan, while the Spaniards of the earlier period are either pure Mercantilists; modified mercantilists like Ustariz; or, like Jovellanos (see his Obras, Barcelona, 1839-40), hold to the “golden mean” with Adam Smith.

20 “La véritable richesse... jouissance entière, non seulement des besoins de la vie, mais même de tous les superflus et de tout, ce qui peut fair plaisir à la sensualité,” Boisguillebert, “Dissertation sur la nature de la richesse,” etc., l. c., p. 403. But while Petty was a frivolous, rapacious and unprincipled adventurer, Boisguillebert, though an intendant under Louis XIV, championed the interests of the oppressed classes with a daring that was equal to his keenness of mind.

21 The French Socialism of the Proudhon type suffers from the same national hereditary disease.

22 “Benjamin Franklin, The Works of, etc.,” ed. by I. Sparks, vol. II., Boston, 1836. “A Modest Inquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency.”

23 L. c., p. 265.

24 L. c., p. 267.

25 L. c., “Remarks and Facts relative to the American Paper Money,” 1764.

26 See “Papers on American Politics; Remarks and Facts relative to the American Paper Money,” 1764, l. c.

27 See e. g. Galiani, “Della Moneta,” in vol. 3 of Scrittori Classici italiani di Economia politica (Published by Custodi). Parte Moderna, Milano, 1803. “La fatica, he says, è l’unica che dà valore alla cosa” (“only effort can give value to any thing”). The designation of labor as “fatica,” strain, effort, is characteristic of the southerner.

28 Steuart’s work, “An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, being an Essay on the Science of Domestic Policy in Free Nations,” appeared first in London in two quarto volumes in the year 1767, ten years before Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations.” I quote from the Dublin edition of 1770. (The references to pages are the same for the standard London edition of 1767, except where otherwise stated. Translator.)

29 Steuart, l. c., vol. I., p. 181-183.

30 Steuart, l. c., vol. I., p. 361-362.

31 See chapter I., book II., vol. I. “of the reciprocal connections between Trade and Industry” (Translator).

32 He declares, therefore, the patriarchal form of agriculture which is devoted to the direct production of use-values for the owner of the land, to be an “abuse,” not in Sparta, or Rome, or even in Athens, but in the industrial countries of the eighteenth century. This “abusive agriculture” is not “trade,” but a “direct means of subsisting.” Just as capitalistic agriculture clears the country of superfluous mouths, so does the capitalistic mode of manufacture clear the factory of superfluous hands.

33 Thus e. g., Adam Smith says: “Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits, in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them.... Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value... is their [commodities’] real price, etc. Adam Smith (Book I., ch. V., p. 34, Oxford, 1869. Translator.)

34 David Ricardo, “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,” 3rd edition, London, 1821, p. 3.

35 Sismondi, “Etudes sur l’Economie Politique,” t. II., Bruxelles, 1837. “C’est l’opposition entre la valeur usuelle... et la valeur échangeable à laquelle le commerce a reduit toute chose,” p. 161. [Paris edition, p. 229, Transl.]

36 Sismondi l. c., p. 163-166 seq. [Paris edition, 230 etf. Transl.]

37 Perhaps the silliest to be found are the annotations of J. B. Say to the French translation of Ricardo, made by Constancio, and the most pedantically arrogant are the remarks of Mr. MacLeod in his newly published “Theory of Exchange,” London, 1858.

38 This objection raised against Ricardo by bourgeois economists was taken up later by the socialists. Having assumed the correctness of the formula, they charged the practice with contradiction to the theory and appealed to bourgeois society to realize in practice the conclusions which were supposed to follow from its theoretical principles. That was at least the way in which the English socialists turned Ricardo’s formula of exchange value against political economy. It remained for Mr. Proudhon not only to proclaim the fundamental principle of old society as the principle of the new, but also to declare himself the discoverer of the formula in which Ricardo summed up the combined results of classical English political economy. It has been proven that the utopian interpretation of the Ricardian formula was about forgotten in England when Mr. Proudhon “discovered” it on the other side of the Canal. (Cf. my work: “Misère de la Philosophie,” etc., Paris, 1847, paragraph on la valeur constituée.)

39 True, Aristotle sees that the exchange value of commodities underlies their prices: “ὅτι ὴ ἀλλαγη ἥν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα ἔιναι, ὁῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ εί κλίναι πέντε ἀντι οἰκίας, ἣ ὅσου αὶ πέντε κλῖναι.” (“It is clear that exchange existed before coin. For it does not make any difference whether you give five beds for a house, or as much money as five beds are worth”). On the other hand, since commodities acquire only in price the form of exchange value with respect to one another, he makes them commensurable through money. “Διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. Τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει, οὔτε γὰρ ἃν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἡν, ὄυτ ‘ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔτ’ ἰσότης, μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας.” (“Therefore all has to be appraised. In that way exchange may always take place, and, with it, society can exist. Coin, like measure, makes everything commensurable and equal, for without exchange there would be no society, without equality there would be no exchange, and without commensurability, no equality.”) He does not conceal from himself that these different objects measured by money are entirely incommensurable quantities. What he is after is the common unit of commodities as exchange values, which as an ancient Greek he was unable to find. He gets out of the difficulty by making commensurable through money what is in itself incommensurable, so far as it is necessary for practical purposes. “Τῇ μὲν οὔν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς.” (“In truth it is impossible to make things that are so different, commensurable, but for practical purposes it is permissible.”) Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea. l. 5, c. 8, edit. Bekkeri. Oxonii, 1837.

40 The peculiar circumstance that, while the ounce of gold serves in England as the unit of the standard of money, it is not divided into aliquot parts has been explained as follows: “Our coinage was originally adapted to the employment of silver only—hence an ounce of silver can always be divided into a certain adequate number of pieces of coin; but as gold was introduced at a later period into a coinage adapted only to silver, an ounce of gold cannot be coined into an adequate number of pieces.” Maclaren: “A Sketch of the History of the Currency,” p. 16, London, 1858.

41 “Money may continually vary in value and yet be as good a measure of value as if it remained perfectly stationary. Suppose, for instance, it is reduced in value.... Before the reduction, a guinea would purchase three bushels of wheat or 6 days’ labour; subsequently it would purchase only 2 bushels of wheat, or 4 days ’labour. In both cases, the relations of wheat and labour to money being given, their mutual relations can be inferred; in other words, we can ascertain that a bushel of wheat is worth 2 days ’labour. This, which is all that measuring value implies, is as readily done after the reduction as before. The excellence of a thing as a measure of value is altogether independent of its own variableness in value” (p. 11, Bailey, “Money and its Vicissitudes.” London, 1837).

42 “Le monete lequali oggi sono ideali sono le piu antiche d’ogni nazione, e tutte furono un tempo reali (the latter assertion is too sweeping), e perchè erano reali con esse si contava.” Galiani, “Della Moneta,” l. c., p. 153 (“Coins which are ideal to-day [i. e., whose names no longer correspond to their value] are among the more ancient with every nation; at one time they were all real, and for that reason served for the purpose of counting.”)

43 The romantic A. Müller says: “According to our idea every independent sovereign has the right to name the metal money, and to give it a nominal social value, rank, standing and title (p. 276, v. II., A. H. Müller, “Die Elemente der Staatskunst,” Berlin, 1809). As far as title is concerned the Hon. Hofrath is right; but he forgets the substance. How confused his “ideas” were, may be seen, e. g., from the following passage: “Everybody understands how much depends upon the right determination of the mint-price, especially in a country like England, where the government with magnificent liberality coins money gratuitously (Herr Müller seems to think that the members of the English government defray the mint expenses out of their own pockets), where it does not charge any mintage, etc., and thus if the mint-price of gold were set considerably above its market price, if instead of paying as now £3 17s. 10-1/2d. per 1 oz. of gold, it would set the price of an ounce of gold at £3 19s., all money would flow into the mint and exchanging for the silver contained there bring it into the market to be exchanged there for the cheaper gold; the latter would in the same manner be brought again to the mint and the entire coinage system would be upset” (l. c., p. 280-281). To preserve order in English coinage, Müller falls back on “disorder.” While shilling and pence are mere names of certain parts of an ounce of gold represented by signs of silver and copper, he imagines that an ounce of gold is estimated in gold, silver and copper and thus confers upon the Englishmen the blessing of a triple standard of value. Silver as a measure of money, next to gold, was formally abolished only in 1816 by 56 George III., c. 68. As a matter of fact, it was legally abolished as early as 1734 by 14 George II., c. 42, and still earlier by actual practice. There were two circumstances that made A. Müller capable of a so-called higher conception of political economy: first, his wide ignorance of economic facts; second, his dilettanti-like visionary attitude toward philosophy.

44 “Ἀνάχαρσις, πυνθανομένου τινὸς, πρὸς τί οί Ἕλληνες χρῶνται τῷ ἀργυρίῳ ἕιπε πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμεῖν.” (Athen. Deipn. l. IV. 49. v. 2, ed. Schweighäuser, 1802.) (When Anacharsis was asked for what purpose the Greeks used money, he replied, “For reckoning.”)

45 G. Garnier, one of the early French translators of Adam Smith, conceived the queer notion of fixing a proportion between the use of money of account and that of actual money. His proportion is 10 to 1. (G. Garnier, “Histoire de la Monnaie depuis les temps de la plus haute antiquité,” etc., t. 1, p. 78.)

46 The act of Maryland in 1723 by which tobacco was made the legal standard, but its value reduced to terms of English gold money, namely one penny equal to one pound of tobacco, reminds of the “leges barbarorum,” in which, inversely, certain sums of money were expressed in terms of oxen, cows, etc. In that case neither gold nor silver, but the ox and the cow were the actual material of the money of account.

47 Thus, we read, e. g., in the “Familiar Words” of Mr. David Urquhart: “The value of gold is to be measured by itself; how can any substance be the measure of its own worth in other things? The worth of gold is to be established by its own weight, under a false denomination of that weight—and an ounce is to be worth so many pounds and fractions of pounds. This is falsifying a measure, not establishing a standard.”

48 “Money is the measure of Commerce, and of the rate of everything, and therefore ought to be kept (as all other measures) as steady and invariable as may be. But this cannot be, if your money be made of two Metals, whose proportion... constantly varies in respect of one another.” John Locke: Some Considerations on the Lowering of Interest, etc., 1691 (p. 166, p. 65 in his Works 7 ed., London, 1768, vol. III.)

49 Locke says among other things: “... call that a Crown now, which before... was but a part of a Crown.... An equal quantity of Silver is always the same Value with an equal quantity of Silver.... For if the abating 1-20 of the quantity of Silver of any Coin does not lessen its Value, the abating 19-20 of the quantity of the Silver of any Coin will not abate its Value. And so a single Penny, being called a Crown, will buy as much Spice, or Silk, or any other Commodity, as a Crown-Piece, which contains 20 times as much Silver.... Now [all that may be done] is giving a less quantity of Silver the Stamp and Denomination of a greater.... But ’tis Silver and not Names that pay Debts and purchase Commodities” (l. c., p. 135-145 passim). If to raise the value of money means nothing but to give any desired name to an aliquot part of a silver coin, e. g., to call an eighth part of an ounce of silver a penny, then money may really be rated as high as you please. At the same time, Locke answered Lowndes that the rise of the market price above the mint price was due not to the rise of the value of silver, but to the lighter silver coins. Seventy-seven clipped shillings do not weigh a particle more than 62 full-weighted ones. Finally he pointed out with perfect right that, aside from the loss of weight in the circulating coin, the market price of silver bullion in England could rise to some extent above its mint price, since the export of silver bullion was allowed while that of silver coin was prohibited (l. c., p. 54-116 passim). Locke was exceedingly careful not to touch upon the burning question of public debts, and no less carefully avoided the discussion of the delicate economic question, viz., the depreciation of the currency out of proportion to its real loss of silver, as was shown by the rate of exchange and the ratio of silver bullion to silver coin. We shall return to this question in its general form in the chapter on the Medium of Circulation. Nicholas Barbon in “A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter, in Answer to Mr. Locke’s Considerations, etc.,” London, 1696, tried in vain to entice Locke to difficult ground.

50 Steuart, l. c., v. II., p. 154.

51 The Querist, l. c., (p. 5-6-7.) The “Queries on Money” are generally clever. Among other things Berkeley is perfectly right in saying that by their progress the North American colonies “make it plain as daylight, that gold and silver are not so necessary for the wealth of a nation, as the vulgar of all ranks imagine.”

52 Price means here real equivalent in the sense commonly employed by English economic writers in the seventeenth century.

53 Steuart, l. c., v. II., p. 154, 299 [1st London edition, of 1767, v. I., p. 526-531. Transl.].

54 On the occasion of the last commercial crisis the ideal African money received loud praise from certain English quarters, after its seat was this time moved from the coast to the heart of Barbary. The freedom of the Berbers from commercial and industrial crises was ascribed to the ideal unit of measure of their bars. Would it not have been simpler to say that trade and industry are the conditio sine qua non of commercial and industrial crises?

55 The Currency Question, The Gemini Letters, London, 1844, p. 260-272, passim.

56 John Gray: “The Social System. A Treatise on the Principle of Exchange, Edinburgh, 1831.” Compare with “Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money, Edinburgh, 1848,” by the same author. After the February revolution Gray sent a memorial to the provisional French government, in which he instructs the latter that France is not in need of an “organization of labour,” but of an “organization of exchange” of which the plan is fully worked out in his money system. Honest John did not suspect that sixteen years after the appearance of his “Social System” a patent for the same discovery would be taken out by the ingenious Proudhon.

57 Gray, “The Social System,” etc., p. 63: “Money should be merely a receipt, an evidence that the holder of it has either contributed certain value to the national stock of wealth or that he has acquired a right to the same value from some one who has contributed to it.”

58 An estimated value being previously put upon produce, let it be lodged in a bank, and drawn out again, whenever it is required, merely stipulating, by common consent, that he who lodges any kind of property in the proposed National Bank, may take out of it an equal value of whatever it may contain, instead of being obliged to draw out the self-same thing that he put in.” L. c., p. 68.

59 L. c., p. 16.

60 Gray: “Lectures on Money, etc.,” p. 182.

61 L. c., p. 169.

62 “The business of every country ought to be conducted on a national capital.” John Gray, “The Social System,” etc., p. 171.

63 “The land to be transformed into national property.” L. c., p. 298.

64 See e. g. W. Thompson: “An Inquiry into the Distribution of Wealth, etc.,” London, 1827. Bray, “Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy,” Leeds, 1839.

65 Alfred Darimont’s “De la Reforme des banques,” Paris, 1856, may be considered as a compendium of this melodramatic theory of money.

66 “Di due sorte è la moneta, ideale e reale; e a dui diversi usi è adoperata, a valutare le cose e a comperarle. Per valutare è buona la moneta ideale, cosi come la reale e forse anche più. L’altro uso della moneta è di comperare quelle cose istesse, ch’ella apprezza... i prezzi e i contratti si valutano in moneta ideale e si eseguiscono in moneta reale.” Galiani, l. c., p. 112 sq. (“Money is of two kinds, ideal and real; and is adapted to two different uses: to determine the value of things and to buy them. For the purpose of valuation ideal money is as good as real and perhaps even better. The other use of money is to buy the same things which it appraises... prices and contracts are determined in ideal money and are executed in real money.”)

67 This, of course, does not prevent the market price of commodities to be above or below their value. However, this consideration is foreign to simple circulation and belongs to quite another sphere to be considered later, when we shall investigate the relation between value and market price.

68 How deeply some beautiful souls are wounded by the merely superficial aspect of the antagonism which asserts itself in buying and selling, may be seen from the following abstract from M. Isaac Pereire’s: “Leçons sur l’industrie et les finances,” Paris, 1832. The fact that the same Isaac in his capacity of inventor and dictator of the “Credit mobilier” has acquired the reputation of the wolf of the Paris Bourse shows what lurks behind the sentimental criticism of economics. Says Mr. Pereire at the time an apostle of St. Simons: “C’est parceque tous les individus sont isolés, séparés les uns des autres, soit dans leur travaux, soit pour la consommation, qu’il y a echange entre eux des produits de leur industrie respective. De la necessité de l’échange est derivée la necessité de determiner la valeur relative des objets. Les idées de la valeur et de l’échange sont donc intimement liées, et toutes deux dans leur forme actuelle exprime l’individualisme et l’antagonisme.... Il n’y a lieu a fixer la valeur des produits que parcequ’il y a vente at achat, en d’autres termes, antagonisme entre les divers membres de la societé. Il n’y a lieu à s’occuper du prix, de valeur que là oú il y avait vente et echat, c’est à dire, oú chaque individu était obligé de lutter, pour se procurer les object nécessaires a l’entretien de son existence” (l. c., p. 2, 3 passim). (“Since individuals are isolated and separated from one another both in their labors and in consumption, exchange takes place between them in the products of their respective industries. From the necessity of exchange arises the necessity of determining the relative value of things. The ideas of value and exchange are thus intimately connected and both express in their actual form individualism and antagonism.... The determination of values of products takes place only because there are sales and purchases, or, to put it differently, because there is an antagonism between different members of society. One has to occupy himself with price and value only where there is sale and purchase, that is to say, where every individual is obliged to struggle to procure for himself the objects necessary for the maintenance of his existence.”)

69 “L’argent n’est que le moyen et l’acheminement, au lieu que les denrées utiles à la vie sont la fin et le but.” (“Money is but the ways and means, while the things useful in life are the end and object.”) Boisguillebert: “Le Détail de la France,” 1697, in Eugene Daires ‘“Economistes financiers du XVIIIieme siècle, vol. I., Paris, 1843, p. 210.

70 In November, 1807, William Spence published a pamphlet in England under the title: “Britain Independent of Commerce.” The principle set forth in this pamphlet was further elaborated by William Cobbet in his “Political Register” under the virulent title, “Perish Commerce.” To this James Mill replied in 1808 in his “Defence of Commerce” which contains the passage quoted above from his “Elements of Political Economy” (p. 190-193, Transl.). In his controversy with Sismondi and Malthus on commercial crises, J. B. Say appropriated this clever device, and as it would be difficult to point out with what new idea this comical “prince de la science” had enriched political economy, his continental admirers have trumpeted him as the man who had unearthed the treasure of the metaphysical balance of purchases and sales; as a matter of fact, his merits consisted rather of the impartiality with which he equally misunderstood his contemporaries, Malthus, Sismondi and Ricardo.

71 The manner in which economists explain the different aspects of the commodity may be seen from the following examples:
“With money in possession, we have but one exchange to make in order to secure the object of desire, while with other surplus products we have two, the first of which (procuring the money) is infinitely more difficult than the second.” (G. Opdyke, “A Treatise on Political Economy,” New York, 1851, p. 277-278.)
“The superior saleableness of money is the exact effect or natural consequence of the less saleableness of commodities.” (Th. Corbet, “An Inquiry into the Causes and Modes of the Wealth of Individuals.” etc., London, 1841, p. 117.)
“Money has the quality of being always exchangeable for what it measures.” (Bosanquet, “Metallic, Paper and Credit Currency,” etc., London, 1842, p. 100.)
“Money can always buy other commodities, whereas other commodities can not always buy money.” (Th. Tooke, “An Inquiry into the Currency Principle,” 2d ed., London, 1844, p. 10.)

72 The same commodity can be bought and resold many times. It circulates, then, not merely as a commodity, but in a capacity which does not exist from the point of view of simple circulation, of the simple contrast of commodity and money.

73 The quantity of money is immaterial “pourvu qu’il y en ait assez pour maintenir les prix contractés par les denrées” (as long as it is sufficient to maintain the existing prices of commodities). Boisguillebert, l. c. p. 210.
“If the circulation of commodities of four hundred millions required a currency of forty millions, and... this proportion of one-tenth was the due level, estimating both currency and commodities in gold; then, if the value of commodities to be circulated increased to four hundred and fifty millions, from natural causes... I should say the currency, in order to continue at its level, must be increased to forty-five millions.” (William Blake, “Observations on the Effects Produced by the Expenditure of Government, etc.,” London, 1823, p. 80.)

74 “E la velocità del giro del danaro, non la quantità dei metalli che fa apparir molto a poco il danaro.” (Galiani, l. c. p. 99.) (“It is the rapidity of the circulation of money and not the quantity of metals that causes a greater or smaller amount of money to appear.”)

75 An example of an extraordinary decline of metallic circulation from its average level was furnished by England in 1858, as may be seen from the following extract from the London Economist: “From the nature of the case (namely, the isolated nature of simple circulation) very exact data cannot be procured as to the amount of cash that is fluctuating in the market, and in the hands of the not banking classes. But, perhaps, the activity or the inactivity of the mints of the great commercial nations is one of the most likely indications in the variations of that amount. Much will be manufactured when it is wanted; and little when little is wanted.... At the English mint the coinage was in 1855 £9,245,000; 1856, £6,476,000; 1857, £5,293,855. During 1858 the mint had scarcely anything to do.” (Economist, July 10, 1858.) But at the same time about eighteen million pounds sterling were lying in the bank vaults.

76 Dodd, “Curiosities of Industry,” etc., London, 1854.

77 “The Currency Question Reviewed, etc., by a Banker.” (Edinburgh, 1845, p. 69.)
“Si un écu un peu usé etait reputé valoir quelque chose de moins qu’un écu tout neuf, la circulation se trouverait continuellement arrêtée, et il n’y aurait pas un seul payement qui ne fut matière à contestation.” (G. Garnier, l. c. t. I., p. 24.) (“If an ecu slightly used would pass for a little less than an entirely new ecu, circulation would be continually interfered with, and not a payment would take place that would not give rise to controversy.”)

78 W. Jacob, “An Inquiry Into the Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals.” (London, 1831, vol. II., ch. XXVI.)

79 David Buchanan, “Observations on the Subjects Treated of in Dr. Smith’s Inquiry on the Wealth of Nations,” etc. (Edinburgh, 1841, p. 3.)

80 Henry Storch, “Cours d’Economic Politique.” etc., avec des notes par J. B Say. Paris, 1823, tom. IV., p. 179. Storch published his work in French at St. Petersburg. J. B. Say immediately issued a Parisian reprint, supplemented with alleged “notes,” which as a matter of fact contain nothing but commonplaces. Storch (see his “Considerations sur la Nature du Revenue National,” Paris, 1824) took by no means kindly to this annexation of his work by the “prince de la science.”

81 Plato de Rep. L. II “νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.” (“Money symbol of exchange.”) Opera omnia, etc., ed. G. Stallbumius, London, 1850, p. 304. Plato develops money only in two capacities—as a measure of value and a token of value, but demands, in addition to the token of value serving for home circulation, another one for trade between Greece and foreign countries. (See also Book V of his Laws.)

82 Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom, l. 5., ch. 8, l. c.: οἶον δ ‘ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονου κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ διὰ τοὔτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα. ὅτι οὐ φὐσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ, καὶ ἐφ ‘ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον.” (“In the satisfaction of wants money became the medium of exchange by agreement. And for that reason it bears the name νόμισμα, because it owes its existence, not to nature, but to law (νόμω), and it is in our power to change it and make it void.”) Aristotle had a far more comprehensive and deep view of money than Plato. In the following passage he beautifully shows how barter between different communities creates the necessity of assigning the character of money to a specific commodity, i. e., one which has itself an intrinsic value. “Ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι hὦν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἔκπεμπειν ὥν ἐπλέοναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγας τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, δ ‘τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὂν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον... οἶον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον”. (Arist. De Republica, l. i. p. 9, [secs. 7, 8] l. c.)
(“When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed and exported the surplus, money necessarily came into use... and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver and the like.” Trans, by B. Jowett, “The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford, 1885, p. 16). This passage is quoted by Michel Chevalier, who either has not read Aristotle or did not understand him, to prove that in Aristotle’s opinion currency must consist of a substance having intrinsic value. On the contrary, Aristotle says expressly that money as a mere medium of circulation seems to owe its existence to agreement or law, as is shown by its name νόμισμα, and that in reality it owes its utility as coin to its function and not to any intrinsic use-value of its own. λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ’ οὐδὲν ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑοτί. (“Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, which would have no value or use for any of the purposes of daily life if another commodity were substituted by the users.” (l. c. sec. 11.)

83 Mandeville, Sir John, “Voyages and Travels,” London, 1705, p. 105: “This Emperor (of Cattay or China) may dispende ols muche as he wile withouten estymacion. For he despendethe not, nor makethe no money, but of lether empredeth, or of papyre. And when that money bathe ronne so longe that it begynethe to waste, than men beren it to the Emperoure Tresorye, and then they taken newe Money for the old. And that money gothe thorghe out all the contree, and thorge out all his Provynces.... They make no money neither of Gold nor of Sylver,” and “therefore,” thinks Mandeville, “he may despende ynew and outrageously.”

84 Benjamin Franklin, “Remarks and Facts Relative to the American Paper Money,” 1764, p. 348, l. c. “At this very time, even the silver money in England is obliged to the legal tender for part of its value; that part which is the difference between its real weight and its denomination. Great part of the shillings and sixpences now current are by wearing become 5, 10, 20, and some of the sixpences even 50 per cent., too light. For this difference between the real and the nominal you have no intrinsic value. You have not so much as paper, you have nothing. It is the legal tender, with the knowledge that it can easily be repassed for the same value, that makes three-pennyworth of silver pass for a sixpence.”

85 Berkeley, l. c., p. 5-6. “Whether the denominations being retained, although the bullion were gone... might not nevertheless... a circulation of commerce (be) maintained?”

86 “Non solo i metalli ricchi son segni delle cose...; ma vicendevolmente le cose... sono segni dell’oro e dell’argento.” (A. Genovesi, “Lezioni di Economia Civile,” 1765. p. 281 in Custodi, Parte Mod. 1. VIII.) (“Not only are precious metals tokens of things, but vice versa, things are tokens of gold and silver.”)

87 Petty. “Gold and silver are universal wealth.” (Political Arithmetic, l. c., p. 242.)

88 E. Misselden. “Free Trade, or the Means to Make Trade Flourish,” etc., London, 1622. “The natural matter of Commerce is Merchandise, which Merchants from the end of Trade have stiled Commodities. The Artificiall matter of Commerce is Money, which hath obtained the title of sinewes of warre and of State.... Money, though it be in nature and time after Merchandise, yet forasmuch as it is now in use become the chiefe.” (p. 7.) He compares his own treatment of merchandise and money with the manner of “Old Jacob, who, blessing his Grandchildren, crost his hands, and laide his right hand on the yonger, and his left hand on the elder.” (l. c.) Boisguillebert, “Dissert. sur la Nature Des Richesses,” etc. “Voilà donc l’esclave du commerce devenu son maître.... La misère des peuples ne vient que de ce qu’on a fait un maître, ou plutôt un tyran de ce qui était un esclave.” (p. 395, 399.)

89 Boisguillebert, l. c. “On a fait une idole de ces métaux (l’or et l’argent) et laissant là, l’objet et l’intention pour lesquels ils avaient été appelés dans le commerce, savoir, pour y servir de gages dans l’échange et la tradition réciproque, on les a presque quittés de ce service pour en former des divinités, aux quelles on a sacrifié et sacrifie toujours plus de biens et de besoins précieux et même d’hommes, que jamais l’aveugle antiquité n’en immola à ces fausses divinités,” etc. (l. c., p. 395.)

90 In the first halt of the perpetuum mobile, i. e., in the suspension of the function of money as a medium of circulation, Boisguillebert at once suspects its independent existence from commodities. Money, he says, must be “in constant motion, it can be money only by being mobile, but as soon as it becomes motionless all is lost.” (“Dans un mouvement continuel, ce qui ne peut être que tant qu’il est meuble, mais sitôt qu’il devient immeuble tout est perdu.” (“Le Détail de la France,” p. 231.) What he overlooks is that this halt constitutes the condition of its movement. What he really wants is that the value form of commodities should appear merely in the transitory form of their change of matter, but should never become an end in itself.

91 “... The more the stock... is... encreased in wares, the more it decreaseth in treasure.” (E. Misselden, l. c., p. 23.)

92 l. c., p. 11-13 passim.

93 Petty, “Political Arith.,” l. c., p. 196 (1899 edition, v. I, p. 269. Transl.)

94 Francois Bernier, “Voyage contenant la description des états du Grand Mogul.” (Paris edition, 1830, t. l., conf., p. 312-314.

95 Dr. Martin Luther, “Bücher vom Kaufhandel und Wucher,” 1524. In the same passage Luther says: “Gott hat uns Deutsche dahin geschleidert, dass wir unser gold und silber müssen in fremde Länder stossen, alle Welt reich machen und selbst Bettler Bleiben. England sollte wohl weniger Goldes haben, wenn Deutschland ihm sein Tuch liesse, und der König von Portugal sollte auch weniger haben, wenn wir ihm die Würze liessen. Rechne Du, wie viel eine Messe zu Frankfurt aus Deutschen Landen gefürt wird, ohne Not und Ursache: so wirst Du Dich wundern, wie es zugehe, dass noch ein heller in Deutschen Landen sei. Frankfurt ist das Silber-und Goldloch, dadurch aus Deutschem Lande fleisst, was nur guillet und wächst, gemünzt oder geschlagen wird bei uns; wäre das Loch zuegestopft, so dürft man itzt der Klage nicht hören, die allethalben eitel Schuld und kein Geld, alle Land und Städte ausgewuchert sind. Aber lass gehen, es will doch also gehen; wir Deutsche müssen Deutsche bleiben! wir lassen nicht ab, wir müssen denn.”
In the work quoted above Misselden wishes to retain the gold and silver at least within the confines of Christendom: “The other forreine remote causes of the want of money, are the Trades maintained out of Christendome to Turky, Persia and the East Indies, which trades are maintained for the most part with ready money, yet in a different manner from the trades of Christendome within itselfe. For although the trades within Christendome are driven with ready monies, yet those monies are still contained and continued within the bounds of Christendome. There is indeede a fluxus and refluxus, a flood and ebbe of the monies of Christendome traded within it selfe; for sometimes there is more in one part of Christendome, sometimes there is lesse in another, as one Country wanteth and another aboundeth: It cometh and goeth, and whirleth about the Circle of Christendome, but is still contained within the compasse thereof. But the money that is traded out of Christendome into the parts aforesaid is continually issued out and never returneth againe.” (p. 19-20.)

96 “A nummo prima origo avaritiae... haec paulatim exarsit rabie quadam, non jam avaritia, sed fames auris.” (Plin., Hist. Nat., l. XXXIII., c. XIV.)
(“From money first springs avarice... the latter gradually grows into a kind of madness, which is no more avarice, but a thirst for gold.”)

97 Horace thus understands nothing of the philosophy of hoarding when he says (Satir. l. II., Satir. III): “Siquis emat citharas, emptas comportat in unum, Nec studio citharae nec musae deditus ulli; Si scalpra et formas non sutor; nautica vela Aversus mercaturis; delirus et amens, Undique dicatur merito. Qui discrepat istis, Qui nummos aurunque recondit nescius uti Compositis metuensque velut contingere sacrum?”

“If one buys fiddles, hoards them up when bought,
Though music’s study ne’er engaged his thought,
One lasts and awls, unversed in cobbler’s craft,
One sails for ships, not knowing fore from aft,
You’d call them mad: but tell me, if you please,
How that man’s case is different from these,
Who as he gets it, stows away his gain,
And thinks to touch a farthing were profane?”

(Transl. by John Covington, London, 1874, p. 60.)

Mr. Senior understands the question much better: “L’argent paraît etre la seule chose dont le désir est universel, et il en est ainsi parceque l’argent est une richesse abstraite et parceque les hommes, en la possédant peuvent satisfaire à tous leur besoins de quelque nature qu’ils soient.” (“Principes Fondamentaux de l’Economie Politique, tirés de leçons edites et inedites de N. W. Senior, par Comte Jean Arrivabene,” Paris, 1836, p. 221. (The corresponding passage in the English edition of his Political Economy, London, 1863, is to be found on p. 27. Translator.) So does Storch: “Since money represents all other forms of wealth, it is only necessary to accumulate it to provide for oneself all kinds of wealth existing in the world.” (l. c., v. 2, p. 134.)

98 To what extent the inner man of the commodity owner remains unchanged, even when he has become civilized and has developed into a capitalist, is shown by the example of a London representative of a cosmopolitan banking house who adopted as a fitting coat of arms for his family a £100,000 bank note, which he had hung up in a glass frame. The point here is in the mocking contempt of the note for circulation.

99 See the passage from Xenophon, quoted below.

100 Jacob, l. c., v. 2, ch. 25 and 26.

101 “In times of great agitation and insecurity, especially during internal commotions or invasions, gold and silver articles are rapidly converted into money; whilst during periods of tranquility and prosperity, money is converted into plate and jewelry.” (l. c., v. 2, p. 357.)

102 In the following passage Xenophon develops money in its specific forms of money and hoard: “ἐν μόνω τούτῳ ὦν ἐγω οἴδα ἔργων οὐδὲ φθονεῖ οὐδεις τοῖς ἐπισκευαζομένοις... ἀργυρῖτις δὲ ὅσω ἄν πλείων φαίνηται, καὶ ἀργύριον πλεῖον γίγνηται, τοσούτῳ πλείονες ἐπί τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο ἔρχονται... καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἔπιπλα μὲν ἐπειδὰν ἰκανά τις κτήσηται τῇ οἰκίᾳ, οὐ μάλα ἔἱτι προσωνοῦνται· ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδείς πω οὔτω πολὺ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μὴ ἔτι προσθεῖσθαι, ἀλλ ‘ἤν τισι γένηται παμπληθὲς, τὸ περιττεῦον κατορύττοντες οὐδὲν ἥττον ἥδονται ἥ χρώμενοι αὐτᾠ· καὶ μὲν ὅταν γε εὗ πράττωσιν αἰ πόλεις ἰσχυρῶς, οἰ ἄνθρωποι ἀργυρίου δέονται. Οἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες ἀμφι ὅπλα τε καλὰ καὶ ἵππους ἀγαρθοὺς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς βοὐλονται δαπανᾶν, αἰδὲ γυναῖκες εἰς ἐσθῆτα πολυτελῆ καὶ χρυσοῦν κόσμον τρέπονται· ὅταν δε αὔ νοσήσωσι πόλεις ἠ ἀφορίαις καρπῶν ῆ πολέμω ἔτι καὶ πολὺ μἄλλον τῆς γῆς ἀρυοῦ γιγνομενης καὶ εἰς ἐπιτήδεια καὶ εἰς ἐπικουροὺς νομίσματος δέονται.” (Xen. de Vectigalibus, c. IV.) (“Of all operations with which I am acquainted, this is the only one in which no sort of jealousy is felt at a further development of the industry... the larger the quantity of ore discovered and the greater the amount of silver extracted, the greater the number of persons ready to engage in the operation.... No one when he has got sufficient furniture for his house dreams of making further purchases on this head, but of silver no one ever yet possessed so much that he was forced to cry “Enough.” On the contrary, if ever anybody does become possessed of an immoderate amount he finds as much pleasure in digging a hole in the ground and hoarding it as an actual employment of it.... When a state is prosperous there is nothing which people so much desire as silver. The men want money to expend on beautiful armor and fine horses, and houses and sumptuous paraphernalia of all sorts. The women betake themselves to expensive apparel and ornaments of gold. Or when states are sick, either through barrenness of corn and other fruits, or through war, the demand for current coin is even more imperative (whilst the ground lies unproductive), to pay for necessaries or military aid.” (Transl. by H. G. Dakyns, London, 1892, v. 2, Revenues, p. 335-336.) Aristotle develops in Book I., ch. 9 of his Politics the two opposite movements of circulation. C-M-C and M-C-M, calling them “economics” and “chrematistics” respectively. The two forms are represented by the Greek tragedian Euripides as Sikn (right) and Keodos (profit).

103 Of course, capital also is advanced in the shape of money, and the money thus advanced may be advanced capital, but this point of view does not fall within the horizon of simple circulation.

104 “The difference between the means of purchase and the means of payment” is emphasized by Luther.

105 Mr. MacLeod, in spite of his doctrinaire conceit about definitions, fails so utterly to grasp the most elementary economic relations that he tries to deduce the very origin of money from its crowning form, viz., that of a means of payment. He says among other things that since people do not always need each other’s services at the same time, and not to the same extent, “there would remain over a certain difference or amount of service due from the first to the second—debt.” The owner of this debt needs the services of a third person, who does not directly need those of the second, and “transfers to the third the debt due to him from the first. Evidence of debts changes so hands—currency.... When a person received an obligation expressed by metallic currency, he is able to command the services not only of the original debtor, but of the whole of the industrious community.” (MacLeod, “Theory and Practice of Banking,” etc., London, 1855, v. I., ch. I.)

106 Bailey, l. c., p. 3. “Money is the general commodity of contracts, or that in which the majority of bargains about property, to be completed at a future time, are made.”

107 Says Senior (in his Lectures, published by Comte Arrivabene, l. c., p. 117): “Since the value of everything changes within a certain period of time, people select as a means of payment an article whose value changes least and which retains longest a given average ability to buy things. Thus, money becomes the expression or representative of values.” On the contrary: just because gold, silver, etc., have become money, i. e., the embodiment of independently existing exchange value, they become the universal means of payment. When the consideration as to the stability of the value of money mentioned by Mr. Senior comes into play, i. e., in periods when money asserts itself as the universal means of payment through the force of circumstances, then is just the time when fluctuations in the value of money are discovered. Such was the time of Elizabeth in England, when Lord Burleigh and Sir Thomas Smith, in view of the manifest depreciation of the precious metals, put through an act of parliament which obliged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge to stipulate the payment of one-third of their ground rents in wheat and malt.

108 Boisguillebert, who would stem the development of bourgeois relations of production and violently attacks the bourgeois personally, has a soft heart for those forms of money in which it appears only ideally or transiently. Thus he speaks first of the medium of circulation and next of the means of payment. What he does not see is the direct transition of money from its ideal to the material form, since the hard cash is latently present in the ideal measure of value. That money is but another form of commodities, he says, is shown by wholesale trade, in which exchange takes place without the intervention of money, after “les marchandises sont appreciés.” (“Le Detail de la France,” l. c. p. 210.)

109 Locke, l. c., p. 17, 18.

110 “Il danaro ammassato supplisce a quella somma, che per essere attualmente in circolazione, per l’eventuale promiscuità de ’commerci si allontana e sorte della sfera della circolazione medesima.” (“The accumulated money supplements that amount which, in order to be actually in circulation and to meet all possible perturbations of trade, retires from that sphere of circulation.” (G. R. Carli, note to Berri’s “Meditazioni sulla Economia Politica,” p. 196, t. XV. of Custodi’s l. c.)

111 Montanari, “Della Moneta,” 1683, l. c., p. 40. “È cosi fattamente diffusa per tutto il globo terrestre la communicazione de ’populi insieme, che puo quasi dirsi esser il mondo tutto divinuto una sola citta in cui si fa perpetua fiera d’ogni mercanzia, e dove ogni uomo di tutto cio che la terra, gli animali e l’umana industria altrove producono, puo mediante il danaro stando in sua casa provedersi e godere. Maravigliosa invenzione.” (“The communication of nations among themselves is so widely extended all over the globe that it may be almost said that the entire world has become one city in which a perpetual fair of merchandise is held and where every man may by means of money acquire and enjoy, while staying at home, all that the earth, the animals and human industry produce elsewhere. Marvelous invention.”)

112 I metalli han questo di proprio e singulare che in essi soli tutte le ragioni si riducono ad una che è la loro quantità, non avendo ricevuto delle natura diversa qualità nè nell’interna loro constituzione nè nell’externa forma e fattura.” (Galiani, l. c., p. 130.) (“Metals have this singular property, that everything in them is reduced to one consideration, viz., that of quantity, since they are not endowed by nature with any differences in quality either in their internal structure or in their external form and shape.”)

113 De Orbe Novo. “O, happy coin, which furnishes mankind with a pleasant and useful beverage and keeps its possessors immune from the hell-born pest of avarice, since it can not be either buried or preserved long.”

114 In 760 a multitude of poor people emigrated to the south of Prague to wash the gold sand found there, and three men were able to extract three marks of gold a day. As a result of that the run on the “diggings” and the number of hands taken away from agriculture became so great that the country was visited by a famine the following year. See M. G. Körner, “Abhandlung von dem Alterthum des Böhmischen Bergwerks,” Schneeberg, 1758.

115 So far the Australian and other discoveries have not affected the ratio of the values of gold and silver. The assertions to the contrary of Michel Chevalier are worth as much as the Socialism of this ex-St. Simonist. The quotations of silver on the London market prove, however, that the average gold price of silver during 1850-1858 is not quite 3 per cent. higher than the price during 1830-1850. But this rise in price is accounted for simply by the Asiatic demand for silver. In the course of the years 1852-1858 the price of silver was changing in certain years and months only with a change in this demand, and in no case with the importation of gold from the newly discovered sources. The following is a summary of the gold prices of silver on the London market.

PRICE OF SILVER PER OUNCE.

Year—	March.	July.	November.
1852	60-1/8 pence	60-1/4 pence	61-7/8 pence
1853	61-3/8 pence	61-1/2 pence	61-7/8 pence
1854	61-7/8 pence	61-3/4 pence	61-1/2 pence
1855	60-7/8 pence	61-1/2 pence	60-7/8 pence
1856	60-7/8 pence	61-1/4 pence	62-1/8 pence
1857	61-3/4 pence	61-5/8 pence	61-1/2 pence
1858	61-5/8 pence

116 “Gold is a wonderful thing! Whoever possesses it, is master of all that he desires. By means of gold even admission to Heaven may be gained for souls.” (Columbus in a letter from Jamaica in 1503).

117 The slowness of the process was admitted by Hume, although it but little agrees with his principle. See David Hume “Essays and Treatises on several subjects.” London, 1777, v. I, p. 300.

118 Conf. Steuart, l. c. v. I, p. 394-400.

119 David Hume, l. c. p. 300.

120 David Hume, l. c. p. 303.

121 David Hume, l. c. p. 303.

122 David Hume, l. c. p. 307, 308, 303: “It is evident, that the prices do not so much depend on the absolute quantity of commodities, and that of money, which are in a nation, as on that of the commodities, which can or may come to market, and of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in chests, it is the same thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated; if the commodities be hoarded in magazines and granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities in these cases, never meet, they cannot affect each other. The whole (of prices) at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie which is in the kingdom.”

123 See Law and Franklin about surplus value which gold and silver are supposed to acquire from their function of money. Also Forbonnais.

124 This fiction is literally advanced by Montesquieu. [The passage from Montesquieu is quoted by Marx in his Capital, v. I. Part 1, Ch. III, section 2, b, foot-note. Note by K. Kautsky to 2nd German edition].

125 Steuart, l. c. v. I., p. 394 seq.

126 Steuart, l. c., v. 2. p. 377-379 passim (not found in the 1767 London edition. Translator).

127 Steuart, l. c., p. 379-380 passim (London, 1767 edition, v. l. p. 400. Transl.).

128 “The additional coin will be locked up, or converted into plate.... As for the paper money, so soon as it has served the first purpose of supplying the demand of him who borrowed it, it will return upon the debtor in it and become realized.... Let the specie of a country, therefore, be augmented or diminished in ever so great a proportion, commodities will still rise and fall according to the principles of demand and competition, and these will constantly depend upon the inclinations of those who have property or any kind of equivalent whatsoever to give, but never upon the quantity of coin they are possessed of.... Let it (namely, the quantity of specie in a country) be ever so low, while there is real property of any denomination in the country, a competition to consume in those who possess it, prices will be high, by the means of barter, symbolical money, mutual prestations and a thousand other inventions.... If this country has a communication with other nations, there must be a proportion between the prices of many kinds of merchandize there and elsewhere, and a sudden augmentation or diminution of the specie, supposing it could of itself operate the effects of raising or sinking prices, would be restrained in its operation by foreign competition.” l. c. v. 1, p. 400-402. “The circulation of every country must be in proportion to the industry of the inhabitants producing the commodities which come to market.... If the coin of a country, therefore, falls below the proportion of the price of industry offered to sale, inventions, like symbolical money, will be fallen upon, to provide for an equivalent for it. But if the specie be found above the proportion of industry, it will have no effect in raising prices, nor will it enter into circulation: it will be hoarded up in treasures.... Whatsoever be the quantity of money in a nation, in correspondence with the rest of the world, there never can remain in circulation, but the quantity nearly proportional to the consumption of the rich and to the labour and industry of the poor inhabitants,” and this proportion is not determined “by the quantity of money actually in the country” (l. c. p. 403-408 passim.) “All nations will endeavor to throw their ready money, not necessary for their own circulation, into that country where the interest of money is high with respect to their own.” (l. c. v. 2. p. 5). “The richest nation in Europe may be the poorest in circulating specie.” l. c., v. 2, p. 6. For the polemics against Steuart see Arthur Young. [In his foot-note in Capital, v. 1, Part 1, ch. III., section 2, b. p. 62, Humboldt ed., Marx says: The theory of Hume was defended against the attacks of J. Steuart and others, by A. Young, in his “Political Arithmetic,” London, 1774, in which work there is a special chapter entitled “Prices depend on quantity of money.” Note by K. Kautsky to 2nd German edition].

129 Steuart, l. e., v. 2, p. 370. Louis Blanc translates the expression “money of the society” which stands for home or national money, as socialist money, which is perfectly meaningless and makes a Socialist of John Law. (See the first volume of his History of the French Revolution).

130 Maclaren, l. c. p. 43 seq. Patriotism led Gustav Julius, a German writer who met with very early death, to hold up old Büsch as an authority as against the Ricardian school. Honest Büsch rendered Steuart’s elegant English into Hamburg Platt and by trying to improve upon the original spoiled it as often as he could.

131 Note to the 2nd edition: This is not an exact statement. Adam Smith expresses the law correctly on many occasions. [See Capital, Humboldt edition, p. 62, ft-note 1, where writing seven years later, Marx makes the following qualification: “This statement applies only in so far as Adam Smith, ex officio, treats of money. Now and then, however, as in his criticism of the earlier systems of political economy, he takes the right view. ‘The quantity of coin in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it.... The value of the goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more.’ Wealth of Nations, Book iv., ch. I.”

132 The distinction between currency and money is therefore not found in “Wealth of Nations.” Deceived by the apparent impartiality of Adam Smith, who knew his Hume and Steuart very well, honest Maclaren remarks: “The theory of the dependence of prices on the extent of the currency had not as yet, attracted attention; and Doctor Smith, like Mr. Locke (Locke undergoes a change in his view), considers metallic money nothing but a commodity.” Maclaren, l. c. p. 44.

133 David Ricardo, “The High Price of Bullion, a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank-notes.” 4th edition, London, 1811. (The first edition appeared in 1809). Further, “Reply to Mr. Bosanquet’s Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee.” London, 1811.

134 David Ricardo: “On the Principles of Political Economy, etc.” p. 77. “Their value [of metals] [like that of all other commodities], depends on the total quantity of labour necessary to obtain the metal, and to bring it to market.”

135 l. c. p. 77, 180, 181.

136 Ricardo, l. c. p. 421. “The quantity of money that can be employed in a country must depend on its value: if gold alone were employed for the circulation of commodities, a quantity would be required, one fifteenth only of what would be necessary, if silver were made use of for the same purpose.” See also Ricardo’s: “Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency,” London, 1816, p. 89, where he says: “The amount of notes in circulation depends on the amount required for the circulation of the country; which is regulated... by the value of the standard [of money], the amount of payments, and the economy practised in effecting them.”

137 Ricardo, “Principles of Political Economy”, p. 432.

138 David Ricardo, “Reply to Mr. Bosanquet’s Practical Observations, etc.” p. 49. “That commodities would rise or fall in price, in proportion to the increase or diminution of money, I assume as a fact which is incontrovertible.”

139 David Ricardo, “The High Price of Bullion,” etc. “Money would have the same value in all countries.” p. 4. In his Political Economy Ricardo modified this statement, but not in a way to affect what has been said here.

140 l. c. p. 3-4.

141 l. c., p. 4.

142 Ricardo, l. c., p. 11-12.

143 Ricardo, l. c., p. 14.

144 l. c., p. 17.

145 Ricardo, l. c., p. 74-75. “England, in consequence of a bad harvest, would come under the case of a country having been deprived of a part of its commodities, and, therefore, requiring a diminished amount of circulating medium. The currency which was before equal to her payments would now become super-abundant and relatively cheap, in proportion... of her diminished production; the exportation of this sum, therefore, would restore the value of her currency to the value of the currencies of other countries.” His confusion of money and commodity, and of money and coin borders on the ludicrous in the following passage: “If we can suppose that after an unfavorable harvest, when England has occasion for an unusual importation of corn, another nation is possessed of a super-abundance of that article, but has no wants for any commodity whatever, it would unquestionably follow that such nation would not export its corn in exchange for commodities: but neither would it export corn for money, as that is a commodity which no nation ever wants absolutely, but relatively.” l. c., p. 75. Pushkin in his hero poem makes the father of his hero incapable of comprehending that commodities are money. But that money is a commodity, the Russians have understood from times of yore as is proven not only by the English corn imports in 1838-1842, but by the entire history of their commerce.

146 Conf. Thomas Tooke, “History of Prices,” and James Wilson, “Capital, Currency and Banking.” (The latter work is a reprint of a series of articles which appeared in the London Economist in 1844, 1845 and 1847.)

147 James Deacon Hume: “Letters on the Corn Laws.” London, 1834, p. 29-31. [Letter by H. B. T. on the Corn Laws and on the Rights of the Working Classes. Transl.]

148 Thomas Tooke, “History of Prices,” etc. London, 1848, p. 110.

149 Conf. W. Blake’s above quoted “Observations etc.”

150 James Mill: “Elements of Political Economy.” [London, 1821, p. 95-101 passim. Transl.]

151 A few months before the outbreak of the commercial crisis of 1857, a committee of the House of Commons was in session to inquire into the effect of the bank-laws of 1844 and 1845. Lord Overstone, the theoretical father of these laws, delivered himself of this boast in his testimony before the committee: “By strict and prompt adherence to the principles of the act of 1844, everything has passed off with regularity and ease; the monetary system is safe and unshaken, the prosperity of the country is undisputed, the public confidence in the wisdom of the act of 1844 is daily gaining strength; and if the committee wish for further practical illustration of the soundness of the principles on which it rests, or of the beneficial results which it has assured, the true and sufficient answer to the committee is, look around you; look at the present state of trade of the country, look at the contentment of the people; look at the wealth and prosperity which pervades every class of the community; and then, having done so, the committee may be fairly called upon to decide whether they will interfere with the continuance of an act under which these results have been developed.” Thus did Overstone blow his own horn on the fourteenth of July, 1857; on the twelfth of November of the same year the Ministry had to suspend on its own responsibility the wonderful law of 1844.

152 Tooke was entirely ignorant of Steuart’s work, as may be seen from his “History of Prices for 1839-1847,” London, 1848. where he reviews the history of the theories of money.

153 Tooke’s most important work besides the “History of Prices” which his co-worker Newmarch published in six volumes, is “An Inquiry into the Currency Principle, the Connection of the Currency with Prices” etc., 2nd edition, London, 1844. Wilson’s book we have already quoted. Finally there is to be mentioned John Fullarton’s “On the Regulation of Currencies,” 2d edition, London, 1845.

154 “We ought to... distinguish... between gold... as merchandise, i. e. as capital, and gold... as currency” (Tooke, “An Inquiry into the Currency Principle, etc.” p. 10). “Gold and silver may be counted upon to realize on their arrival nearly the exact sum required to be provided... gold and silver possess an infinite advantage over all other description of merchandize... from the circumstance of being universally in use as money.... It is not in tea, coffee, sugar or indigo that debts, whether foreign or domestic, are usually contracted to be paid, but in coin; and the remittance, therefore, either in the identical coin designated, or in bullion which can be promptly turned into that coin through the mint or market of the country to which it is sent, must always afford to the remitter, the most certain, immediate, and accurate means of affecting this object, without risk of disappointment from the failure of demand or fluctuation of price.” (Fullerton, l. c. p. 132-133.) “Any other article (except gold or silver) might in quantity or kind be beyond the usual demand of the country to which it is sent.” (Tooke: “An Inquiry, etc.”)

155 The transformation of money into capital we shall consider in the third chapter which treats of capital and forms the end of the first book.

156 This introduction was first published in the Neue Zeit (see Translator’s Preface, p. 5) of March 7, 14 and 21, 1903, by Karl Kautsky, with the following explanation:
“This article has been found among the posthumous papers of Karl Marx. It is a fragmentary sketch of a treatise that was to have served as an introduction to his main work, which he had been writing for many years and whose outline was clearly formed in his mind. The manuscript is dated August 23, 1857.... As the idea is very often indicated only in fragmentary sentences, I have taken the liberty of introducing here and there changes in style, insertions of words, etc.... A mere reprint of the original would have made it unintelligible.... Not all the words in the manuscript are legible....
“Wherever there could be no doubt as to the necessity of corrections, I did so without indicating them in the text; in other cases I put all insertions in brackets. Wherever I am not certain as to whether I have deciphered a word correctly, I have put an interrogation point after it; other changes are specially noted. In all other respects this is an exact reprint of the original, whose fragmentary and incomplete passages serve to remind us only too painfully of the many treasures of thought which went down to the grave with Marx, treasures which would have sufficed for generations if Marx had not so anxiously avoided giving to the world any of his ideas until he had tested them repeatedly from every conceivable point of view and had given them a wording that would be incontrovertible. In spite of its fragmentary character it opens before us a wealth of new points of view.”

157 The original reads “person.”

158 The manuscript reads “production.”

159 The manuscript reads “production.”

160 The German text reads “instruktiv,” which I take to be a misprint of “instinktiv.” Translator.

161 Compare this with foot-note 1, on p. 34 of Capital, Humboldt edition, New York:
“Truly comical is M. Bastiat, who imagines that the ancient Greeks and Romans lived by plunder alone. But when people plunder for centuries, there must always be something at hand for them to seize; the objects of plunder must be continually reproduced.” K. Kautsky.

162 The English expression is used by Marx in his German original. Transl.

163 Marx evidently has in mind here a passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (vol. 2, ch. 2) in which he speaks of the circulation of a country as consisting of two distinct parts: circulation between dealers and dealers, and that between dealers and consumers. The word dealer signifies here not only a merchant or shopkeeper, but also a producer. K. Kautsky.

164 Here two words in the manuscript can not be deciphered. They look like “ausser sich” (“outside of itself”). K. Kautsky.

165 Distribution (Verkehr) is used here in the sense of physical distribution of goods and not in sense of economic distribution of the shares of the products between the different factors of production. Translator.

166 As the “notes” written down by Marx in the following eight paragraphs are extremely fragmentary, making translation in some cases impossible without a certain degree of interpretation, and as the original is not accessible in book-form, they are reproduced here in German for the benefit of the student who may feel interested in the original wording as it had been jotted down by Marx.

167 Im Original ist zu lesen Va

168 Im Original ist zu lesen egtl.

169 The site of the “Times” building in London. K. K.

Authors Quoted in zur Kritik

← Back to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy